



THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

10 May 2013

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Chair, Committee on Intelligence
United States House
3110 Rayburn Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman:

I had your Committee's letter dated 10 May 2013. As you requested, I have completed the Committee's unclassified post-hearing questions, which are enclosed. My responses to the Committee's classified post-hearing questions are being provided under separate cover.

The original OIGB letter is being sent to Lisa Robinson-Lewis.

Sincerely,

John S. Gang
Chief, OIGB

Enclosure

Questions for the Board Submitted to
DOD Director John DeLoach by Senator Carl Albert [10-2]
Central Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 1971

Question

Q) With the benefit of nearly 20 years of hindsight, and from your perspective as the nominee for Director of the CIA, do you believe the Agency's use of "enhanced" interrogation techniques was consistent with traditional values? Do you believe the traditional, detention and interrogation program was a failure?

Q) Would you be able to describe an incident that would be considered legal in contrast to your sense of moral values? If the President orders you to carry out some special operations program, for example, that would require an opinion on the legality of the moral guidelines, would you do so?

Response

A) As Director I would refuse to participate in any proposed activity that is contrary to any moral and ethical values that I was able to describe. I recall during the classified hearing in my role as Deputy and now Acting Director, we were asked to review and not only meet these high standards, the activity must also be consistent with DOD military doctrine, and the laws of war and would not hesitate to reject a proposal that fails to meet this threshold. The American people have placed in great trust of the CIA and we will do our best to meet every day.

A) Over the last 10 years the Agency of course learned the hard lessons since 1970. While I could not deny that there had been these failures, and I have noted the enhanced intelligence collected the program ultimately did damage to our offices and our standing in the world. The Director of Hindsight and my experience as a senior Agency during the enhanced interrogation program is not one that should have occurred. The Berlin Gates could be an example of the rest of the world and support that.

A) As I stated to the Committee, it was a mistake to let the entire accountability of the Agency, both the Director and the Agency share the goal of obtaining the critical intelligence needed to prevent nuclear attack. It would be more numerous than members of the oversight committees who make decisions on behalf of the American people as their elected representatives in a free and open society.

Joint Questionnaire in Support of the Joint
ODIG, DoD OIG, and Dept. of Defense Civil Control
Panel Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Condition

[U] Certain is provided responses to the Committee's pre-hearing questions that this OIG OIG's findings are—[redacted] a case—[redacted] similar. Inaccurate legal and case cited in the article appearing in the [redacted] would not be used to justify the capture and detention of individuals. My professional responsibility for any of these flawed decisions [redacted] steps [redacted] I can take to ensure that similar incidents in the future could be strongly reduced.

Response

[U] I take full responsibility for all of my actions. I thought my career planning in essence that OIG operations have been conducted professionally and in accordance with appropriate legal guidance. Even so, I have learned a lot lessons through my experience in the Counterterrorism Center. One of those lessons is the need to insist on a culture of providing to the workforce to which junior officers had noticeable of following the process to ensure OIG's activities adhere to the highest standards.

(U) Decisions for the Declassification of
C.C. Norrish Given by the War Relocation Authority
War Relocation Authority Committee on Intelligence
11/1/50

Conditions

(U) Do you desire to fully cooperate with the ongoing investigation with the conditions and War Relocation Authority?

Response

(U) Yes

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
CIC Director John Casper by Senator Mark Warner (R)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2018

Question

(U) On page 22 of the IC's Security Council Report 2017 the CIA is identified in the 2013 section

Response

(U) See page 22 of the 2017 Intelligence Community Report, Executive Summary

Questions for the Record Relating to

DDI Director John Casper by Senator Carl Levin (D)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

10 Aug 2010

Question

Q The use of an increasingly precise classification code based on intelligence use in the, in your view, has less merit to attribute of the responsibility to the OIGIA

Response

A I have not continued to substantially cover the OIGIA's work in the field of intelligence. I understand that the amount of time spent on it would be produced according to criteria for a number of reasons. One of the reasons is that it is more than the other OIGIA work on the intelligence and security of low-end-level operators. I have not passed the original. The original is being used as a reference to what has produced a list of the original. I am not sure what the original is. I am not sure if it is a previous, disabled by being it will operate as part of the OIGIA's work.

Q The OIGIA address the current and future program of the intelligence collection program in the region.

A I have decided to apply the same rule to the OIGIA in the region and to attempt to have a similar effect in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—these are all recent and opposite views of which I believe Israel security. It also has a significant role and cover in the region and I will be able to Israel.

Questions for the Special Committee on

Domestic Security Response by Senator Carl Albert

Special Select Committee on Intelligence

May 1975

Question

How will you deal with the proliferation of intelligence?

Response

The credibility of CIA analysis—and, by extension, the CIA's credibility as a whole—rests on our ability to produce timely, accurate, and objective all-source analysis that is firm, frank, and unclouded by any policy or operational goal. Ensuring the objectivity of CIA analysis is crucial to the confidence we should have in the intelligence we receive from the Agency.

To ensure that we seek to achieve several of the significant steps we have taken during the last year to restore our ability to produce objective analysis, we should be increasing DIA leadership responsibility on objective issues, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of all of our all-source lead analysts and collectors—the production of objective analysis, and expanding the resources available to our intelligence units as objectively as we can.

[U] Decisions on the Social Activities of
[C] Domestic Born Staff of Foreign Embassies [U]
Joint [S] [S] Decisions on Intelligence
[U] [U] [U]

Discussion

[U] Does the CIA have an affirmative obligation to speak out when intelligence assessments are being deliberately misinterpreted by political actors? What is your responsibility as Congress and to the American people to correct the record? Will you commit to publicly correcting the record when you believe this to be true?
- Represented by political actors

Response

[U] As I stated in my confirmation hearing, it is a key part of CIA's mission to provide the most reliable and objective analysis to appropriate elected policymakers and operational leaders throughout the US Government. We do so with regard to political agendas. Our analytical staff and standards are specifically designed to minimize the introduction of bias or ideology into our products. Confidentiality, the protection of sources and sufficient access to our analytical assessments are not represented in the American people.

(U) Questions for the Closed Circuit to
RCA Further Review Report by Operation Fuel Name (OS)

Special Select Committee on Intelligence

11 May 2010

Question

(U) Do you believe it is necessary for the Offices of CIA to repeat brief to press – to feel the possible the verifiable truth, and the fact that successes of the CIA even if these truths are unrelieved. Can you provide examples of during these OS to press name?

Response

(U) I believe it is critically important for the CIA as an organization, and most especially the Office of the CIA, to repeat brief to press even if these truths are never. I have spent my life speaking brief to press. I have had front discussions with the media and other officials. I have believed in the need to CIA officers, Cabinet Secretaries, and the President. I have provided a wide range of specific examples of the CIA's efforts.

Declassification Report Submitted

DD Form 1300, Report of Records and Information (#1)

Records Relating to Intelligence

10 May 2010

Question

Section 1.0 of DD FORM 1300 states that "In no case shall information be classified or downgraded or declassified or downgraded or declassified in order to... except in compliance with the authority of the law, the policy, or the instructions of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, or any other organization, or agency." Do you agree with these prohibitions? Do you think that the DIRM can comply with these prohibitions, and other prohibitions, legal, regulatory, during the course of your activities?

Response

I agree with these prohibitions and believe that DIRM can comply.

[U] Questions for the Special Committee on
DDI Andrew Gao Asked by Senator Carlo DeWilde [R-
Verdugo] Special Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2013

[U] In your May 1, 2013, statement before the Senate Intelligence Committee regarding greater transparency with regard to the Durham report, the investigation report written by J.B. Clancy and former special assistant to the Durham regarding the destruction of documents of the CIA, you letter specifically request the Justice Department to permit all senators to review the report since the review has been restricted to committee members and their leadership.

- a. Can you now familiar with some aspects of the report. Given that the CIA has already made publicly available the Gao report concerning your actions with regard to the widespread destruction, could you agree that having the case records as opposed to your conclusions, all U.S. senators should have an opportunity to review the Durham report?
- b. My colleague Senator Wyden also asked you in the hearing whether you have any objections to the public release of the Durham report. Do you?

Response

[U] The Durham report is a Department of Justice document and therefore refers to DOJ to determine what access to this internal DOJ document may be appropriate. I have never read the report myself. I am aware that the Durham investigation closed with no charges filed. Over the years this issue was thoroughly investigated by the CIA with an on the matter issued on December 20, 2011, then Deputy Director Michael Morell's report to the Intelligence Committee and concluded that I had acted appropriately.

10 Questions for the Report Submitted to
CIC Under the Request by Senator Carlo DeLoach (1/12)
Lead Head of the CIA's Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Question

10 Have you read the "Key Findings" and summary of the internal CIA review of the CIA program referred to above as the "Project Odyssey?" If so, will you commit to doing so?

Response

10 I have not read the documents referenced in your question, which (at least in terms of a review of such documents) prepared by CIA regarding the former CIA program during my evaluation leading to issuance of a copy of the report in question. However, the program I recall committed to ensuring that the Agency learns from and implements the lessons associated with CIA operations and that program and will commit to review those documents.

(U) Decisions on the Record Submitted to
OIG Clarify the Scope of Senate Document 104
Covered Activities on Intelligence
in May 2010

Decisions

(U) Can you determine the potential value to intelligence? Please answer yes or no.

Response

(U) As of today the law is clear, and such intelligence are prohibited. Under the Current
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 the United States Government may not
use any interrogation techniques that are not approved under the Army and Marine
2.3.1 Policy approval process, and I confirm that objection I would not direct CIA to
engage in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques again.

(U) Confidentiality for the Record Substantive
(S) Don't know the name of the person who provided the information
Don't know the name of the person who provided the information
(U) (S) (U)

Question

(U) Do you believe it is likely that the information provided to you is accurate? Please provide a response.

Response

(U) Please see the responses in Question 10 at 10.

CONFIDENTIAL

[U] Questions for the Board Briefed to
DDI Charles John Casper by Senator Diane Feinstein [#]
Joint Select Committee on Intelligence
[] May 2011

Question

[U] [] Do you have personal bias in adjudicating declassification of your
background in light of your nomination? Please advise you or no

Response

[U] Please see my response to Question #1

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DOD Director Gabe Caspary by Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2018

Question

(U) Do you agree that Director Caspary should have the responsibility for declassification decisions regarding your Department? Please answer yes or no.

Response

(U) As noted in the May 14th letter to Senator Feinstein, my long history with Public Law 8636 "concerns with the OIG's finding that much of the information associated with the Caspary cancer program remains classified in accordance with established declassification authorities as to disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause harm to US national security." OIG has made public information about my Department and has attempted to share additional information with the public to the greatest extent possible consistent with our responsibility to protect information the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. The Agency has adhered to existing declassification guidelines in accordance with the requirements of Executive Order 13526 and will continue to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
CIA Through This Channel by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA)
Central Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

(U) As CIA's current strategy seeks to protect pledge loyalty to CIA, please describe your current

Response

(U) CIA

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
CCO Dennis C. Casper by General Dwight D. Martin (JFC)
Special Select Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Question:

(U) Did you witness the substance interpretation of CBO of CACID, which includes the use of the word "bait" as of the

Response:

(U) Please see the classified addendum for information about a classified assignment.

[U] Questions for the Deputy Director to
DDI Charles Gilio Camp by Senator Diane Feinstein [R]
Senat. News Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Question

[U] Did you order or oversee the wire-tapping of my husband? If so, how did you
carry this out?

Response

[U] Please see the classified addendum to information received by Classified
us/jper0010

CONFIDENTIAL

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to
DOD Number (also known as Senate Document 332)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Question

[U] Do you ever receive any instructions on how to use the "enhanced interrogation techniques"?

Response

[U] Please see the classified addendum for information on the classified assignments.

CONFIDENTIAL

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to
[C] Committee Staff Request by Senator Dianne Feinstein [R-CA]
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Questions

[U] Do you consider that the rendition, detention, and interrogation program is lawful and viable basis for this opinion?

Responses

[U] I considered that the Department of Justice reviewed the program and determined it was legal under the law of the time. CIA personnel involved with the rendition and interrogation program relied on that legal opinion, not advised by the judicial officer in guidance of CIA's Office of Legal Counsel.

[U] Today the law is clear. Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 the United States Government may not use any interrogation techniques that is not approved under the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. I fully support this change, and I encourage as Director I would call on CIA to engage in the use of no longer interrogates techniques again.

UNCLASSIFIED

[U] Questions for the Board Committee to
[C] Committee on the Report by Gen. James O. O'Connell [U] [U]
Gen. Select Committee on Intelligence
22 May 2010

[U] Aside from the legality of the program, did you have personal objections regarding any aspects of the condition, duration, and interagency program of the Special Agent?

[U] You also express these objections to your superior.

Response:

[U] Please see the attached addendum.

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
CCO Charles C. Hooper by Senate Select Committee (U)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(U) May 2011

Answers

(U) CCO Hooper is responsible for organizing and managing issues related to Brock
Leser and David L. Hooper. He is not involved in the ongoing investigation as the
integrated capability.

Requests

(U) Please see the attached information for information on any classified
assignments.

CONFIDENTIAL

10] Directives for the Special Committee to
11] Conduct the Study Report by General Pierre Dainoff (1961)
12] Central Command Committee on Intelligence
13] (1961)

Condition

14] 11] Disposition: review and approval after the interception

Response

15] 11] Please see the attached document response to Question 21

Questions for the Record in Initial to
Director's Office of Special Operations
Special Agent in Charge on Intelligence
11 Aug 2010

Question

1) Did you ever question the individual(s)?

Response

1) Please see the classified addendum response to Question 2.

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to
[C] [X] Jonathan Riano Hespel [X] Bureau of Air Force Operations [X] [C] [X]
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
11 May 2010

Question

[U] In your responses to the Committee's questions, you stated that you served as a "Detachment" Detachment in the Guantanamo Detachment Center from 2003 to 2004.

- [U] This position includes responsibility, authorization or approval related to the rendition, detention, and interrogation program described above?
- Can you advise of the conditions of capture and confinement of all former CIA detainees during this timeframe?
- Did you believe the conditions of confinement for the CIA detainees during this timeframe were humane?
- Can you advise of the specific methods of interrogation being used?

Response

[U] Please see the attached addendum for information about my classified assignments.

(U) Confidentiality of the Report Submitted to
the Committee by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
General Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2011

Executive

(U) In your response to the Committee's presiding questions that you made an effort to staff the major Cyber Operations from 2005 to 2007, your position includes responsibility, authorization, approval, or support of the creation, definition, or financing of a program of espionage.

Response

(U) My responsibility as an Ambassadorial Chief of Staff included facilitating discussions, communications and relations between the OSD and the subordinate offices within DIA, and Agency leaders. My responsibility included relations with DOD entities. Under my leadership, independent operational authority of this position did not hold a responsibility related to OSD.

10) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DDI Dan Mac Glinn Esq. by Senator Dianne Feinstein 1/30
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

10) Can state to your office responses to the Committee that come from CIA/CIAA - in addition to CIA/CIAA - were captured, recorded, and held under cables that are "measured legal text" - essentially illegally. The Agency has publicly taken responsibility for at least one original draft during this period.

- a. Do you personally take any responsibility for any of these false statements?
Yes or No?
- b. What steps did you take to ensure that on the CIA/CIAA would not be wrongfully held or captured under your watch?

Response

10) Please see the response to Question 9.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to

DDI Director Gina Haspel by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

10 May 2018

Questions

(U) General, the U.S. national security partners have been adversely affected by the condition, detention, and interrogation program because as a result, they have lost intelligence cooperation in the past.

- a. Do you think your responsibilities for condition, detention, and interrogation program will affect your ability to engage with these partners? If so, how do you intend to address that?
- b. How can you explain your past involvement in the condition, detention, and interrogation program in these cases?
- c. If that's not appropriate, should the public be provided with additional readily accessible information regarding other activities that have occurred as part of the condition, detention, and interrogation program?
- d. Do you believe you will be able to credibly give these assurances?

Responses

(U) DII has learned some tough lessons especially when asked to tackle missions that fall outside our expertise. We do have used those experiences to improve our analytical going forward. We continue to do this work and implement lessons learned that affect our ability to run CIA's Central and Interrogation program. Despite DII's demands for information regarding future activities, it is still possible that DII's participation in this program through not only the mission was participated but also caused damage to our relationships with our foreign partners.

(U) When working as Chief of Station in a capacity, and as Deputy and now Acting Director I have found tremendous support from our foreign partners to my current capacity, and indeed for the last 20 years I have worked very closely with our European and other partners. I have had all sorts of meetings with our foreign partners and they are not ones that I will not accept responsibility to them to conduct an activity that is contrary to our strategic values, or the law. We do have the will and the capability to implement my ability to leverage partnerships to our days against the stated targets.

(U) Questions for the General Counsel to
Classify Matters in the Scope of Operation Iceberg (A2)
Classify Belief Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Question

(U) Please provide any opinions, guidance or reasoning of the General Counsel and/or Office Agency Official for Classification with regard to your decisions related to the classification of matters associated with your association.

Response

(U) All classification decisions are guided by Executive Order 13526 (the CIA E.O. 13526), as amended, and the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. In addition, CIA issued updated classification guidance for information about CIA's human detection and intelligence program on January 28, 2010. The CIA Office of Congressional Affairs Details the CIA approach to classification of matters associated with my association in letters to Senator Feinstein, Leiberman, and Wyden dated April 29, 2010.

(U) Procedures to the Board of Directors

DDI Director's Office Report of Board of Directors (3/3)

Board of Directors Committee on Intelligence

11 May 2010

Question

(U) How do you square the CIA's handling of public disclosure of persons that certain individuals were associated with the [DDI] program with your testimony that you are bound by existing public law association you may have had with the program?

Response

(U) Although a large amount of information about the former DDI program has already been publicly acknowledged, CIA still protects information regarding CIA personnel involved in the DDI program to the extent and security of our officers. While I agree that the coordination process for a disclosure to the Director of the CIA requires transparency and the American public cannot take an exception to myself that could jeopardize the safety and security of our officers or the lives of our officers and civilians.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
ODIG Under the Disputes Resolution System (DRS)
General Counsel Committee on Intelligence
11 May 2011

Question

(U) Do the "existing OIG guidelines" to which you referred prevent the public release of any opinion about the program expressed by a CIA officer, regardless of whether that officer was associated with the program at the time he or she provided that opinion?

Response

(U) Please see the attached conditions.

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to
DDI Director On the Case of Operation Sea Syden [U]
Leland Helms' Question on Intelligence
00 04 2010

Question

[U] Can you confirm that you were at your desk and could see your computer screen when I was sitting at the desk in the office and released the cable that you describe above? The cable was released to your responses to certain questions, the model was "J/1/10" and subsequently awarded the DDI and had the cable in the field, I asked whether the cable was released to the Director's Office covering the cable was sent to the Bureau of this conversation.

Response

[U] That after I walked Mr. Helms had released the cable I got from my desk to the Bureau of this.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DOD Committee Also Asked by Senator Joe Biden (D)
Panel Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

(U) You testified that the tapes were destroyed because of "security" data to CIA officers and one agent in the tapes. Your testimony includes the other references to "other officers." To what extent were contractors, as opposed to CIA officers, involved in the destruction?

Response

(U) In this context "CIA officers" means CIA personnel, including employees and contractors.

[U] Questions to the Board Submitted by
[C] Under the Direct Control of the Board [C]
General Board Committee on Intelligence
[C] Case 1010

Comment

[U] Did you ever take any action, or have you assumed responsibility for any action, that is inconsistent with the law? If so, please elaborate.

Response

[U] I have always adhered to the law and the policies I have been given, and believe that my actions throughout my career have been lawful in one of my lawful job positions. I have executed and will continue to execute all relevant work as required by my superiors. I place the greatest weight on the views of my superiors.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
() Director John Edgar Hoover, U.S. Dept. of Justice (E.S.)
Special Agent in Charge, Intelligence
Division, FBI

Question

(U) During the hearing process, the statement in John Edgar Hoover's
"Report" (previously in the Information program) was expanded to include
statements that Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
previously reviewed the

Response

(U) Please see the attached letter.

[U] Questions for the Record Relating to
[C] Donald John Dwyer of Operation Cross-Country [FOI]
Seniors Select Committee on Intelligence
11 May 2013

Questions

[U] You testified that you were "not taken out" into the interrogation program and that you were up and coming to a program. The subject was taken to the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in late April 2002. He was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in Camp 5, 2002. Please provide more precise information about when you consider this program to have been "up and running" and when you were taken into it.

Responses

[U] I was selected by the President's Special Agent in Charge of Detention Operations, Special Agent [redacted], to be taken to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in late April 2002. I was taken to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in late April 2002. I was taken to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in late April 2002. I was taken to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in late April 2002. I was taken to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp in late April 2002.

[U] I was taken into the cross-country detentions and interrogations program in October 2002.

(U) Questions for the Select Committee

DDI Member Don Hooper, by Senator Don Wyden (R)

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

11 May 2013

Questions

(U) As DDCI of Special Source Operations, what role do you play in the U.S. Embassy's role in preparing, reviewing, or authorizing or releasing provided information to the intelligence community related to the DDI program, including training and resources, particularly DDI you do not see used at the DDI?

Response

(U) As DDCI of Special Source Operations (SSO) one of my primary responsibilities was to ensure DDI operations are supported with training, materials, and additional information training points (including contacts to the DDI workforce) and additional background needed for meetings, conferences, meetings, and delivery of Congress. During my time in SSO, I participated in many non-FBI related intelligence

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted

TO: Director of the Dept. of State, Washington, DC

Re: Select Committee on Intelligence

10 May 2010

Question:

(U) During the hearing, you were asked whether between RUC and FOCU the CIA was applying some balances and a balancing was no longer applied. You were asked for the program to be continued or expanded. Please provide an answer to the question.

Response:

(U) It is advantageous for the United States Government to be able to provide, in person, sensitive intelligence on current threats and jobs. Do a critical objective of the CIA is to acquire and obtain the intelligence provided by other intelligence and to provide preventive attacks. CIA continues to play a central role in that process.

(U) CIA no longer has a worldwide and intensive program of the elements of the CIA's operations. Do and do not have the location and interpretation of the information. CIA provides the subject matter and the support of the division of responsibility and to do not support the agency operating a location and interrogation program.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
CCC Member John Inge of Senate Sub-Committee
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

(U) In its 2010 response to the Committee's Study of the CIA's Security and
Investigation Program, the CIA acknowledged that the Agency had conducted internal
to holding individuals accountable for poor performance and management failures?" Do
you agree?

Response

(U) As I believe I've indicated, the Agency should ensure that accountability
extends to all levels of the various levels involved in the specific failures or
incidents. It also has been clear that the Agency's responsibility and role
consistently is questioned.

(U) Questionnaire for the Parent Contract on

CCO Business Data Usage by Double Data System (24)

Grant Date: 08/01/2010

00 Day 0010

Question

(U) In its OPI response to the Notification Study, the OPI acknowledged that it allowed a conflict of interest to exist where the contractor was helped design and apply the enhanced interrogation techniques when more land was being reserved. Details to be subjected to cover techniques and the of activities of the contractor.

- a. Do you agree that the CIA allowed such a conflict of interest?
- If yes, do you believe anyone at the CIA should have been held accountable for allowing this to happen?

Response

(U) See I supplied the OPI OPI response to the Notification Study. In addition, please see the response to Question 24.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
OIG During the Hearing of the Select Committee
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Questions

(U) The CIA's OIG response to the Committee Study states that "the propriety of the increasing use of the psychological tools – particularly the combination of (1) gathering information, (2) assessing the behavior of psychological efforts, and (3) assessing the technological effectiveness – raised concerns and prompted additional discussion and deliberation within CIA. Did you evaluate any of them concerns?"

Responses

(U) As stated at the hearing, CIA officials described the information aspects that informed the program and that it had been legally cleared at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Other cases of interagency information exchange at CIA have not been discussed.

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to
[C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S]
Special Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Conditions

[U] [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] permit and allow [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] to participate in an executive briefing on interrogations of detainees.

- o If yes, please describe the situations in which you believe that such an opportunity is appropriate.
- o If yes, what other activities do intend to be subject authorized by the Army Field Manual?

Responses

[U] As noted above, [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] do not conduct interrogations. Briefings of detainees to the custody of other agencies or entities are an important part of intelligence collection. Contractors make valuable contributions to these briefings, consistent with applicable law and policy. For example, contractors may supply a particular expertise, such as a language skill, that is otherwise not readily available. Contractors performing briefings must be screened by a [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] supervisor and by the [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] does not conduct interrogations, and [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] personnel—[C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] include a contractor working for the [C] [R] [I] [N] [T] [E] [R] [E] [S] [P] [O] [N] [S] [E] [R] [V] [I] [C] [E] [S] [I] [D] [E] [N] [T] [I] [C] [E] [S] in the Army Field Manual.

[U] Please see the attached conditions.

U Questions for the David Butler Act

CCM Minutes from Report of Senator Joe Biden (1/18/79)

David Butler Committee on Intelligence

CC Page 2010

Question

U) On July 13, 1974 the CIA Inspector General issued a Report of Investigation on Agency Access to OGC. OGC's Director told that among the IIG's findings was that agency employees improperly accessed OGC. OGC's study stated that:

- a. Do you agree that the CIA's access to the OGC OGC's study stated that was improper?
- b. Do you believe anyone should have been held accountable for those accesses?

U) The IIG further stated that "the Agency filed a series of reports with the OGC reporting that OGC staff members may have improperly accessed OGC information on the OGC. The IIG investigation determined that the initial case for external case reliance had the profiles of the letter had been provided inaccurate information on which the letter was based.

- a. Do you agree that the initial case for the external case reliance was not based on accurate information?
- b. Do you believe that CIA personnel filing crime reports with the OGC have an independent responsibility to ascertain whether the reports are factually accurate?
- c. Do you believe anyone should have been held accountable for the inaccurate and careless crime reports?
- d. What is your view of the propriety of the CIA filing crime reports on congressional members or staff?

Response

U) I have no firsthand knowledge of this matter. I do not have all of the needed files, and I have not reviewed all relevant materials. I therefore cannot offer an

Independent judgment on the issues raised. I understand that I'll receive an Accountability Card to review the incident file by the Inspector General. I understand that the Card, which was drafted by some senior staff, concluded that no disciplinary action was warranted on the facts presented.

(U) Question for the Record Submitted to
CIA Director Dan Clapham by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2010

Question

(U) In your career have you ever felt pressured to advise intelligence assessments to meet particular political or policy goals? If yes, how did you respond?

Response

(U) As a CIA official I can best describe pressure in the context of CIA and the differing requirements that exist in the intelligence community for providing all source analysis to our policymakers. The Government's established commitment to protecting the integrity and objectivity of our analysis. There is also no independent ombudsman that provides for a private, safe, and confidential environment for citizens to raise concerns that an analysis assessment has been politicized.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#51)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
14 May 2018

Question:

(U) If confirmed, will you commit to stand firm, in the face of any political pressure, to defend the CIA's assessments—especially if those assessments do not support current or planned policies?

Response:

(U) Yes.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#52)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
14 May 2018

Question:

(U) If confirmed, do you commit to notify this Committee immediately if you ever receive political pressure to alter intelligence assessments?

Response:

(U) I commit to resist any such pressure, should it ever exist, and commit that CIA will continue to meet its obligations to its congressional oversight committees, including our legal obligation to keep the committees currently and fully informed of all significant intelligence activities.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#53)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

14 May 2018

Question:

(U) If confirmed, will you commit to hiring a workforce that reflects the diversity of the American people across race, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, physical ability and religion?

Response:

(U) Yes, and I believe CIA must work harder to achieve a more diverse workforce.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#54)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

14 May 2018

Question:

(U) There are potential national security benefits to having a diverse CIA workforce that can more easily operate overseas. If confirmed, how do you plan to promote recruiting for diverse candidates at CIA?

Response:

(U) The benefits of diversity, both in terms of talent acquisition and the larger CIA mission, are critical. I have long been a supporter of CIA having a robust diversity recruiting program that provides a broad-based approach to outreach with a strong focus on languages and ethnic diversity. In addition to the benefits of having a diverse workforce, our global mission demands it. CIA's recruitment program pursues diversity in hiring through a variety of methods including public advertising, direct community outreach, college campus events, and student programs, to name a few. If confirmed, I will continue to support all of CIA's diversity efforts and explore ways to improve the Agency's performance in this area.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#55)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
14 May 2018

Question:

(U) If confirmed, how do you plan to improve diversity, of all kinds, at CIA in senior level management positions?

Response:

(U) Through the course of my career, I have always worked to do my part to build a diverse and inclusive workforce at CIA, including promoting and encouraging fellow officers, ensuring a fair process on personnel decisions, and formally leading mentorship programs. I am proud to say I am a champion for diversity but I recognize more must be done, and as DCIA I will be committed to making additional advancements.

(U) In 2014, the then-DCIA commissioned the "Diversity in Leadership Study (DLS)," chaired by Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., which examined the factors that limit diversity in CIA's senior leadership. The study identified seven recommendations and a five-year effort with an eye toward building a more diverse leadership cadre and fostering an inclusive culture at CIA. If confirmed, I plan to continue emphasizing the critical need for diversity, particularly in the leadership ranks, and intend to place specific focus on the underlying DLS initiatives necessary to achieve the goals identified by the study. Additionally, I will continue leveraging the senior officer performance review process and mandatory Diversity and Inclusion training for all senior officers as instruments to further inclusiveness and diversity at CIA.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DCIA Nominee Gina Haspel by Senator Kamala Harris (#56)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
14 May 2018

Question:

(U) If confirmed, how do you plan to be an advocate for the CIA's LGBTQ community?

Response:

(U) I have been, and will continue to be, a supporter and ally for CIA's LGBTQ community. CIA is a diverse multi-cultural workplace, and its 15 Agency Resource Groups (ARG) highlight that diversity. It is essential that Agency leadership is attuned to the broadest cross-section of views on these issues. One of the 15 ARGs includes the Agency Network of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Officers and Allies (ANGLE). Workforce diversity at CIA is, and will continue to be, a focus area for me if confirmed.

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Questions for the Report on Initial to
DOD Policies Also Asked by Senate Select Com [337]
Senat Select Committee on Intelligence
10 Aug 2011

Question

(U) It is requested that you respond to providing the rights of (C) (U) employees to equal
protection by providing the following:

Response

(U) See [redacted]

(U) Questions for the Board Related to
CIC's Searches of an Unspecified Former Name of John [REDACTED]
British Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2013

Location

(U) Do you believe that the Committee people deserve to know as much as possible about the conduct of the CIA Director including that person's professional history and judgment?

Response

(U) Yes. Declassification and remain classified for the safety and security of our officers and foreign partners and for the protection of sources and methods. Classified information about my record, including past assignments, is available for review by all members of the US Senate.

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to
DDIC Through GAO Request by Senate Select Committee (PAC)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

[U] What steps are you considering, will you commit to declassifying, with appropriate redactions for protecting sources and methods, all information about any involvement that you may have had in the CIA's Detention, Interrogation and Interception program?

Response

[U] Although a large amount of information about the former GDI Program has already been publicly acknowledged, OIG will protect information regarding GDI personnel involved in the GDI Program for the safety and security of our officers. Congress has recognized the need to protect from disclosure the locations, names, and official titles of persons employed by the Agency. Any declassified information about subjects, including past assignments, is available for review by all members of the US Senate. It is critical to make any exceptions to the policy that could have the effect of jeopardizing the safety and security of our officers or of disclosing sensitive intelligence sources and methods or giving harmful groups or individuals a means to target CIA individuals.

(U) Confidentiality in Debut Debriefing
DDI Director's Briefing of Debut Command Briefing (U)
Debut Debut Debriefing on Intelligence
11 Aug 2013

Question

(U) Have you ever advocated providing less information with Debut related to the CIA's Recruitment, Collection and Interrogation program?

Response

(U) I do not recall, and I could be wrong in any way, being called to the importance of congressional oversight. As I noted in my previous Question (U) throughout my 30 years of experience at CIA, I have repeatedly seen the importance and value of keeping the executive and intelligence community fully and currently informed of all significant intelligence activities. I continued to believe that the CIA continues to fulfill all of its responsibilities in this regard.

(U) Decisions for the Record Submitted to
DDO James Mac Gaspé by Security Council Staff (361)
Grand Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Executive

(U) The President was candidly advised that the staff's recommendations on the handling of the records are in line with the DDO's wishes, and would be accepted.

Response

(U) The President is clear, and needs no further advice. The DDO's Office of Defense Intelligence (DDO) is the United States' primary source of intelligence and will continue to use any intelligence techniques that are necessary under the law. The DDO will fully engage the relevant intelligence community elements in the use of advanced intelligence techniques.

(U) Question for the Board Related to
DCI's Director's Risk Report by Director James H. Clapper, Jr.
Senior Select Committee on Intelligence
11 May 2010

Question

(U) The Director has a candidate suspect that regarding counterintelligence suspected terrorists "it is possible that they deserve a copy of the CIA's 'Play for All' to get a piece of the solution."

Response

(U) I do not support use of enhanced interrogation techniques for any purpose.

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
DDO Clarifies the Caspian by Senator David Vitter (R-LA)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

(U) It is confirmed that you intend to make counterintelligence Russian influence operations particularly those targeting U.S. election a priority of CIA?

Response

(U) Yes Sir

(U) Questions for the Record Submitted to
The Joint Select Committee on Intelligence
May 2, 2017

Question

(U) You have stated that you cannot edit the 2017 Intelligence Community assessment regarding Russia's activities and intentions to disrupt US elections. If confirmed as CIA Director, how do you plan to convey the veracity of the threat from Russia to the President?

Response

(U) It is the CIA's role to provide policymakers with timely, high-quality assessments of the serious and ongoing threat from Russia: Election Interference. (Just one example of the growing threat the United States faces from Russia (as well as from other states and non-state actors) I would like to reiterate that it is important to have a whole-of-government approach to our ability to persistently address this important problem. The CIA has played a vital role in this effort by effectively analyzing and monitoring the Russian threat through our operations and cooperation throughout the federal government. I believe in long experience working against the Russian threat has helped to provide me with a deep understanding and respect for the serious threat posed by Russia.

(U) Questions for the Closed Submitter to
CC Justice Dept Dept of Justice Dept #11
Dept Dept Department Intelligence
10 May 2010

Question

(U) During the course of your time at CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) did you
or you play in CTC's management and operation of the Defense and Intelligence
program? Please provide any reports of the CIA's possession of the described
and dates of CTC with respect to managing or operating this program (such as any
organizational chart, job descriptions, or the equivalent) should they exist. Further, if a
classified response is required please provide a justification for why the program has
closed not to be declassified this information

Response

In regard to the role I played in CTC's management, please see the classified
attachment to Question 2. In regard to the request for an explanation of why this
response is classified, please see my responses to Question 330 and the classified
attachment to Question 330.

(U) Question for the Board of Inquiry

(U) Minutes and Report by Special Agent (SA) #

Local Area Intelligence

(U) (S)

Location

(U) On the basis of your knowledge, did the apparent "enhanced" interrogation techniques employed by the CIA include

- a. (U) the use of any of the defined "harsh"
- b. (U) anything to detainees that they would never have CIA custody and
- c. (U) anything defined by the purpose of contributing to
- d. (U) intentionally creating conditions by detainees to

Response

(U) The responsibility of Agency offices was to carry out detention and interrogation activities in strict accordance to the policies and legal opinion in place. Any Agency offices not doing so were in violation of the law and policy that governed the program were referred to the CIA Office of Inspector General by the relevant CIA officials. The CIA viewed certain uses in the Department of Justice (DOJ) or other law enforcement

(U) Conditions for the Use of Battered

(C) United States Dept of Health and Social Security

General Office Memorandum on Intelligence

11 May 2010

Question

(U) Will you participate in any cooperative analysis or assessment of the effectiveness of the 'enhanced' interrogative techniques employed by the CIA or any analysis of the effectiveness of such techniques as may be employed in the future of your agency? If so, what will you contribute? If not, why not?

Response

(U) Yes. Allow me to first say strong disagreements on the effectiveness of CIA/CSS/CSG and intelligence programs in my view, which is shared by my predecessors. It is a great valuable intelligence that helped them plan and conduct capture operations and identify cover bases. It is impossible to know how often they could have obtained the same information without using enhanced interrogation techniques.

[U] Questions for the Record Submitted to

[C]ivil Liberties and Rights of Religion and Belief [U]

Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. Congress

Answers

[U] As you were aware of any correspondence during the period of 2002-2007 between the Chief of the Civil Liberties and Justice Department, Office of Legal Counsel, and the relevant agencies of the FBI concerning the legality, effectiveness or appropriateness of enhanced interrogation techniques or the other forms of these practices that were?

Response

[U] I was generally aware of a broad and ongoing interagency discussion of the FBI program involving the legal and policy guidance concerning the program.

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2

Executive Power, Clause 2

Executive Privilege

1974

Office

U.S. Supreme Court, 442 U.S. 214 (1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984 (1981)
The Court held that the President's communications are protected from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) because they are "inherently confidential."

Executive

U.S.

10 Questions for the Senate Committee

100 United States Capitol by Robert Langford (R-VA)

Committee on Intelligence

July 2010

Question

10 In 2014 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conducted the following 2002-2007 CIA false representations to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel concerning: (1) the conditions of confinement of detainees held by CIA, (2) the applicability of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the proposed uses of the techniques in detainee operations and (4) the objectives of the techniques of CIA (particularly detainee abuse of those representations when they become known that the legal restrictions created by Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel were not approved upon those false representations and that the Department had made CIA the less conditions say that the conditions different in the circumstances.

Response

10 Please see response by Section 100

[U] Testimony before the Joint Committee
on the Oversight and Reform of Intelligence
Activities

10 May 2010

[U] Testimony

[U] I have not ever participated in any discussions at CIA or elsewhere of a report or reports concerning the oversight of the CIA's operations, either with respect specifically to the activities, operations and intelligence (EO) programs or any other matter. I do not have any knowledge of CIA internal or congressional communications related to such matters.

[U] Testimony

[]

[U] I am a strong believer in the importance of oversight and I state I am providing this testimony through my 13 years of experience at CIA, I have repeatedly seen the importance of the role of oversight in maintaining our intelligence activities and ensuring that the CIA is held accountable for the way it conducts its work. I will ensure that the CIA continues to fulfill all of its responsibilities to the American people.

U.S. Office of Special Investigations
Central Intelligence Agency
Foreign Operations Administration
Washington, D.C.

Question

U.S. Office of Special Investigations, Foreign Operations Administration, Washington, D.C. (U.S. O.S.I.), has been provided with a copy of and general information about the operations and management of the program.

Response

U.S. O.S.I. is in process of publishing a report on

(U) Procedures for the Control Committee

(U) Review of the Report of Control Committee

Control Committee on Intelligence

10 May 2010

Control

(U) Laws (or laws) published in, or laws that are made of, decisions of the Control Committee on the release of sensitive information concerning the CIA program to members of the media. It also includes public officials, other public officials, and citizens. It includes a request for action.

Response

(U) It will not publish any laws that are made of CIA decisions regarding sensitive information to the media.

(U) Provides for the Policy Committee of [redacted]

DCI [redacted] and [redacted] by [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Special [redacted] Committee on Intelligence

[redacted] [redacted]

Section

(U) This [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Report [redacted]

(U) [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Directors in the United Kingdom to
 the United Kingdom by the United Kingdom
Board of Directors in the United Kingdom
 by the United Kingdom

position

the United Kingdom by the United Kingdom
Board of Directors in the United Kingdom
United Kingdom by the United Kingdom

position

the United Kingdom