SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE

Post-hearing Questions for
Ms. Kate Heinzelman
upon her nomination to be
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency

fFrom Vice Chairman Rubio]
1. How would you define a private company in China?
I understand your longstanding concerns about the People's Republic of
China (PRC) government and the various means it uses to advance its
objectives and appreciated the opportunity to discuss this with you in
connection with my confirmation hearing. Confronting these challenges is a
critical task for the Intelligence Community and a priority-as Director
Burns has made clear-for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If
confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Office of the General Counsel is
doing its part to support the agency's work in this regard.
With regard to private companies in China, foreign countries regulate (and
otherwise interact with) privately held, publicly traded, and public-sector
companies differently. I am not an expert on the corporate law of the PRC
or Chinese law more generally. It is, however, my understanding that, even
as to companies that would be characterized as private, Chinese legal
requirements compel certain cooperation with PRC government entities,
including in circumstances that can raise national security concerns and
other risks.
2. Is WuXi App Tee Co., LTD a private company? Please provide an
explanation of your answer.
Please refer to my response to Question 1. As stated during my
confirmation hearing, I performed fewer than 10 hours of billable work
during my time as a counsel in private practice that involved advice on
compliance with U.S. privacy law to WuXi AppTec Co., LTD. I did not
understand the company to be a PRC government or public-sector entity.
3. In response to pre-hearing question 57 related to your work on behalf of
WuXi App Tee Co., LTD, you responded: "I was not aware during the
course of the representation [ofWuXi App Tee Co., LTD] or when I was
filling out the standard questionnaire of any suggestion that WuXi App Tee
Co., LTD is controlled by a foreign government."
a. When did you fill out the standard questionnaire?
I completed the standard questionnaire on March 18, 2022.

b. Are you aware that in February 2022, WuXi Biologics - a subsidiary
of WuXi App Tee Co., LTD with well-known links to the CCP - had
subsidiaries placed on the U.S. Commerce Department's "Unverified
List"?
I was not aware that the two companies referenced, WuXi Biologics
Co., Ltd. and WuXi Biologics (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., were added to the
referenced Department of Commerce list until I received these posthearing questions.
4. You testified that you provided advice to WuXi App Tee Co., LTD on health
privacy laws in the United States.
Do you assess that WuXi's possession of Americans' health data is
exempt from the PRC's 2017 National Security Law?
As stated during my confirmation hearing, the advice that I provided
to the company pertained to U.S. law. My recollection is that the
advice was about compliance with U.S. privacy laws that apply to
various categories of personal data held by companies, in this case, a
health-sector company. My reference to health privacy was intended
to explain why partners would seek my assistance with such clients in
particular.
I do not have a basis to assess this question about the application of
Chinese law.
5. Do you see any meaningful distinction between Chinese state-owned entities
and ostensibly "private companies" in China, given the reach of the CCP
into the "private" sector, Chinese laws requiring companies to turn over
information to the Chinese state, and CCP's blurring of its military and
civilian sector through the Military Civil Fusion Strategy?
As indicated in my response to Question 1, it is my understanding that, even
as to companies that would be characterized as private, Chinese legal
requirements compel certain cooperation with PRC government entities,
including in circumstances that can raise national security concerns and
other risks. I am not an expert regarding the manner in which these
requirements are implemented or enforced under Chinese law. Similarly, I

am not familiar with details of China's work to advance its military
capabilities through its Military Civil Fusion strategy.
6. Are "private" Chinese companies working to advance China's government
policy of displacing the United States, including its Military Civil Fusion
Strategy?
It is my understanding that the PRC government is " increasingly combining
growing military power with its economic, technological, and diplomatic
clout to strengthen CCP rule, secure what it views as its sovereign territory
and regional preeminence, and pursue global influence," as the Intelligence
Community assessed in its 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, and that the
legal requirements discussed above, which compel certain cooperation with
PRC government entities, support these objectives.
7. During your time as Chief Counselor in the Office of the Attorney General,
have you become aware of any suspected microwave attacks against DOJ
employees that the administration refers to by the moniker 'Anomalous
Health Incidents,' or AHis?
Addressing anomalous health incidents (AHis) is a priority for the
Department of Justice, as the health and well-being of the Department' s
employees and colleagues across the federal government is of utmost
importance. I am aware, as has been publicly reported, that U.S.
Government personnel have reported experiencing symptoms associated
with AHis. The Department of Justice is participating in the governmentwide effort to address such incidents and working to ensure that any affected
Department of Justice personnel have clear guidance on reporting such
incidents. As I testified at my confirmation hearing, I understand this to be a
priority for Director Burns, and, if confirmed, I would work to support the
CIA's efforts both to ensure those affected receive appropriate care and to
assess the cause of the incidents as appropriate. With regard to additional
information, I would direct you to the Department's AHi Coordination Lead
designated pursuant to section 6603(a)(l) of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022, who I understand will be
briefing relevant committees of Congress as required by the NOAA.
8. What action, if any, have you directed or otherwise supported related to AHI
investigations or AHi incidents among DOJ employees?

As noted above, pursuant to recent National Defense Authorization Act
requirements, the Department of Justice has designated an AHI Coordination
Lead for its response to AHI. Please refer to my response to Question 7.
9. If confirmed, will you commit to reviewing the policies and procedures at
CIA to ensure that affected officers and their families have the best medical
care and support available, and review any IC legal guidance or policies that
are currently impeding the expedient delivery of care to these individuals?
Yes. Addressing AHis is a priority, as noted in my response to Question 7.

Health and well-being are of paramount importance. If confirmed, I would
work to support the CIA's efforts in this regard.
IO.Will you also commit to a full, transparent assessment of any attack on an IC
officer even if such an acknowledgement could carry uncomfortable policy
implications for others in the Administration?
Yes, if confirmed, I will work to support the commitment made by Office of
the Director ofNational Intelligence General Counsel Fonzone in this regard
in his responses to post-hearing questions and the CIA's efforts to assess, or
assist in the assessment of, such matters, as appropriate for the CIA's
General Counsel and consistent with the need to protect sensitive national
security information.
11. Starting in August 2020 and into January 2021, you were Vetting Director in
the Office of the General Counsel for the PT Fund, President Elect-Biden's
presidential transition. You also did volunteer work for the Biden campaign
in 2020. Your response to a pre-hearing question on your duties in the role
was light on details and said simply that "[you] led the team that vetted
potential nominees and appointees for the incoming administration."
a. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the General Counsel' s office
and the CIA are free from political influence?
I believe firmly that there is no place for partisan or other
inappropriate influence in intelligence work. As stated at my hearing,
as a lawyer, I view it as my responsibility to give my best legal
advice, based on the facts and the law, on any matter. If confirmed,
this is an expectation I would have for all members of the Office of
General Counsel. Director Burns has been clear, as he stated at his

confirmation hearing, that "good intelligence, delivered with honesty
and integrity, is America's first line of defense . ... that intelligence
professionals have to tell policymakers what they need to hear ....
And .. . that politics must stop where intelligence work begins." If
confirmed, I would work to maintain and help further reinforce these
principles throughout the agency, including through the provision of
legal advice on relevant legal restrictions that apply to agency
personnel.
b. As Vetting Director, did you discuss the unique threat of the CCP
with those you vetted?
As Vetting Director, my role was not to advise those vetted regarding
national security threats.
c. Can you assure Americans with whom you may disagree politically
that your political views will not drive your advice and counsel if
confirmed as CIA General Counsel?
Yes. Please refer to my response to Question 11 a.
12.In your current position as Chief Counselor in the Office of the Attorney
General, you have advised on a "number of national security matters-work
that often involves other interagency partners." Please respond to the
following questions with a "yes" or "no."
a. Have you advised on immigration or border security matters?
b. Did you advise on the termination of the Department of Justice's
China Initiative?
c. Did you advise on any aspect of the Administration's Afghanistan
withdrawal?
d. Have you advised on matters related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine
and the U.S. response?
e. Did you advise on the decision to remove the FARC from the Foreign
Terrorist Organization list?

f. Did you advise on the Administration's recent engagement with the
Maduro regime in Venezuela?
g. Are you advising on the Administration' s engagement on a nuclear
deal with Iran?
h. Have you advised on the Administration's efforts to close the
detention center at Guantanamo Bay?
In my role as Chief Counselor in the Office of the Attorney General I have
helped manage the office and advised the Attorney General, with a particular
focus on national security matters.
The Attorney General has publicly addressed Departmental actions related to
certain of the matters above-for instance, certain immigration-related
issues, the China Initiative, and the Department's efforts to disrupt and
prosecute criminal activity associated with the Russian regime.
With respect to matters that come before the Attorney General personally, I
have had visibility into most such matters, and my level of involvement in
any particular one may have taken a variety of forms. For example, I may
have had awareness of the matter, attended related meetings or events,
overseen the work of a Counsel to the Attorney General on the matter, or
advised on associated Attorney General statements or actions. With respect
to national security matters involving Administration policies that come
before the Attorney General, for instance as part of a National Security
Council process, my role has generally been to ensure that the Attorney
General has appropriate preparation from subject-matter experts.
13. You noted in responses to the standard Committee questionnaire that at the
White House Counsel's Office, where you served from 2013 to 2015, your
portfolio "involved working closely with the National Security Council staff
on legal policy issues, including matters of national security and intelligence
policy." Please respond to the following questions with a ''yes" or "no."
a. Did you work on matters related to the Obama Administration' s
policy toward Cuba?
b. Did you advise on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action?

c. Did you advise on the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner exchange?
I worked on a range of national security matters during the years that I
served in the White House Counsel's Office. For instance, in conjunction
with other attorneys from the National Security Council staff and White
House Counsel's Office, I worked on: advising White House clients on
litigation developments; legal issues associated with the development of
privacy-related policies; national security, intelligence, and law enforcement
legal authorities; legal issues associated with big data; cybersecurity
legislative developments; legal questions arising from proposed or enacted
national security legislation; legal matters associated with Administration
positions relating to intelligence, counterterrorism, and foreign relations; and
a range of matters presented to deputies and principals through the National
Security Council process. Because I did not serve as a lawyer on the
National Security Council staff, my role was generally to assist the White
House Counsel on an as-needed basis in his or her consideration of relevant
legal issues, including by ensuring the office had appropriate awareness of
relevant issues, and to represent the office's views on legal issues to other
relevant offices.
14.At any point during your government service, have you advised on matters
related to Guantanamo Bay detainees? If yes, in what capacity and when?
Yes, various matters relating to Guantanamo Bay have been recurring
national security issues during my time in government and have come before
principals for whom I have worked.
15 .Do you support this Administration's recent decision to transfer al-Qaeda
fighter and devout jihadist Mohammed al-Qahtani - often referred to as the
"20 th hijacker" - from the detention center at Guantanamo Bay to Saudi
Arabia?
On March 7, 2022, the Department of Defense announced the repatriation of
al-Qahtani following a June 2021 Periodic Review Board (PRB)
determination that law of war detention was no longer necessary to protect
against a continuing significant threat to the national security of the United
States. I have no reason to conclude that the PRB's determination was not
consistent with the process set forth in Executive Order 13567 or the law.
16.Should the detention center at Guantanamo Bay be closed?

The Administration is committed to closing the detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, and the Department of Defense has described the United
States' ongoing efforts toward a deliberate and thorough process focused on
responsibly reducing the detainee population and ultimately closing the
facility .
17.What are the counterterrorism or other implications for U.S . national
security due to the nature and circumstances surrounding the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan?
I would look to the Intelligence Community to make any such assessment.
As indicated by the Intelligence Community' s 2022 Annual Threat
Assessment, the Intelligence Community has been engaged in assessing the
impact of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
18.Is the homeland more or less safe following the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan?
Please refer to my response to Question 17.
19 .It is well known to the public, due to the Declassification Act of 2000, that
between 1950 and 1976, Air America was an entity managed by the CIA,
Department of Defense, and Department of State to carry out humanitarian
and covert missions. During this time, Air America operated externally as a
commercial entity. Air America employees served the U.S . government in a
covert capacity to achieve foreign policy objectives throughout the Cold
War, Korean War, and Vietnam War. Over 131 Americans employed by Air
America died, many due to job-related incidents, and others went missing in
action. Chairman Warner and I have introduced the Air America Act most
recently in February 2021. Our bill would qualify the service of Air America
employees as creditable for retirement benefits under the Civil Service
Retirement System. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee reported the bill (as amended) favorably on February 2,
2022. We provided the bill text to you with our prehearing questions.
a. Do you support providing Air America employees with retirement
benefits?

As a general matter, I support providing Americans who have served
their country all appropriate benefits. I do not have sufficient
familiarity with the facts surrounding Air America-includ ing any
benefits for which Air America personnel or their survivors may have
been or may be entitled under existing law and policy, or the
precedent for extending Civil Service Retirement System benefits in
analogous circumstances- and therefore do not have an informed
position on the bill as drafted. If confirmed, I would want to look into
this issue.
b. If the bill is enacted, will you support its execution in providing Air
America employees with retirement benefits?
Yes.
20. The following statement appears on the CIA' s public website: "Air
America, an airline secretly owned by the CIA, was a vital component in the
Agency's operations in Laos."
a. Do you agree with this statement?
I am not familiar with the full history of Air America and do not have
a basis to dispute the accuracy of this statement.
21. The following statement also appears on the CIA's public website: "During
the Vietnam War, Air America, a CIA proprietary airline, flew a variety of
missions in the Far East. These missions ranged from undercover CIA
operations to overt air transportation. The Republic of Vietnam and various
US Government agencies contracted with Air America."
a. Do you agree with this statement?
I am not familiar with the full history of Air America and do not have
a basis to dispute the accuracy of this statement.
22.In additional pre-hearing question 47, you were asked if you interpret the
term "intelligence" to include anything beyond "foreign intelligence" or
"counterintelligence." You were then asked what other kinds of intelligence
you believe might fall under the term "intelligence." In your answer, you
told the Committee that, "the National Security Act makes clear that the

term ' intelligence' in the statute includes both foreign intelligence and
counter intelligence." The Committee is familiar with the statutory definition
and seeks to understand how you, as the nominee to serve as General
Counsel of the CIA, interpret the definition of "intelligence."
a. Do you interpret the term "intelligence" to include only "foreign
intelligence" and "counterintelligence?"
b. Do you believe the use of the term "includes" in the statute leaves the
door open for "intelligence" to include information other than foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence? Please be specific.
It is important to note at the outset that the practical implications of this
interpretation may differ by agency, as departments and agencies have
different missions and authorities. Other legal and policy restrictions will
further limit the activities that agencies may conduct. For instance, under
the National Security Act of 194 7, the Director of the CIA "shall have no
police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions."
50 U.S.C. § 3036(d)(l); see also Executive Order 12333 § 1.7(a).

As the question notes, the National Security Act of 1947 provides a
definition of the term " intelligence," though the questions posed require
further interpretation, particularly in light of the use of the term "includes."
See 50 U.S.C. § 3003(1). The fact that the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 revised the definition of "national
intelligence" in the National Security Act, but did not replace the preexisting
definition of "intelligence" when doing so, must also factor into the analysis.
Before reaching a conclusion on the proper interpretation of the term
"intelligence" in this portion of the National Security Act of 194 7, I would
want to consult with subject-matter expert attorneys and analyze the text,
context, and structure of the Act as a whole. I would also want to have the
benefit of the views of the other departments and agencies that have applied
this language to their own missions over time. This is particularly important
in this context given the potential implications of the question for other
departments and agencies that operate pursuant to different authorities.
If confirmed, I would seek to work closely with agency and Executive
Branch counterparts, and with this Committee, to ensure that CIA' s

activities comport with the law, and that the agency has the authorities it
needs to accomplish its critical mission.
23.In additional pre-hearing question 47, you were also asked your view on the
differences, if any, between "intelligence" and "national intelligence," as
defined in Title 50, Section 3003. You were further asked to provide
examples of what you consider to be "intelligence" that is not "national
intelligence." Your response to the Committee was that "all 'national
intelligence' ... would seem to fall within the colloquial definitions of
'intelligence,' in the sense of' information."'
a. What are the "colloquial definitions" of intelligence? Are they
different from what is defined in statute?
While there are, generally speaking, various definitions of the term
"intelligence" in other contexts, as the question highlights, the
relevant question here is how to interpret the term in the context of
this particular statute. Please refer to my response to Question 22.
b. If confirmed, will you abide by the colloquial definitions of
intelligence, or the statutory definition?
When interpreting a statutory term, I would apply the statutory
definition.
c. What is the difference between "intelligence" and "information," as
referenced in your response?
Please refer to my response to Question 22.
d. Is "national intelligence" a subset of "intelligence?"
As I understand the definitions in 50 U.S.C. § 3003(5), "national
intelligence" refers to information that meets the criteria specified in
Section 3003(5)(A)-(B). Intelligence that does not meet these criteria
would not qualify. As noted above, how broadly to interpret the term
"intelligence" as it appears in 50 U.S.C. § 3003(1) depends on a more
complete analysis of the statute.

24. The definition of "national intelligence" was changed in the 2004
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to enable law
enforcement to share its information with the Intelligence Community, and
to enable the Intelligence Community to share its intelligence with law
enforcement.
a. Do you believe that intelligence shared by the Intelligence
Community with law enforcement has to have a foreign intelligence

or counterintelligence nexus?
As noted in response to Question 22, the CIA has a foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence mission. Its activities with
respect to U .S. persons, and in the United States, in particular, are
circumscribed by applicable law and policy. With regard to
intelligence sharing, the National Security Act of 1947 provides that
the Director of the CIA shall "correlate and evaluate intelligence
related to the national security and provide appropriate dissemination
of such intelligence." 50 U.S.C. § 3036(d)(2). The CIA ' s Attorney
General Guidelines issued pursuant to Executive Order 12333 provide
that the agency may, among other things, disseminate information
concerning U.S. persons needed to protect the safety of any persons or
organizations and incidentally obtained information that may indicate
involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local, or
foreign laws, provided such sharing is otherwise consistent with the
law. If confirmed, I would support the CIA ' s compliance with these
important provisions of law.
25.During your confirmation hearing, you discussed Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorizes the government to
collect intelligence on non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States
to detect, identify, and disrupt terrorist and other national security
threats . The current FISA Title VII authorities (including Section 702)
expire on December 31 , 2023 , unless reauthorized. Prior to past
reauthorizations, in 2012, Attorney General Holder and Director of National
Intelligence Clapper wrote a joint letter to Congress supporting a clean
reauthorization of these authorities. Subsequently, in 20 17, Attorney General
Sessions and Director of National Intelligence Coats wrote a joint letter to
Congress supporting a clean reauthorization of these authorities. Your
questionnaire submission also states that you published an article on these
specific Section 702 authorities.

a. Do you support a clean reauthorization of these FISA Title VII
authorities? Please answer yes or no. If no, please explain why not,
and please include classified information as necessary.
b. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take regarding FISA
Title VII reauthorization? Please be specific, and please include
classified information as necessary.
I strongly support reauthorizing Title VII of FISA, which has been
reauthorized by Congress twice since 2008 in a bipartisan manner. If
confirmed, I would work to support efforts to reauthorize these tools,
including by making myself available to this Committee and Executive
Branch colleagues to assist in Congress's and the Administration' s
reauthorization efforts. As Director Haines indicated during her
confim1ation proceedings, I would, if confirmed, work with others in the
Executive Branch and the Congress to support efforts to determine whether
any changes can be made that would improve the protection of privacy and
civil liberties without compromising national security. Further, I would
support the Intelligence Community's efforts to provide Congress with the
information it needs to evaluate the important role that Title VII plays in
protecting U.S. national security.
]From Senator Wydenj
1. The Intelligence Community has become more transparent with regard to

compliance incidents associated with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA). For example, the DNI and the Department of Justice produce
semiannual assessments of compliance with the procedures and guidelines
issued pursuant to Section 702 of FISA and release those assessments to the
public. The IC has also declassified and released FISA Court opinions that
detail compliance problems. Would you support a framework whereby the
CIA would release to the public information on incidents in which the
Agency did not comply with the Attorney General-approved guidelines that
govern its activities under Executive Order 12333?
If confirmed, I would take seriously any failures to comply with the
Attorney General-approved guidelines issued pursuant to Executive Order
12333; would consider how such compliance issues should be reported; and
would work with others at the CIA, including the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Officer, and in the Intelligence Community to support Director Burns ' s

review of CIA activities under Executive Order 12333 for compliance and
transparency.

/From Senator Cotton}
1. When you previously served as a counsel in the Department of Justice's
National Security Division, it was publicly reported that then-Assistant
Attorney General Lisa Monaco was involved in meetings regarding whether
to try terrorism suspects held at Guantanamo Bay in military commissions or
in the U.S. civilian courts . It was also publicly reported that the National
Security Division was involved in assigning prosecutors to pending cases
against those terrorism suspects. Please describe your involvement, if any, in
policy discussions or prosecutions relating to Guantanamo Bay detainees
when you were a counsel at the National Security Division.

As Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, I
assisted the Assistant Attorney General in her daily duties and worked on a
range of matters within the purview of the Department's National Security
Division. I provided assistance, along with other attorneys from the
Division and U.S. Attorneys ' offices, on certain counterterrorism-related
matters handled by the Division at the time, of which matters relating to
Guantanamo Bay would have been a part. My role would generally have
been to provide as-needed assistance.
2. Please describe the policy portfolio to which you were assigned when you
were a counsel in the Department of Justice's National Security Division,
including the matters you handled which you consider to be the most notable
of your time there.
I do not recall being assigned a discrete portfolio of issues during my time at
the National Security Division, given the nature of my job. As a Counsel to
the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, I assisted the Assistant
Attorney General in her daily duties and worked on a range of matters within
the purview of the Department' s National Security Division. For instance,
in conjunction with other attorneys in the National Security Division' s front
office and throughout the Division, I worked on: prosecution-related legal
issues; the establishment of the National Security Cyber Specialists'
Network and the application of cybersecurity-related authorities; interagency
discussions about national security roles and responsibilities ; the application
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; Attorney Gerieral guidelines

issued pursuant to Executive Order 12333 ; and the Division's management
of matters before the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
More generally, I assisted in the Assistant Attorney General's management
of matters assigned to the Division and in communicating about those issues
to the Department' s leadership offices. I also assisted the Assistant Attorney
General and other Department officials in their work on a range of matters
arising through the National Security Council process.
3. Please describe your involvement, if any, in litigation conducted by the
Department of Justice's National Security Division when you were a counsel
there. If you ever filed a notice of appearance in a case conducted by the
National Security Division during that time, please also provide the docket
number and case caption.
In addition to working on certain counterterrorism-related matters at the
National Security Division, I believe that I supported the Division' s work on
certain civil litigation-related matters and assisted in certain matters before
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In 2012, I filed a notice of
appearance in appellate proceedings in United States v. Chi Tong Kuok, No.
10-50444 (9th Cir.), a case involving charges of conspiracy and attempt to
export defense articles without a license, money laundering, and conspiracy
and attempt to smuggle goods from the United States.
4. When you served as a counsel in the Department of Justice's National
Security Division, were you ever involved in requesting opinions from the
Office of Legal Counsel on matters such as electronic surveillance, physical
searches, or interrogation of terrorism suspects detained by the United
States? If so, please describe your involvement.
As a Counsel in the National Security Division I worked with the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) but do not specifically remember being involved in
requesting formal OLC opinions.
5. In your materials submitted to the Committee, you described your portfolio
while working at the White House Counsel's Office from 2013 to 2015 as
"including matters of national security and intelligence policy." Please
approximate what percentage of your work in the White House Counsel's
Office concerned national security and intelligence policy, and provide the
Committee with a description of the key matters on which you were

involved.
Over time, my portfolio at the White House Counsel's Office expanded to
include matters beyond national security-related matters. I do not presently
have a basis to identify the percentage of my work that was non-national
security matters at any given time, but I believe that national security matters
were a consistent part of my portfolio. These matters included working, for
instance, in conjunction with other attorneys from the National Security
Council staff and White House Counsel's Office, on: advising White House
clients on litigation developments; legal issues associated with the
development of privacy-related policies; national security, intelligence, and
law enforcement legal authorities; legal issues associated with big data;
cybersecurity legislative developments; legal questions arising from
proposed or enacted national security legislation; legal matters associated
with Administration positions relating to intelligence, counterterrorism, and
foreign relations; and a range of matters presented to deputies and principals
through the National Security Council process.
6. During your confirmation hearing, you said that, in "most matters" under the
purview of the Attorney General, you have at least "some visibility,"
although your involvement varies. Please describe your involvement, if any,
in matters involving the National Security Division, the FBI's Intelligence
Branch, the FBI' s Counterintelligence Division, or any Department of
Justice work before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).
In my role as Chief Counselor in the Office of the Attorney General, I have
helped manage the office and advised the Attorney General, with a particular
focus on national security matters. This has regularly involved matters with
the National Security Division and the FBI, including matters related to the
Department of Justice's work involving the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that have come to the office's attention.
7. The Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence jointly
submit a semiannual assessment of compliance with procedures and
guidelines issued pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. On March 14, ODNI publicly released a redacted form of
the 22nd such semiannual assessment. In your role as Chief Counsel to the
Attorney General, have you been involved in the oversight of the
government's compliance with Section 702 procedures? If so, please

describe your involvement.
I have assisted the Attorney General in his work relating to national security
matters, including matters involving the Department of Justice's role with
respect to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
8. Were you involved in the decision of Assistant Attorney General Matthew
Olsen to end the Department of Justice's "China Initiative"? If so, please
describe your involvement.
As noted in response to Question 6, and in my response to Question 12 from
the Vice Chairman, in my role at the Department of Justice I have assisted
the Attorney General in his work relating to national security matters in
particular, including matters arising from the National Security Division.
The Attorney General has commented publicly on the China Initiative, and
as I noted in my testimony, Assistant Attorney General (AAG ) Olsen
recently announced the results of the review he conducted. In doing so,
AAG Olsen made clear that the Department of Justice "will continue to
prioritize and aggressively counter the actions of the PRC government that
harm our people and our institutions," and that it will be "relentless in
defending our country from China."
9. FBI Director Wray has previously testified that the FBI has over 1,000
investigations into Chinese theft of our intellectual property. Since the
Department announced the end of the China Initiative, have investigations
and prosecutions of Chinese theft of our intellectual property increased, or
decreased?
I do not know the number of investigations and prosecutions that the
Department of Justice may currently be conducting into such matters.
However, since AAG Olsen' s February 23, 2022 announcement regarding
the China Initiative, the Department of Justice has made several public
announcements related to charges against or prosecutions of PRCgovernment-associated individuals. As noted above, AAG Olsen has also
been clear about the fact that "the government of China has ... used
espionage tools and tactics against U.S. companies and American workers to
steal critical and emerging technologies."
IO.How many active investigations is the Department of Justice currently
conducting into Chinese theft of American intellectual property?

I do not know the number of investigations that the Department of Justice
may currently be conducting into such matters. Please refer to my responses
to Questions 8 and 9 regarding the Department' s efforts to counter threats
from the PRC government.
11.How many active prosecutions is the Department of Justice currently
conducting related to Chinese theft of American intellectual property?
I do not know the number of prosecutions that the Department of Justice
may currently be conducting into such matters. Please refer to my responses
to Questions 8 and 9 regarding the Department' s efforts to counter threats
from the PRC government.
12. The Chinese Communist Party is arming itself with technology that it
acquires from our labs and research universities. It is well-established that
the CCP sends PRC nationals to collect or steal cutting-edge intellectual
property from our campuses. Please explain your views on whether
tightening STEM student visas to Chinese nationals would affect the CCP's
ability to conduct economic espionage against the United States.
I appreciate the seriousness of the threat posed by economic espionage
against U.S. entities and am aware that the Intelligence Community has
assessed that "China will remain the top threat to U.S. technological
competitiveness as Beijing targets key sectors and proprietary commercial
and military technology from U.S. and allied companies and institutions"
through a variety of tools in its 2022 Annual Threat Assessment. I do not
have a sufficient factual basis at present to have an informed view on how
tightening STEM student visas might affect Chinese Communist Party
economic espionage efforts specifically.
13.During your confirmation hearing, I asked whether you were involved in the
creation of Attorney General Garland' s October 4, 2021 , memorandum
regarding school boards. You said that, in your current role, in "most matters
that came before the Attorney General," you would have "some visibility,"
and that your involvement could include "a variety of things," which you
said "could range from setting up a meeting, attending a meeting, [or]
advising him on associated statements or actions."
a. For this specific matter, what was your involvement?

b. Did you set up meetings? If so, with whom?
c. Did you attend meetings on the memo? If so, when were those
meetings?
d. Did you advise Attorney General Garland on the decision to issue the
memorandum?
e. Did you advise Attorney General Garland on associated statements or
actions that accompanied or were subsequent to that memorandum? If
so, please list each such statement or action on which you provided
advice.
As noted in my response to Question 12 from the Vice Chairman and in my
testimony, with respect to matters that come before the Attorney General
personally, I have had visibility into most such matters in my role as Chief
Counselor, and my involvement in any particular one may have taken a
variety of forms. At my confirmation hearing I described the nature and
constraints of my role and noted the Attorney General ' s statements,
including in testimony before Congress, about the October 4, 2021
memorandum. In addition to addressing questions about the memorandum,
the Attorney General has subsequently addressed the Department's work to
prevent and address violence and threats of violence in remarks on January
5, 2022, in which he noted that "Americans who serve and interact with the
public at every level - many of whom make our democracy work every day
- have been unlawfully targeted with threats of violence and actual
violence."
14.Since the Attorney General issued his October 4, 2021, memorandum
regarding school boards, have you received updates on whether and how
often individuals have been reported to the FBI or other law enforcement
agencies for the types of conduct described in that memorandum?
In my testimony, I noted the Attorney General ' s statements, including in
testimony before Congress, about the October 4, 2021 memorandum. In
addition to addressing questions about the memorandum, the Attorney
General has subsequently addressed the Department's work to prevent and
address violence and threats of violence in remarks on January 5, 2022, in
which he noted that "Americans who serve and interact with the public at

every level - many of whom make our democracy work every day - have
been unlawfully targeted with threats of violence and actual violence."
15.As Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, you had the opportunity to
recommend that he advocate for timely, comprehensive intelligence sharing
directly with Ukraine in the Principals' Committee and National Security
Council. Did you do so? Why or why not?
As the Attorney General has noted in responding to questions posed to him
in testimony about other matters, I am not able to address internal Justice
Department deliberations. With regard to Ukraine more generally, however,
Director Burns made clear in his recent remarks at Georgia Tech the United
States' commitment to rapid and effective intelligence sharing with the
United States' Ukrainian partners and with our allies. If confirmed, I would
work to support the Intelligence Community's efforts with respect to
Ukraine as appropriate.
16. You also had the opportunity to recommend last fall that the Attorney
General advocate in the PC and NSC for the delivery of any and all arms
with which Ukrainians could defend themselves. Did you do so? Why or
why not?
Please refer to my response to Question 15.
17 .Did you conduct reviews on options to provide Ukraine with weapons?
What conclusions did you reach?
Please refer to my response to Question 15.
18.How did your experience in the White House during the crises in Syria and
Yemen inform your policy recommendations with regard to Ukraine?
As a general matter, I draw upon and seek to learn from the experiences I
have had working in and observing the national security environment over
the course of my career. With regard to any particular policy
recommendations, please refer to my response to Question 15.
19.What do you assess are the risks of issuing overly prescriptive guidelines or
micromanaging international security operations from Washington?

As a general matter, I believe that good management strikes an appropriate
balance-specific to a particular operational environment and missionbetween centralization and decentralization. As relevant to the CIA General
Counsel specifically, I believe that effective legal advice and compliance
guidance provides operators in the field the information that they need to
accomplish their missions consistent with applicable law and policies
without giving rise to unwarranted restrictions or confusion that can impede
or interfere with operations. As I noted in my statement for the record, I
value giving legal advice that is designed to be actionable.
20.Last year, the administration released a domestic terrorism strategy asserting
that, among other things, "conditions related to the COVID-19
pandemic ... will almost certainly spur some DVEs to try to engage in
violence this year." How many domestic terrorist attacks have been
committed by U.S. persons opposed to COVID lock-downs?
I do not know.
21.Do you believe that it is appropriate for our foreign intelligence agencies to
conduct domestic law enforcement activities that have no foreign nexus?
As Director Bums emphasized in his recent remarks at Georgia Tech,
domestic law enforcement is the business of other agencies. The CIA has a
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence mission. In Executive Order
12333, the President charged the Director of the CIA with collecting,
analyzing, producing, and disseminating "foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence."
There are, moreover, several specific legal limitations on CIA's activities in
the United States. For instance, the National Security Act of 1947 states that
the Director of the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement
powers or internal security functions." 50 U.S.C. § 3036(d)(l). Executive
Order 12333 further states that the Director of the CIA shall conduct
counterintelligence "without assuming or performing any internal security
functions within the United States." Executive Order 12333 § l .7(a).
As Director Burns explained in his responses to the Committee's additional
prehearing questions, the '"law enforcement proviso" in the National
Security Act of 194 7 described above does not preclude certain types of CIA

assistance to U.S. law enforcement agencies. Where otherwise consistent
with applicable law, the CIA may provide assistance to law enforcement or
other civil authorities in accordance with Section 2.6 of Executive Order
12333. Further, consistent with section 15 of the CIA Act of 1949, the CIA
has certain security authorities focused in and around agency facilities. Of
course, in all circumstances, any CIA activity must comply with all
applicable laws and policies.
22.Do you believe that it is legal or appropriate to use National Intelligence
Program funding to conduct domestic law enforcement activities that have
no foreign nexus?
Please refer to my response to Question 21. The CIA is only permitted to
utilize National Intelligence Program (NIP) funding for lawful activities for
which appropriated funds are available. As noted above, the CIA operates
under a variety of legal and policy limitations. To advise on whether NIP
funding is available for particular CIA activities, I would consult with
appropriate Office of General Counsel attorneys, among others, if
confirmed.
23.Do you see any risks by reallocating resources - collection or analytic from a foreign intelligence mission that only the CIA and IC can execute
effectively, to a law enforcement mission where the FBI, DOJ, and others
have a track record of success? Please answer yes or no, and please explain
the basis for your answer.
As a general matter, I believe it is important that Executive Branch
departments and agencies act in a coordinated fashion that makes lawful,
appropriate, and best use of their respective tools, expertise, and authorities.
I do not know enough presently about the specific reallocation of resources,
or the contemplated law enforcement activities, to which the question refers
to comment on particular resource allocations .
24.Did you work on the 2013 "Presidential Policy Guidance" on CT
operations? Please describe your role in the policy process for formulating
this guidance. What effect do you assess this policy had on military activities
against al-Qa' ida and other terrorist groups?
As a Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, I
assisted the Assistant Attorney General in her daily duties and worked on a

range of matters within the purview of the Department's National Security
Division. With regard to my role in the National Security Division, please
refer to my response to Question 2. While I am familiar with the guidance
referenced, I do not have an adequate basis for characterizing the impact it
has had on military activities against al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups.
25. What role do you assess that changes in pressure on terrorist groups played
in the rise of ISIS?
I would look to the Intelligence Community to make any such assessment.
In its 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, the Intelligence Community
assessed, for instance, that"[ c]onsistent U.S. and allied counterterrorism
pressure has degraded the external attack capabilities of ISIS and al-Qa'ida,
but they still aspire to conduct attacks in the United States."
26.Please describe your role in any policy deliberations regarding the uprising
of the Syrian people against the dictator Bashar al-Assad. How do you assess
that what has widely been reported as a policy of limited engagement
affected the duration of the conflict, Syria's humanitarian crisis, or the
appeal of ISIS?
I would look to the Intelligence Community to make any such assessment.
With regard to my role in the National Security Division and White House
Counsel's Office, please refer to my responses to Question 2 above and
Question 13 from the Vice Chairman.
27.Did you work on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action? Please describe
your role in the policy process that led to negotiating and ratifying this
agreement. Do you assess that Iran' s terrorist and ballistic missile activities
increased or decreased since the agreement was signed? Is it your
assessment that the Iranian regime benefited financially from the deal?
I would look to the Intelligence Community to make any such assessment.
With regard to my role as a lawyer in the White House Counsel's Office,
please refer to my response to Question 13 from the Vice Chairman.
28.Following the JCPOA, did the Iranian regime begin supplying ballistic and
cruise missiles to proxies and partners in the Middle East?

I would look to the Intelligence Community to make any such assessment.
29.Were you aware in 2015 that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
reported that Iran was directly responsible for the deaths of at least 500 U.S.
service members-later confirmed to be 603-in Iraq?
I do not recall if I was specifically aware of the Chairman's statement in
2015.
30.Please describe your role in any policy process surrounding President
Obama's January 2014 announcement that he was unilaterally ending some
and curtailing other signals intelligence collection programs. Do you assess
that this resulted in a reduction of foreign intelligence collection?
At the White House Counsel ' s Office I worked on a range of national
security matters in conjunction with other attorneys from the National
Security Council staff and the White House Counsel's Office. My role was
generally to assist the White House Counsel on an as-needed basis in his or
her consideration of relevant legal issues, including by ensuring the office
had appropriate awareness of relevant issues, and to represent the office ' s
views on legal issues to other relevant offices. The Administration's
responses to intelligence disclosures beginning in 2013 were a recurring
national security issue during the period that I worked on these issues at the
White House. I do not have a basis for assessing the impact the January
2014 announcement had on U.S. foreign intelligence collection.
31.In your prehearing questionnaire, you note that you have never represented
"a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government." Is it
your assessment that a company can be based in the PRC and subject to
China's 2017 National Security Law but not controlled by the PRC?
It is my understanding that, even as to companies that would be
characterized as private, Chinese legal requirements compel certain
cooperation with PRC government entities, including in circumstances that
can raise national security concerns and other risks. I am not an expert
regarding these requirements under Chinese law or how they are
implemented and enforced. Please refer to my responses to Questions 1 and
2 from the Vice Chairman.

32.How do you assess that biotechnology fits into communist China's CivilMilitary Fusion plans?
I am not familiar with the Chinese Communist Party ' s specific aspirations
regarding the manner in which biotechnology fits into the Military Civil
Fusion strategy, though my understanding is that the strategy ' s aim is to help
advance the Chinese military ' s technological capabilities.
33. What risks would the provision of biotechnology equipment, expertise, or
data to the People's Republic of China pose to the national security of the
United States?
Providing sensitive biotechnologies to foreign countries, particularly in
circumstances that do not comply with applicable U.S. law, may give rise to
a variety of risks . I would look to the Intelligence Community to make any
such assessment as relates to specific countries or technologies in particular.
If confirmed, I would work to support any Intelligence Community efforts
on these issues with appropriate legal advice.
34.Do you think that former national security officials have any obligations to
the United States after they leave government? Why would it be appropriate
for a former official to profit from their previous service by representing
America's adversaries?
Former government officials have important obligations after they leave
government. These obligations reflect that public service is a public trust.
National security officials, in particular, must continue to safeguard sensitive
information with which they were entrusted. Post-employment restrictions
and obligations based in statute, regulation, and executive order also apply
and restrict, among other things, former officials' activities as they relate to
representing, aiding, or advising foreign governments and others. I am
committed to honoring these obligations and, if confirmed, to providing
advice to departing CIA personnel on compliance with these important
obligations.
35.During your time at the Department of Justice, the White House, or in
private practice, have you ever observed evidence of a campaign by the
People' s Republic of China to project illiberal Communist Chinese laws,
policies, and norms onto the international system or the legal codes of other

countries, or manipulate the legal codes of other countries to advance CCP
objectives?
While I cannot recall a specific example of a matter in which I observed
such behavior first-hand in my work, I am generally familiar with the PRC
government's efforts in this regard and with the threat posed by the PRC
government's transnational repression efforts more broadly. As noted in the
2022 Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment, "Beijing is
intensifying efforts to mold U.S. public discourse, pressure perceived
political opponents, and muffle criticism on such issues as religious
freedom, suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, and oppression of the
Uyghurs as well as other minorities."
36.Do you think that the Chinese Communist Party uses private companies,
trade associations, or seemingly innocuous government bureaucracies to
wage such a campaign?
Yes, please refer to my response to Question 35. I would look to the
Intelligence Community to assess the extent to which the Chinese
Communist Party uses particular means to achieve its objectives. The
Intelligence Community's 2022 Annual Threat Assessment notes that the
Chinese Communist Party will work to "undercut U.S. influence, drive
wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that
favor its authoritarian system."

[From Senator Sasse]
1. If confirmed, will you commit that you will not perform work for any PRCcontrolled entity after leaving government service?
I have no intention of working for any entity that I know to be PRCgovemment-controlled and, if confirmed, will not perform work for any
client that is inconsistent with my legal responsibilities, ethical
commitments, or personal standards, including by performing work that
threatens U.S. national security. Of course, I will also comply with all
applicable post-employment restrictions. These include those set forth in
Executive Order 13989 and federal post-employment restrictions laws and
regulations, including the recently enacted section 308 of the Fiscal Year
2022 Intelligence Authorization Act and the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 207.