March 1, 2021

The Honorable Mark R. Warner, Chairman
The Honorable Marco Rubio, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
211 Hart Senate Building
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio:
Thank you for the Committee's letter dated February 26, 2021. As requested, I have
completed my responses to the Committee's post-hearing questions, which are enclosed. My
response to an additional question from Senator Cotton is being submitted under separate cover
due to the sensitivity of that topic.
I appreciated the opportunity to testify before the Committee and to answer its questions.

Sincerely,

William J. Burns
Enclosure

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record for
William J. Burns
Upon his nomination to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

[From Vice Chairman Rubio]
Nord Stream II
Ambassador Burns, as you know completion of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline
linking Russia and Germany is a top priority for Vladimir Putin.
1. What do you see as the risks associated with completion of this project?
(U) I agree with Secretary Blinken’s statement in his confirmation testimony
that completion of Nord Stream II (NSII) is a “bad idea.” In broad terms, Nord
Stream II would enable Russia to accomplish one of its strategic objectives
which is to bypass Ukraine as a transit state for its natural gas while retaining
European market share. Russia has worked to reduce gas volumes through
Ukraine with each new European pipeline project it has undertaken. Moscow
views its pipeline projects as a means to stoke division in the West and boost its
sway in Europe, and it has used political and economic pressure to induce
European cooperation. Even with NSII, Russia's energy leverage will diminish
if Europe follows through on efforts to diversify energy suppliers and routes,
limit investment in some strategic sectors, and bolster anticorruption campaigns
to thwart Moscow's efforts to blackmail or co-opt local and national officials.
2. How might completion of Nord Stream II affect energy security in
Europe, and what would be the likely outcome for Ukraine? In
answering, please provide an updated assessment on Mathias Warrnig,
the CEO of Nord Stream II, on his ties to Russian and East German
Intelligence. To the extent possible, the assessment should be
unclassified with a classified annex.
(U) In my view, the completion of the project will have an uneven effect on
Europe's energy security based on infrastructure and transit fees, with Germany
being the greatest beneficiary. Countries closest to Germany—such as Austria
and the Czech Republic—that have more infrastructure in place to receive and
transmit volumes of NSII gas to other European consumers would be most
likely to take gas from NSII if it were completed. Countries farther east—such
as Ukraine—would be among those most adversely impacted because of
infrastructure constraints or reduced transit revenue.
(U) At full capacity, the project would reroute 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of
existing natural gas volumes transiting Ukraine, rather than increase Russian
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natural gas volumes to Europe. In addition, at full capacity the project would
eventually crimp Ukraine's natural gas transit revenues—most likely reducing
them by more than $1 billion per year.
(U) Nord Stream II Chief Executive Officer Matthias Warnig began his career
as an East German intelligence officer in the State Security Service (Stasi) in
1974 and served in West Germany during the same time that Vladimir Putin
was a KGB officer in East Germany, according to public reporting. Also
according to public reporting, the two men met during this time. If confirmed, I
will provide a classified assessment on this matter.
Foreign Gifts
In your pre-hearing disclosures you disclosed holiday gifts from foreign
governments that you accepted during your time as President of the Carnegie
Endowment International Peace, including a “Super Bowl group trip” from the
Saudi Ambassador.
3. What was the cost or total value of the trip? What year was this trip
taken? Were you required to pay taxes on this gift?
(U) I accepted a gift from the Saudi ambassador to attend the Super Bowl in
February 2018, along with a small group that included several Arab ambassadors
in Washington. I have been transparent on this matter -- consulting with Carnegie
Endowment's ethics officer, who approved the trip in advance, and filing it on my
required Committee and nominee disclosure forms. I estimate the total value of
the gift at over $1000. According to my tax advisor, I was not required to pay taxes
on the gift.
4. Given Saudi Arabia’s track record suppressing freedom of expression,
association, religion, directing unlawful killings, and detention of
innocent American citizens, do you believe it was appropriate to accept
such a gift from the Saudi Ambassador, even in your private capacity?
(U) I should have declined the trip and watched the game, as I have done every
other year, from home. I have never pulled any punches in my sharp public
criticism of the Saudi government's actions, particularly the horrific murder of
Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, whom I had met over the years and knew to be
a thoughtful, honest and courageous critic of the excesses and overreach of the
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Saudi leadership. I was equally direct in my condemnation of Saudi Arabia’s role
in the catastrophic war in Yemen. I have written and spoken often about my
serious concerns about Saudi behavior, including in Senate Foreign Relations
Committee testimony.
5. Do you believe the United States should press Saudi Arabia on its
egregious human rights record while also working on issues critical to
U.S. and Saudi security?
(U) I believe firmly that the United States should press Saudi Arabia hard on
human rights abuses, while also working on issues critical to U.S. and Saudi
security.
Cuba
Press reporting has indicated that Russia has long used Cuba as a platform for
intelligence collection against the United States, and more recently other
adversaries, including China, are doing the same by exploiting its proximity to the
U.S.
6. What is your view of the Cuban regime as a threat to U.S. interests?
(U) In my view, Cuba remains a repressive, undemocratic state with a troubling
human rights record and history of espionage against the United States. The most
pressing and immediate concern, however, is Cuba's alliances with other countries
hostile to the United States. It hosts military and intelligence personnel from these
countries, and cooperates with them in ways that harm the interests of the United
States and our democratic allies in the region.
7. How do you believe our adversaries, particularly Russia and China,
view Cuba?
(U) China and Cuba have longtime ideological ties but recent years have seen a
change in the nature of the relationship as China has moved beyond ideology and
instead leveraged Cuba's dire economic situation to increase its foothold in the
Western Hemisphere. Cuba has little to offer China in return for economic
assistance except access to a location near the United States, which China is wellpositioned to exploit. Russia also sees Cuba as a dependably autocratic partner.
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8. Who are Cuba’s closest intelligence partners?
(U) Cuba's intelligence relations with others tend to be transactional, but it is
difficult to discount the degree to which the Cuban regime is dependent on Russian
intelligence support. Cuba's historical role as a longtime client and intelligence ally
of the Soviets continues now with Russia. In fact, Russian press reports indicate
Cuba allowed Russia to reopen a signals intelligence collection site in Cuba aimed
at the United States.
9. What is Cuba’s role in supporting the Maduro regime in Venezuela,
and how do you assess that contributes to instability in the Western
Hemisphere?
(U) Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's rise to power and his weakening
of Venezuelan democratic institutions owed much to the support provided by the
Castro regime. Cuban advice to Chavez and now Maduro, while solidifying the
Venezuelan regime's control over public discourse and stifling dissent, also has
resulted in mismanagement of the Venezuelan economy. For its part, Cuba remains
dependent on Venezuelan oil for as long as Venezuelan wells continue to function.
In terms of the contribution to instability in the region, among other things, the
flow of Venezuelan refugees fleeing the hardships in Venezuela has created the
worst refugee crisis in the region's history and has placed economic and political
burdens on countries already struggling with the damaging ramifications of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The U.S. has recently added Cuba back to the list of U.S. State Sponsors of
Terrorism due to the fact that Cuba provides safe haven for members of U.S. State
Department-designated foreign terrorist organizations – namely the FARC and
ELN.
10.Do you agree that countries that provide safe haven for terrorists
should be considered sponsors of terrorism?
(U) The Secretary of State makes the policy determination for designating state
sponsors of terrorism. Cuba was removed from the list in 2015 and was recently
placed back on the list at the end of the previous Administration. If confirmed, I
will prioritize intelligence support to policy makers on Cuba's malign activities.

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Iran
Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, the president is required to keep
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership “fully and currently”
informed of any initiatives or negotiations with Iran relating to its nuclear program.
11.If confirmed, do you commit to keep Congress informed of the
intelligence community’s role in any negotiations with Iran?
(U) The intelligence community plays an important role in informing Congress of
Iran’s activities, and to the extent CIA is involved in supporting future policy
negotiations, I will keep the Committee informed.
The JCPOA is still in effect, even without the participation of the United States,
and we have all read in the newspapers the steps Iran has taken recently with
regard to its enrichment activities, which are prohibited under the JCPOA.
12.You told Senator Cornyn in our hearing that “the United States
[should] do everything we can to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon.” As Director of the CIA, how would you provide early
warning of Iran’s intention to turn years of research and preparatory
work into a finished weapon? In your view, what does that look like,
and how will Iran react to “everything we can do”?
(U) If confirmed, I will ensure that CIA continues to provide a clear, objective, and
timely view of all relevant intelligence to policymakers and Congress on this
issue. Early warning to policymakers relies on the strength of CIA’s technical and
HUMINT collection capabilities, which are key to gaining the most accurate
intelligence picture possible on Iranian intentions and activities across the
spectrum of nuclear, ballistic missile and other destabilizing programs. If
confirmed I will place a significant focus on ensuring the robustness of CIA’s
capabilities, paired with collaborative opportunities with IC partners. As I
emphasized in my hearing, it is crucial for the United States to do everything it can
to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, and to keep up the pressure on
the Iranian regime to cease hostile regional and international activities and live up
to international norms. Without such a comprehensive strategy, I would not expect
to see unprompted changes or a de-escalation in its destabilizing actions.
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13.Would you agree Iran is the world’s leading exporter and supporter of
terrorism?
(U) Iran has long been designated by the United States as a state sponsor of
terrorism, with good reason. Iran continues to provide financial aid, advanced
weapons, and training to militant and terrorist groups in the Middle East while
cultivating operative networks across the globe. During the past few years, Iran
and its partners and proxies have conducted attacks against us and allied interests
heightening tensions in the Middle East. Targets have included U.S. locations and
personnel in Iraq, oil facilities, regional shipping, and other infrastructure.
14.Do you believe that we can trust the world’s leading exporter of
terrorism to honor an international agreement?
(U) Ensuring that Iran honors international agreements is not, in my view, a
question of “trust,” but rather of hard-headed verification and monitoring measures
that enable the U.S., our partners, and international agencies to measure
compliance.
15.Do you believe that providing sanctions relief to the world’s leading
exporter of terrorism is likely to increase terrorist activity?
(U) In my view, an increase in Iran's financial resources would enable Tehran to
better fund militant and terrorist groups and may engender an increase in Iranbacked terrorist and lethal activity. However, it is notable that U.S. sanctions that
have constrained the Iranian government’s revenue have not caused a marked
change in Iran's military and security activity.
Recent Rocket Attacks in Iraq
Three times in the past week Iran and its proxies have tried to kill Americans who
are working with the Iraqi government to secure their country from ISIS. I am
pleased to see the administration beginning to respond to these provocations with
targeted military action.
16.What is your view of the importance of establishing attribution as a
predicate to deterrence regarding Iranian proxies?
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U) Establishing attribution is a critical step in combatting such threats, and I have
seen over the course of my long career in government the critical role CIA plays in
that effort. Iran designs its support to proxy groups to be deniable in part to limit
Washington's ability to hold Iran responsible for attacks. CIA’s mission to conduct
objective all-source intelligence is essential in determining culpability in the wake
of attacks in order to support U.S. policy.
Mission and Structure of CIA
17. A) What is your view of the size and composition of the CIA workforce,
as it stands today? What changes would you consider making?
How will you improve recruitment of Americans from many
backgrounds, including first and second-generation Americans and
those with STEM backgrounds?
B) Do you intend to evaluate CIA’s organizational structure for
possible changes? If you do conduct a review of the CIA’s
structure, will you commit to keeping the Committee apprised of
the findings and your intentions?
C) What are your plans for resourcing and managing the CIA’s
election security efforts? Do you see election security in terms of a
sustained effort, or something that ebbs and flows in relation to the
electoral calendar?
D) If confirmed, do you commit to immediately notifying the
Committee of impending leadership changes before they are
publicly announced?
(U) If confirmed, I will consider it the highest honor to lead the exceptional women
and men of CIA. As I stated in my hearing, I believe it is critically important that
the CIA workforce reflects the diversity of our Nation and the diverse and unique
skillsets demanded by CIA’s global mission. The size and structure of CIA should
evolve as needed to meet that core objective, and fully evaluating the resourcing
posture of CIA will be an early focus for me if confirmed. I intend to take
necessary steps to ensure that CIA has the highest quality language, technical and
tradecraft training complemented by the most efficient and effective recruitment,
retention and career advancement practices. If confirmed, I will assess all
organizational aspects of CIA, to include those associated with STEM hiring and
sustainment of election security efforts, and look forward sharing my findings with
the Committee. I also commit to sharing any leadership changes at the Agency
with the Committee.
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[From Senator Cotton]
Russia
Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is in the final stages of construction, and last
year’s defense bill greatly expanded the scope of companies subject to sanctions
for supporting this destabilizing activity. I understand that the State Department
has been contacting these companies to make them aware of their potential
sanctions exposure.
18.Will you commit, if confirmed, to immediately providing the Senate
with the unclassified list of all companies involved in the project that the
IC produced in response to the National Defense Authorization Act?
(U) The CIA provides classified intelligence support to the State Department and
other policy agencies' reporting requirements under the National Defense
Authorization Act. If confirmed, I will pursue your interest in an unclassified list of
companies that CIA determined to be engaged in conduct that would make them
potentially subject to sanctions.
19.Will you commit, if confirmed, to provide an updated assessment of ties
between Nord Stream CEO and Russian, East German, or other hostile
intelligence agencies, in unclassified form with a classified annex if
necessary?
(U) If confirmed, I commit to review our available intelligence on this matter and
working with the Committee on a pragmatic way forward.
Nuclear Weapons Treaties
Early this month the Commander of STRATCOM wrote that “Russia began
aggressively modernizing its nuclear forces, including its non-treaty-accountable”
weapons a decade ago and “China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to
double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next decade.”
20. If confirmed, will you commit to providing this committee with regular
updates on Russia’s and China’s nuclear modernization efforts?
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(U) Yes. If confirmed, I will provide regular updates on Russia’s nuclear
modernization efforts, as well as China's ongoing efforts to modernize the People's
Liberation Army's (PLA) nuclear forces. I will ensure that CIA uses the full array
of its intelligence capabilities, in conjunction with the rest of the intelligence
community, to monitor and assess developments relating to China's military,
particularly its nuclear forces.
In 2019 DIA Director LTG Ashley indicated that Russia is violating the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and last year the Department of
State reported that China may be doing the same.
21. If confirmed, how will you ensure that CIA is postured to collect
against, evaluate, and inform policy makers about our adversaries’
adherence to or violation of international arms control agreements?
(U) As I know from my prior public service, CIA plays a critical role in support of
broader U.S. government efforts to monitor treaty compliance. The intelligence
community's collection and analysis informs the formal determinations of
verification and compliance made by the State Department in its annual report to
Congress, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments." The DCIA must concur on this
report as stipulated in 22 U.S.C. § 2593a. If confirmed, I would make collection
against our adversaries’ nuclear weapons program, to include China's adherence to
or violation of its self-proclaimed nuclear weapons testing moratorium, one of our
highest priorities.
China
Last week I released a report recommending a series of actions to confront the
Chinese Communist Party’s economic aggression against the United State,
including more stringent visa screening to catch PRC spies. The Department of
State holds an important role in the travel and visa screening system that was built
to prevent terrorists from traveling to the United States.

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22. What lessons should the rest of the U.S. Government take away from
our successes in screening visa applicants for terrorist affiliations in
recent years? Where do we still need to make improvements?
(U) I have read carefully the report you released, and its recommendations,
including on visa screening. Since 9/11, CIA has intensified its efforts, working
with its U.S. government partners, to prevent terrorists from entering the United
States. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities to identify areas where the
Intelligence Community's unique foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
collection efforts can better inform U.S. Government partners in visa
considerations to protect U.S. national security interests.
23. How should we share best practices and lessons learned across
government to confront problems such as economic espionage? If
confirmed, how would you put this into practice?
(U) A unified and collaborative approach is necessary to confront challenges posed
by China's broad-scale economic espionage efforts. Through foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence collection efforts, the CIA is able to provide unique
information and insights to other U.S. Government partners to inform visa
considerations as appropriate, including on foreign nationals who may pose a
threat to U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I look forward to further
strengthening CIA's collaboration with both U.S. Government and foreign
intelligence partners on this issue, as well as working with and learning from the
private sector, to improve our efforts to confront China's economic espionage
activities.
Iran and Middle East
In November, we were reminded that Iran maintained components of a secret
nuclear weapons program within their defense establishment when the leader of
their new defense research organization – curiously, the same general who lead
their pre-2004 nuclear weapons program – was killed while he was under Iranian
government protection near Tehran. The IAEA never interviewed this scientist
before his death, or inspected his organization’s facilities, but Iran’s Supreme
Leader vowed to continue his work in the “nuclear and defense fields.”

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24. Do you agree that any Iranian military research relevant to building a
nuclear weapon presents a threat to the United States as well as our
allies and partners?
(U) Yes.
25. If confirmed, how would you view continued military research and
development activities by Iranian nuclear weapons scientists in the
context of any future agreement with the Iranian regime?
(U) If confirmed, I will work to ensure that CIA provides as clear, objective,
and timely a view of all relevant activities as possible to policymakers and
Congress, including any continued military research and developmental
activities by Iranian nuclear weapons scientists.
You have stated that “when the [JCOPA] was in place... U.S. unmanned aircraft
weren’t being shot down by Iran…[and] Gulf shipping and infrastructure weren’t
being hit by Iranian mines and missiles,” but this ignores Iranian missile attacks
from Yemen against a range of international ships and infrastructure, including
U.S. Navy vessels, as well as the shoot-down there of an unmanned U.S. aircraft.
26. Why do you not consider Iranian-sponsored and facilitated attacks
against U.S. ships and aircraft to be of concern in this case?
(U) In that commentary, I was noting the fact that there were relatively few
Iranian-supported attacks against U.S. interests -- in the Gulf itself -- during the
period before the U.S. decided to withdraw from compliance with the JCPOA,
compared to the period that followed. I remain deeply concerned about Iran’s
support for a range of militia groups across the Middle East, and the continuing
potential for those groups to target U.S. ships and aircraft, including missile
attacks from Yemen.
27. What role did Iranian government support to the Houthis play in that
group’s ability to expand their attacks beyond Yemen, considering some
of that activity occurred during your time as Deputy Secretary of
State?

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(U) I agree with the DNI's 2019 Annual Threat Assessment statement: "Iran's
support to the Huthis, including supplying ballistic missiles, risks escalating the
conflict and poses a serious threat to U.S. partners and interests in the region.
Iran continues to provide support that enables Huthi attacks against shipping
near the Bab el Mandel) Strait and land-based targets deep inside Saudi Arabia
and the UAE, using ballistic missiles and UAVs."
On Monday, South Korean press reported that the Republic of Korea was reaching
an agreement with the Biden Administration to unfreeze billions in sanctioned
Iranian funds in exchange for the IRGC releasing an oil tanker that they hijacked
early last month.
28. Are you concerned that the regime will use sanctions relief to fund its
missile and paramilitary programs?
(U) As I stated in response to Question 15, in my view, an increase in Iran's
financial resources would enable Tehran to better fund militant and terrorist
groups and may engender an increase in Iran-backed terrorist and lethal
activity. However, it is notable that U.S. sanctions that have constrained the
Iranian government’s revenue have not caused a marked change in Iran's
military and security activity.
During the Obama administration, you engaged in secret negotiations with Iran
without the knowledge of Congress.
29. If confirmed, will you commit to fully brief this committee on any
negotiations that the agency may be engaged in with the Iranians, as
required by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act?
(U) I commit to comply with all requirements of U.S. law.
Last year, the Iranian military launched a “space vehicle,” from a mobile missile
launcher, with a solid-fuel engine typically used in ballistic missiles, and carrying
an intelligence satellite that by their own description is unlikely to every collect
any intelligence.
30. What purpose do you assess such an exercise could possibly have, if not
to develop ICBM technology? Do you think this and other IRGC
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missile activity is consistent with Iran’s obligations under UN Security
Council resolutions, including UNSCR 2231?
(U) Iran has launched space launch vehicles to place satellites into orbit. These
launches are concerning because space launch vehicles share the same booster
technology as ballistic missiles. The determination of whether space launch
and other IRGC missile activity is consistent with UNSCR 2231 would fall to
the State Department, with intelligence support from CIA. As discussed with
the Committee, any comprehensive strategy to deter Iranian malign behavior
must address their ballistic missile program.

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