SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE

Additional Pre-Hearing Questions for
Matthew G. Olsen upon his nomination to be Assistant Attorney General for the National
Security Division, Department of Justice

Keeping the Intelligence Committee Fully and Currently Informed
QUESTION 1: Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that the obligation to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities applies not only to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) but also to “the heads of
all departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved in
intelligence activities.” Section 503 establishes a similar requirement concerning covert actions.
Sections 502(a)(2) and 503(b)(2) provide that these officials shall “furnish to the congressional
intelligence committees any information or material” concerning intelligence activities or covert
actions, including the legal basis for them, that is requested by either of the committees in order
to carry out its authorized responsibilities. Finally, 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(1) provides that the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security (AAG/NS) shall conduct, handle, or supervise
the “brief[ing] of Congress, as appropriate, on matters relating to the national security activities
of the United States[.]”
a. What is your understanding of the obligation of the Attorney General and the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to keep the congressional intelligence
committees, including all their Members, fully and currently informed?
RESPONSE: Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 imposes an obligation on
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all agencies involved in intelligence
activities to keep the congressional intelligence committees "fully and currently informed
of all intelligence activities ... including any significant anticipated intelligence activity
and any significant intelligence failure." I understand that the National Security Act also
provides that this responsibility be exercised "to the extent consistent with due regard for
the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive
intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters." These
obligations apply to intelligence activities undertaken by the FBI and DEA components
that are part of the Intelligence Community. The Attorney General, like all department
heads, has responsibility for ensuring that Intelligence Community elements within the
Department fulfill this obligation with respect to their activities. In addition, applicable
regulation provides that the Assistant Attorney General for National Security shall “brief
Congress, as appropriate, on matters relating to the national security activities of the
United States,” and shall “advise and assist the Attorney General in carrying out his
responsibilities…related to intelligence, counterintelligence, or national security matters.”
b. To what activities of the Department of Justice (Department), including the FBI, does this
obligation ordinarily apply?
RESPONSE: The FBI and DEA have obligations to keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed about their intelligence activities, as set forth in
Section 502 of the National Security Act. These pertain to certain activities of the FBI's
National Security Branch and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)'s Office of
National Security Intelligence, both of which are Intelligence Community elements.

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c. What is your understanding of the Attorney General’s obligation to provide to the
congressional intelligence committees any information or material concerning the legal
basis for intelligence activities or covert actions, which either committee requests in order
to carry out its legislative or oversight responsibilities?
RESPONSE: The congressional intelligence committees play an essential role in
overseeing and authorizing the Executive Branch's intelligence activities. To effectively
discharge that function, the committees must receive timely information concerning the
legal basis for intelligence activities or covert actions, as Sections 502 and 503 provide.
The intelligence agencies are required to provide information or material relating to their
own intelligence activities to the committees as set forth in the National Security Act.
The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring that Intelligence Community elements
within the Department fulfill this obligation with respect to their activities.
d. The Committee utilizes detailed information on the overall national security threat
environment and other intelligence matters to fulfill its intelligence authorization and
oversight functions. Do you agree that the Department and the FBI should fully notify
and brief the congressional intelligence committees on potential counterterrorism and
counterintelligence threats to the United States, as well as FBI intelligence-related
activities to thwart such threats?
RESPONSE: Yes. I agree that the Department, including the FBI, should fully notify
and brief the congressional intelligence committees on potential counterterrorism and
counterintelligence threats to the United States, as well as the Department's
intelligence­related activities to thwart such threats.
e. The Committee’s legislative and oversight responsibilities include assessing the utility
and effectiveness of counterterrorism and counterintelligence authorities, as well as the
legality of those authorities as applied. Do you agree that the Department’s and FBI’s
notifications and briefings should include detailed information on these authorities, as
well as their use in ongoing and completed investigations?
RESPONSE: Yes. I agree that the notifications and briefings of the Department,
including the FBI, should include detailed information on these authorities. These
intelligence briefings must be conducted in a manner which keeps the intelligence
committees fully informed as required, consistent with law enforcement and intelligence
responsibilities. Ensuring meaningful oversight of these activities is critical to public
confidence that these authorities are being used appropriately and effectively.

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Liaison to the Director of National Intelligence
QUESTION 2: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 507A(b)(2), the AAG/NS “shall serve as primary
liaison” to the DNI for the Department.
a. What is your understanding of how past AAG/NS’s have performed this responsibility?
Describe the principal ways in which the AAG/NS should carry out this responsibility
and the principal matters that the AAG/NS should address in performing this
responsibility.
RESPONSE: As the Department's primary liaison to the DNI, the AAG/NS, supported
by the National Security Division, works closely with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Office of General Counsel for ODNI. NSD was
created, in part, to better align law enforcement and intelligence efforts countering
national security threats and to ensure appropriate coordination and deconfliction of
efforts. The AAG/NS plays a critical role in ensuring that intelligence equities are
appropriately considered when making decisions in law enforcement matters, and
similarly, ensuring that equities related to criminal investigations and cases are
appropriately considered when making decisions in intelligence matters. The AAG/NS
carries out this responsibility through regular consultations and coordination with ODNI
and its Office of General Counsel, thereby facilitating protection of national security
consistent with the law.
b. Have you discussed with the DNI, and with personnel in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), your respective understandings of that responsibility? If
so, please describe.
RESPONSE: No, I have not had the opportunity to speak to the Director of National
Intelligence regarding our respective understandings of this responsibility. If confirmed, I
look forward to working in partnership with DNI Haines and ODNI to discharge this
critical role.
Priorities of the National Security Division and the Attorney General
QUESTION 3: Have you discussed with the Attorney General his specific expectations of you,
if confirmed as Assistant Attorney General, and his expectations of the National Security
Division (NSD) as a whole? If so, please describe those expectations.
RESPONSE: I have not had the opportunity to speak with the Attorney General about
his specific expectations of the AAG/NS or the National Security Division as a whole.
However, the Attorney General and I have discussed his general views regarding the
important role of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security and the National
Security Division. Based on that conversation, I know that the Attorney General and I
share the belief that NSD plays an essential role in safeguarding the nation and that the
Division must always pursue its mission to seek justice based only on the facts and the
law.
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QUESTION 4: Based on your experience in, and current understanding of, NSD, please
provide any observations or recommendations related to the strengths or weaknesses of NSD,
including its organization, responsibilities, personnel, allocation of resources, and any other
matters that you believe are relevant to strengthening NSD.
RESPONSE: I am not familiar with changes to the organizational structure,
responsibilities, personnel, and allocation of resources of the National Security Division
that may have occurred since I was last in government. If confirmed, I will prioritize
efforts to support and strengthen the Division’s work.
Oversight of Intelligence Activities
QUESTION 5: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(17), the AAG/NS shall “[p]rovide oversight of
intelligence, counterintelligence, or national security matters by executive branch agencies to
ensure conformity with applicable law, executive branch regulations, and Departmental
objectives and report to the Attorney General on such activities.”
a. What is your understanding of NSD’s oversight role, including the manner in which it
has been exercised, concerning the FBI’s intelligence activities?
RESPONSE: To ensure compliance with the Constitution, statutes, and Executive
Branch policies, the Office of Intelligence Oversight Section is responsible for the legal
oversight of IC agencies’ implementation of FISA authorities and certain other national
security activities conducted by FBI. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Oversight
Section conducts oversight reviews or audits at certain IC agencies, including the FBI,
and investigates and reports compliance matters to the FISC and Congress. As part of its
compliance work, the Oversight Section identifies individual and systemic incidents of
non-compliance and works with the responsible agencies to correct existing problems and
limit the occurrence of future incidents. In addition to its broad intelligence collection
oversight responsibilities, the Oversight Section also fulfills various reporting obligations
of the Department.
b. What is your understanding of NSD’s oversight role undertaken in the offices of United
States Attorneys, including the manner in which it has been exercised?
RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General and the
Acting Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division, my understanding is
that NSD is responsible for ensuring that national security activities conducted by United
States Attorney's Offices are coordinated as part of a national program. To fulfill that
responsibility, NSD supervises the application of most federal criminal laws related to
counterterrorism and counterespionage. Through its authority to approve the use of
certain statutes in national security prosecutions, NSD seeks to ensure a coordinated and
consistent approach in combating national security threats. NSD also ensures that the
Department's national security activities are coordinated with the Intelligence Community
and other members of the Executive Branch's national security apparatus.

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c. What is your understanding of NSD’s oversight role, including the manner in which it
has been exercised, concerning the IC’s intelligence activities outside of the Department?
RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General and
the Acting Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division, my
understanding is that NSD exercises its oversight responsibilities with respect to elements
of the Intelligence Community outside the Department of Justice in several ways. First,
through its role as the government's representative before the FISC, NSD reviews and
submits all FISA applications on behalf of the applicable Intelligence Community
agencies and monitors compliance by these Intelligence Community agencies with orders
from the FISC. In addition, together with ODNI, NSD oversees FISC-approved legal
procedures. The Office of Intelligence Oversight Section is responsible for the legal
oversight of IC agencies’ implementation of FISA authorities. That includes working
with ODNI to review acquisition under Section 702 of FISA to ensure compliance with
targeting, minimization, and querying procedures established pursuant to the statute.
Additionally, NSD performs oversight through its role as the liaison to the Director of
National Intelligence. In that role, NSD reviews policies that require consultation and
approval by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333. Lastly, NSD, along with
other Department components, may participate in National Security Council policy
development and decision-making meetings in which intelligence activities are subject to
legal and policy discussion.
d. Are there improvements, in terms of resources, methodology, and objectives in the
conduct of this oversight that you believe should be considered?
RESPONSE: I am not currently at the Department and do not know the specific details
regarding the existing resources, methodology, and objectives with respect to oversight
activity. If confirmed, I look forward to managing the important oversight function of the
Division and will determine if additional resources or other improvements are needed.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
QUESTION 6: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(6), the AAG/NS shall administer the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
a. What responsibility does NSD have with regard to ensuring that representations made to
the United States courts, both by other Department elements and by Intelligence
Community (IC) elements, are accurate and complete with regard to intelligence
activities and other classified matters? What responsibility does NSD have to correct any
inaccurate or incomplete representations? Please describe how NSD fulfills this
responsibility.

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RESPONSE: NSD has the responsibility to ensure that the Division’s representations in
court are accurate and complete, and to strive to ensure that the same is true of
representations made by the Intelligence Community in matters handled by NSD. If there
are material mistakes, NSD must inform the courts promptly and work with the
Intelligence Community to correct them. To fulfill this responsibility, NSD attorneys
must work diligently to understand the facts of intelligence activities and other national
security-related matters that may be at issue in litigation or other matters for which they
are responsible. With regard to FISA applications in particular, I am aware that NSD and
the FBI have undertaken a number of measures in recent months to improve the accuracy
of information presented to the court
b. Based on your experience in and current understanding of NSD, what improvements, if
any, would you make to the administration of FISA, in terms of policies, resources,
technology, and relations with both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
and IC elements?
RESPONSE: I am not currently at the Department and do not know the current policies,
resources, technology, and relations the National Security Division has with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and Intelligence Community elements. If confirmed, I
will ensure that the Division continues to implement policies designed to improve the
accuracy of information presented to the FISC and that the Division has the appropriate
policies, resources and technology.
c. The former Chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board recently
released a White Paper titled, Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in
which he recommended that DOJ pursue opportunities to make the FISA oversight
process more efficient, stating, “Congress should support and provide greater funding for
DOJ’s efforts to deploy automated oversight tools augment manual reviews.” What
improvements, if any, would you make to improve the efficiency of FISA oversight?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I will work with the oversight personnel in NSD to
determine whether additional funding is needed to develop automated tools to assist the
Division’s oversight and compliance work.
d. What is the role of NSD in the declassification of FISC opinions? What changes, if any,
would you make to this process?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, I am not privy to
the current role of NSD in the declassification of FISC opinions. I am aware that the
Department is required by existing law to conduct a declassification review of significant
opinions and orders, and that the government has released many such opinions. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Division meets this obligation and supports meaningful
transparency in the FISA process, where it can be achieved consistent with the need to
protect national security information. If confirmed, I will review the current
declassification review process to determine if any changes are needed.
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QUESTION 7: On March 15, 2020, three FISA authorities expired, known as the Business
Records, Lone Wolf, and Roving authorities.
a. If confirmed, how will you pursue reauthorizing these intelligence tools?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I will work with the Department’s leadership and with
Congress to evaluate the operational effects of the expiration of these authorities, as well
as the potential operational effects of any legislative proposals to reauthorize them.
b. If confirmed, how do you plan to prioritize these efforts, particularly with regard to our
foreign adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I will request a briefing from the FBI and NSD personnel to
better understand how the expired authorities were used to counter national security
threats posed by foreign adversaries.
QUESTION 8: Title VII of FISA, which includes foreign-based collection authorities, expires
at the end of 2023. Do you support reauthorization for a period of years or making these
provisions permanent? Please provide the principal reasons for your support.
RESPONSE: Based on my previous experience at the Department, the National Security
Agency, and the National Counterterrorism Center, I believe that Title VII of FISA,
including Section 702, is a vital national security tool. Section 702 provides critical
authorities for collecting foreign intelligence to protect our national security. The Title
VII authorities have been reauthorized twice since 2008 in a bipartisan manner by
Congress. Permanent reauthorization would ensure that these important tools remain
available to the Intelligence Community to counter international terrorism activities and
other national security threats such as international terrorism and espionage. Should the
Title VII authorities be permanently reauthorized, Congress would maintain oversight of
the implementation of these tools through various reporting requirements in Title VII.
Encryption
QUESTION 9: Our adversaries’ abilities to evade lawful surveillance authorities by using
various encryption methods has hindered our intelligence collection and poses risks to our
national security. The Intelligence Community and Department of Justice have been vocal in
their challenges caused by encryption.
a. If confirmed, what position will you take regarding encryption in general, and
specifically regarding mandatory decryption for national security and law enforcement
investigations?

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RESPONSE: Strong encryption is an essential element of protecting individual privacy
and security from evolving cyber threats. However, encryption that is implemented
without the ability to respond to lawful orders from law enforcement may pose a
significant challenge to federal, state, and local authorities in investigations ranging from
international terrorism to child exploitation. If confirmed, I will work with this
Committee and others in Congress to identify potential solutions that address law
enforcement’s legitimate and demonstrated needs to protect public safety, while
respecting the civil liberties, economic, and cybersecurity imperatives that have driven
the widespread adoption of strong encryption globally.
b. If confirmed, in your role as AAG, how will you consider and give deference to the
encryption challenges faced by Intelligence Community agencies and the Department of
Justice in their national security and law enforcement investigations?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I will examine the various legislative proposals that have
been introduced on encryption and lawful access, and will work with the Criminal
Division, the FBI. and other components of the Justice Department to understand how the
challenge has evolved for law enforcement at both the federal and state/local levels in
national security, child exploitation, and other cases. I will also work with the DNI to
understand the particular challenges faced by the Intelligence Community.
Ransomware and Digital Extortion
QUESTION 10: If confirmed, what are your plans for implementing, on NSD’s behalf, the
Ransomware and Digital Extortion Guidance, as described in Deputy Attorney General
Monaco’s June 3, 2021 Memorandum?
RESPONSE: I am not at the Department and cannot speak to plans for implementing
the Deputy Attorney General’s recent guidance. I know the Department is committed to
combatting ransomware and that NSD plays an important role in those efforts.
Ransomware is a serious threat to public safety. The government must help victims fight
ransomware, including by working with foreign partners and the private sector. Criminal
deterrence through investigation and prosecution is also a critical part of addressing this
threat. Law enforcement must also target the infrastructure that supports ransomware.
This includes vendors that sell malware, services that help conceal malware from antivirus software, and money launderers. The international reach of ransomware means
countries must work together to prevent these attacks. If confirmed, I would look to learn
more about work already underway and building on DOJ’s successes in working with
foreign partners to disrupt ransomware attacks and other malicious cyber activities.

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Protection of Classified Information
QUESTION 11: Describe your understanding of the personnel resources that NSD should
devote to the prosecution of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and how NSD
should divide responsibility on these matters with the Criminal Division. Please describe any
recommendations related to prosecutions connected to unauthorized disclosures of classified
information with regard to Department policies and resources.
RESPONSE: Unauthorized disclosures of classified information can pose a serious risk
to the nation's security, including to the government’s sources of information and
methods of information gathering. Effective enforcement of laws forbidding such
disclosure has both a specific and general deterrent effect. Because I have not been with
the Department since 2010, I am not privy to the personnel resources that NSD uses to
investigate and prosecute unauthorized disclosures of classified information, nor am I
aware of how responsibility for these matters may be shared with the Criminal Division.
QUESTION 12: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(1), the AAG/NS has the responsibility to
advise the Attorney General, the Office of Management and Budget, and the White House on
matters relating to national security. In addition, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(7), the
AAG/NS has the responsibility to prosecute crimes involving national security, foreign relations,
and terrorism.
a. Describe your understanding of the personnel resources within NSD that should be
devoted to the prosecution of media leak cases, and how NSD should divide
responsibility on these matters with the Criminal Division.
RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department since 2010, I do not know
what personnel resources NSD uses to investigate and prosecute media leak cases. Nor do
I know how responsibility for these matters is shared with the Criminal Division. I
understand from public reporting that the Attorney General has announced a change in
policy and longstanding practice that would prohibit DOJ from seeking subpoenas or
other compulsory legal process in investigations into the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information “to obtain source information from members of the news media
who are doing their jobs.” If confirmed, I would ensure that the National Security
Division adheres to the Department’s policy.
b. Describe your understanding of the role that NSD has played since its inception in media
leak prosecutions in United States district courts and on appeal to the United States courts
of appeals.
RESPONSE: The National Security Division is charged with the mission of
protecting the United States from threats to our national security. This responsibility
includes the protection of classified information against unauthorized disclosures,
including by supporting, consistent with Departmental policies, investigations and
prosecutions of violations of federal law.

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c. Are there any steps that the Department could take to increase the number of individuals
who are prosecuted for making unauthorized disclosures of classified information to
members of the news media? If so, please describe.
RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department since 2010, I am not familiar
with steps the Department may be taking, or could take, to increase the number of
prosecutions in such cases. If confirmed, I will study this issue and make any needed
improvements to ensure the robust protection of classified information in a manner
consistent with Department policy and our national values.
d. Are there any additional steps that the U.S. government as a whole should take to prevent
the unauthorized disclosures of classified information from occurring? If so, please
describe.
RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department since 2010, I am not familiar
with steps the government as a whole may be taking, or could take, to combat
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. If confirmed, I will study this issue
and make any needed improvements to ensure the robust protection of classified
information in a manner consistent with Department policy and our national values.
e. Are there any additional steps that the U.S. government as a whole should take to prevent
the unauthorized removal and retention of classified information from occurring? If so,
please describe.
RESPONSE: Because I have not been with the Department since 2010, I am not familiar
with the steps the government as a whole may be taking to prevent the unauthorized
removal and retention of classified information. I look forward to learning more about the
steps the Department and government are taking and further studying this issue to
determine whether more should be done.
f. Please describe your understanding of NSD’s prepublication review responsibilities and
the administrative and judicial review, which is available to an officer or employee, or
former officer or employee, with respect to the Department’s exercise of prepublication
authorities, including those applicable to the FBI. In answering this question, please
provide your evaluation of the extent to which present and former officers and employees
of the Department adhere to their prepublication obligations.
RESPONSE: As a condition of obtaining a security clearance, individuals agree to
submit to the government any materials intended for publication that may contain
classified information, so that the government can review such materials to prevent the
inadvertent disclosure of classified information. NSD conducts prepublication review for
certain individuals, including current and former Department officials and employees. I
am aware that there is some ongoing litigation related to the scope of the prepublication
review process, brought by former government officials. I have always sought to uphold
my own prepublication review obligations.

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Obtaining Approvals from the Department/National Security Undercover Operations
QUESTION 13: In general, if a particular investigative authority has been underutilized
because of governmental administrative burdens, are you committed to eliminating unnecessary
administrative burdens so that intelligence professionals are more willing to use the authority?
RESPONSE: Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to eliminating unnecessary
administrative burdens that may be inhibiting intelligence professionals from lawfully
and appropriately using their authorities.
a. What is your understanding of how long it takes for the FBI to obtain authority for
exemptions in national security undercover operations?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, I do not know how
long it takes for the FBI to obtain authority for exemptions in national security
undercover operations. It is my understanding that the length of the process varies
depending upon several factors, including the complexity of the undercover operation and
the amount of information contained in the authorization request. If confirmed, I would
seek to fully understand the current process and identify any areas where it could be more
efficient.
b. What additional steps should the Department take to ensure to eliminate unnecessary
delays?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, I do not know the
current process, or whether there are additional steps the Department should take to avoid
unnecessary delay. If confirmed, I look forward to working on this issue and ensuring
that there are no unnecessary administrative burdens
Counterterrorism Prosecutions
QUESTION 14: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(8), the AAG/NS has the responsibility to
“[p]rosecute and coordinate prosecutions and investigations targeting individuals and
organizations involved in terrorist acts at home or against U.S. persons or interests abroad, or
that assist in the financing of or providing support to those acts[.]”
a. Describe your understanding of the personnel resources that NSD should devote to the
prosecution of terrorism cases.
RESPONSE: The Department's highest priority is protecting the nation against acts of
terrorism, espionage and other national security threats. The National Security Division
plays a critical role in achieving that mission. Because I am not currently at the
Department, however, I am not privy to the personnel resources of NSD that are
dedicated to the prosecution of terrorism cases. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
resources are appropriately allocated to this work.

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b. Describe your understanding of the role that NSD has played since its inception in
terrorism prosecutions in United States district courts and on appeal to the United States
courts of appeals.
RESPONSE: Since its inception, the National Security Division has played a key role in
terrorism prosecutions in the United States district courts. I am aware that the Division
has also added an appellate capability in national security cases. Through its authority to
approve the use of certain statutes in terrorism prosecutions, NSD seeks to ensure a
coordinated and consistent approach in combating terrorism threats. NSD also ensures
that the Department's counterterrorism activities are coordinated with other elements of
the Intelligence Community.
c. Describe what role NSD will play, if any, in prosecutions before military commissions.
RESPONSE: NSD attorneys support the work of military prosecutors before the military
commissions, and NSD is responsible for handling related appeals to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. I expect that work to continue as the Division seeks
justice for those who died on September 11, 2001, and in other attacks.
Counterespionage Prosecutions
QUESTION 15: Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 0.72(a)(7), the AAG/NS has the responsibility to
“[p]rosecute federal crimes involving national security, foreign relations and terrorism[.]”
a. Describe your understanding of the personnel resources that NSD should devote to the
prosecution of espionage cases.
RESPONSE: The Department's highest priority is protecting our nation against acts of
terrorism, espionage and other national security threats. NSD plays a critical role in
achieving that mission. Because I am not currently at the Department, however, I am not
privy to the personnel resources of NSD that are dedicated to the prosecution of
espionage cases. If confirmed, I will ensure personnel resources are appropriately
allocated to this work.
b. Describe your understanding of the role that NSD has played since its inception in
espionage prosecutions in United States district courts and on appeal to the U.S. courts of
appeals.
RESPONSE: Based upon my experience as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
NSD and Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security, NSD has played a key
role since its inception in espionage prosecutions in the United States district courts.
Through its authority to approve the use of certain statutes in espionage prosecutions,
NSD seeks to ensure a coordinated and consistent approach in combating the threat of
espionage. NSD also ensures that the Department's counterintelligence activities are
coordinated with other elements of the Intelligence Community.

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Foreign Investment Review Section/CFIUS
QUESTION 16: What is your vision for the Foreign Investment Review Section (FIRS)?
RESPONSE: I am aware that the Foreign Investment Review Section (FIRS) has grown
rapidly in recent years, in particular due to expanded CFIUS jurisdiction as a result of the
Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA); and the
issuance of Executive Order 13913, which established the Committee for the Assessment
of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (also
known as Team Telecom) and established the Attorney General as the Chair of that
Committee. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Section continues to represent DOJ as an
active member of CFIUS; enable the Attorney General to execute his duties as Chair of
Team Telecom, and help protect U.S. telecommunications networks from exploitation by
foreign adversaries; and conduct robust compliance and enforcement activities to help
ensure that mitigation agreements effectively address national security risks presented by
CFIUS and Team Telecom matters.
QUESTION 17: What foreign investment, if any, requires extra scrutiny in order to protect
national security interests? From which countries and in what sectors?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, and much has
changed since I was last in government, I am not in a position to opine on what foreign
investment requires extra scrutiny. I do know, however, that among the foreign
investment that is of particular interest to the Department are transactions that implicate
telecommunications equipment and services, and transactions that implicate the privacy
of the sensitive personal data of U.S. persons. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
Department scrutinizes foreign investment based on robust risk assessments of the threat,
vulnerabilities, and consequences posed by each transaction under review.
QUESTION 18: As the Attorney General’s representative on the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, if confirmed, what would be your approach to CFIUS reviews?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently working at the Department, and much has
changed since I was last in government, I am not specifically familiar with the Attorney
General’s approach to CFIUS reviews. However, I understand that the Department is
among the most active members of CFIUS, and devotes considerable resources to that
part of the Department’s mission. If confirmed, I would certainly embrace the
Department’s foreign investment review work as a significant part of my role, and would
prioritize the Department’s work to appropriately balance the nation’s open investment
climate with the need to ensure that foreign investment does not harm the national
security interests of the United States.

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China
QUESTION 19: What threat does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pose to the national
security of the United States?
RESPONSE: I agree with Secretary of State Blinken who has said that China represents
the most significant challenge to the United States of any country in the world. If
confirmed, I will assess the Department’s current structure and capacity to counter such
threats and fully support the President’s national security team in protecting the American
people’s security, prosperity, health, and way of life against all enemies.
QUESTION 20: What is your assessment of the CCP’s tactics to achieve global dominance,
particularly as it relates to their efforts within the United States?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently in government, I cannot speak to current
intelligence assessments. However, the public record makes clear that China is engaging
in increasingly aggressive behavior, including stealing our intellectual property,
conducting espionage, repressing its own citizens at home and around the world, and
asserting power globally.
QUESTION 21: What role does the Department of Justice play, and specifically the Assistant
Attorney General for the National Security Division, in ensuring our national security interests
are protected?
RESPONSE: The mission of the National Security Division is to carry out the
Department’s highest priority to protect the United States from threats to our national
security by pursuing justice through the law. NSD is designed to ensure greater
coordination and unity of purpose between prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, on
the one hand, and intelligence attorneys and the Intelligence Community, on the other,
thus strengthening the effectiveness of the federal government's national security efforts.
More specifically, the Assistant Attorney General is responsible for supervising the
prosecutions of counterterrorism and counterespionage cases; advising the Attorney
General and the White House, and briefing Congress on matters relating to the national
security activities of the United States; overseeing Department policy with regard to
intelligence, counterintelligence, or national security matters; administering the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act; representing the Department on the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States, and executing the Attorney General’s responsibilities as
Chair of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States
Telecommunications Services Sector (also known as Team Telecom); and providing
oversight of intelligence, counterintelligence, or national security matters by executive
branch agencies to ensure conformity with applicable law, executive branch regulations,
and Departmental objectives, among other duties.
14

QUESTION 22: What is your assessment of Huawei? Do you consider it to be a national
security threat to the United States? Why or why not?
RESPONSE: I am not in government and am not familiar with current intelligence
information. I have stated previously, including before Congress in testimony citing
intelligence assessments, that Chinese-backed companies like Huawei pose national
security risks to the United States. Those risks are well documented. I agree with FBI
Director Wray that the United States must “consider carefully the risk that companies like
Huawei pose if we allow them into our telecommunications infrastructure.”
Iran and the Western Hemisphere
QUESTION 23: Iran continues to take provocative actions worldwide, including in the Western
Hemisphere through at least some coordination with the illegitimate Maduro regime in
Venezuela and the communist dictatorship in Cuba. If confirmed, will you commit to
maximizing all tools at your disposal as Assistant Attorney General for National Security to
penalize and deter Iranian aggression in the Western Hemisphere?
RESPONSE: Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and a threat to our
forces and partners in the region. The same is true of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC), which is a designated terrorist organization and serves as a branch of
Iran’s military. The Department plays an important role in investigating and prosecuting
material support to terrorist organizations such as the IRGC, and enforcing sanctions
against Iran and designated terrorist organizations. Iran also has the expertise and
willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations, including attacks against critical
infrastructure, such as the April and July 2020 attacks against Israeli water facilities, as
well as to conduct espionage and influence activities. If confirmed, I will continue efforts
to disrupt Iran’s malicious activities across the board through all available tools.
QUESTION 24: If confirmed, will you commit to maximizing all tools at your disposal as
Assistant Attorney General for National Security to bring to justice members of the Maduro
regime?
RESPONSE: I am aware that the Department of Justice last year brought an indictment
against Former President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro Moros, Venezuela’s vice
president for the economy, Venezuela’s Minister of Defense, and Venezuela’s Chief
Supreme Court Justice, along with additional current and former Venezuelan government
officials. If confirmed, I stand ready to offer any support needed from the National
Security Division to bring those individuals to justice in accordance with the rule of law.

15

Publications
QUESTION 25: In March 2019, you coauthored an article in Politico Magazine titled What
Emergency? in which you stated, in part, “[i]n fact, there is no evidence that terrorists are intent
on exploiting the border with Mexico to enter the United States.” Is this your assessment today?
RESPONSE: My statement was based on the 2018 State Department finding that there
was “no credible evidence indicating that international terrorist groups [had] established
bases in Mexico” or that terrorist groups were working with drug cartels or sending
operatives into the U.S. via the southern border. I am not aware if the State Department
or Intelligence Community publicly revised that assessment. I firmly believe it is
essential that U.S. national security strategy be driven by data and based on expert, nonpartisan assessment of threats. If confirmed, that belief would guide my leadership of the
National Security Division.
Professional Experience
QUESTION 26: For each of the following, describe specifically how your experiences will
enable you to serve effectively as the AAG/NS. Include within each response a description of
issues relating to NSD that you can identify based on those experiences.
a. Chief Trust and Security Officer at Uber Technologies, Inc.;
RESPONSE: As the Chief Trust and Security Officer at Uber, I have led a global team
with responsibility across a wide range of security-related areas, including cyber security,
physical security, public safety operations, and corporate investigations. This experience
has provided me with a deep appreciation of the challenges global companies face
operating in a dynamic threat environment and of the importance of cooperation between
the public sector and the private sector in confronting these challenges. I also have
gained valuable management experience leading a large and diverse team operating in
hundreds of cities around the world.
b. President of IronNet Cybersecurity, Inc.
RESPONSE: In 2014 when I left government service, I co-founded IronNet
Cybersecurity, along with former NSA director Keith Alexander and others. Our goal
was to build a company that would provide products and services to companies and
governments to enable them to confront advanced cyber threats and prevent cyber
attacks. This experience provided me with a greater understanding of the nature of the
cyber threat landscape and the challenges companies face in this context. I also expanded
my network of government and business leaders and innovators in the cyber security
field.

16

c. Director of the National Counterterrorism Center;
RESPONSE: I served for three years as the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center under President Obama. Created by Congress in response to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, NCTC is responsible for the integration and analysis of terrorism
information and strategic operational planning of counterterrorism activities. In this role
as a leader in the Intelligence Community, I worked closely with the Department of
Justice and National Security Division and gained directly relevant experience on the
critical interaction between NSD and the intelligence agencies, particularly in the context
of counterterrorism activities.
d. General Counsel for the National Security Agency;
RESPONSE: As the NSA General Counsel, I Served as the chief legal officer for NSA,
providing advice and representation on all of NSA’s missions, including intelligence and
counterterrorism operations and cybersecurity. I worked closely with the National
Security Division and other elements of the Intelligence Community and gained
invaluable experience relating to a range of legal, policy, and compliance issues facing
national security officials and operators.
e. Associate Deputy Attorney General,
RESPONSE: As Associate Deputy Attorney General, I helped to supervise the national
security functions of the Department, including the National Security Division, United
States Attorney’s Offices, and the FBI. I assisted the Deputy Attorney General in the
oversight and management of counterterrorism and espionage prosecutions, the litigation
before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
f. Special Counselor to the Attorney General, Executive Director, Guantanamo Review
Task Force
RESPONSE: As the head of the Guantanamo Review Task Force within the Attorney
General’s Office, I led the review of detainees at Guantanamo in accordance with an
executive order. In this capacity, I was responsible for establishing and supervising an
interagency task force of national security professionals from across the federal
government and for managing the process for compiling and analyzing the relevant
intelligence information on each detainee. I worked in close coordination with the
Department of Justice, including NSD and the Civil Division. I gained experience
bringing together a diverse group of officials from multiple agencies, with a range of
perspectives, to reach consensus on the challenging legal, policy, and operational issues
relating to detainees.

17

g. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division at the Department of
Justice
RESPONSE: As a senior career official in the Department of Justice’s National Security
Division—a newly formed division in the Department—I managed intelligence and
surveillance operations and the oversight of these activities. In this role, I managed over
125 attorneys and support staff members dedicated to the Department’s intelligence
operations and oversight units. In addition, I was responsible for managing the
Department of Justice’s implementation of landmark changes in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act and worked in close collaboration with the Intelligence Community to
interpret new statutory provisions, address policy and technical challenges, and adopt
new oversight mechanisms to ensure the effective and lawful use of the government’s
new surveillance authority. During the 2009 Presidential transition, I served as the acting
Assistant Attorney General for National Security, overseeing the work of the entire
division.
QUESTION 27: Since leaving government service in 2014, you have been employed by
numerous private sector companies and organizations. For each of the following, please
describe specifically the nature of the company or organization and the work you performed on
behalf of the company or organization.
a. Uber Technologies, Inc.;
RESPONSE: Uber is a global technology company based in San Francisco that provides
mobility and delivery services. I manage a global team that is responsible for cyber security,
physical security, public safety operations, and corporate investigations.
b. Hart InterCivic, Inc.;
RESPONSE: Hart InterCivic Inc. is a privately held company based in Texas that provides
election technologies and services to government jurisdictions. I am a member of the board
of directors.
c. WestExec Advisors;
RESPONSE: WestExec Advisors is a strategic advisory firm that offers geopolitical and
policy advice on trends and risks, economic developments, and the evolving technological
landscape. I was a part-time consultant for the firm and focused on cyber security matters.
d. Fairfax National Security Solutions;
RESPONSE: Fairfax National Security Solutions provides strategic consulting and advisory
services to select government clients. I was a part-time consultant for the firm and worked on
a matter involving defensive cyber security advice for the Saudi Arabian government.

18

e. IBM;
RESPONSE: IBM is a multinational technology company headquartered in New York. I
was a part-time consultant for IBM, where I focused on IBM’s i2 threat intelligence
platform.
f. Booz Allen Hamilton
RESPONSE: Booz Allen Hamilton is a multinational management and information
technology consulting firm headquartered in Virginia. I was a part-time consultant for Booz
Allen Hamilton, where I worked on a project involving advice to the Saudi Arabian
government on establishing a counterterrorism analytic center.
QUESTION 28: What, if any, conflicts might arise from your private sector positions if you are
confirmed as Assistant Attorney General, and how would you address these conflicts?
RESPONSE: I am not aware of any conflicts of interest arising from my private sector
positions. In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of
Government Ethics and the Department of Justice’s designated agency ethics official. If I
am confirmed, any potential conflict of interest will be resolved in accordance with the
terms of an ethics agreement that I have entered with the Department of Justice’s
designated agency ethics official, and I will continue to consult with the Department’s
ethics office.
QUESTION 29: Since leaving government service in 2014, you have been affiliated with
numerous organizations. For each of the following, please describe specifically both the nature
of the company or organization and your role with the company or organization.
a. Human Rights First;
RESPONSE: Human Rights First is a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights
organization based in New York, Washington D.C., Houston, and Los Angeles. I am a
member of the board of directors.
b. Center for a New American Security;
RESPONSE: The Center for a New American Security is a Washington, D.C. based think
tank that focuses on U.S. national security. As an adjunct senior fellow, I have focused on
issues such as cyber security, counterterrorism, and surveillance.
c. National Security Institute;
RESPONSE: The National Security Institute is a non-profit advocacy organization affiliated
with George Mason University. I am member of their advisory board.

19

d. Foreign Policy for America;
RESPONSE: Foreign Policy for America is a nonpartisan advocacy organization based in
Washington, D.C., focused on U.S. foreign policy. I am a member of their advisory board.
e. Center for American Progress;
RESPONSE: The Center for American Progress is an independent nonpartisan policy
institute based in Washington, D.C. I am a nonresident senior fellow and have focused on
national security issues.
f. Noblis;
RESPONSE: Noblis is a non-profit science, technology, and strategy organization based in
Washington, D.C. I am a member of Noblis’s national security advisory board.
g. Enlightenment Capital
RESPONSE: Enlightenment Capital is a private investment firm that provides capital and
strategic support to middle market businesses in the aerospace, defense, government and
technology sectors. I am a member of their advisory board.
h. Wickr
RESPONSE: Wickr is an American software company based in New York City that has
developed several secure messaging apps. I am a member of their federal advisory board.
QUESTION 30: What, if any, conflicts might arise from your affiliations if you are confirmed
as Assistant Attorney General, and how would you address these conflicts?
RESPONSE: I am not aware of any conflicts of interest arising from my private sector
positions. In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of
Government Ethics and the Department of Justice’s designated agency ethics official. If I
am confirmed, any potential conflict of interest will be resolved in accordance with the
terms of an ethics agreement that I have entered with the Department of Justice’s
designated agency ethics official, and I will continue to consult with the Department’s
ethics office.

20

Additional Questions from Senator Wyden
Investigations of members and staff of Congress
QUESTION 1: On March 29, 2013, the DNI issued a memorandum on Dissemination of
Congressional Identity Information within the Executive Branch, also known as the “Gates
Procedures.” Those Procedures, which include a section on congressional notification, also
indicate that they do not apply in the following circumstances:
“The dissemination of Congressional identity information for law enforcement purposes,
when required by law or when such dissemination is necessary for an IC element to fully
satisfy its obligation to report possible violations of federal criminal law, consistent with
applicable policies and procedures.”
a. Under what circumstances do you believe that Congress should be notified of criminal
investigations of current or former members and staff?
RESPONSE: The Gates Procedures contain rules that generally govern the dissemination
of information by the Intelligence Community that identifies members of Congress or
Congressional staff. While I am not familiar with the current operation of these
procedures in detail, I understand that the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General
have started a process to evaluate and strengthen the Department’s own policies and
procedures for obtaining records related to members of Congress. In light of that ongoing
process and given that policies and procedures may have changed since I last served in
government, I am not in a position to opine on the circumstances in which notice should
be provided to Congress about criminal investigations of current or former members and
staff. If confirmed, I will work with Department leadership to evaluate its existing
policies and procedures and consider whether any modifications are appropriate.
b. Who should be the recipient of such notifications?
See above answer.
c. At what stage in the investigation should the notification occur?
See above answer.
d. How detailed should the notification be with regard to the predicate for the investigation
and nature and legal basis for collection?
See above answer.

21

Investigations and the news media
QUESTION 2: On May 21, 2021, President Biden referred to subpoenas to seize journalists’
communications records in leak investigations as “simply, simply wrong.” On June 5, 2021, the
Department of Justice announced that it “will not seek compulsory legal process in leak
investigations to obtain source information from members of the news media doing their jobs.”
a. How do you intend to implement and enforce this policy within the National Security
Division?
RESPONSE: Based on public statements, I understand that the Attorney General plans
to issue a memorandum with further guidance about the implementation of this policy,
including definitions of key terms. I would await the issuance of that memorandum and,
if confirmed, I will ensure that the Division adheres to Department policy.
b. Will you release to the public any implementing guidelines related to this policy?
RESPONSE: Because the guidance related to implementation of this policy will be
issued by the Attorney General, I would defer to the Attorney General regarding its
release to the public.
c. Do you believe that the government should seek information on members of the news
media to obtain source information through means other than “compulsory legal
process”? If yes, please describe those means.
RESPONSE: I understand the Department’s policy to mean that prosecutors generally
will not be permitted to use subpoenas or other compulsory legal processes to obtain
information about sources from members of the media or from third parties such as
internet or telephone service providers with which media members have accounts. I
would not want to speculate about other circumstances in which Department officials
could potentially seek information from members of the news media, such as on a
voluntary basis.
QUESTION 3: In a November 5, 2014, letter to the New York Times, then-FBI Director James
Comey described how an FBI employee communicating online with a suspect portrayed himself
as an employee of the Associated Press. Director Comey described this tactic as “legal” and
“appropriate.” Do you believe it is appropriate for the government to impersonate news
organizations?
RESPONSE: I am not familiar with the specific circumstances involved in the abovereferenced letter. I understand the concerns that may arise in connection with an
undercover operation of this nature and, if confirmed, I will review this issue in more
detail.

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Title V of FISA
QUESTION 4: If Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act were to be reauthorized, do you
believe it should be used to collect “tangible things” if they do not pertain to: (1) a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power; (2) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is
the subject of an authorized investigation; or (3) an individual in contact with, or known to, a
suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an authorized investigation?
a. If yes, under what circumstances do you believe the application for a Section 215 order
could be based on the “relevance” standard without satisfying any of the above three
requirements for presumptive relevance?
RESPONSE: As stated previously, because I am not currently working at the Department, I
am not privy to such circumstances. I will ensure that the nation’s surveillance activities
comply with laws passed by Congress and our Constitution.
QUESTION 5: In a November 6, 2020, letter, then-DNI Ratcliffe wrote that, “with respect to
the use of Title V [of FISA] to obtain records from ISPs, the FBI does not request and obtain
pursuant to Title V the content of any communication, to include search terms submitted to an
online search engine.”
a. Do you agree that internet search information constitutes content of communications and
thus can only be obtained with a probable cause warrant?
RESPONSE: Because I am not in the Department, I do not know all of the relevant facts.
It is certainly true that the government must safeguard the constitutional rights of all
Americans. Congress created the FISC so that the judicial branch is fully empowered to
make determinations regarding the appropriate constitutional and statutory requirements.
b. Does this warrant requirement apply regardless of how or from whom the information
might be obtained?
RESPONSE: See above answer (a.).
QUESTION 6: On November 25, 2020, then-DNI Ratcliffe sent a letter stating that an order
pursuant to Title V of FISA had “directed the production of log entries for a single, identified
U.S. web page reflecting connections from IP addresses registered in a specified country that
occurred during a defined period of time.”
a. During her confirmation process, Director Haines stated that the ODNI would brief the
Committee on this collection pending the outcome of a Department of Justice review. If
confirmed, will you prioritize the completion of that review and ensure that the
Committee is briefed?

23

RESPONSE: I am not familiar with the order mentioned in Director Ratcliffe’s letter,
but, if confirmed, I will have an opportunity to better understand how Title V authorities
are exercised in practice, and I pledge to work with my counterparts across the
government to ensure Congress is fully informed of the circumstances of the matter.
When it comes to FISA, it is important that the Committee is appropriately briefed on the
incident referenced in the letter. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all IC activities
are carried out in accordance with the Constitution and federal law.
b. Does the government have the authority now, or in the event of a reauthorization of
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, to collect log entries for web pages reflecting
connections to persons inside the United States?
RESPONSE: See above answer (a).
Section 702 of FISA

QUESTION 7: For years, the FBI’s U.S. person queries of data collected pursuant to Section
702 has included extensive documented abuses, including numerous queries unrelated to national
security and “batch queries” of large numbers of individuals. In its November 18, 2020,
Memorandum and Opinion, the FISA Court wrote that it remained “concerned about the
apparent widespread violations of the querying standard,” and noted that it lacked information to
confirm that changes promised by the FBI had been implemented. Given the failure of the FBI
to resolve this long-standing problem, do you agree that probable cause warrants should be
required for U.S. person queries of Section 702 data?
RESPONSE: Based on my years of service in the Department of Justice and
Intelligence Community, I believe that Section 702 is a critical tool to protecting our
national security. If confirmed, I examine the concerns that the FISC noted in its
November opinion to determine the cause and implement solutions to help ensure the
problem does not recur. From what I have read in the publicly released FISC opinion,
these FBI queries were conducted against unminimized data lawfully acquired by the
government pursuant to Section 702. The opinion also discusses remedial actions taken
by the FBI to address their noncompliant queries. If confirmed, I will seek a briefing on
these remedial measures to determine if I believe they are sufficient to address the
compliance issues.
QUESTION 8: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National
Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702. He
responded:
“As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been
reverse targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific
inquiry that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702
tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S.
person, but little reporting about a Section 702 target, that might be an indication that
reverse targeting may have occurred.”
24

How should this “fact specific inquiry” be implemented through the Section 702 nominations
and querying processes of Intelligence Community entities?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I will study this issue carefully and consult with
Intelligence Community lawyers and the Attorney General to ensure that all
collection activities are conducted in accordance with the Constitution and the
law. If confirmed, I look forward to managing the important Section 702
oversight function of the Division and will endeavor to ensure a robust effort
aimed at preventing reverse targeting.
QUESTION 9: Do you believe Section 702 of FISA authorizes the collection of
communications known to be entirely domestic?
RESPONSE: It is my understanding from my time working in NSD that Section 702
explicitly prohibits the government from intentionally acquiring any communication as to
which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be
located in the United States.
QUESTION 10: The 2018 legislation reauthorizing Section 702 of FISA codified limitations on
the use of U.S. person information in criminal proceedings.
a. Do you believe these limitations should be extended to other provisions of FISA?
b. The limitations include an exception for “transnational crime, including transnational
narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime.” Please describe the full scope of
“transnational crime” in this context.
RESPONSE: I have not worked in government since the passage of the 2018
reauthorization of Section 702. If confirmed, I will review the implementation of the
provision and consult with the Department leadership and others on whether its limitations
should be extended to other provisions of FISA or if there are areas where further
amendments to FISA are needed.
QUESTION 11: Under Section 702 of FISA, the government can direct an electronic
communications service provider to provide “assistance necessary to accomplish the
acquisition.” Under Section 702(h)(5), if the provider does not comply with a directive, the
government may seek an order from the FISA Court to compel compliance. Prior to the
reauthorization of Section 702 in 2018, the government stated that it had “not to date sought an
order pursuant to Section 702(h) seeking to compel an electronic communications service
provider to alter encryption afforded by a service or product it offers.”
a. Do you believe that the government should inform the FISA Court should it issue a
directive to a provider to alter the encryption afforded by a service or a product,
regardless of whether the government files a motion to compel compliance?

25

RESPONSE: I confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that the
government complies with its obligations under FISA. I am not familiar with the specific
facts referenced in the question, but, if confirmed, I will have an opportunity to better
understand how this authority is exercised in practice. I pledge to work with my
counterparts across the government to ensure Congress is fully informed consistent with
the government’s obligations under the National Security Act.
b. Will you commit to notifying Congress of any such directive?
RESPONSE: See above answer.
c. Do you believe the public should be informed should the facts underlying the
government’s public statement related to Section 702(h)(5) change?
RESPONSE: See above answer.
Other surveillance matters
QUESTION 12: Title 50, section 1812, provides for exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance and interception of certain communications may be conducted. During her
confirmation process, Director Haines stated that, “the President must take care that the law be
faithfully executed and Title 50, Section 1812 is no exception.” Do you agree that this provision
is binding on the President?
RESPONSE: Yes, I agree that the President must take care that the law be faithfully
executed and Title 50, Section 1812 is no exception.
QUESTION 13: Do you agree that the FISA Court amici play an important role in raising
significant matters of law with the Court? If yes, do you believe that granting the amici access to
all FISA information, as provided for in Section 215 reauthorization legislation passed by both
houses of Congress, helps the amici fulfill the role of raising issues with the Court?
RESPONSE: I believe that amici play an important role in rising significant legal
matters with the FISC and FISC-R. The existing statute in Section 1803(h)(i)(6)(A)
provides that the amicus curiae shall have access to any legal precedent, application,
certification, petition, motion, or such other materials that the court determines are
relevant to the duties of the amicus curiae. It is thus up to the FISC to determine those
materials relevant to the amicus curiae. The amicus curiae may also ask the court for
access to other materials, but ultimately it is the FISC that should decide whether those
materials are relevant to the specific duties of the amicus curiae in the matter in which
they were appointed. In addition, the current statute provides that an amicus curiae may
have access to classified documents, information, and other materials or proceedings to
the extent consistent with the national security of the United States.

26

QUESTION 14: The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s (PCLOB’s) March 5, 2021,
report on Executive Order 12333 stated that, “[a]s technology and the law evolve at an everfaster pace, the IC’s review and revision of elements’ Attorney General-approved guidelines
should proceed at a similar rate. Up-to-date guidelines will better safeguard U.S. persons’
privacy and civil liberties and support intelligence mission needs.” Do you agree to review the
Attorney General-approved guidelines to ensure they are up to date with changes in law and
technology?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I will review the Attorney General-approved guidelines to
determine if updates should be made in light of changes in law and technology.
QUESTION 15: The PCLOB’s March 5, 2021, report on EO 12333 stated:
“As agencies implement their new or revised Attorney General-approved guidelines,
such lower-level policies likewise must be updated to reflect new privacy and civil
liberties safeguards. For instance, some agencies’ new or revised Attorney Generalapproved guidelines for the first time address ‘bulk collection.’ As a result, activityspecific policies that relate to such activities must be updated to address the safeguards
now afforded by the revised procedures, as well as PPD-28 and other intervening
developments in the law. These also may include, for example, new or revised training
requirements and updated database user manuals.”
Will you review Intelligence Community privacy and civil liberties safeguards, as well as
policies, training, manuals and other guidance, and ensure that they are consistent with Attorney
General-approved guidelines and the public’s understanding of the legal and policy framework
for IC collection?
RESPONSE: Yes, if confirmed I will review Intelligence Community privacy and
civil liberties safeguards, as well as policies, training, manuals and other guidance,
and ensure that they are consistent with Attorney General-approved guidelines and
the public’s understanding of the legal and policy framework for IC collection.
QUESTION 16: The PCLOB’s March 5, 2021, report on EO 12333 also stated that IC elements
should review their legal and constitutional analysis regularly and revise them as necessary to
reflect changes in the law and technology. For example, technological changes can affect the
scope and nature of U.S. person information collected or how the IC queries and retains U.S.
person information. Do you agree to conduct a review of IC entities’ legal analysis regarding
EO 12333 collection to ensure that it reflects changes in the law and technology?
RESPONSE: Yes. If confirmed, I agree to review legal analysis from the IC
regarding 12333 collection in light of changes in law/technology.

27

QUESTION 17: According to a chart posted by the ODNI, only the Department of the Treasury
Office of Intelligence and Analysis does not have finalized Attorney General-approved EO
12333 procedures. During their confirmation processes, Director Haines and DNI General
Counsel Fonzone committed to prioritizing the completion and public dissemination of those
procedures. Will you likewise make this a priority?
RESPONSE: Yes. If confirmed, I will make this a priority.
QUESTION 18: The Department of Justice has published policy guidance on the use of cellsite simulator technology, often referred to as stingrays. The guidance requires law enforcement
to obtain a probable cause warrant for the use of stingrays, other than in emergencies. Do you
believe that the IC should obtain a FISA probable cause warrant for the domestic use of stingrays
consistent with the conduct of electronic surveillance under FISA?
RESPONSE: I have not had occasion to consider this issue in depth. If confirmed,
I look forward to doing so and would work with the Department of Justice and the
General Counsels of the IC elements to ensure that the IC’s intelligence activities
are conducted in conformity with the Constitution, applicable federal law, and
Executive Orders.
QUESTION 19: On August 1, 2017, Senators Leahy, Lee, Franken and I wrote to thenAttorney General Sessions asking about the impact on Americans of the use of stingrays and the
Department of Justice’s representations about stingrays to the courts. The response was marked
Law Enforcement Sensitive. If confirmed, will you release that response to the public, as
requested in a May 17, 2018, letter from Senators Leahy, Lee and myself?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I look forward to looking into this issue in depth. Since I
have not been in the government for a number of years, I am not privy to the
Department’s position on this.
QUESTION 20: In December 2020, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
released its Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Strategy and Efforts to Disrupt Illegal
Dark Web Activities. The audit described Network Investigative Techniques (NITs) which
“require computer exploits that the FBI is increasingly developing for national security purposes
but not for criminal investigations.” If confirmed, will you agree to make public annual statistics
on the number of times these computer exploits have been used in national security cases and
how often they have been used against Americans?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue carefully to
determine whether there are additional steps that can ensure security protections,
consistent with the need to protect national security. I will ensure that all
intelligence activities are conducted in conformity with the Constitution and
federal laws.

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QUESTION 21: In June 2018, in the case of Carpenter v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the government’s collection of cell-site locational records was a Fourth Amendment search.
In November 2019, the government acknowledged that it was not collecting cell-site or GPS
information pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which does not require a
warrant. In 2020, both houses of Congress passed legislation reauthorizing Section 215 that
prohibited such collection, although the legislation was not passed into law.
a. Do you agree that, should Section 215 be reauthorized, it should not be used to collect
cell-site or GPS information?
RESPONSE: Because I am not currently in the Department, I do not know the relevant
information necessary to offer an informed view of this issue. I am aware that previously
proposed legislation to reauthorize Section 215 included a prohibition on collection of cellsite and GPS information. I know this is an important question and, if confirmed, I will seek
to fully understand the relevant issues.
b. Do you agree that the constitutional principles enunciated in Carpenter and reflected in
the government’s decision with regard to collection under Section 215 applies generally
to the IC’s collection under other provisions of FISA and EO 12333?
RESPONSE: The government must abide by the Constitution and federal law in all of its
intelligence activity. Because I am not currently in the Department, I cannot speak to the
how the relevant Supreme Court precedent and government decisions apply to other
provisions of FISA and EO 12333.
c. Do you support transparency with regard to whether, and under what circumstances,
Carpenter applies to the Intelligence Community?
RESPONSE: As a general matter, I support transparency consistent with the need to
protect national security information.
d. Do you support the issuance of controlling guidance ensuring consistency with regard to
the interpretation of Carpenter and its application to the Intelligence Community?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I commit to reviewing whether such guidance would be
beneficial. Furthermore, if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to be transparent about
the frameworks within which we collect information while protecting sources and
methods.

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QUESTION 22: Do you believe that the privacy interests of Americans should depend on
whether their information is purchased or obtained voluntarily by the government, as opposed to
compelled through legal process?
RESPONSE: I am dedicated to the protection of the privacy interests of Americans. If
confirmed, I will have an opportunity to better understand how to ensure that information
is obtained through the proper process consistent with the civil liberties and privacy
interests of Americans.
QUESTION 23: Do you support transparency with regard to the type of information on
Americans that the Intelligence Community purchases or obtains voluntarily and the legal basis
for that collection?
RESPONSE: As a general matter, I support transparency, consistent with the need to
protect national security information. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
this issue and where there might be opportunities to increase transparency.
QUESTION 24: NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person or
certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under Executive
Order 12333 “normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after
a finding of probable cause.”
a. Is there any reason this requirement should not apply to other IC entities, particularly
with regard to U.S. person queries of data collected in bulk?
RESPONSE: Under Executive Order 12333, IC entities are required to operate in
accordance with Attorney General-approved procedures that provide specific circumstances
and limitations under which IC entities may lawfully collect, retain, and disseminate
information concerning U.S. persons. These procedures are in place to ensure lawful
intelligence activities are carried out in a manner that provides protection for the privacy
and civil liberties of Americans. If confirmed, I will make the IC’s compliance with the
Attorney General- approved procedures a priority and evaluate whether any additional
requirements or other changes would be appropriate.
b. How, if at all, should evidence of probable cause presented to the Attorney General differ
than that required under FISA?
RESPONSE: See above answer.
c. Please describe any exceptions to this requirement.
RESPONSE: See above answer.

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QUESTION 25: Do you agree that no element of the IC can request that a foreign entity
conduct any activity that it is not authorized to undertake itself?
RESPONSE: Executive Order 12333 requires all intelligence activities to be
consistent with the Constitutionand laws and provides that no element of the
Intelligence Community may participate in or request any person (including a foreign
entity) undertake activities it forbids.
QUESTION 26: What limitations do you believe should apply to the receipt, use or
dissemination of communications of U.S. persons collected by a foreign partner or source? How
should those limitations address instances in which the foreign partner or source specifically
targeted U.S. persons or instances in which the foreign partner or source has collected bulk
communications known to include those of U.S. persons?
RESPONSE: From my experience working in NSD and NSA, it is my understanding
that the IC elements may not request any person, including a foreign entity, to
undertake activities that the Constitution, federal laws, or Executive Orders, including
Executive Order 12333, forbid the IC elements themselves to take. If foreign partners
or sources collect and share information concerning U.S. persons consistent with this
prohibition, IC elements are only authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate such
information in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General
consistent with Executive Order 12333. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the Department and my counterparts in the IC to make sure that all parties are
following the procedures outlined by the AG consistent with EO 12333 in an effort to
ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons are protected. I will also
make it a priority to reevaluate the process to determine if any changes could make the
process more effective.
QUESTION 27: Do you believe that communications data collected in transit are or should be
treated differently than communications data at rest? Please address any distinctions as they may
apply to FISA, EO 12333, PPD-28, and USSID 18.
RESPONSE: As mentioned above, it is critical that all IC activities involving
communications data are carried out in accordance with the Constitution and applicable
federal law, including FISA. This is also applicable to Presidential orders such as
Executive Order 12333 and PPD-28, and their applicable implementing procedures,
USSID 18.
QUESTION 28: In March 2019, the Department of Justice Inspector General released its
“Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Use of Administrative Subpoenas to Collect
or Exploit Bulk Data.” Do you believe that the subpoena authorities in question, and 21 U.S.C. §
876(a) in particular, allow for bulk collection?

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RESPONSE: Because I haven’t been with the Department for a number of years, I
am not familiar with the details of DEA’s use of administrative subpoenas outside of
what was outlined in the Inspector General’s report. If confirmed, I would work to
ensure that these intelligence activities are conducted in conformity with the
Constitution, applicable federal laws, and Executive Orders.
QUESTION 29: Do you believe that the government should be able to hack all visitors to a
particular website with a single warrant, even when those visitors were not previously known
and visits to the web site are not per se a crime?
RESPONSE: I am not familiar with the specific nature of the activities described in the
question. In general, the Fourth Amendment requires that any warrant must describe
with particularity “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Whistleblowers
QUESTION 30: The statutes governing Intelligence Community Inspectors General state that
whistleblower complaints determined by the Inspectors General to be “urgent concerns” “shall”
be transmitted to Congress. (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)(C), 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)(C), 5 U.S.C. App
8H(c)).
a. Do you agree that the law requires that whistleblower complaints determined by the IC
Inspector General to be an “urgent concern” be transmitted to Congress?
RESPONSE: If confirmed, I commit to transmitting to Congress whistleblower
complaints determined by the Inspector General to be an urgent concern.
b. If yes, do you agree with the concerns expressed by 67 Inspectors General in an October
22, 2019, letter sent by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE) about the Office of Legal Counsel’s September 3, 2019, opinion?
RESPONSE: I am not familiar with the letter referenced in the question but, if
confirmed, I will seek to review to understand the concerns raised.
QUESTION 31: The law states that whistleblowers must obtain from the DNI, through the IC
Inspector General, “direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in
accordance with appropriate security practices.” Do you agree that this provision does not
permit the DNI to deny whistleblowers direct access to Congress altogether?
RESPONSE: I understand that the Director of National Intelligence has pledged to not
deny the IC Inspector General direct access to the Congress.
PCLOB
QUESTION 32: Do you agree that the reports of the PCLOB should be released to the public,
to the greatest extent possible, and that the public should have access to the three reports
referenced in the PCLOB’s March 5, 2021, report on EO 12333?
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RESPONSE: I believe transparency is important, consistent with the need to protect
classified or otherwise sensitive information. I agree that the PCLOB’s reports should
be made public, consistent with the protection of sources and methods, and, if
confirmed, would support efforts to provide suchtransparency into the PCLOB’s work.
QUESTION 33: Do you believe the mandate of the PCLOB should be expanded beyond
counterterrorism so that it can review any IC program or activity that affects the privacy and civil
liberties of Americans?
RESPONSE: If I am confirmed, I will consult with the PCLOB about the effectiveness
of its current mandate and assess whether changes to it should be instituted by working
closely with Congress.
Detention and interrogation
QUESTION 34: Do you believe that any of the CIA’s former enhanced interrogation
techniques are consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act, the U.S. statutory prohibition on
torture, the War Crimes Act, or U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture or
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?
RESPONSE: Waterboarding is torture, and all techniques that constitute inhumane and
degrading treatment are prohibited by law. If confirmed, you have my commitment that
I will ensure that I and the National Security Division will follow the law.
Lethal authorities
QUESTION 35: Please describe your view of the legal implications of targeting or otherwise
knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. government lethal operation. What additional
transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?
RESPONSE: I agree with the CIA Director that “[t]he decision to target a U.S. citizen
with lethal force is one of the most serious decisions that the U.S. Government could
confront and is generally contemplated by an Administration only in narrow
circumstances – for example when a U.S. citizen is part of enemy forces within the scope
of a force authorization. Any proposal must be lawful, authorized by the President under
a framework approved by the Department of Justice, and take into account that person’s
constitutional rights.” I believe that in these circumstances and elsewhere, the
government should offer the maximum amount of transparency about national security
matters possible consistent with the need to protect national security.

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Transparency
QUESTION 36: Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation
of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities but is inconsistent with the public’s
understanding of the law?
RESPONSE: Yes, I support such declassification and release to the extent consistent
with the protections of sources and methods.
QUESTION 37: If you or any other individual from the National Security Division were to say
something pertaining to national security that was factually inaccurate in public, would you
correct the public record?
RESPONSE: I would always strive to be factually accurate in my own statements and in
other statements made by the National Security Division. If I were to later learn that a
statement was factually inaccurate, I would take action to correct the record. If I were
unable to make a public correction consistent with the requirement to protect classified
information, I would inform the intelligence committees of the inaccuracy in a classified
setting.
State secrets
QUESTION 38: In the state secret case of United States v. Zubaydah before the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Department of Justice has represented that, in releasing its Study of the CIA’s
Detention and Interrogation Program, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence redacted the
names of countries that hosted CIA detention sites. The Department made this representation in
its December 2020 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and its March 2021 Reply Brief. These
representations are inaccurate on their face, as the Committee does not redact information, and
are contradicted by the Study itself, which repeatedly emphasized not only the CIA’s redactions,
but the Agency’s desire to mask the names of the countries in the classified version of the Study.
If confirmed, will you ensure that these misrepresentations to the Court are corrected?
RESPONSE: I cannot comment on pending litigation. However, I commit to always
ensuring that our representations to the Court are accurate.

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