Statement for the Record
Senate Select Commi3ee on Intelligence

“Countering China’s Malign Influence Opera7ons in the United States”
Dr. Glenn Tiffert
Dis<nguished Research Fellow
Co-Chair, Project on China’s Global Sharp Power
Hoover Ins<tu<on, Stanford University
September 27, 2023
Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, and dis<nguished members of the commi3ee, it is a
pleasure to appear before you today. In 2018, the Hoover Ins<tu<on and the Asia Society jointly
released a seminal study, China’s Influence and American Interests: Promo6ng Construc6ve
Vigilance, which for many was an eye opener into China’s influence opera<ons across the
United States.1 Building on that founda<on, in 2020 Hoover launched its project on China’s
Global Sharp Power (CGSP), which I co-chair. CGSP produces data-driven analysis and policy
recommenda<ons on China with an emphasis on research security, cri<cal technologies, and
malign foreign influence. Influence opera<ons at the subna<onal level are a special focus.
Since its origins as a hunted revolu<onary insurgency, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
consistently sought to render the world outside of itself more tractable and compliant.
Influence opera<ons have been integral to its dominion over China’s complex society, and today
they loom especially large outside of the country, where the CCP’s capacity to project violence is
constrained. These opera<ons encounter few obstacles in the permissive, lightly policed
socie<es characteris<c of liberal democracies, where they aim to coopt, corrupt, and coerce
local actors into advancing party objec<ves. Frequently, their targets are unaware or
compara<vely unconcerned that they are par<cipa<ng in a grand design orchestrated by the
CCP because they are focused instead on the short-term transac<onal logic of their rela<onship
with a Chinese partner.
CCP influence opera<ons employ a mixture of carrots and s<cks, alternately covert, subtle, and
brazen to capitalize on the idealism, avarice, and ins<ncts for self-preserva<on of their quarries.
While those that violate law are subject to exis<ng enforcement ac<ons, a great many CCP
influence opera<ons in the US inhabit lawful zones of protected speech and associa<on that can
be difficult for legal tools to reach, par<cularly when US ci<zens are involved in their execu<on.
Some unfold slowly or diffusely to create good will and dependency rela<onships ripe for later
1

Larry Diamond and Orville Schell eds., China’s Influence & American Interests: Promo6ng Construc6ve Vigilance
(Stanford: Hoover Ins<tu<on Press, 2018), hDps://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/diamondschell_chineseinfluence_oct2020rev.pdf.

1

exploita<on. Influence opera<ons qualify as malign if they obfuscate their origins, funding
sources, and agenda; trade in disinforma<on or misdirec<on that degrades discourse; or
advocate viola<ons of law, fundamental rights, or democra<c principles.2 Lawful but malign
opera<ons are among the most challenging to combat in democra<c socie<es because they test
our liber<es and commitments to due process and nondiscrimina<on.
The CCP explicitly rejects the liberal democra<c concep<on that civil society should be
autonomous from the state.3 In principle, it reserves the right to insinuate itself in a supervisory
or leadership capacity everywhere in China to ensure that all play their part in its projects and
remain aligned with its priori<es, and none develop the independent resources, pres<ge, and
organiza<onal capacity to challenge its supremacy. The CCP aims, in the words of the PRC
Cons<tu<on, to “unite all forces that can be united” while neutralizing ac<ve and poten<al
sources of resistance.4 Its foreign influence opera<ons originate in the logic of this “united
front” and the domes<c ins<tu<ons and prac<ces that support it.
The United Front Work Department (UFWD), an organ of the party’s central commi3ee, holds
the lion’s share of the influence opera<on por`olio. UFWD personnel are found at every major
level of party administra<on in China and, more importantly, all party members are bound to
support the mission of the united front no ma3er where they serve. Under Xi, the UFWD has
experienced a renaissance, greatly expanding its workforce, budget, and responsibili<es. While
most of its effort reflects domes<c priori<es, it oversees thousands of organiza<ons that
operate in academic, charitable, commercial, cultural, ethnic, and religious affairs, many of
which also engage with foreign partners or have an interna<onal footprint. Regula<ons adopted
in 2020 require these organiza<ons to observe party leadership in their united front work and
many have party cells embedded in their governance.5 Examples include nominally independent
chambers of commerce and federa<ons of industry and commerce, which court interna<onal
business, and the Chinese People’s Associa<on for Friendship with Foreign Countries (中国⼈⺠
对外友好协会), which promotes people-to-people diplomacy and manages sister city
rela<ons.6 The zeal with which these organiza<ons execute party mandates varies to be sure,

2

Kamya Yadav et al., What Makes an Influence Opera6on Malign, Carnegie Endowment for Interna<onal Peace,
August 7, 2023, available at
hDps://carnegieendowment.org/files/What_Makes_An_Influence_Opera<on_Malign.pdf.
3
“Document 9: A ChinaFile Transla<on,” ChinaFile, November 8, 2013, hDps://www.chinafile.com/document-9chinafile-transla<on.
4
Preamble, Cons<tu<on of the People’s Republic of China, amended March 11, 2018.
hDp://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregula<ons/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html
5
Regula<ons on the Work of the CCP United Front Work Department 中国共产党统⼀战线⼯作条例,
promulgated December 21, 2020, hDps://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-01/05/content_5577289.htm.
6
Gerry Groot, Understanding the Role of Chambers of Commerce and Industry Associa<ons in United Front Work,”
China Brief, 18(11), June 19, 2018, hDps://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-role-of-chambers-ofcommerce-and-industry-associa<ons-in-united-front-work/.

2

but the principle that the party leads all remains, and under Xi Jinping it is exercising that op<on
ever more intrusively. 7
Much of the foreign-facing work of the UFWD concerns Taiwan and the mul<-ethnic Chinese
diaspora, which the CCP treats as emana<ons of its domes<c polity. For instance, associa<ons
for the promo<on of peaceful unifica<on (和平统⼀促进会) are found throughout the world,
where they amplify PRC policy on Taiwan and Tibet and seek to limit interna<onal engagements
with the island to the PRC’s terms. In 2020, the US State Department designated the Na<onal
Associa<on for China’s Peaceful Unifica<on as a foreign mission, calling it a front organiza<on
for the UFWD. The Western Returned Scholars Associa<on (欧美同学会/中国留学⼈员联谊会)
<es together ethnic Chinese businesspeople and scholars working abroad. In addi<on to
conven<onal networking ac<vi<es, it has supported talent program recruitment and illicit
technology transfer.8 The Chinese Overseas Friendship Associa<on (中华海外联谊会) monitors
and purports to speak for Chinese abroad. In January 2022, one of its leaders in London
triggered a MI5 security service interference alert to the UK Parliament based on intelligence
that she was using UFWD money to cul<vate rising poli<cians.9 In August of the same year,
Beijing mobilized overseas friendship associa<ons from twenty-two countries to issue
coordinated protests against US House Speaker Nany Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.10
Evidence suggests that the <ghtening poli<cal climate in China is fueling transna<onal
repression, ostracism, and in<mida<on of diaspora communi<es abroad. Reports of crossborder harassment, surveillance, assault, and even abduc<on against ac<vists and students are
rising.11 The indirect cases are the hardest to combat. In 2023, a pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong
Kong vitupera<vely labeled a local professor an “agent of the West” for accep<ng a fellowship in
the US funded by the “invisible hand” of the US Congress.12 She was openly watched in the US
7

MaDhew Johnson, The CCP Absorbs China’s Private Sector: Capitalism with Party Characteris6cs (Stanford: Hoover
Ins<tu<on Press, 2023),
hDps://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/Hvr_JohnsonEssay_CPP_web.pdf.
8
Toshi Yoshihara and Jack Bianchi, Uncovering China’s Influence in Europe: How Friendship Groups Coopt European
Elites, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020,
hDps://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8225_(Uncovering_Chinas_Influence_Report)_FINAL.pdf; Takashi
Suzuki, “China’s United Front Work in the Xi Jinping Era – Ins<tu<onal Developments and Ac<vi<es,” Journal of
Contemporary East Asia Studies, 8:1 (2019), 83-98.
9
Gordon Corera, “Why Did MI5 Name Chris<ne Lee as an ‘Agent of Influence’,” BBC, July 19, 2022,
hDps://www.bbc.com/news/uk-62179004.
10
“Friendship organiza<ons and people from many countries condemn Pelosi's visit to China's Taiwan region and
express firm support for the one-China principle 多国友好组织和⼈⼠谴责佩洛⻄窜访中国台湾地区 表示坚定
⽀持⼀个中国原则,” People’s Daily ⼈⺠⽇报, August 9, 2022, p. 3
11
“Silenced Voices, Hidden Struggles: PRC Transna<onal Repression on Overseas Human Rights Ac<vists,”
DoubleThink Labs, 2023, hDps://drive.google.com/file/d/1olZOWYiHniv3TQ6pJgLKqpTKrSAqNkJv/view; Serena Roy,
“The Threat of Transna<onal Repression from China and the U.S. Response,” Tes6mony to the CongressionalExecu6ve Commission on China, June 15, 2022,
hDps://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/DHS%20Tes<mony_Chinese%20Repressi
on%20-%20CECC%20JUN15%20-FINAL%20TransmiDed%20to%20CECC_0.pdf.
12
“China Must Remove ‘Academic Villains’ Who Oppose China and Disrupt Hong Kong ⽂汇报-中国须清除反中乱
港‘学棍’ ,Wen Wei Po ⽂汇报, February 28, 2023, A12.

3

to frighten her, but in ways that preserved plausible deniability, and did not return to Hong Kong
for her own safety. PRC authori<es or their proxies also arrange phone calls between their
targets and family members s<ll in China who under duress urge their loved ones to abandon
their ac<vi<es in the US and return home. Social and professional organiza<ons and Chineselanguage media in overseas markets channel such pressure with a potency that few outside of
the affected communi<es appreciate.13 In Canada, at least a half-dozen former or current
poli<cians, some of them ethnic Chinese, have reportedly been a3acked in influence opera<ons
orchestrated by Beijing.14 But because these opera<ons typically present as ordinary poli<cking
or transpire in private social media groups voiced by surrogates, establishing viola<ons of law or
clear a3ribu<on to the CCP can be difficult.
In 2015, Xi Jinping re-established an interagency leading small group to guide implementa<on of
united front work across the party and state bureaucracies, and the UFWD by no means
monopolizes the field.15 Many other organs play vital roles in malign foreign influence
opera<ons, such as the propaganda department of the central commi3ee, which oversees
China’s state media and publishing outlets. These outlets disseminate state narra<ves in
mul<ple language around the globe through official channels and a network of proxy sites. They
have been central to the informa<on war over the COVID pandemic, state repression in Xinjiang,
and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, Chinese state media employees are
inauthen<cally posing as trusted, independent social media influencers on major Western social
media pla`orms, where they promote slickly produced party propaganda and lifestyle content
that rebut foreign cri<cisms of China and portray it posi<vely.16 The US an<-war group Code
Pink, which disrupted a February 2023 hearing of the House Select Commi3ee on the CCP, has
taken up the same mission, launching a “China is Not Our Enemy” campaign that traces back to
a global web of shell companies and the wealthy husband of the group’s founder, who
collaborates closely with the CCP propaganda department.17
PRC influence opera<ons on Western social media are growing bolder. They are promo<ng a
litany of Chinese government reports that document flaws in American democracy as part of a
global campaign to showcase China’s poli<cal system as superior and have started using
genera<ve AI to create appealing visual content that results in higher social media engagement.
These developments portend concerted interreference in the 2024 US elec<ons and as a
13

“Sophis<ca<on, Scope, and Scale: Digital Threats from East Asia Increase in Breadth and Effec<veness,” MicrosoR
Threat Intelligence, September 2023, hDps://query.prod.cms.rt.microsou.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW1aFyW.
14
Norimitsu Onishi, “Canadian Poli<cians Who Cri<cize China Become Its Targets,” New York Times, July 15, 2023,
hDps://www.ny<mes.com/2023/07/15/world/americas/canada-china-elec<on-interference.html.
15
“China’s Influence Opera<ons Bureaucracy,” in Diamond and Schell, China’s Influence & American Interests, 2018,
151-162, hDps://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/16_diamond-schell-chinas-influence-andamerican-interests_appendix-1-_chinese-influence-opera<ons-bureaucracy.pdf.
16
“Chinese State Media’s Global Influencer Opera<on,” Digital Threat Analysis Center, January 31, 2022,
hDps://miburo.substack.com/p/csm-influencer-ops-1; “Chinese State Media’s Global Influencer Opera<on: Why It
MaDers,” Digital Threat Analysis Center, February 10, 2022, hDps://miburo.substack.com/p/chinese-state-mediasglobal-influencer.
17
Alexander Reid Ross and Courtney Dobson, “The Big Business of Uyghur Genocide Denial,” New Lines Magazine,
January 18, 2022, hDps://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-big-business-of-uyghur-genocide-denial/.

4

preparatory step, in the runup to the preceding midterm elec<on, the campaigns began
impersona<ng American voters.18
The Ministry of State Security (国家安全部) and the Interna<onal Liaison Department of the
CCP central commi3ee (中国共产党中央委员会对外联络部) run obfuscated influence
opera<ons directed at US elites at the na<onal and subna<onal levels and seek to iden<fy and
cul<vate rising stars. 19 The MSS has long fed opera<ves posing as academic or policy insiders to
American media, scholars, and government analysts to influence how China is understood and
spoken about in the US, most notoriously through the China Reform Forum, a research
ins<tu<on under the central party school, and the China Ins<tutes of Contemporary
Interna<onal Rela<ons (CICIR, 中国现代化国际联系研究院), a leading think tank.20
Experienced China watchers engage with these ins<tu<ons knowing them for what they are, but
danger lurks when the untempered credulously soak up their talking points. Par<cularly in Xi
Jinping’s China, where cri<cal, independent voices have grown circumspect or silent, the
pundits who s<ll speak volubly and the ins<tu<ons that host them must be assessed with care.
The Center for China and Globaliza<on (CCG), another leading Beijing think tank, is a case in
point. Wang Huiyao (王辉耀), its globe-trolng founder, is a fixture on the US and interna<onal
conference circuits. In 2019, Senator Rubio drew a3en<on to the fact that a prominent
Washington think tank did not list Wang’s high-level affilia<ons with the UFWD when it invited
him to speak. 21 But this airing of his <es has hardly slowed Wang down. In 2021, Wang and CCG
president Mabel Miao (苗绿) published a book, I Talk to the Word About China (我向世界说中
国), that dis<lls lessons from a litany of interna<onal media and track two engagements, such as
the Munich Security Conference, the Davos Forum, and the Mink Debate on “how to create new
narra<ve methods and models” about China.22 In the months since China’s COVID lockdown
ended, Wang has capitalized on the hunger to restore in-person lines of communica<on by
resuming his role interpre<ng China for audiences around the world and hos<ng a parade of
Americans visi<ng Beijing.

18

“Sophis<ca<on, Scope, and Scale: Digital Threats from East Asia Increase in Breadth and Effec<veness,” MicrosoR
Threat Intelligence, September 2023, hDps://query.prod.cms.rt.microsou.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW1aFyW.
19
Alex Joske, “The Party Speaks for You: Foreign Interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front
System,” Australian Strategic Policy Ins6tute, Report 32/2020 (2020), hDps://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast2.amazonaws.com/202006/The%20party%20speaks%20for%20you_0.pdf?VersionId=gFHuXyYMR0XuDQOs.6JSmrdyk7MralcN; David
Shambaugh, “China’s ‘Quiet Diplomacy’: The Interna<onal Department of the Chinese Communist Party,” China: An
Interna6onal Journal, 5:1 (2007), 26-54; “China’s Influence Opera<ons Bureaucracy,” 161-162.
20
David Shambaugh, “China’s Interna<onal Rela<ons Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” The China
Quarterly, no. 171 (2002), 575-596; “Profile of MSS-Affiliated PRC Foreign Policy Think Tank CICIR,” Open Source
Center, August 25, 2011, hDps://irp.fas.org/dni/osc/cicir.pdf.
21
“LeDer of Marco Rubio to Congresswoman Jane Harman, President and CEO of Woodrow Wilson Interna<onal
Center for Scholars,” May 4, 2018, hDps://ia903106.us.archive.org/0/items/5776350-RubioleDer/5776350RubioleDer.pdf.
22
“I Speak China to the World 我向世界说中国,” Center for China and Globaliza6on, July 2021,
hDp://www.ccg.org.cn/archives/64531.

5

Figures like Wang offer foreign journalists, scholars, and analysts another sought aoer
commodity: the trophy of access. Access to the party’s anointed unofficial spokespeople is a
currency that affirms self-esteem, burnishes one’s standing among peers, and indicates that one
has professionally arrived. One earns and maintains access by picking one’s words and projects
carefully to steer clear of the party’s red lines. United front work encourages this cult of access
as a form of invisible social control; access rewards and reinforces posi<ve behavior just as visa
denial disincen<vizes the nega<ve. Losing it can interrupt research, knock one off the fast track,
and set back a career.
In July 2022, the Na<onal Counterintelligence and Security Center issued an unclassified bulle<n
that helpfully summarizes PRC influence opera<ons targe<ng government and business leaders
at the US subna<onal level.23 Elected officials at the state and local levels typically lack the
exper<se on China’s poli<cal system and its malign influence opera<ons to meet prospec<ve
partners from the PRC on a level playing field. They are understandably more a3en<ve to the
immediate concerns of their cons<tuents rather than ma3ers of geostrategic compe<<on and
are stretched thin. Only four states have full <me legislatures with large, well-paid staffs.24
Consequently, they present a far sooer environment for malign influence opera<ons than their
counterparts at the federal level, and they are u3erly outgunned by the resources the PRC
devotes to studying and cul<va<ng them.
A 2019 report issued by D&C Think, a Beijing-based think tank, and the Tsinghua University
Globaliza<on Research Center surveyed the altude of US governors towards China and
determined: “17 governors are friendly to China, 14 governors have an ambiguous altude
towards China,6 governors are tough on China, and 14 governors have no obvious and open
stance on China.” No<ng opportuni<es to forge connec<ons free of Washington’s gaze, the
report provided a detailed breakdown of state per capita GDP and trade sta<s<cs and asserted
that the “cons<tu<on prohibits the (US) president from interfering in the affairs of the
governors of each state. The governor does not need to worry about the affairs of the federal
government.”25
The mismatch in capacity was evident in a 2006 memorandum to the sister city agreement
between Irvine, California and Xuhui district in Shanghai, in which Irvine promised in language
that was surely supplied by the Chinese side not to send official delegations to Taiwan, not to fly
the Taiwanese flag and not to play the Taiwanese national anthem or attend Taiwan National Day
celebrations. It also stipulated that Irvine recognizes “that there is only one China.” After news of
the memorandum provoked an uproar in the local Taiwanese community, it was
23

“Safeguarding Our Future: Protec<ng Government and Business Leaders at the U.S. State and Local Level from
People’s Republic of China (PRC) Influence Opera<ons,” Na6onal Counterintelligence and Security Center, July 2022,
hDps://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/PRC_Subna<onal_Influence-06-July-2022.pdf.
24
“Part and Full-<me Legislatures,” Na<onal Conference of State Legislatures, July 28, 2021,
hDps://www.ncsl.org/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-<me-legislatures.
25
“Panoramic View of the US Aytude Towards China: Governors 美国对华态度全景 - 州⻓篇, Minzhi Research
Ins6tute, June 22, 2019, reposted at hDps://chinatechthreat.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CTT-MandarinComparison_final.pdf.

6

rescinded.26 Similarly, in 2019, staff from the PRC embassy in Washington pressured the city of
Rockville, Maryland to abandon plans to sign a sister city rela<onship with Yilan, Taiwan, in part
ci<ng a 2009 agreement between Rockville and the PRC city of Jiaxing as adverse precedent.27 In
this instance, the city stood firm.
The Chinese People’s Associa<on for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC, 中国⼈⺠对外
友好协会), a UFWD-affiliated organ, stood behind both cases. The CPAFFC promotes people-topeople diplomacy and manages sister city rela<ons in coordina<on with PRC diplomats and
party policy. Since 2011, it has also sponsored the China-US Governors Forum. In 2020, the US
State Department withdrew from the formal agreement suppor<ng this forum aoer the
previous year’s itera<on was billed undisguisedly as a deal-making opportunity rather than as a
selng for intergovernmental dialogue.
Economics figures prominently in the debate over China’s influence opera<ons in the US. For
instance, in 2021, the PRC embassy in Washington caused a s<r by lobbying US execu<ves and
business groups to oppose drao legisla<on before Congress on trade and human rights.28 But
such overt displays are unnecessary in sectors where the commercial interests of US firms
already overlap with the PRC’s strategic objec<ves, as perhaps in banking and semiconductors,
and the firms themselves echo CCP talking points on their own ini<a<ve. This is the state that
united front work aims to create.
At the same <me, condi<ons are changing. This year, investment into the US from China has
fallen to the lowest level since 2009 owing to the collapse in travel between the two na<ons,
rising tensions, stricter regulatory reviews, and China’s slowing economy.29 In certain areas, such
as ba3ery technology and land sales, this retrenchment may be going too far.
Chinese ba3ery companies lead the world and are inking deals to supply top interna<onal
automakers. But poli<cal opposi<on to using Chinese technology in the US for fear of foreign
interreference and supply chain dependence threatens to undermine the compe<<veness of
major American automakers on the global market, hold back their transi<on to new energy
vehicles, and make catching up and leaping ahead harder to do. The US should humbly take a
page from the united front playbook by turning China’s strengths in this area to our advantage.
US states and locali<es should also renounce blanket, discriminatory restric<ons on residen<al

26

“Sister-City Pact puts Irvine in Bad Spot,” Los Angeles Daily News, June 21, 2006,
hDps://www.dailynews.com/2006/06/21/sister-city-pact-puts-irvine-in-bad-spot/.
27
Sarah Newland, “Paradiplomacy as a Response to Interna<onal Isola<on: The Case of Taiwan,” The Pacific Review,
36:4 (2023), 784-812, hDps://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2025889.
28
Michael Mar<na, “Chinese Embassy Lobbies U.S. Business to Oppose China Bills – Sources,” Reuters, November
21, 2021, hDps://www.reuters.com/business/exclusive-chinese-embassy-lobbies-us-business-oppose-china-billssources-2021-11-12/.
29
“China Shows Signs of Decoupling from US as FDI, Trade Falls,” Rhodium Group, September 7, 2023,
hDps://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar<cles/2023-09-07/china-fdi-into-us-plunges-to-more-than-decade-lowrhodium-says.

7

land purchases that infringe on cons<tu<onal rights, stoke xenophobic sen<ments, and
derogate the democracy we seek to protect.
Recommenda<ons:
A century ago, Sun Yat-sen famously compared the Chinese people to a sheet of loose sand, but
today that metaphor may more aptly describe the United States. The CCP is disciplined and
purposeful. It sees the openness, decentraliza<on, and pluralism that make American
democracy vibrant as vulnerabili<es to exploit, and we face daun<ng coordina<on problems
and tradeoffs in forging responses. Parochial interests dissipate our resolve, and federalism
fractures governmental capacity, leaving a house divided. Legisla<ve fixes will inevitably impose
costs, and these must be weighed carefully and kept propor<onate. They must not compromise
cherished liber<es or harm those who bear the brunt of CCP repression most, the mul<-ethnic
Chinese diaspora. With those points in mind, I urge the commi3ee to consider the following
recommenda<ons.
1. Increase funding for open-source research and publica<on on malign foreign influence
opera<ons. Although US law enforcement and the intelligence community track PRC
influence opera<ons, they have significant resource constraints and restric<ons on their
authori<es, and their ability to release informa<on into the public record is limited by
the need to protect inves<ga<ons, sources, and methods. Important segments of
American society may also lack trust in their statements. Non-governmental
organiza<ons, think tanks, and academic researchers are well-posi<oned to overcome
these obstacles and must expand their roles in raising awareness of malign foreign
influence opera<ons, exposing their evolving goals and mechanics, and mobilizing
resistance.
2. Provide integrated federal support to subna<onal governments and business. Hardening
US society against malign foreign influence and empowering subna<onal actors to
safeguard the integrity of their domains requires unifying disparate federal resources.
Create integrated client-facing touch points that can provide interagency guidance in
domains such as paradiplomacy and commercial ac<vity. These could be housed in DHS
fusion centers and Commerce’s commercial service offices around the United States.
Produce fact sheets for commonly encountered situa<ons, such as controversies over
sister-city rela<onships and PRC a3empts to muddle the dis<nc<ons between official US
policy towards Taiwan and China’s one China principle.
3. Look beyond espionage and law enforcement. Malign foreign influence opera<ons run
the gamut of lawful and illicit ac<vi<es, and many of the most impac`ul may lie within
zones of protected speech and associa<on where government authority is constrained.
Combalng these requires strategies that borrow from public health as much as from
law and counterintelligence. Government can break through collec<ve ac<on problems
in civil society by crea<ng public infrastructure for trainings, transparency ini<a<ves,

8

informa<on sharing, and best prac<ces. It should facilitate and enable desirable conduct
rather than simply proscribe the undesirable.
4. Address systemic as well as acute risk. Incident reports and case studies provide data for
characterizing the threat posed by malign foreign influence opera<ons and concrete
reference points for tailoring solu<ons. But one must remain mindful of the forest as
well as the trees. Discrete influence opera<ons that seem trivial by themselves may in
the aggregate yield profound effects over <me, shioing the environmental condi<ons
and incen<ve structures that shape how actors think and act. Efforts to combat malign
foreign influence must respond to acute events and slow-rolling processes that generate
climate change. The most successful influence opera<ons are those that run under the
radar.

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