February 19, 2021

The Honorable Mark R. Warner, Chairman
The Honorable Marco Rubio, Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
211 Hart Senate Building
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Chairman Warner and Vice Chairman Rubio:
Thank you for the Committee's letter dated February 17, 2021. As you have requested, I
have completed the Committee's Additional Prehearing Questions, which are enclosed.
My responses to the Committee's classified prehearing questions are being submitted
under separate cover. I look forward to appearing before the Committee on February 24th •

Sincerely,

William J. Bums
Enclosure

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

Additional Prehearing Questions for
William J. Burns
Upon his nomination to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

1

Role and Performance of the D/CIA in Senior National Security Leadership
QUESTION 1: Briefly describe how you see your role and responsibilities in
relation to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the Secretary of State,
and the President’s National Security Advisor. What you would bring to these
relationships, and how you would change your role to improve the effectiveness
of these relationships, if confirmed?
(U) The DNI serves as the head of the Intelligence Community and acts as the
principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council (NSC), and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national security.
The DNI is also responsible for budgeting, oversight, and intelligence coordination
across the elements of the Intelligence Community, including establishing
objectives, priorities, and guidance for the collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DNI, my
longtime friend and colleague Avril Haines, to make sure the Agency’s efforts
complement her role as head and integrator of the Intelligence Community.
(U) The Secretary of State is a statutory member of the NSC. Under the direction
of the President and through the Secretary of State, Chiefs of Mission advance the
foreign policy and national security interests of the United States. CIA is required
to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently informed with respect to all activities
and operations in each country in which CIA has a presence. Through my time at
the Department of State serving alongside CIA officers, I learned to deeply
appreciate the vital role that the partnership between CIA and the Department
plays in advancing those foreign policy and national security interests. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Secretary Blinken, with whom I have
had the pleasure of working for many years, to strengthen that partnership.
(U) The NSC, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
acts as the highest-ranking executive branch entity that provides support to the
President for review of, guidance for, and direction of the conduct of all foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence, and covert action, and associated policies and
programs. I served as a member of the NSC staff early in my career, and am
intimately familiar with its critical role. NSA Sullivan and I have worked closely
together in the past. If confirmed, I look forward to working with him again, and I
will fully support the DNI’s efforts to provide the best intelligence and advice to
the NSC and the President – and to deliver it with honesty and integrity.
2

Post-Modernization and the Future of the CIA
QUESTION 2: The CIA underwent a major reorganization several years ago.
Mission Centers were created to reinforce a “team approach” and put the focus
on growing well-rounded Agency officers. Since then, how we collect
intelligence has evolved. Do you believe that the CIA should remain focused
on clandestine collection? Moreover, how will you maintain objective analysis
as a central function of the CIA under this construct? How should the conduct
of these activities be balanced and prioritized in the future at the CIA?
(U) Yes, I do believe CIA should remain focused on clandestine collection. What
remains constant through technological advances is the need for human
intelligence operations and the necessary clandestine global infrastructure to
surface the truth and intent behind secrets. It is a fundamental and unique role of
the CIA that has not changed since the enactment of the National Security Act of
1947 and issuance of Executive Order 12333. In principle, the CIA is designated
the “collector of last resort,” though in practice it is widely considered the primary
source across the wide range of intelligence requirements. The CIA should be
focused on the most challenging requirements.
(U) The CIA, and the Directorate of Analysis (DA) specifically, remains central to
providing timely, accurate, and objective all-source analysis. Ensuring the
objectivity of CIA’s analytic product is at the core of the analytic mission and is
deeply embedded in CIA culture. The DA’s credibility – and, by extension, the
CIA’s credibility – depends in part on its ability to “call it like analysts see it” and
not be influenced by, or biased toward, policy and operational goals. The
reorganization undertaken several years ago was focused on improving integration
across CIA. My sense is this integration of analysts and operators within Mission
Centers provides national security decision advantage to our policymakers and
faster collaboration on tough issues. Managers at all levels must continue to
ensure that this integration strengthens analytic objectivity.
QUESTION 3: Since modernization in 2015, and now operating under
limitations of COVID-19, there have been numerous efforts to improve the
CIA’s management of the workforce. There have also been efforts to address
training and care for officers and their families to improve the readiness of the
organization. What areas of an officer's preparedness and readiness would you
focus on as Director of the CIA?

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(U) If confirmed, I will have no higher priority as Director than ensuring the
health and wellbeing of officers and their families, through this pandemic and
wherever and whenever they face harm or risk.
(U) I believe that CIA should continue to make data-driven decisions that
promote the health and safety of its officers while achieving its mission,
particularly given that the workforce cannot telework. It is my
understanding that CIA continues to promote flexibility through additional
programs and policies that further meet officers’ needs during this
pandemic, to include Professional Training from home and new flexible
work schedules. If confirmed, I intend to further strengthen these programs
and enhance policies that reinforce the resiliency and wellbeing of the
workforce.
QUESTION 4: The CIA is operating in a growing number of
environments subject to foreign adversary ubiquitous technical surveillance
(UTS) measures. These measures threaten, and may jeopardize the
clandestine nature of CIA operations. Please explain how you would
address the very real and pressing challenges facing you as Director of the
CIA.
(U) If confirmed, I plan to address UTS measures with a multi-pronged,
integrated, comprehensive approach, leveraging all CIA elements to get ahead of
the threat. I plan to engage my counterparts throughout the government, as well as
our allies abroad, to share strategies and solutions for addressing how ubiquitous
collection is exploited by our adversaries. This will require CIA to adapt its
tradecraft, generate smarter technology, and properly leverages all available data.
HUMINT Role of the CIA
QUESTION 5: In your view, is it appropriate for the Director of the CIA to
continue to be the National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager?
(U) Yes, in fact it is more critical than ever for the DCIA to guide this functional
community of clandestine and overt HUMINT collectors. The CIA is the only
organization that is focused on HUMINT as a function and has developed a broad
foundation of operational, technical, and analytic expertise on which to build and
lead the HUMINT enterprise. The DCIA is well positioned to guide this
functional community of clandestine and overt HUMINT collectors. The
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evolving threats and opportunities that come with the ubiquitous technical
surveillance environment and big data analytics require the HUMINT enterprise
to come together as never before to integrate, deconflict, and evolve US
efforts. The National HUMINT Enterprise is comprised of 13 different US
government agencies and organizations all collecting intelligence to support the
equities and informational needs of their respective organizations. The Director
of CIA as the National HUMINT Manager ensures uniformity of tradecraft,
collection standards, and operational activity for the US government by sharing
best practices and techniques. The National HUMINT Manager also evaluates
intelligence consumer satisfaction with the HUMINT Enterprise, so that if
changes are needed it can be accomplished through all of the HUMINT
executors. The DCIA continues to be in the best position to execute these
functions successfully.
QUESTION 6: What do you consider to be the appropriate division of
responsibilities for HUMINT between the CIA and the various components of
the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)? As the National HUMINT
Manager, how would you improve sharing of HUMINT between elements
within the Intelligence Community (IC), and how would you seek to benefit and
enhance the collection of HUMINT within the IC?
(U) Responsibilities for each IC element are laid out in Executive Order 12333,
and each have their own unique capabilities and authorities to bring to bear against
the complex challenges facing our country; however, in the realm of HUMINT
collection (both clandestine and overt), the actions of one HUMINT executor may
impact the operations of another, making coordination of activity paramount. At
the same time, the US government benefits from having appropriate redundancy in
its collection capability. This overlap ensures the adversary cannot exploit any
seams in the IC. To that end, it is critical for each to lean forward and share lessons
learned and best practices in tradecraft and the use of technology. To do so will
not only enhance the IC’s capabilities as a whole, but will also enable the IC to
focus the “best athlete” against the “right operation” with the most knowledge
available to ensure success.
(U) As the Community HUMINT Manager, I will continue to promote greater
collaboration and information sharing by IC members, create more opportunities
for IC officers to serve in different IC agencies, and ensure technology
advancements are agile and shared with IC partners.
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QUESTION 7: As a former senior diplomat, you have been a high-volume
consumer of the intelligence the CIA provides. In this regard, and with your
exposure to the operational activities of the CIA, what are your views on the
working relationships of the FBI, DHS, National Security Agency (NSA), and
other elements of the DOD and the CIA? How could these relationships be
improved at the working level, and how would you make this work as Director
of the CIA?
(U) As I have known throughout my career, effective, cooperative interagency
relationships are absolutely crucial, especially within the intelligence community –
with each partner supporting the other. In keeping with the 9/11 Commission
Report, it’s essential that IC members work side-by-side, sharing usable
information that benefits the US government as a whole. Now that the many of the
organizational and cultural barriers to partnership and collaboration have been
removed where appropriate, we must focus on improving the IT infrastructure and
making other practical improvements which will continue to enhance more timely
coordination and integrated efforts.
QUESTION 8: What role do you see for the CIA in paramilitary actions? How
do you distinguish between the appropriate roles of the CIA and the United
States Special Operations Forces in paramilitary actions?
(U) CIA necessarily must operate in hazardous and austere environments, whether
to prosecute the United States’ covert action mission, as directed by the President,
or to collect foreign intelligence against hard targets. I would suggest that
“paramilitary-style actions” should not be considered a separate category of
operation, but a method by which these two broader missions may be
accomplished, with increasing attention being paid to aligning more of CIA’s
collection capabilities against our most strategic and challenging targets.
(U) While there are some similarities between the CIA’s paramilitary capabilities
and the Department of Defense’s Special Operations Forces (SOF), their legal
authorities and objectives are different. DoD uses SOF to execute a military
strategy where CIA uses its distinct authorities for its clandestine mission.
Together, these activities are critical parts of supporting the President’s National
Security Strategy.

6

The CIA and Cybersecurity Posture
QUESTION 9: The issue of cybersecurity is a focus of this Committee. Public
cybersecurity incidents have led to questions about the security of CIA systems
writ large.
A. How would you improve the cybersecurity posture of CIA systems?
B. What are your top priorities for cybersecurity and technical
counter- cyberespionage protections at the CIA in the near term?
(U) Like many organizations, CIA has been challenged by the relentless
proliferation of advanced threats to its operations, information technology
networks, and data. On a daily basis, Foreign Intelligence Services and cyber
criminals employ sophisticated and technologically advanced capabilities and
tactics in their non-stop efforts to steal the classified information collected, stored,
and processed by CIA.
(U) If confirmed, I will ensure that CIA is consolidating the organizational gains
made in recent years and continuing to invest in personnel, counterintelligence
processes, cyber defense technology, and needed upgrades to information
technology systems.
• Specifically, I will ensure CIA is making sustained investments in several
key areas, such as:
o Continued innovations in Artificial Intelligence technologies that
help cyber defenders detect and repel the most sophisticated and
difficult-to-detect attacks.
o Emerging technologies and best practices aimed at securing the
complex supply chains upon which CIA and other government
agencies rely.
o Collective defense frameworks and technologies to ensure CIA and
other Intelligence Community organizations are learning and
benefitting from one another.
• Finally, I would work to create a culture of accountability in which every
CIA employee, at every level, is educated about cyber risk and made aware
that all aspects of the business should be conducted with a focus on
cybersecurity as a mission imperative.
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Duty to Correct Public Statements
QUESTION 10: What is your view of the Director of the CIA’s responsibility to
inform senior administration policy officials or their spokespersons when the
available intelligence either does not support or contradicts public statements they
have made?
(U) If I became aware that a senior administration policy official or their
spokesperson had made a public statement that I later learned was not supported
by, or contradictory to, available intelligence, I would consult with that official
and suggest ways to correct the public record unless doing so would risk
disclosing sources and methods.
QUESTION 11: How would you improve the independence of CIA analytic
products, and distance yourself from political sentiment sufficiently to remain
dispassionate and unbiased given the current media and information
environment?
(U) Throughout my career, I have understood that objective intelligence analysis,
delivered with honesty and without any hint of politics or policy agenda, is
foundational for sound policy choices. If confirmed, I will be deeply committed to
exactly that approach.
(U) Across my years in government service, I have been impressed by the
exceptional lengths CIA analysts go to ensure their analysis is objective, even
when its conclusions may be unwelcome. Rigorous objectivity has always been,
and must remain, the touchstone for the Agency’s analysis. I am committed to
protecting and defending the ability of CIA officers to provide their best, wellgrounded analysis, whether or not it fits my own analytic views.
(U) Both the leadership of the Directorate of Analysis and the Agency’s
Ombudsman for Objectivity will continue to play vital roles in ensuring CIA
analysts have recourse to raise concerns about objectivity or politicization, and in
acting as conduits to ensure any concerns are surfaced and addressed.
Law Enforcement Proviso
QUESTION 12: The National Security Act of 1947 (Section 104A (d)(1))
states that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency “shall have no
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police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.”
Explain your understanding of this proviso. Furthermore, explain whether you
believe the CIA should have arrest authorities, and if so, under what conditions.
(U) The “law enforcement proviso” of the National Security Act of 1947 limits the
CIA’s authority. I understand that Congress, influenced by the United States’
experience in World War II with totalitarian states such as Nazi Germany, was
determined “that the CIA neither invade the FBI’s jurisdiction nor become a secret
police.” I should note that while it is a significant legal constraint, the “law
enforcement proviso” does not preclude certain types of CIA assistance to U.S. law
enforcement agencies in various circumstances. With the exception of the
authority of CIA special police officers to protect CIA installations, property, or
employees, I do not believe that CIA should have the authority to arrest persons in
the United States.
QUESTION 13: What principles, in your view, should govern rules pertaining
to the collection and retention of U.S. person information by U.S. intelligence
agencies, even if the data is in transit? Please explain if there are any special
rules or exceptions necessary for the collection and retention of U.S. person
information by the CIA.
(U) It is crucial that the Intelligence Community achieve the correct balance
between acquiring information needed to keep our nation safe and protecting
information concerning the privacy interests of U.S. persons, including their
privacy interests in communications that are in transit. The CIA’s January 2017
Attorney General-approved Guidelines provide specific principles and standards
that govern the collection, use, retention, and dissemination of information
concerning U.S. persons, including incidentally acquired information concerning
the communications of U.S. persons. These Guidelines implement the
requirements of Executive Order 12333 and Section 309 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (“Procedures for the Retention of
Incidentally Acquired Communications”). If confirmed, I commit to following
these guidelines and procedures, and I look forward to working with the
Committee in its important oversight role with respect to these authorities.
Science & Technology and Research & Development
QUESTION 14: Section 501 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021 ensures that the Director of the CIA has the legal authorities required
to improve the skills in science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics
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(collectively referred to as “STEAM”) necessary to meet long-term national
security needs.
A. Do you commit to providing the support necessary to execute these legal
authorities and improve the Agency’s workforce skills related to
STEAM areas of expertise?
(U) Yes. Your recent approval of the STEAM legislation will certainly
enhance CIA’s ability to use appropriated funds to issue grants to colleges
and universities to develop innovative ways to leverage technology through
research; to narrow intelligence gaps; and to develop our STEAM
workforce. I fully support CIA’s academic partnerships with Historically
Black Colleges & Universities and Minority Serving Institutions to increase
diversity of thought and approaches in the core disciplines of science and
technology. I also look forward to leveraging CIA Labs’ established
relationships with academia, industry, and other government entities to
expand our STEAM outreach and workforce development. I am confident
that this approach will bolster the technical skills of our existing workforce,
and develop the STEAM workforce of the future.
B. Do you commit to keeping the congressional intelligence committees
currently and fully informed as to the progress that the agency is
making toward improving the agency’s workforce skills related to
STEAM areas of expertise, and how the agency’s workforce is
improving its ability to meet long-term national security needs?
(U) Yes.
Brain Trauma Injuries
QUESTION 15: To address injuries suffered by CIA employees, section 6412
of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 authorized the Director
of the CIA to provide enhanced injury benefits to a covered employee or
qualifying dependents who suffer an injury overseas due to war, insurgency,
hostile act, or terrorist activities. Since that time, the CIA has advised that this
provision may not provide complete coverage for certain brain, heart, and back
injuries.
A. Do you commit to providing the support necessary for legislation to
ensure that all qualifying brain, heart, back, and potentially other injuries
10

are covered?
(U) Yes. I also want to thank the Committee for its interest and advocacy
on this important issue.
B. Do you commit to providing the congressional intelligence committees
with ongoing, timely intelligence-related written and verbal updates on
the “Havana Syndrome” and related issues?
(U) Yes.
C. Do you commit to advising the congressional intelligence committees
when additional legislative, administrative, or other action is required to
address the “Havana Syndrome” and related issues?
(U) Yes.
QUESTION 16: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has
worked to find legislative solutions to the spate of brain trauma injuries that have
afflicted CIA personnel in recent years. While the committee has had some
success on this front, our efforts to achieve a comprehensive and enduring
legislative fix to this problem would benefit greatly from your commitment to
viewing the committee as a partner in this matter.
A. Can this committee count on your support for our legislative efforts to
ensure CIA officers have access to the healthcare and rehabilitative
services needed to treat brain trauma injuries?
(U) Yes.
B. Is it your positon that the CIA’s Office of Medical Services (OMS) has an
obligation to treat seriously all claims of duty-related physical injury
arising from CIA personnel, to include the symptoms of brain trauma?
(U) Yes.
Classification & Transparency
QUESTION 17: Executive Order 13526 states, “ln no case shall information be
classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in
11

order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2)
prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain
competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not
require protection in the interest of national security.” Executive Orders 12958
and 13292 prohibited classification for these same factors.
A. Do you commit to fulfilling both the letter and the spirit of
these prohibitions?
(U) Yes.
B. What role do you believe the CIA Inspector General should play
in investigating possible violations of these prohibitions?
(U) Under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, one of the
duties and responsibilities of the CIA Inspector General is to conduct
investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Agency
to ensure they are conducted in accordance with law and regulations,
and to keep the Director fully and currently informed concerning
violations of law and regulations. I expect that possible violations of
the Executive Order 13526 classification prohibitions that come to
the attention of the Inspector General will be appropriately reviewed.
C. What accountability do you believe is appropriate for violations of
these prohibitions?
(U) CIA employees who knowingly, willfully, or negligently violate the
Executive Order 13526 classification prohibitions will be subject to
appropriate sanctions as prescribed by the Executive Order.
QUESTION 18: If you or another CIA officer were to say something that was
factually inaccurate in public, would you correct the public record?
(U) If I became aware that I or another CIA officer had made a public
statement that I later learned was factually inaccurate, I would take action to
correct the public record unless doing so would risk disclosing sources and
methods. To the extent the erroneous statement was made to Congress, I
would take appropriate steps to inform Congress about the correction.
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QUESTION 19: “Central intelligence Agency intelligence Activities:
Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order
12333” is currently posted online. Do you commit to continuing to post these
procedures and to making public any modifications, superseding policies and
procedures, or significant interpretations?
(U) Yes, consistent with my responsibility to protect sources and methods.
QUESTION 20: The CIA’s PPD-28 Section 4 policies and procedures are
publicly available. Will you ensure that the CIA continues to post these
procedures as well as any modifications, superseding policies and procedures,
or significant interpretations?
(U) In accordance with the PPD-28 Section 4 publication requirements, I
commit to continue making publicly available CIA’s PPD-28 Section 4
policies and procedures, which are unclassified. I also commit to make
publicly available any unclassified modifications of these procedures or
any superseding unclassified procedures that are promulgated.
QUESTION 21: Will you support the declassification and public release of any
interpretation of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities, but is
inconsistent with the public’s understanding of the law?
(U) Yes, insofar as we see a significant gap in the public’s understanding of the
law and consistent with my responsibility to protect sources and methods.
Additionally, the National Security Act requires that the CIA General Counsel
notify the congressional intelligence committees of any significant legal
interpretations of the Constitution or federal law.
QUESTION 22: During her confirmation, DNI Haines stated that “[i]f
confirmed, I will seek to articulate and make public the circumstances under
which the IC purchases commercially available information and the legal basis
for doing so, consistent with the protection of sources and methods.” Will you
make the same commitment?
(U) Yes, consistent with my legal obligation to protect sources and methods.

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Detention, Interrogation and Rendition
QUESTION 23: Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 prohibits the use of any interrogation technique
or approach or treatment related to interrogation not authorized by the Army
Field Manual. Is this provision of law binding on the CIA?
(U) Yes.

QUESTION 24: Do you believe that any of the CIA’s former enhanced
interrogation techniques are consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act, the
U.S. statutory prohibition on torture, the War Crimes Act, or U.S. obligations
under the Convention against Torture or Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Convention?
(U) I believe the CIA’s former enhanced interrogation program included torture,
which violates U.S. commitments and obligations.
QUESTION 25: Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any
detention facilities other than “facilities used only to hold people on a short-term
transitory basis.” Do you support this prohibition?
(U) Yes.

QUESTION 26: Section 1045 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 requires the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI, the Attorney General, and
the Director of the FBI, to complete a “thorough review” every three years of
Army Field Manual 2-22.3 (Human Intelligence Collector Operations)
("AFM").
A. Do you agree to advocate for a timely review of the AFM?
(U) Yes.
B. Do you agree that the CIA’s former enhanced interrogation techniques
should be prohibited under the AFM?
(U) Yes.
C. Section 1045 requires that the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group
14

(HIG) submit a report on best practices for interrogation and states that
the review of the AFM may include recommendations for revisions based
on HIG research. After reviewing the science, the HIG concluded that,
“[based on the comprehensive research and field validation studies
detailed in this report, it is concluded that the most effective practices for
eliciting accurate information and actionable intelligence are noncoercive, rapport-based, information-gathering interviewing and
interrogation methods.” Do you agree that the review of the AFM should
be consistent with these scientific best practices?
(U) Yes.
QUESTION 27: If confirmed, will you ensure that the full, non-redacted
Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program (“Study”) is
made available to cleared CIA personnel, so that its lessons can be learned?
(U) The Executive Summary containing the background, summary, and
conclusions of the Study is available to all CIA personnel. Should the
Committee request additional access for CIA personnel for the full,
unredacted Study, I will consider appropriate options with the Committee.
QUESTION 28: If confirmed, will you review the options for making the full,
non-redacted Study, or relevant portions thereof, available to appropriately
cleared defense counsel at the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay and
report to Congress on that review?
(U) If confirmed, should the Committee request access to the report for the
military commission counsels, I will, within the framework of the rules of
discovery in the military commission cases, review options with the Committee
for making relevant portions of the Study available to appropriately cleared
defense counsel.
QUESTION 29: If confirmed, will you review the options for ensuring that
medical personnel at Guantanamo Bay have access to any information in the
Study relevant to the health of detainees?
(U) If confirmed, should the Committee request access to the report for medical
personnel at Guantanamo Bay, I will review any information in the Study
relevant to the health of detainees and consider options with the Committee for
providing access to that information if not already provided.
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QUESTION 30: Do you agree that CIA officers should not participate in
interrogations of detainees in liaison custody when those officers witness, know
of, or otherwise suspect the torture or mistreatment of detainees?
(U) Yes, I agree that CIA officers should not participate in detainee debriefings
if the CIA has received credible information that detainees in liaison custody
have been tortured or mistreated.
QUESTION 31: The statutory prohibition on interrogations not consistent with
the AFM applies to any individual “in the custody or under the effective control
of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government; or
detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or
agency of the United States, in any armed conflict.”
A. Please describe the factors that would indicate whether a detainee is in
the “effective control” of any officer, employee, or other agent of the
United States Government.
B. Please describe how you would define whether a detainee is “detained
within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department of agency
of the United States.”
(U) I would base an interpretation of the statutory standards on the facts of a
particular situation in consultation with the General Counsel. Relevant
factors may include whether the U.S. controls access to the detention facility
in question, owns the land on which the facility is located, manages the
operations of the facility, controls the disposition of detainees, and/or has the
authority to discipline or fire the personnel running the facility.
(U) Executive Order 13491 prohibits CIA from operating any detention
facilities, other than facilities used only to hold people on a short-term,
transitory basis.
QUESTION 32: The United States recognizes its obligations under the
Convention Against Torture, not to “expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a
person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he [or she] would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”
A. To what extent should written “diplomatic assurances” be required for
extraditions and renditions?
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(U) Diplomatic assurances, and consulting with the Department of State or
Chief of Mission of the relevant Embassy in assessing the reliability and
credibility of assurances obtained in connection with an extradition or
rendition, are important considerations in determining whether the legal
standards for an extradition or rendition are met and that detainees will be
treated humanely.
B. Should such assurances be accepted from countries with established
records of committing torture?
(U) The reliability and credibility of any assurances would be assessed on a
case-by-case basis in light of all relevant factors and credible information
known to CIA at the time, including the practices of the country providing
the assurances and that country’s record of compliance with assurances
provided in similar circumstances to the U.S. and other countries.
Accountability
QUESTION 33: On June 27, 2013, then-CIA Director Brennan submitted to
the Committee a letter acknowledging that, with regard to the CIA’s Detention
and Interrogation Program, the CIA “[f}ell short when it came to holding
individuals accountable for poor performance and management failures.” The
CIA then made the following recommendation:
“Broaden the scope of accountability reviews. Direct that the Executive
Director ensure that all memoranda establishing and laying out the scope
of an accountability review board, including directorate level boards,
explicitly call on the board to assess and make recommendations to
address any systemic issues revealed by the case, and to expand the scope
of the review as warranted to include officers responsible for those
systemic problems.”
The 2014 Accountability Board that investigated the conduct of the five
individuals named in the CIA’s OIG report on “Agency Access to the SSClShared Drive on RDlNet” did not expand its scope beyond the five individuals,
nor did it address accountability for officers responsible for systemic problems.
A. As a general matter, if confirmed, how would you improve
accountability within the CIA?
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B. Do you agree with the 2013 recommendation that accountability reviews
at the CIA should be broadened to consider officers responsible for
systemic problems?
C. If confirmed, will you review the accountability review process at the CIA
to ensure that it addresses systemic problems and includes officers
responsible for those systemic problems as well as management failures?
(U) Accountability is fundamental and systemic problems are no exception. If
confirmed, I will, in leading the Agency forward, explore whether CIA’s current
accountability review process should be broadened or otherwise improved.
Human Rights
QUESTION 34: In an August 6, 2015, letter, then-Director Brennan wrote that
“[while we neither condone nor participate in activities that violate human rights
standards, we do maintain cooperative liaison relationships with a variety of
intelligence and security services around the world, some of whose constituent
entities have engaged in human rights abuses.” If a liaison service were to use
CIA-provided resources to engage in human rights abuses, with CIA’s
knowledge, would the CIA bear any legal responsibility?
(U) Situations involving allegations of liaison’s misuse of CIA resources in
activities that violate human rights standards would be a serious matter that would
involve review by the General Counsel, notification to Congress, and possible
termination of the relationship.
Chief of Mission Authority and Relations with the Department of State
QUESTION 35: Director Brennan’s August 6, 2015, letter stated that “[when
we choose to continue a liaison relationship despite allegations of human rights
abuses by individuals associated with liaison service, CIA policy requires that
we take several steps to inform our U.S. Government partners and to mitigate
the risk of future human rights abuses. First we advise the local Chief of Mission
of CIA’s concerns and seek the Chief of Mission’s input on whether to continue
the liaison relationship.]” Should the CIA inform the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) or other elements of the Department of State when it considers a
liaison relationship despite allegations of human rights abuses?
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(U) Under the direction of the President, it is vital for Chiefs of Mission to be kept
fully and currently informed of intelligence activities and operations undertaken in
their countries of accreditation to include matters related to human rights records
of liaison partners. If a Chief of Mission were to oppose continuing the
relationship, I would expect that the matter would be elevated to the headquarters
components of CIA and the Department of State for further discussion and
resolution, which may include consideration by the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research.
QUESTION 36: 22 U.S.C. 3927 states that “Under the direction of the
President, the chief of mission to a foreign country ... shall have full responsibility
for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive
branch employees in that country....” Absent direct intervention from the
President, is the CIA obligated to cease intelligence activities (including, but not
limited to liaison relationships) that do not have the approval of the chief of
mission?
(U) Pursuant to a long-held agreement between Department of State and CIA,
Chiefs of Station are required to keep Chiefs of Mission fully and currently
informed about all CIA programs and activities carried out in their countries of
accreditation (unless CIA has been specifically exempted from this responsibility
by the President or the Secretary of State). Intelligence activities that do not have
the approval of the Chief of Mission, but remain supported by the Chief of Station
are referred back to CIA and the Department of State for resolution.
QUESTION 37: Please describe the appropriate process whereby covert action
is reviewed by the Department of State for consistency with U.S. foreign policy,
both at the outset and over the course of the program. What entities within the
Department of State should be part of that review?
(U) The Secretary of State is a statutory member of the NSC. In considering and
submitting to the President a policy recommendation on each proposed covert
action, the NSC is required to consider and submit all dissents. The NSC also is
required to conduct a periodic review of ongoing covert action activities, including
an evaluation of the effectiveness and consistency with current national policy of
such activities and their consistency with applicable legal requirements.
(U) The Department of State has a critical role in contributing to the policy
coordination of covert action programs as senior officials serving both in
Washington and as Chiefs of Mission contribute to the policy coordination process
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to ensure consistency with U.S. foreign policy. The Department of State’s Bureau
of Intelligence and Research is and should continue as a collaborative partner that
participates in interagency working groups to ensure that foreign policy views are
considered in developing and implementing the programs.
Section 702 of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
QUESTION 38: During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General
for National Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse
targeting in Section 702 of FISA. He responded:
“As l understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person
has been reverse targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target
necessitates a fact specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a
variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted
in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S.
person, but little reporting about the Section 702 target, that might be an
indication that reverse targeting may have occurred.”
If confirmed, how will you ensure that this fact specific analysis is applied to the
CIA’s nomination of Section 702 targets?
(U) FISA Section 702 prohibits “reverse targeting” – intentionally targeting a
person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of
such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in
the United States. Extensive internal and external oversight mechanisms help
ensure that CIA’s nomination of Section 702 targets does not violate the
prohibition on reverse targeting.
(U) CIA’s activities under Section 702 are subject to continuous internal oversight
by CIA’s FISA Program Office, Office of General Counsel, and Office of Privacy
and Civil Liberties. CIA’s FISA Program Office and Office of General Counsel
also train CIA FISA users on the prohibition against reverse targeting.
(U) CIA’s activities under Section 702 are audited every 60 days by the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI). During the 60-day audits, the Department of Justice reviews all Section
702 tasking decisions for compliance with statutory requirements, including the
prohibition on reverse targeting. In addition, CIA’s activities under Section 702
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are subject to judicial oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as
well as legislative oversight by both the congressional intelligence and judiciary
committees.
Executive Order 12333
QUESTION 39: NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the
U.S. person or certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of
communications collected under Executive Order 12333 “normally must
be approved by the Attorney General on a case-by-case basis after a
finding of probable cause.” Should the same requirement apply to the
CIA?
(U) The Attorney General has recognized that CIA’s situation is different
from NSA’s. CIA’s January 2017 Attorney General-approved Guidelines
on the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning
U.S. persons, issued pursuant to Executive Order 12333, state that queries
of CIA information repositories “are not considered collection; rather,
those queries examine previously collected information and do not require
any additional approval” beyond those for the initial collection of the
information.
Outsourcing of Intelligence
QUESTION 40: What rules should apply to the CIA’s receipt, use, and
dissemination of communications collected by a foreign source or liaison
partner that is known to include U.S. person communications?
(U) The CIA’s January 2017 Attorney General-approved Guidelines apply to
CIA’s receipt, use, retention, and dissemination of communications collected
by a foreign source or liaison partner. The Guidelines implement Executive
Order 12333 as well as the requirements of Section 309 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, which requires procedures for any
intelligence collection activity not otherwise authorized by court order,
subpoena, or similar legal process when it is reasonably anticipated to result in
the acquisition of nonpublic communication to or from a U.S. person. The
Guidelines provide a robust set of rules governing the collection, use,
retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons,
including incidentally acquired information concerning the communications of
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U.S. persons.
QUESTION 41: Do you agree that the CIA cannot request that a foreign entity
conduct any activity that the CIA is not authorized to undertake itself?
(U) CIA cannot ask a third party to undertake activities forbidden by E.O. 12333
or to otherwise violate U.S. law.
Lethal Operations
QUESTION 42: The 22 May 2013 Direct Action Presidential Policy Guidance
(PPG) (“Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets
Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities”) was released
to the public. Do you support transparency with regard to these policies?
(U) Yes, I do generally support being as transparent as possible with the public on
U.S. direct action policy. But I believe that such transparency must be weighed
against the impact of revealing to terrorists and terrorist groups key aspects of such
policies that could enable them to take steps to evade counterterrorist operations
and therefore continue to threaten the U.S. homeland, U.S. persons and interests,
and our allies overseas.
QUESTION 43: Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications
of targeting or otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government
lethal operation. What additional public transparency do you believe would be
warranted in that situation?
(U) The decision to target a U.S. citizen with lethal force is one of the most
serious decisions that the U.S. Government could confront and is generally
contemplated by an Administration only in narrow circumstances – for example
when a U.S. citizen is part of enemy forces within the scope of a force
authorization. Any proposal must be lawful, authorized by the President under a
framework approved by the Department of Justice, and take into account that
person’s constitutional rights. I believe continued transparency is important.
QUESTION 44: On July 1, 2016, President Obama issued Executive Order
13732, “United States Policy and Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address
Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations lnvolving the Use of Force.” Section 3 of
the Executive Order directed the DNI to publicly release an annual report on
strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government against terrorist targets outside areas
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of active hostilities. President Trump revoked Section 3 on March 6, 2019.
Section 1723 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included a similar reporting
requirement.
A. During her confirmation, DNI Haines agreed to advocate for a new or
revised Executive Order that includes reporting on strikes taken by and
civilian casualties caused by all U.S. Government agencies. Do you
support Director Haines’ position?
(U) Yes, I support the release of an annual report that provides aggregate
statistics on strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government and civilian
casualties.
B. DNI Haines supported making Section 1723 permanent and ensuring
compliance with Section 1723, including the requirement that the report
be submitted in unclassified form. Do you support these positions?
(U) Yes.
Whistleblowers
QUESTION 45: Do you agree that any monitoring of CIA personnel for
purposes of detecting insider threats must protect confidentiality of protected
whistleblower communications? If so, how should that protection be assured?
(U) I fully support the statutory protections afforded to whistleblowers, the
confidentiality of their protected communications, and the importance of honoring
whistleblower anonymity. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the current
whistleblower procedures and protections for CIA personnel to determine whether
any changes are appropriate.
QUESTION 46: Do you believe that Intelligence Community (IC)
whistleblowers who request access to an attorney with appropriate
security clearances should have that access?
(U) Yes, where appropriate.

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Saudi Arabia
QUESTION 47: A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded
that “Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United
States to Avoid Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process.”
A. If confirmed, will you make Saudi efforts to undermine the U.S.
judicial process a collection and analytic priority?
(U) If confirmed, I will support any FBI or DOJ requirements for
the intelligence community on this issue.
B. The FBI further assessed that “KSA officials are unlikely to alter their
practice of assisting the flight of Saudi citizens in legal trouble from the
United States in the near term unless the USG directly addresses this
issue with the KSA.” If confirmed, do you agree to raise this concern
directly with your Saudi counterparts?
(U) If confirmed, I will support any policy requirements for the
intelligence community on this issue, including if policymakers ask CIA to
raise concerns through intelligence channels.
Russia Investigation
QUESTION 48: During her confirmation, DNI Haines stated that she would
order a review of the Committee’s Report on Russian Active Measures
Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, and in particular Volume
5, to determine whether additional declassification is possible consistent with
the need to protect national security. If confirmed, will you support this review
and seek to declassify the maximum amount of information consistent with the
protection of sources and methods?
(U) Yes.
Historical Review Panel
QUESTION 49: Starting in the mid-1990s and for over 20 years, the Director
of the CIA chartered a Historical Review Panel (HRP) to advise on
declassification and other matters of historical interest. The HRP reported
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directly to nine Directors, but in 2018 the CIA dissolved it with no reason given,
either publicly or to HRP members. We understand that recently the CIA has
decided to reconstitute a new entity to advise on declassification, the “CIA
Historical Advisory Panel” (HAP). However, the new HAP does not report to
the Director of the CIA and appears to be disconnected entirely from the CIA’s
senior leadership. If confirmed, will you restore the new HAP to make it a
direct report to the Director of the CIA, meet with it, and give it your full
support?
(U) If confirmed, I look forward to promoting the work of the Historical Advisory
Panel, supporting its relationship with CIA senior leadership, and working with the
Agency’s Chief Data Officer to ensure the Panel’s advice and recommendations on
declassification and other matters of historical interest are appropriately
communicated to me and others in senior leadership.
China
QUESTION 50: In 2018 remarks to this committee, your prospective
predecessor as Director of the CIA, Gina Haspel, referenced China’s unfair trade
practices, overt and illicit efforts to steal U.S. technology and intellectual
property, and efforts to diminish U.S. influence all around the world.
A. Do you agree with the assertion that China’s Confucius Institutes are an
instrumentality for propagating Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
influence on the campuses of America’s educational institutions?
(U) Yes. Beijing tries to advance its soft power and pro-China propaganda
through cultural and educational programs at US academic institutions.
(U) Programs such as Confucius Institutes fund Chinese-language learning
and provide the CCP direct access to university officials. Beijing uses this
access to spread positive portrayals of China, and steer conversations from
topics sensitive to the CCP.
B. Do you agree with the assertion that Beijing uses nominally private
civic organizations like the China-U.S. Exchange Foundation to sway
public opinion and build influence in the United States?

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(U) Yes. The CCP employs a whole-of-government approach to exert
influence and uses complementary overt and covert means that draw on a
wide array of carrots and sticks to try and influence political, economic, and
cultural developments to benefit CCP interests.
C. Do you agree with the assertion that China’s using nominally
independent third-party organizations to act as the primary agents for
funding and managing lobbying efforts on behalf of the CCP represents
a deceptive and dangerous form of influence laundering?
(U) Yes. The CCP mobilizes and directs nongovernment Chinese actors,
such as businesses, NGOs, and expatriate communities, to diversify
influence efforts and transmit their views in multiple channels.
QUESTION 51: The CIA’s quick adoption of technology like Artificial
Intelligence (AI) will help to mitigate the numerical advantages of the Chinese
intelligence services, as well as increase efficiency and exposure for its workforce
- both critical, because in China the U.S. faces technological authoritarianism that
threatens the U.S. technological dominance, and our more principled use of
technology.
A. How will you, as Director of the CIA, ensure that the IC’s traditional
inclination to favor security over new technology does not
unreasonably delay adoption?
B. How will you ensure there is a glide path to operationalize pilot
projects at the CIA, to include those centered on AI, into sustainable
solutions for multiple missions?
(U) China is investing considerable resources on Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning (AI/ML) technologies to enhance its intelligence collection and
counterintelligence capabilities. CIA must meet this challenge by transforming
how it collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence. I understand that CIA has
devised an AI/ML strategy to achieve this goal, is working closely with the leading
AI/ML firms in the country, and – with DNI to help – will drive the adoption of
AI/ML technologies across the IC. As DCIA, I will make this a priority by
accelerating the implementation of mission critical AI/ML capabilities and
ensuring the Agency develops a mature AI/ML infrastructure.

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QUESTION 52: How do you plan to hire more officers with critically needed
skills like data scientists and Mandarin speakers?
(U) If confirmed, I plan to continue to seek opportunities to enhance CIA
initiatives focused on attracting STEAM and mission-critical language talent.
These efforts will be focused on building CIA’s most important asset: its people.
Some of these ongoing initiatives include an increased presence online to reach the
caliber of officers needed to fill critical positions. CIA’s vibrant online presence
and recruitment techniques are key to connecting with the prospective workforce
needed for the future. I also plan to continue leveraging recruitment bonuses
focused on new hires who speak mission-critical languages such as Chinese, or
who are expert in hard-to-fill STEAM occupations such as data science, cyber
security, data analytics, and software developers. Academic and community
outreach is also critically important, and I intend to broaden CIA engagement with
STEAM professional and affinity groups. This leadership challenge will be one of
my top priorities if confirmed.

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