Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Countering the People’s Republic of China’s Economic and Technological Plan for Dominance
Dewey Murdick, Ph.D.
Director, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University
May 11, 2022
Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, members of the committee, thank you for the invitation.

China is keenly aware of its gaps and is using every means available to close them
In 2018, a Chinese state-run newspaper identified nearly three dozen crucial technologies that relied on specific imports
that make China vulnerable to other countries’ potential sanctions and export controls. In a series of articles, the full list of
which is provided below in Appendix A, the authors covered topics including:
● The difficulty with producing rocket engines and aviation landing gear due to limitations in making high-strength
steel;
● The challenges of building reliable high-resolution LiDAR (or light detecting and ranging sensors) that are the
“eyes” of many unmanned vehicles; and
● Detailed gaps in China’s ability to produce key semiconductor manufacturing equipment components.
These articles expressed the feeling that the United States and other powers could use these and other limitations to
“strangle” China at any time.
The Chinese are keenly aware of their strengths and deficits, and are making strides toward achieving
technological self-sufficiency. They regularly leverage a wide range of government powers in an attempt to dominate key
technology areas — not just the cutting edge.
Understanding who is leading and following in emerging technologies between the United States and China
requires evaluating comparative success across several key markers of leadership. These include research-driven
knowledge creation, financial investment, human talent, intellectual property ownership, market share in technologies,
and international standards and norm setting. Using these measures, it is helpful to understand what China sees as its
comparative advantages or weaknesses in emerging technology development.
For example, an article published in January by the Institute for International and Strategic Studies at Peking
University notes China’s own technological strength has been improving progressively in recent years and it has
become an influential science and technology (S&T) power. In artificial intelligence and machine learning, the Chinese
consider themselves to be leading in product-driven research and development areas like facial and speech recognition,
computer vision, and talent training at scale. In basic research, the United States and China are comparable in terms of
scientific research paper publication and citation numbers. Yet the Chinese also know they lag behind the United States in
original, groundbreaking research and in universities’ and employers’ ability to attract and retain top AI talent. Further,
they view U.S. efforts to coordinate AI technology standards among global democracies as compounding their own
problems with internally coordinating standards at different levels of government.
The United States still has a large lead over rapidly-advancing China in AI chips, algorithms, machine learning, and other
core technologies; it leads in promoting military AI applications, and it has introduced ML technology in biosynthesis and
drug R&D, achieving major breakthroughs. Though the United States relies heavily on foreign chip manufacturing, it
maintains an overall technological advantage through its possession of intellectual property and the integration of IP in
advanced semiconductor supply chains. Though China’s circuit industry is rapidly developing, it faces redundancies and
foreign dependencies that keep it well behind the United States. And the same Peking University study cited above also
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notes that the technical strength gap between China and the United States in 5G and other communications technologies is
narrow.
Beyond AI, the Chinese are also aware of the places where they maintain leverage over the United States in key parts of
global supply chains. A December 2020 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report stated that, in 2019, 57.7 percent of
U.S. imports of malaria diagnostic test kits came from China, as did more than 90 percent of key antibiotics and their
derivative imports. As reported in a recent Nature article, the pandemic demonstrated the massive disruptive effects of
China’s dominance in bioeconomic supply chains for U.S. research and medical care, including backlogs of medical PPE
and laboratory equipment vital to operations like gloves, pipette tips, and bleach for decontamination. Experimental
materials including DNA extraction kits and research animals were also interrupted. Labs could not conduct any kind of
research during this time, halting or slowing groundbreaking and innovative research.
China gaining advantages in any of these technologies, be it artificial intelligence, semiconductors, genome editing, or
quantum technologies, would have implications for global security — and potentially, U.S. intelligence community
operations.

The United States has three basic ways to shape its response
The United States needs to prepare now for the long term. As China’s tech ecosystem matures and becomes
increasingly innovative, the United States risks being surprised (and falling behind) because we don’t have a
comprehensive view of what China and other actors are doing across the technology landscape. I see three basic classes of
responses for the United States and its allies that need to be used together to achieve the greatest effect: run faster, slow
competitors down, and monitor the entire science and technology landscape more effectively.
First, the U.S. government could help the nation run faster. It could spur on the innovation ecosystem by expanding
efforts to buy down risk, investing in innovation incubation, and reducing friction points that might slow U.S.-centric
private sector innovation. An increase in funding focused on the transition of research and engineering innovations into
American-made products would also yield positive domestic outcomes.
Second, the U.S. government can work with its allies to slow down the pursuing competition and protect critical
technology. The United States should work with like-minded countries to maximize the effectiveness of export controls,
sanctions and other related measures, as appropriate. However, these measures will not be effective on their own over
time because they can be circumvented, require complicated multi-party coordination, create perverse incentives for tech
firms to leave the United States, and spur China to innovate around them. Such methods are most useful when employed
selectively in combination with run faster and the third option, S&T landscape monitoring.
Third, the United States must improve its monitoring of the science and technology landscape. Doing so is critical
to our success in long-term competition with a high-tech peer. Specifically, Congress can support an analytic
capability that monitors the S&T landscape and enables rapid adoption of new capabilities that offset Chinese advantages.
It also is critical in fast follower situations. China’s rapid rise in science and technology has been facilitated by more than
60,000 open-source collectors and analysts. China’s large-scale S&T analysis capability has enjoyed massive, multilayered and sustained state support. The resources devoted to these efforts allow China to prioritize technical areas for
exploration and help ensure that the country is not surprised by worldwide innovations.
To my knowledge, no part of the U.S. government — including the intelligence community — has developed a scalable
countermeasure to the Chinese approach. Instead, the United States relies on private sector parties to watch the threat and
opportunity horizon, and has a limited S&T intelligence analysis capability that typically focuses on foreign threats in a
handful of areas without comprehensive context. The United States has made no systematic, continuous, and scalable
investment into the wholesale survey and monitoring of the worldwide S&T landscape. This analytic gap directly affects
national security and economic competitiveness. And it undermines the country’s ability to make informed technologyrelated decisions.

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Analysis capabilities are essential to enable competition with a high-tech peer
CSET and others have proposed options to create this much-needed independent capability that uses unclassified
sources to monitor global developments in emerging technologies. In fact, CSET has built a relevant prototype. To be
effective, it must sit apart from the intelligence community due to authority and incentive challenges. The U.S.
government needs a continuous analysis of the global S&T landscape to support strategic planning and decisions by
federal, state, and local authorities in areas such as the following:
● Prioritization of R&D investment and divestment;
● Expert finding, selecting collaborations, and partnerships; and
● Timely insight on the constantly changing targets of unwanted tech transfer.
A well-resourced S&T analysis and monitoring organization with sustained funding:
● Creates an unclassified foundation on top of which more sensitive threat work can be overlaid;
● Functions seamlessly across foreign and domestic technological challenges;
● Assembles a critical mass of resources that are hard to find due to high setup costs, such as technical
infrastructure, data resources, expert technical input, and analytic talent; and
● Works to enable innovations to move from research to practice.
We need to embrace this transformative S&T landscape monitoring mission. When used in combination with “run
faster” and “slow them down” policy options, it will help maintain U.S. leadership in critical emerging technologies and
supply chains — now and into the future.
Thank you, and I look forward to our discussion.

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Appendix A: Citation Information for the 35 “Chokepoints” Articles
Article

Citation

(1)
Photolithography
machines

!"#$%& [staff reporter Gao Bo], “'(’)*’+,-./0123456” [“These ‘Details’ Keep

(2) Microchips

!"#$:;<=>?? [staff reporters Zhang Gailun and Fu Lili], “,@A’B’CD,-AEC”

Top Photolithography Machines a Distant Prospect for China”], 789" [S&T Daily], April 19, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/5DGC-8786 and https://perma.cc/BZK5-F8QE.1

[“ZTE’s Chip Problem Gives China Heart Palpitations”], 789" [S&T Daily], April 20, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/H8XT-6Z6Q and https://perma.cc/E89F-Y9JT.
(3) Operating
systems

!"#$%& [staff reporter Gao Bo], “FGH4DIJKLMNOPAQ-RS” [“Lost Opportunities:

(4) Aircraft engine
nacelles

!"#$TU [staff reporter Jiao Yang], “V$WXYD-Z[\]^4A_`Ra” [“No Homes of

The Pains of a Great Power Without a Domestically Developed Operating System”], 789" [S&T Daily],
April 23, 2018, 1, https://perma.cc/DL52-V2VL.

Their Own: The Nacelle Problem of Domestic Aircraft Engines”], 789" [S&T Daily], April 24, 2018, 1,
https://perma.cc/3GP8-UMDQ.

(5) Touch sensors
!"#$:bc [staff reporter Zhang Jiaxing], “defghDijkA4fl’-Zmn’“ [“An
(for industrial robots)
Oversight in Sensors, a ‘Domestic Touch’ for Dumbed-Down Robots”], 789" [S&T Daily], April 25,
2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/A3JG-V8F2 and https://perma.cc/6SQ5-25TP.
(6) Vacuum
evaporators

!"#$op [staff reporter Liu Yan], “q\rs4tuv%wxyz{A|}” [“Vacuum Evaporator

(7) High-end radio
frequency (RF)
components

!"#$%& [staff reporter Gao Bo], “~•f€v•‚ƒlA„4…†” [“RF Components: For Mobile

(8) Primers and
reagents used for
iCLIP technology
(for RNA
manipulation)

!"#$:bc [staff reporter Zhang Jiaxing], “‘‡ˆ’.‰D-ZŠ‹Œ•Ž•” [“‘Targets’ Are Elusive,

(9) Heavy-duty gas
turbines

!"#$•‘ [staff reporter Qu Jian], “‘’“”•’D–—˜™š4A›œR•” [“‘Weakness between the

Shortage: A Shadow over High-End Displays”], 789" [S&T Daily], April 26, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/4KMP-NE8P and https://perma.cc/ZU9A-9LAC.

Phones, an Embarrassing Reliance on Others”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 7, 2018, 1, 4,
https://perma.cc/6CJH-HRYM and https://perma.cc/5UQ2-J6CB.

Leaving Domestic Production of Innovative Drugs in a Fog”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 8, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/6JF4-4VJ5 and https://perma.cc/C9UE-M4TG.

Kidneys’—The Blade Wounds of Heavy-Duty Gas Turbines”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 9, 2018, 1, 4,
https://perma.cc/H9SV-LDWU and https://perma.cc/WW9D-RSM8.

1

Most of the “chokepoints” articles published by Chinese state-run newspaper Science and Technology Daily (S&T Daily; !"#$) in 2018—
profiled in the upcoming CSET report “Chokepoints: China’s Self-Identified Strategic Technology Import Dependencies”—begin on page one and
continue onto a subsequent page. In these cases, we provide two URLs. The first one links to a PDF of page one of the relevant issue of S&T Daily, a
page that includes the first half of the “chokepoints” article among other articles. The second PDF is of the page of the newspaper that contains the
second half of the “chokepoints” article in question.

4

(10) LiDAR

žŸ#$ ¡ [reporter intern Cui Shuang], “¢2£¤¥¦D+K^§¨•©ª” [“LiDAR Dimness
Leaves Autonomous Driving in a Tangle”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 10, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/SCA7-XVBN and https://perma.cc/KRK3-P5LA.

(11) Airworthiness
standards

!"#$TU [staff reporter Jiao Yang], “«[¬-v-Z[]®¯°.±A²³” [“Airworthiness

(12) High-end
capacitors and
resistors

!"#$%& [staff reporter Gao Bo], “IJ'(´µD¶·¸¹º%w»¼»½” [“Without This

(13) Electronic
design automation
(EDA) software

!"#$¾¿À [staff reporter Yu Huiyou], “ÁEÂÃÄ€vÅÆÇÈA,-’WlÉ’“ [“Core Industrial

(14) High-end
indium tin oxide
(ITO) sputtering
target materials

!"#$ÊËÌ [staff reporter Zhao Hanbin], “͹ÎQχÐDÑÒxyÇÈ•lÓÔ” [“Unable to

(15) Core
algorithms (for
robotics)

!"#$ÕÖ [staff reporter Yang Lun], “×عÙD-ZÂÃ4flJˆ’Ú’“ [“With Inept Algorithms,

Standards: Another Difficult Hurdle for Domestic Aircraft Engines”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 11, 2018,
1, 3, https://perma.cc/669C-55H8 and https://perma.cc/FZ7U-AR3W.

Know-How, High-End Capacitors and Resistors Will Remain Beyond Our Reach”], 789" [S&T Daily],
May 14, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/57QK-KFUJ and https://perma.cc/FBN7-2ADB.

Software: China’s ‘Uncharted Territory’ in Smart Manufacturing”], 789" [S&T Daily], 1–2, May 17,
2018, https://perma.cc/7GW3-J2T5 and https://perma.cc/4U7J-RHV9.

Sinter Large-Size Targets, Panel Display Manufacturing Depends on Others for Survival”], 789" [S&T
Daily], May 18, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/DXH8-XXGN and https://perma.cc/J9LC-RTL4.

Domestically Produced Robots Are a Bit ‘Slow’“], 789" [S&T Daily], May 22, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/QP2T-RBCN and https://perma.cc/EY6D-UWJP.

(16) Aviation-grade !"#$ÛÜÝ [staff reporter Sun Yusong], “[\ÞйßàD-ZQá4âãGä” [“Weak in
steel (for landing
Aviation-Grade Steel, Large Domestic Aircraft Lack Support for Takeoff and Landing”], 789" [S&T
gear)
Daily], May 23, 2018, 1–2, https://perma.cc/PT8S-6AKK and https://perma.cc/73ST-RYWR.
(17) Milling cutters

!"#$åæ [staff reporter Hua Ling], “ç%èÞé’ê¼’D-Zëì.í–î” [“For High-Speed
Railway Track ‘Facelifts,’ Domestic Milling Cutters Are Not Up to the Task”], 789" [S&T Daily], May
24, 2018, 1, https://perma.cc/W4VP-4YAR.

(18) High-end
bearing steel

!"#$ïðÌ [staff reporter Wang Yanbin], “%wñòÞD.óôõA,-ÇÈÃ_Ò” [“High-End
Bearing Steel, a Difficult Shortcoming for Chinese Manufacturing to Overcome”], 789" [S&T Daily],
May 25, 2018, 1, https://perma.cc/26AR-FFKY.

(19) High-pressure !"#$ïö÷=øùúïÜû [staff reporter Wang Haibin and correspondent Wang Yufang], “%üý
piston pumps (for
hydraulic machinery) þÿD!",-#$ÇÈÃ%&A¯'(” [“High-Pressure Piston Pumps: A Thorn in the Side of China’s
Equipment Manufacturing Industry”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 28, 2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/XA2SQBGQ and https://perma.cc/WV9R-NN3Q.
(20) Aviation design !"#$:) [staff reporter Zhang Ye], “[\Ä€a*D-Zá4+,-{’./0’“ [“Aviation
software
Software Plight Has Domestic Aircraft Design under a ‘Skull-Squeezing Curse’“], 789" [S&T Daily],
May 30, 2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/RU6C-MTQS and https://perma.cc/U9HU-YC5V.
(21) High-end
photoresists (for
photolithography)

!"#$ß-1 [staff reporter Guo Guozhong], “,-234ZÃ5236G7” [“China’s
Semiconductor Industry Losing Its Luster Due to Photoresists”], 789" [S&T Daily], May 31, 2018, 1, 3,
https://perma.cc/MYL5-PYGZ and https://perma.cc/KD25-QMZW.

5

(22) High-pressure
common rail direct
fuel injection
systems (for lowemission diesel
engines)

!"#$89:=o; [staff reporters Jiang Dongzhou and Liu Hao], “%ü<é¹,=D-Z>?4•
@A” [“When High-Pressure Common Rail Is No Good, Domestic Diesel Engine Production Suffers”], 78
9" [S&T Daily], June 4, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/T7JN-4GU7 and https://perma.cc/R83U-KFA4.

(23) Transmission
!"#$:bc [staff reporter Zhang Jiaxing], “¶·ABCD3D%EFœ•GHIAJ~K»L”
electron
[“High-Definition 3D Photographs of Our Proteins are Dependent on Foreign Transmission Electron
microscopes (TEM)
Microscopes”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 6, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/HX2Z-BF6V and
https://perma.cc/6YPW-346K.
(24) Main bearings
for tunnel boring
machines (TBM)

!"#$TU [staff reporter Jiao Yang], “KMANO4P¹Q¹=RlASñò” [“Chinese-Made

(25) Microspheres

!"#$%& [staff reporter Gao Bo], “TUvVWÂùÆò@RX” [“Microspheres: The Unbearable

Tunnel Boring Machines Have to Use Main Bearings from Others”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 7, 2018, 1,
3, https://perma.cc/SD3Z-E622 and https://perma.cc/QJA5-WMUM.

Lightness of National Industry”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 12, 2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/TF8V-L8ZX
and https://perma.cc/P27W-8LSP.
(26) Underwater
connectors

!"#$YZ [staff reporter Chen Yu], “[\]^u-Z_fDö`abcdlef” [“With No
Domestic Producers of Underwater Connectors, Seafloor Observation Network Depends on Others”], 789
" [S&T Daily], June 13, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/K8ZS-6JWZ and https://perma.cc/G93B-6SH6.

(27) Key materials
for fuel cells

!"#$:;< [staff reporter Zhang Gailun], “ghijklÐmD˜m»noÃp.qrs”

(28) High-end
welding power
sources (for
underwater welding
robots)

!"#$›t=uvw [staff reporters Ye Qing and Long Yuemei], “-Zx^»y’z”’D4fl[\

(29) Lithium
battery separators

!"#$ÛÜÝ [staff reporter Sun Yusong], “¯|}~•–€v-Z•»n‚ƒ„…†9” [“One Layer
of Separators, Two Very Different Environments: Domestic Lithium Battery Production Still Waiting for the
Clouds to Part”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 21, 2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/DN9Q-C6T6 and
https://perma.cc/42QZ-EYNV.

[“Without Three Key Materials, Fuel Cell Commercialization Will Be Hard to Achieve”], 789" [S&T
Daily], June 14, 2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/EQ5E-GYGV and https://perma.cc/6NAR-HB27.

NÃJEW{” [“Domestic Production of Welding Power Sources ‘Misfires,’ Frustrating Underwater Robot
Operations”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 20, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/UZG7-NBU7 and
https://perma.cc/47XR-D898.

(30) Components
!"#$:bc [staff reporter Zhang Jiaxing], “‡kAˆbf‰Šh‹Œ}•” [“Dull Detectors Blur
for medical imaging
Medical Imaging”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 25, 2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/H62R-UUH7 and
equipment
https://perma.cc/6SZ3-XU3T.
(31) Ultra-precision !"#$:ŽU [staff reporter Zhang Jingyang], “ø••Ù‘’2“R”D•½–—” [“In Ultrapolishing
Precision Polishing Techniques, the Road to the Top is Long and Rocky”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 26,
techniques
2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/N6V6-FETT and https://perma.cc/LLZ2-2G7H.
(32) Epoxy (for
high-end carbon
fiber)

!"#$˜™ [staff reporter Li He], “š›œ•žŸ¹ D-Z¡¢£u¤¥³” [“Insufficient
Resiliency in Epoxy Means Domestic Carbon Fiber Lacks Strength”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 27, 2018,
1, 4, https://perma.cc/2TVR-8PZK and https://perma.cc/SU6R-E4Y5.

6

(33) High-strength
stainless steel (for
rocket engines)

!"#$>¦á=žŸ#$ƒ§¨ [staff reporter Fu Yifei and reporter intern Yu Ziyue], “©¹ªA”«

(34) Database
management
systems

!"#$%& [staff reporter Gao Bo], “®ä¯°±OPv,-²"‰³’´µ¶·¸K’“ [“Database

(35) Scanning
electron
microscopes (SEM)

žŸ#$¹qº [reporter intern Lu Chengkuan], “»¼»L’½¾’DÂÃÇÈ.ó¿hÀÁ” [“Scanning
Electron Microscope ‘Visual Impairment’ Makes Minute Observation Difficult for Industrial
Manufacturing”], 789" [S&T Daily], July 3, 2018, 1, 3, https://perma.cc/VWV2-AFDP and
https://perma.cc/9LVG-V9ES.

]^4’¬-’“ [“The Intractable ‘Rust Disease’ of Rocket Engines”], 789" [S&T Daily], June 28, 2018,
1, 3, https://perma.cc/KH74-9FKL and https://perma.cc/TTV7-CY7R.

Management Systems: China still Looking for the ‘Right Way to Open’“], 789" [S&T Daily], July 2,
2018, 1, 4, https://perma.cc/MDR9-JJCG and https://perma.cc/3ZEP-2DZX.

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Appendix B: Recommended Reading
Zachary Arnold and Melissa Flagg, "A New Institutional Approach to Research Security in the United States” (Center for
Security and Emerging Technology, January 2021). https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/a-new-institutional-approachto-research-security-in-the-united-states/
Tarun Chhabra, William Hannas, Dewey Murdick, and Anna Puglisi, “Open-Source Intelligence for S&T Analysis”
(Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2020). https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/open-sourceintelligence-for-st-analysis/
CSIS Technology and Intelligence Task Force, “Maintaining the Intelligence Edge: Reimagining and Reinventing
Intelligence through Innovation” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2021).
https://www.csis.org/analysis/maintaining-intelligence-edge-reimagining-and-reinventing-intelligence-through-innovation
Ryan Fedasiuk, Emily Weinstein, and Anna Puglisi, "China’s Foreign Technology Wish List" (Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, May 2021). https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas-foreign-technology-wish-list/
Melissa Flagg and Paul Harris, "System Re-engineering: A New Policy Framework for the American R&D System in a
Changed World" (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, September 2020).
https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/system-re-engineering/
William Hannas and Huey-Meei Chang, "China's STI Operations" (Center for Security and Emerging Technology,
January 2021). https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/chinas-sti-operations/
Will Hunt, "Sustaining U.S. Competitiveness in Semiconductor Manufacturing" (Center for Security and Emerging
Technology, January 2022). https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/sustaining-u-s-competitiveness-in-semiconductormanufacturing/
Ben Murphy, “Chokepoints: China’s Self-Identified Strategic Technology Import Dependencies” (Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, May 2022). Forthcoming
Alex Rubin, Alan Omar Loera Martinez, Jake Dow, and Anna Puglisi "The Huawei Moment" (Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, July 2021). https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-huawei-moment/
Wang Jisi, Zhao Jianwei, Hu Ran, Zhang Chengyang, and Zhang Yike, “Sino-U.S. Strategic Competition in the
Technology Domain: Analysis and Outlook” (Institute for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University,
January 2022). http://cn3.uscnpm.org/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=27016

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