UNCLASSIFIED

SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

Additional Questions for
Mr. Michael C. Casey upon His Nomination to be
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center

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Responsibilities of the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center
QUESTION 1: What is your understanding of the unique role of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) within the Intelligence
Community (IC)?
NCSC leads and supports the U.S. Government’s (USG) counterintelligence (CI)
and security activities critical to protecting our nation. This includes providing CI
outreach to U.S. private sector entities at risk of foreign intelligence penetration and
issuing public warnings regarding intelligence threats to the United States. Within
the IC, the Director of NCSC is the mission manager for CI, serving as the National
Intelligence Manager for Counterintelligence (NIM-CI) and the principal
substantive advisor to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on all aspects of
CI.
Additionally, NCSC supports the DNI’s execution of her Security Executive Agent
(SecEA) authorities across the Executive Branch, including the IC, to protect our
national security interests by ensuring the reliability and trustworthiness of those to
whom we entrust our nation’s secrets and assign to sensitive positions. Pursuant to
Executive Order (EO) 13587, NCSC also supports the National Insider Threat Task
Force, on behalf of the DNI, to strengthen insider threat programs across the USG
and prevent the compromise of classified information.
QUESTION 2: What is your understanding of the specific statutory
responsibilities of the Director of the NCSC?
Under the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, the Director of NCSC
serves as the head of national CI for the USG. In this role, the Director of NCSC is
responsible for leading NCSC in:
 Producing the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment;
 Producing and implementing the National Counterintelligence Strategy;
 Overseeing and coordinating the production of strategic analyses of CI
matters, including the production of CI damage assessments and
assessments of lessons learned from CI activities;
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 Developing priorities for CI investigations, operations, and collection;
 Carrying out and coordinating surveys of the vulnerabilities of the USG and
the private sector to intelligence threats to identify the areas, programs, and
activities that require protection from such threats;
 Advocating for research and development programs and activities of the
USG and the private sector to direct attention to the needs of the CI
community;
 Developing policies and standards for training and professionalizing the
workforce, and developing and managing the conduct of joint training
exercises; and,
 Performing CI outreach, including consulting with the private sector to
identify vulnerabilities from foreign intelligence activities.
The Director also oversees NCSC’s coordination of the development of CI budgets
and resource allocation plans. Furthermore, under the CI and Security
Enhancements Act of 1994, the Director of NCSC serves as the chairperson of the
National CI Policy Board.
Additionally, under Section 103F of the National Security Act, the Director of
NCSC is tasked to perform not only the duties set forth under the CI Enhancement
Act of 2002, but also such duties prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
Under Section 119B of the National Security Act, the DNI designated NCSC as a
National Intelligence Center to align CI and security functions in a single
organization. In support of its role as a National Intelligence Center, NCSC is
responsible for leading and supporting the integration of the USG’s CI and security
activities, providing outreach to federal and private sector entities, and issuing
public warnings regarding intelligence threats to the United States.
There are also numerous instances where NCSC supports the DNI in her
execution of her statutory responsibilities. A primary example of this is
NCSC’s role as the primary staff element supporting the DNI’s Security
Executive Agent (SecEA) functions. In this role, NCSC helps to oversee
many personnel security functions related to eligibility to access classified
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information and to hold a sensitive position, to include: overseeing the
national security background investigation and adjudication programs;
developing and issuing policies and procedures, including those that support
reciprocal recognition; and arbitrating and resolving disputes among
agencies.
NCSC, on behalf of the DNI, is therefore required to ensure continuous
performance improvement in personnel security processes. This includes
building the capacity of the background investigative workforce and
implementing modernized continuous vetting techniques, as appropriate.
QUESTION 3: Have you discussed with Director Haines her specific future
expectations of you, and her future expectations of the NCSC as a whole? If so,
please describe these expectations.
The DNI and I have spoken multiple times about the future of the NCSC.
Director Haines has expressed that her key objectives for NCSC include:
 Enhancing NSCS’s work on the key fundamentals that underlie the work of
the IC such as completing and improving the ongoing clearance
modernization and move to Trusted Workforce 2.0;
 Building on past successes in NCSC’s work on understanding and helping to
mitigate the supply chain vulnerabilities for the IC and the entire United
States Government;
 Ensuring that the United States Government has the right CI programs
needed to protect its work, particularly in the digital space; and
 Helping to continue to convey to the private sector and academia the threats
posed by foreign actors, particularly China, and helping those actors grow the
programs and expertise needed to protect themselves.

NCSC Mission
QUESTION 4: What do you believe are the greatest challenges facing NCSC?
The evolving CI threat landscape and the growth of NCSC’s mission
requirements means that NCSC must build on a number of existing efforts
in order to ensure that it is effectively postured against the adapting threat
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environment will be an enduring challenge.
NCSC will need to build on prior efforts to include:
 Identifying stakeholders and outlining stakeholders’ USG and security roles
and responsibilities, and clarifying stakeholders’ relationships with NCSC.
 Ensuring that NCSC’s various roles and missions are properly prioritized
and not duplicating the work of other parts of the IC or other agencies who
might be better postured to carry out that work.
 Leveraging the IC in protecting non-USG entities that foreign intelligence
entities target for their research, technologies, data, and intellectual
property.
 Assisting NT50 agencies to establish “CI awareness” and/or security
programs to ensure that USG data and sensitive information are identified
and protected.

QUESTION 5: Please explain your vision for the NCSC, including your views
on its current and future priorities and what the organization should look like five
years from now.
My vision is for NCSC to be the nation’s premier source for CI and security
expertise and a trusted mission partner in protecting America against foreign and
other adversarial threats. NCSC is currently updating the National CI Strategy that
focuses on prioritizing specific goals that will make America less vulnerable to
foreign intelligence threats.
To implement the vision, if confirmed, I would:
 Leverage the interagency and ensure the CI community is moving in an
integrated way to accomplish goals that include:
o Detecting, understanding, and anticipating foreign intelligence threats;
o Deterring foreign intelligence activities and capabilities;
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o Protecting U.S. interests; and,
o Building CI capabilities, partnerships, and resilience.
 Advocate for resources and budgetary authority to support requirements for
the IC and NT50 agencies that align resources to priorities designed to
counter risks from foreign and other adversarial intelligence threats.
 Build resilience in the private sector and academia to advance outreach,
education, and awareness by making resources available that assist with the
development of insider threat and mitigation programs.
 Advance security priorities and support efforts to mitigate supply chain
risks, issue security standards that address evolving threats, and establish
technical capabilities that complement the CI and security communities to
advance their missions.
NCSC currently devotes significant time and effort to raising awareness of foreign
intelligence threats. I envision that in five years NCSC will continue to provide
focused, sustained leadership in key areas such as: protecting our economic
security by mitigating the theft of intellectual property and critical technologies;
harnessing and mitigating the promise and risks posed by cutting edge technology
available to both the United States and our adversaries; and, putting personnel
security and insider threat programs in place to maintain a trusted workforce.
QUESTION 6: What specific benchmarks should be used to assess the NCSC’s
performance?
NCSC uses many benchmarks to assess progress against the following goals
outlined in its National CI Strategy and personnel vetting performance plans.
 NCSC gauges the effectiveness of its governance by assessing progress
against strategic priorities and by taking an integrated approach to CI and
security. NCSC engages across the community by chairing various boards
such as the National CI Policy Board, the IC Security Directors’ Board, and
the CI Strategy and Resource Board.
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 NCSC evaluates this in the annual production of the State of the CI Mission
which provides an assessment of the CI community’s progress against
priorities, initiatives, and challenges. The State of the CI Mission is also
used to inform the CI community’s prioritization of resource needs for
outyears.
 NCSC also reviews benchmarks for security programs to measure their
effectiveness. NCSC issued Performance Management Guidelines and the
Federal Personnel Vetting Performance Management Standards to
modernize outcomes for measuring efficiency and effectiveness of vetting
programs. NCSC’s forthcoming issuance of the Federal Personnel Vetting
Performance Management Implementation Guidance will establish nearterm and future targets for performance measures. Collectively, these
security policies will facilitate uniform measurement, assessment, and
reporting of key vetting processes to ensure consistency, fairness, and the
protection of civil liberties.
 NCSC evaluates the effectiveness of its outreach efforts in terms of
deployed capabilities, usage, and demand for upgraded capabilities, and user
testimonials. NCSC also attempts to understand the extent to which
outreach has changed stakeholder behaviors, increased collaboration among
stakeholders, and empowered stakeholders to enhance their own security
and resilience.
 To measure the health and welfare of NCSC internally, NCSC points to the
successful recruitment and retention of highly qualified CI and security
officers to serve in NCSC, responsible stewardship of human and financial
capital, stellar employee climate survey results, and the success of
groundbreaking initiatives such as our Cross-the-Line program that crossfertilizes expertise across the Center and allows for professional growth.
CI Threats
QUESTION 7: What in your view are the most critical CI threats that are
currently confronting the United States?
The United States faces a growing range of intelligence threats from an expanding
set of actors. Russia and China represent major traditional intelligence threats to the
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United States with well-resourced, technically sophisticated intelligence services
determined to gain sensitive U.S. information and thwart U.S. collection and
operations. Regional actors such as Iran and North Korea, and non-state actors such
as terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, and hackers/hacktivists are
growing in intent and capability. These actors also are increasing their
collaboration with one another, enhancing their skills, expanding their geographic
reach, and magnifying the threat to the United States.
This expanding array of Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIE) are targeting our data,
technology, and talent to erode our military and economic advantage, threatening
the critical infrastructure that keeps our economy and society functioning,
influencing U.S. public opinion and government policies, and undermining our
democracy and societal cohesion. FIE are adopting cutting-edge technologies—
from advanced cyber tools to unmanned systems to enhanced technical surveillance
equipment—that improve their capabilities and challenge our defenses. Much of
this technology is available commercially, providing a shortcut for previously
unsophisticated foreign intelligence entities to become significant threats.
U.S. adversaries also increasingly view data as a strategic resource and a collection
priority. They are focused on acquiring and analyzing data—from personally
identifiable information on U.S. citizens, to commercial and government data—that
can make their espionage, influence, kinetic and cyber-attack operations more
effective, advance their exploitation of the U.S. economy, and give them strategic
advantage over the United States.
QUESTION 8: What would be your top priorities for the NCSC, in terms of the
CI threats facing the United States?
NCSC’s top priorities are to mitigate and counter a range of foreign intelligence
threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Hostile intelligence services and nonstate actors are becoming more capable and have access to more tools. They seek to
access government systems and infrastructure, undermine the private sector through
commercial espionage, infringe on the privacy of U.S. citizens through data theft,
and shape U.S. policy and public opinion through influence operations.
I anticipate these priorities will be reflected in the forthcoming National CI Strategy
and, if confirmed, I would look forward to reviewing the strategy and ensuring the
Committee is kept apprised of its development. We must better anticipate foreign
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intelligence threats and work together across the IC, the broader federal
government, and with our partners to counter these harmful intelligence activities
and degrade FIE capabilities.
Our strength as a nation rests upon a number of strategic advantages that we must
help protect and defend, including our people, our democratic institutions, our
critical technology, infrastructure, and supply chains. We must invest in the future
to develop the capability and capacity to meet these challenges and protect
America’s strategic advantage. We must reinvigorate our CI community, build and
enable strong partnerships, and increase collaboration to build resilience against
current and future foreign intelligence threats.
QUESTION 9: What actions would you plan to take to ensure that each of your
identified priorities is satisfied?
I understand through the forthcoming National CI Strategy, NCSC intends to drive
the direction and alignment of CI priorities and activities. NCSC will leverage the
strengths of each federal department or agency within their respective missions and
authorities, and in coordination with the CI community, will baseline current
activities and identify shortfalls and gaps. These shortfalls and gaps will then be
addressed through the strategy’s implementation plan to provide future direction,
investment, and resource shifts needed to ensure the successful implementation of
the strategy.
QUESTION 10: In your opinion, what CI threats, if any, have been overlooked or
underestimated?
The top evolving and not fully understood or fully addressed challenge involves the
comprehensive national security, data security, and counterespionage laws of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). These laws state that the PRC government may
access private information, compel PRC citizens in China and overseas to assist
PRC intelligence services, and arbitrarily detain or arrest foreigners in China for
suspected espionage activities. I do not believe that the United States has fully
grappled with the implications of this comprehensive system.
We also cannot underestimate the threat posed by FIEs, especially China and Russia
and those groups who assist them, to our critical infrastructure, particularly the
financial, power, water, communications, and transportation sectors. Each of these
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sectors has a large, relatively vulnerable footprint. Their supporting personnel,
networks, and other infrastructure are here in the United States, posing additional
legal, coordination, collection, and other challenges for the IC. Any disruption in
these sectors could impact our economy, military readiness, and the U.S. population
overall. FIEs will look to exploit these nodes during a time of conflict or crisis.
The convergence and disruptive potential of several advanced technologies—
including AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, autonomous systems,
semiconductors and telecommunications—may have unanticipated impacts across
multiple critical sectors such as healthcare, energy, agriculture, and advanced
manufacturing. The CI community will face numerous challenges as these
technologies develop, ranging from the collection and exploitation of sensitive
personal and other data to the disruption of key technical and lifeline sector supply
chains to increased adversary capabilities to influence U.S. and global financial
markets.

QUESTION 11: What in your view is the appropriate role of NCSC in conducting
direct informational outreach to U.S. National Labs, universities, and private sector
start-ups and other entities vis-à-vis their appeal as high-value targets for economic
espionage?
NCSC has a critical role to play in conducting outreach to private sector, academic,
and research entities. The purpose of NCSC’s outreach is to educate these entities
on foreign intelligence threats to their organizations, provide them with best
practices for mitigation, and help them build resilience to protect their critical
assets.
Working with other federal partners, NCSC has been conducting extensive outreach
for years to entities in U.S. emerging technology sectors, as well as U.S. National
Labs, universities, and other research institutions. NCSC conducts its outreach
through both classified and unclassified threat briefings, dissemination of written
products and videos, national communications campaigns, and through enduring
partnerships with industry, academia, state and local entities, foreign allies, and
other stakeholders.
Given its limited staff and resources, it is critical for NCSC to continue to partner
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with USG agencies in its outreach efforts. I would also highlight the opportunities
provided by the “China Roadshows” hosted by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
SSCI, which have allowed NCSC, with other partners, to engage with the private
sector at the C-Suite level. By working together, NCSC and its partners unify
messaging, deconflict engagement efforts, and broaden the scope of their outreach
efforts. NCSC will continue to align its outreach activities with the goals and
objectives of the National CI Strategy of the United States and will capture metrics
on its outreach activities to measure effectiveness and achieve optimal impact for
resources spent.
I would also note that over time, I expect NCSC’s, and other federal entities’,
engagement with the private sector to evolve. As more private sector entities are
aware of the threat posed by China and other actors, their questions will naturally
become more focused on “what can we do” and less about the nature of the threat.
NCSC is, I believe, well positioned to continue to highlight best practices to bring
together government and private sector partners to combat the evolving threat.
QUESTION 12: Please describe the CI threat resulting from the presence of
thousands of foreign nationals from adversary countries at our National Labs and
the risks this threat poses to U.S. national security.
The nature of the foreign intelligence threat to our National Labs has changed over
the past decades. State actors increasingly are exploiting our culture of openness
and collaboration to acquire information on United States research and
development, new technologies, and to advance their military capabilities,
modernize their economies, and weaken U.S. global influence. While we gain
expertise, insight, and valuable skills by maintaining our commitment to a
transparent and open innovation ecosystem, we learned that foreign adversaries are
taking advantage of the access we have provided to legitimate, talented foreign
scientists and academics.
Congressional Oversight
QUESTION 13: The National Security Act of 1947, Section 102A (50 U.S.C.
§ 3024) provides that the DNI “…shall be responsible for ensuring that national
intelligence is provided… to the Senate and House of Representatives and the
committees thereof,” and will “…develop and determine an annual consolidated
National Intelligence Program [(NIP)] budget.”
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a. What do you understand to be the obligation of the DNI and the Director
of the NCSC in support of the DNI to keep the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about matters
relating to compliance with the Constitution and laws?
As Director Haines has stated, the DNI, per Section 502 of the National Security
Act, has a clear legal responsibility to inform the Congressional Intelligence
Committees of issues of compliance with the Constitution and laws, and to report
any illegal intelligence activities. As a long-time and current congressional staffer,
I have a tremendous appreciation for the value and necessity of the committee’s
oversight responsibilities, and fully agree with Director Haines’ statement. Should I
be confirmed as the Director of NCSC, I commit to keeping the committees
informed of any such violations that occur under my authority.

b. What are the Director of the NCSC’s specific obligations under
section 102A, including as to the NIP budget?
The Director of NCSC has an obligation to support the DNI’s role in overseeing the
programming and execution of the NIP budget. Additionally, the Director of NCSC
is charged with providing such information the DNI requests for determining the
NIP budget. Additionally, under the CI Enhancement Act of 2002, the Director of
NCSC, in coordination with the DNI, is responsible for coordinating the
development of budgets and resource allocation plans for CI programs and
activities, as well as ensuring that the budget and resource allocation plans address
CI objectives and priorities.
Intelligence Community CI Offices and Reforms
QUESTION 14: Please describe your authorities over the CI offices within the IC.
While NCSC does not have operational authority over CI offices in the IC, NCSC
may promulgate guidance for IC CI programs. Additionally, by setting strategic
priorities for CI investigations, operations, and collection, NCSC guides
implementation of CI programs within the IC. NCSC also conducts oversight of IC
CI offices through its evaluation of their implementation of the National CI
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Strategy.
QUESTION 15: Do you see any need for modifications to the statutory role or
authorities of the Director of the NCSC? If so, please explain.
The United States faces daunting threats from FIEs that seek to undermine our
economic strength, steal our most sensitive information, and weaken our defenses.
The growing impact of those activities demands knowledge repositories, strategic
orchestration of CI activities across the USG, and greater outreach efforts to engage
and disrupt FIE threats.
To address these issues, if confirmed, I intend to work regularly with the ODNI to
identify possible adjustments in NCSC authorities to clarify its mission and
functions where needed.
Finally, I would note that the Committee’s Audits and Projects Team conducted a
study of NCSC last year that highlighted several potential changes to the authorities
of NCSC. If confirmed as the Director of the NCSC, I would look to work through
those recommendations with the DNI and the committee.

NCSC Analysis
QUESTION 16: What unique role does NCSC’s strategic CI analysis play as
compared to the analysis produced by other IC components?
NCSC serves a unique role within the IC by producing the National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA), as required in the CI
Enhancement Act of 2002. The NTIPA establishes the President’s national CI
priorities, helps policymakers understand the principal FIE objectives and targets,
and describes the intelligence threats that could harm the United States. The NTIPA
provides a baseline for U.S. CI requirements to guide the analytic, collection,
operational, and security activities of the IC, and many other NCSC products—
including the National CI Strategy and the CI Production Guidance—flow from it.
In addition, NCSC’s National CI Officers lead several interagency initiatives to
drive collection, analysis, and operations to identify and counter foreign intelligence
entities and protect America’s strategic advantage.
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In addition to analytic guidance, NCSC contributes to interagency CI risk
assessments that integrate IC-coordinated threat information, vulnerability data, and
mitigation strategies to assess specific CI risks to the United States. These include
embassy site assessments, supply chain risk assessments, and damage assessments
related to unauthorized disclosures. Since many of these threats also impact our
allied partners, NCSC produces releasable versions of these products, as
appropriate.
QUESTION 17: What is the NCSC’s role in coordinating and publishing the IC’s
CI assessments?
As directed by the DNI, and in consultation with appropriate elements of the
departments and agencies of the USG, NCSC oversees and coordinates the
production of strategic analyses of CI matters, including the production of CI
damage assessments and assessments of lessons learned from CI activities. The
NTIPA reflects the culmination of contributions from and in coordination with the
IC, many USG departments and agencies, and other components within ODNI.
This document reflects the greatest concerns the IC and U.S. decision makers have
about the current foreign intelligence threat landscape, and focuses the CI
community’s efforts against a range of foreign intelligence threats. Since many of
these threats also impact our allies, NCSC produces releasable versions of NTIPA
products as well.
State and Local Governments
QUESTION 18: What is NCSC’s role in producing and disseminating
intelligence for state, local, and tribal partners, including information as it relates to
insider threats?
a. How is that role different than that of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)?
b. What is your understanding of the amount and nature of
cooperation among NCSC, FBI, and DHS?
NCSC does not have a direct role in producing or disseminating finished
intelligence for state, local, and tribal partners, including those that may relate to
insider threats. NCSC partners with IC agencies that are authorized to produce and
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disseminate intelligence at this level, such as FBI and DHS, in the production of
bulletins, advisories, and appropriate threat warning information designed to inform
and empower partners at this level. These entities are authorized to provide threat
warnings and have authorities to produce finished intelligence as well.
NCSC also works directly with Executive Branch agencies to: share best practices
for countering foreign intelligence and insider threats; and develop web-based
platforms to raise threat awareness by creating and disseminating unclassified
advisories, bulletins, and guidance that address insider threat topics. NCSC
continues to collaborate with ODNI’s Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
(FSLTT) Partnerships Group to address FSLTT insider threat-related equities.
National Intelligence Manager for CI
QUESTION 19: What is your vision of the Director of the NCSC in the role of
National Intelligence Manager for CI?
As mission manager for the CI community, if confirmed, my vision is for NCSC to
lead innovative CI and security solutions, further integrate CI and security
disciplines into IC business practices, and effectively resource such efforts. To do
this, we would drive integrated CI activities to anticipate and advance our
understanding of evolving FIE threats and U.S. security vulnerabilities. We would
drive development and implementation of new capabilities to preempt, deter, and
disrupt FIE activities and insider threats, and advance CI and security to protect our
people, missions, technologies, information, and infrastructure from FIEs and
insider threats. We would continue enhancing the exchange of FIE threat and
security vulnerability information among key partners and stakeholders at all levels
to promote and prioritize coordinated approaches to mitigation. In carrying out
these activities, my goal would be to create a more proactive CI and security
posture in the United States, employing all instruments of national power to prevent
regional and emerging threat actors from gaining leverage over the U.S.
QUESTION 20: What is the Director of the NCSC’s role in developing the
National Intelligence Priorities Framework with regard to CI?
The Director of NCSC, as the National Intelligence Manager for CI, fulfills the
duties of the NIPF Intelligence Topic Expert for CI. The Director is charged with
integrating the CI community’s efforts across intelligence functions, disciplines,
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and activities in an attempt to achieve unity of effort and effect. One of the most
important tools for accomplishing those tasks is the NIPF. The Director uses the
NIPF process to prioritize collection and analysis against FIE threats against the
United States and codify our approach for the coming year.
The Director of NCSC convenes the CI community and oversees the drafting of the
CI NIPF topic’s priorities to integrate, and prioritize our efforts. NCSC last
completed this effort in March of this year, when the Center and subject matter
experts from all relevant intelligence agencies and departments came together to
review FIE threats and recommended to the DNI a reprioritization to accurately
reflect the CI threat level of each foreign intelligence actor. This periodic review
helps the IC determine the state of collection and analysis against FIEs, develop
integrated strategies to address collection and analytic gaps, and evaluate
responsiveness and success in closing those gaps.
QUESTION 21: What is the Director of the NCSC’s role in providing guidance
on resource allocation with regard to particular CI capabilities and platforms?
The Director of NCSC provides guidance on resource allocation regarding CI
capabilities and platforms through the National CI Strategy and subsequent
implementation plan, as well as through the broader IC’s Consolidated Intelligence
Guidance. In addition, the Director works within established budgetary processes to
impact changes required to address CI and security priorities in the NIP and
evaluate IC program resource allocations against the National CI Strategy’s goals
and objectives.
QUESTION 22: What is the Director of the NCSC’s role in providing guidance
with regard to the allocation of resources among and within IC elements?
The Director of NCSC provides guidance on the allocation of CI and security
resources through the Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution (IPPBE) process. The Director also advocates directly to the IC
CFO and ODNI for resources for the CI and security mission and evaluates
whether IC programs are meeting their expected accomplishments. The
Director’s resource allocation recommendations are informed by NCSC’s
continuous direct interaction with IC elements and ODNI leadership. NCSC
also relies on documents such as the National CI Strategy and the Unifying
Intelligence Strategy for CI, as well as the Consolidated Intelligence
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Guidance to communicate CI and security priorities to the IC. Using these
documents as a guide, NCSC advocates for IC element CI and security
resource requests through the IPPBE process.
QUESTION 23: Given resource constraints, how should the Director of NCSC
identify unnecessary or less critical programs and seek to reallocate funding?
The Director of NCSC identifies critical and less critical programs through
evaluation of CI and security programs and by developing a clear sense of IC
priorities through direct interaction with IC and ODNI leadership. Working
closely with IC partners, the Director participates in the entire budget process
and routinely makes recommendations on strategic CI and security resource
priorities, evaluates IC program requests, advocates for CI and security
resources, and makes recommendations on resource alignments.
While the Director of NCSC does not have directive authority over funds
reallocation, the Director effectively communicates CI and security-related
priorities through documents such as the NTIPA, the National CI Strategy, the
National Intelligence Strategy, and other CI and security-related policies and
guidance so that departments and agencies can align their resources to the
identified priorities. NCSC actively shapes the resource environment by
routinely reviewing and recommending CI and security-related resource
requests as a part of the IPPBE process as well as leveraging its CI and
Resource Strategy Board to refine enterprise mission requirements and
priorities.
QUESTION 24: What are the most important CI gaps or shortfalls across
the IC?
We need to better understand how FIEs exploit the increasing availability of
commercial intelligence tools and services to increase their capabilities and
cooperate with other state and non-state actors to exploit our vulnerabilities. To
increase our understanding and pivot to a more proactive CI posture, the IC must
drive integration, action, and resources across the CI community to outmaneuver
and constrain FIEs, protect America’s strategic advantages, and invest in the future
to develop the capabilities and resilience needed to meet the current threats and
challenges and those to come.
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FIEs seek to collect information from virtually all USG departments and agencies,
state and local governments, cleared defense contractors, commercial firms across
numerous sectors, think tanks, academic institutions, and more. FIEs are pursuing
not only classified information, but also vast troves of unclassified material that can
support their political, economic, R&D, military, and influence goals, and their
attempts to target U.S. persons, supply chains, and critical infrastructure. We must
continue to build trust and increase collaboration with government partners across
the federal, state, and local levels as well as in academia and private industry to
sensitize these sectors to the growing threats posed by FIEs and develop practical
approaches for information sharing and threat mitigation.
We face an increasingly complex technology landscape that requires the
modernization of not only of our collective systems, but also requires an equally
skilled workforce. We must develop a technically proficient CI workforce trained in
key areas such as cyber, critical infrastructure, supply chain risk management,
malign investment, and economic security.
Insider Threats and Unauthorized Disclosures
QUESTION 25: What is the role of the NCSC in preventing insider threats and
unauthorized disclosures?
EO 13587 established the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), which is cochaired by the DNI and the Attorney General and is staffed by NCSC and FBI
personnel.
The NITTF developed National Policy and Minimum Standards to establish a
national baseline necessary for USG insider threat programs. The NITTF provides
technical and programmatic guidance to Executive Branch departments and
agencies, conducts training and workforce professionalization, and disseminates
best practices across the USG.
Since its inception in 2011 the NITTF has provided independent assessments of
departments and agencies insider threat programs to gauge compliance with the
minimum standards and to provide policymakers with a status of the enterprise.
NCSC continues to focus on evolving its NITTF framework to measure
effectiveness, maturity, and efficiency.
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NCSC also maintains significant roles and responsibilities within the IC to deter,
detect, and report unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Pursuant to
ICD 701, Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified National Security Information,
NCSC provides guidance and oversight to IC elements on CI and security matters
related to unauthorized disclosures of classified information, maintains a repository
of notifications from IC elements regarding any loss or compromise of classified
intelligence, and reports to the DNI on a semiannual basis data regarding the
occurrence of unauthorized disclosures, trends, actions taken, and status.
QUESTION 26: How does NCSC work with the FBI’s National Insider Threat
Task Force to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats?
Pursuant to EO 13587, the National Insider Threat Task Force is co-chaired by the
U.S. Attorney General and the DNI and is staffed by NCSC and FBI. The NITTF’s
work impacts Executive Branch departments and agencies by deterring, detecting,
and mitigating insider threats. Countering insider threats requires a collaborative
effort across the government to develop effective strategies and programs. Through
these efforts, the NITTF trains and assists agencies in managing insider threat
programs. NITTF and the FBI continue to support the USG and partners to mature
established insider threat programs.
QUESTION 27: What is your plan to ensure success in preventing insider threats
and unauthorized disclosures?
NCSC is taking a multi-pronged approach to ensuring success, including through its
management and oversight of implementing the National Insider Threat Maturity
Framework, the National Operations Security Program (OPSEC), and the IC’s
Unauthorized Disclosure Program. The NITTF’s ongoing initiative to conduct
program reviews of USG insider threat programs focuses on compliance with the
established Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and
on reviewing federal programs to measure their effectiveness. The NITTF works
with agencies to address vulnerabilities in their programs to further enhance
program effectiveness. This initiative is designed to detect, deter, and prevent
future insider threats.
NCSC continues to improve the IC’s approach to protect against unauthorized
disclosures as it provides guidance and oversight to IC elements on CI and security
matters related to unauthorized disclosures, helping them to deter, detect, and report
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unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Pursuant to ICD 701,
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified National Security Information, NCSC
maintains a repository of notifications from IC elements regarding any loss or
compromise of classified intelligence and reports to the DNI on a semiannual basis,
data regarding the occurrence of unauthorized disclosures, trends, actions taken, and
status.

Acquisition and Supply Chain Risk Management
QUESTION 28: What is the role of the NCSC in preventing and mitigating
foreign state and non-state actors from compromising the supply chains upon
which the USG relies for its products and services?
NCSC works with USG Supply Chain Risk Management and cyber offices to help
them assess and mitigate efforts to compromise USG and industry supply
chains. NCSC also collaborates with the USG cyber community and the IC to
provide CI and security perspectives on foreign intelligence and other threat
actors’ cyber capabilities. NCSC facilitates interagency fora and platforms for the
sharing of risk information and best practices.
QUESTION 29: What is your plan to increase NCSC’s success in preventing and
mitigating foreign state and non-state actors from compromising the supply
chains upon which the USG relies for its products and services? How do you
measure and define “success” in this context?
NCSC intends to expand industry outreach on CI supply chain threats and risk
management best practices to further enhance understanding and acceptance of the
shared risk environment of modern global supply chains.
Feedback from stakeholders and demand for new capabilities from academia,
private industry, allies, and the USG informs NCSC’s measurements for success.
Success would be bolstered by the introduction of stronger contractual language
during USG acquisitions, proactive engagement that identifies vulnerabilities and
mitigations up-front, and increased investment in CONUS-based manufacturing of
critical technology components.
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QUESTION 30: How do you intend to use NCSC’s resources and organizational
mandate to fight against the licit and illicit acquisition of U.S. sensitive and
advanced technology by foreign actors?
NCSC’s role in the whole-of-government effort against the licit and illicit
acquisition of U.S. sensitive and advanced technology by foreign actors is to
integrate, deconflict, educate, and champion the CI community’s efforts. Further,
NCSC has a role in identifying the variety of tools, capabilities, and partners across
government that should be connected to provide much more comprehensive
protection for our most vital technologies and capabilities. Additionally, the CI
community will continue expanding outreach efforts to highlight the known
vulnerabilities in the U.S. science and technology (S&T) infrastructure to industry,
government labs, and others developing cutting-edge technologies. The CI
community will continue to identify and share best practices for security and
espionage awareness.
Providing threat awareness information to our partners and allies helps them make
informed decisions about how to improve their security and CI postures. NCSC
works closely with the National Labs to facilitate robust training and threat
awareness. For example, NCSC recently introduced the “Safeguarding Science”
toolkit on its public-facing website. The initiative is designed to raise awareness of
the spectrum of risk in emerging technologies and to help our stakeholders in these
fields—such as semiconductor and quantum—develop their own programs to
protect research and innovation. NCSC partnered in this initiative with several
USG organizations—including the National Science Foundation, Office of Science
and Technology Policy, and National Institute of Standards and Technology—to
provide tangible mitigation options against theft, abuse, misuse, and exploitation of
U.S. scientific, academic, and emerging technology sectors. NCSC is also
addressing these issues in the forthcoming National CI Strategy.
NCSC’s outreach and engagement will foster the development of an informed,
empowered scientific community that will be best positioned to assess emerging,
advanced technologies and their applications (such as AI and quantum computing),
design measures to guard against the potential misuse or theft of these technologies,
and encourage information exchanges with the national security community. As a
result, the IC will be better postured to proactively identify security
challenges. NCSC is also addressing this issue in the forthcoming National CI
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Strategy.
NCSC Personnel and Resources
QUESTION 31: Do you believe that NCSC currently has an appropriate level of
personnel and resources? If not, please specify the areas that are lacking and
NCSC’s current plans to address those areas.
At this time I do not know. If confirmed, I will evaluate NCSC’s personnel and
resource levels to ensure NCSC is staffed to provide CI and security leadership and
support to the USG, conduct outreach to appropriate U.S. private sector entities, and
issue public warnings regarding intelligence threats to the United States.
As the threat environment evolves, I will leverage the ODNI planning and
budgeting process to ensure NCSC has the technically trained and experienced
personnel and resources to meet mission requirements.
Professional Experience
QUESTION 32: Please describe specifically how your experiences would
enable you to serve as the Director of NCSC.
I have spent the last 28 years working in Congress overseeing departments and
agencies of the United States government that are involved in national security. For
the last seven and a half years, I have served first as the Minority Staff Director and
then the Staff Director for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In these
roles, I helped, with my counterpart, to lead the staff of the committee in overseeing
all aspects of the USIC. I also, again, with my counterpart at the time, helped direct
the staff of the committee’s investigation into Russia’s attempt to interfere in the
2016 election. This three and a half year effort involved considerable exposure to,
and engagement with, all the various CI elements of the USIC. Further, as part of
my daily job responsibilities as the SSCI staff director, I have personal and direct
engagement with multiple CI entities in the IC on issues of concern.
Prior to joining the SSCI staff, I was employed for 9 years at the House Armed
Services Committee, where I oversaw multiple areas of DOD operations. While not
as directly as involved in CI, I was frequently exposed to CI, insider threat, and
supply chain risks and programs of the Department of Defense.
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To be clear, I am not, unlike the past acting and confirmed Director of the NCSC,
an FBI agent. However, and with all due respect to those individuals, each of
whom I believe did an excellent job in that role, I believe that my background suits
me for this new role, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed. I have had a broad
exposure to the IC and the entire USG national security operations. I have had
long, and often in depth, engagement with CI professionals across the IC. As the
Staff Director of the SSCI, I have experience in running a staff of over 40 people.
Additionally, the role of Staff Director of the committee has frequently required the
ability to navigate multiple competing interests, among members, other committees
of the Senate, HPSCI, the IC, and the White House, among others, to enact
legislation and complete projects, which has direct parallels to how NCSC must
navigate the IC and multiple agencies involved in the CI mission. And, as evident
by my professional experience, I have a deep appreciation for the oversight
responsibilities of the committee and the necessity for partnering with the
committee to ensure NCSC meets its mission requirements.

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