SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES
SENATE

Additional Prehearing Questions for
Avril D. Haines
Upon her nomination to be
Director of National
Intelligence

Responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence
QUESTION 1: ​The role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) can differ depending on
what the President has requested. If confirmed, you would be the seventh DNI.
A. ​What guidance has President-elect Biden provided you for the role of the DNI? Specifically,
is the vision that the position be a director, coordinator, or something else?
The President-elect has said that he wants me to be a fierce advocate for telling the truth and
levelling with decision makers. Beyond that, if I am confirmed, my role would be to serve as the
principal intelligence adviser to the President and his senior advisers, including military advisers,
in order to inform their consideration of critical national security issues; to lead the Intelligence
Community to effectively integrate intelligence analysis; to establish objectives and priorities for
the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence across the
community; to be a responsible steward of of our nation’s resources in the execution of an annual
budget for the National Intelligence Program; to drive resource and capability decisions and
ensure resources are allocated appropriately and responsibly across the community; and to
oversee relationships with the intelligence services of foreign governments and international
organizations. In accomplishing these objectives, I am committed to doing so free from political
influence, and with a focus on increasing coordination across the IC. I also believe that the
President-elect envisions a DNI who is committed to facilitating robust oversight of the IC by
Congress as well as enhanced transparency with the American public.
B. ​How will you reaffirm that the Intelligence Community’s (IC’s) role is that of an apolitical,
honest broker charged with disseminating the truth?
It is essential that the Intelligence Community workforce and the American people understand
and believe that the IC’s role is to provide honest, apolitical analysis and advice, regardless of
whether it is convenient or expedient. If confirmed, I intend to reaffirm that vital role for the IC
by communicating it consistently and demonstrating it personally. The IC workforce will hear me
emphasize, from my first day on the job, that politics must end where intelligence work begins and
that, moreover, the IC’s responsibility is to offer honest, high-quality analysis without concern for
whether the message is likely to be well received. I will lead by example, providing -- in public
where appropriate, as well as in private -- intelligence work that reflects professional expertise
and candid conclusions, and overall a steadfast commitment to truth.
C. ​Do you intend that the DNI will deliver and brief the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) or will
you leave it to the PDB staff? Do you anticipate having Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
personnel accompany personnel from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) for PDB briefings?

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Central to the success of any DNI is ensuring that the Intelligence Community is delivering its
important analysis to the President and other senior policymakers. As President-elect Biden
assumes the presidency, I am confident that he will determine the format and participation for
PDB sessions that best suit his needs; and, if confirmed, I will look forward to ensuring that the
products of the IC workforce are delivered in a manner that maximizes their utility to the
President.
D. ​What qualities will you want in a principal deputy?
If confirmed, I want to ensure that a principal deputy reflects and amplifies my commitment to a
number of key values. First is a commitment to the Intelligence Community workforce itself,
which is the IC’s greatest asset: a principal deputy should share my view of the importance of
supporting and empowering that workforce. Second is a commitment to the apolitical nature of
the IC’s work: a principal deputy should amplify and extend my insistence, if confirmed, that the
IC deliver the highest possible quality intelligence products without regard to politics. Third is a
commitment to tighter coordination and synchronization across the IC: a principal deputy should
assist me in day-to-day efforts to improve collaboration across IC elements so that the IC
maximizes the utility and efficiency of its work. Fourth is a commitment to being a responsible
steward of our nation’s resources in the execution of an annual budget for the National
Intelligence Program: a principal deputy should assist me in driving resource and capability
decisions and ensuring resources are allocated appropriately and responsibly across the
community. And fifth is a commitment to transparency with the public and cooperation with
Congressional oversight, to ensure support for the IC’s mission.
E. ​How will you enhance the morale of an ODNI workforce that has experienced significant
disruption in the last two years?
First and foremost, it is imperative for the incoming DNI to publicly and privately acknowledge
the hardworking and dedicated ODNI workforce and to demonstrate respect for their expertise
and commitment to the American people. Early communication with the workforce will be critical
to repairing morale, as will the resumption of regular town hall meetings with the ODNI
workforce. The Intelligence Community’s ability to best address today’s national security
challenges depends on an empowered and trusted workforce. Key early actions will be to
reaffirm the incoming administration’s trust in the IC, reinforce a commitment to non-politicized
intelligence, emphasize the protection for whistleblowers, and ensure that the IC is fulfilling its
traditional role of informing policy deliberations.
F. ​Because the DNI is the government’s security executive agent, what priority will you give to
security clearance reform, and how will that be reflected in ODNI’s efforts as a whole?
Security clearance reform will be a high priority for me, if confirmed as the next DNI. It is
apparent that the current system is perceived as moving too slowly, which costs the IC talent -talent that we need in order to provide the best possible intelligence to policymakers as they
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confront a complex array of national security challenges. If I am confirmed, I will seek rapidly to
understand the extent and nature of the problems with the existing processes and the status of
ongoing reform initiatives, and I will ensure that the Committee is kept informed of our efforts to
improve the system.
G. ​How do you see the DNI’s relationship with the Director of the CIA and the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S))?
The DNI’s relationships with the leadership of all Intelligence Community components and,
where appropriate, the agencies within which they reside are critical to advancing the integration
of intelligence analysis and successfully executing the DNI’s coordination role.
Of particular importance are the relationships between the DNI and the Director of the CIA
(DCIA), as well as the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)).
Each is a critical partner for a successful DNI. While operating with due deference to the distinct
authorities of DCIA and USD(I&S), the DNI should strive to cultivate a working relationship with
both officials that is grounded in a transparent and frank dialogue, which will be required to work
through issues of shared concern. The foundation of such a dialogue is rooted in strong personal
relationships, and I intend to work to build that foundation from day one.
By statute, the DCIA “shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency,” which should enable a DNI to have a current and holistic
understanding of the CIA’s current activities. I envision that dialogue being rooted in clear
communication and regular information sharing to work through issues of common concern, such
as covert action or the status of HUMINT operations.
The relationship with USD (I&S) is different but no less important in coordinating the IC’s DOD
elements and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) funding. If confirmed, I would seek to
better integrate USD (I&S) into the DNI’s work of integrating and coordinating the IC, relying on
them to assist in achieving effective coordination and to facilitate work on issues of shared
interest across the community, including MIP/National Intelligence Program (NIP) cost shares,
critical DOD collection programs and platforms, and intelligence support to combat elements.
H. ​What do you see as the DNI’s role in covert action vis-à-vis the CIA and the White House?

The authority and responsibility for formulating and executing covert action programs rests with
the President and the CIA. However, the DNI is charged by statute with ensuring that the CIA
complies with the Constitution and laws of the United States, including in covert action programs.
In addition, under Executive Order 12333 the DNI has the responsibility to oversee and provide
advice to the President and the National Security Council with respect to covert action programs.
So, while the DNI does not have operational covert action authorities, she has a significant role to
play in helping to ensure that covert action programs are lawful and effective.

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I. ​Please describe your understanding of the following responsibilities of the DNI:
1. ​Serving as the principal adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.
2. ​Overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence
Program (NIP).
3. ​Managing the ODNI.
The DNI serves as the head of the IC and principal intelligence adviser to the President. In that
role, the DNI must provide the best possible intelligence analysis without being influenced by
politics. Additionally, Congress established the DNI to oversee and to coordinate the activities of
the other elements of the Intelligence Community. That includes establishing objectives and
priorities for the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence;
ensuring maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the IC; developing
and ensuring the execution of an annual budget for the National Intelligence Program; and
overseeing the coordination of relationships with the intelligence or security services of foreign
governments and international organizations. The DNI must also foster an organization
well-suited to carry out the DNI’s coordination and integration of the IC, composed of IC officers
with the necessary experience to work effectively across the IC. In my experience, the DNI has
played an indispensable role in integrating and setting priorities for the IC, leading the ODNI,
and in providing intelligence advice to senior policymakers, including the President, and to the
Congress.
QUESTION 2: ​What is your view of the role and responsibilities of the DNI in overseeing IC
agencies and integrating them into an effective intelligence enterprise? Please answer
separately for each of the following:
A. ​The OUSD(I&S) and the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components.
The DNI shares responsibility for the defense intelligence components with the Secretary of
Defense and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)). The
relationship between the DNI and USD(I&S) is critical in coordinating the work of the DoD
elements and the Military Intelligence Program funding.
B. ​The CIA.
The DNI is charged by statute with ensuring that the CIA complies with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, among other responsibilities for overseeing the CIA’s work and its
coordination with other elements of the Intelligence Community.
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C. ​The intelligence agencies that reside in other departments of the federal government.
The responsibilities of the DNI include s​ ynchronizing and prioritizing collection, analysis, and
counterintelligence efforts across Intelligence Community elements.
QUESTION 3: ​If confirmed as DNI, what steps will you take to improve the integration,
coordination, and collaboration among IC agencies?
A. ​What do you believe are the top IC management priorities for the DNI at present? If
confirmed, how would you address each one?
A top management priority, especially right now, is to ensure that the IC workforce is supported,
effective, and has a DNI who understands their role and keeps politics out of their work. If
confirmed, I will make clear to them that they will be protected from any inappropriate influence,
so that they can do their job of speaking truth to power. And I will make clear that they will be
protected from retaliation if they deliver a message that is unwelcome to policymakers.
Moreover, I will seek to recruit and retain diverse talent, promote innovation in every aspect of
our work, and foster a culture that is ethical, nonpartisan, accountable, and aligned with the
values we share as a country.
B. ​What do you believe are the greatest threats to the IC’s continued effectiveness in
performing its mission?
It is essential to protect the Intelligence Community’s critical work from politicization
or even the perception of politicization. It is also essential for the Intelligence
Community to effectively focus and prioritize its work on the threats of today and
tomorrow, and keep pace with, and leverage, technological developments in a rapidly
developing environment.
C. ​What areas of improvement need to be made in terms of IC acquisition?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying the current state of IC acquisition to understand how it
can be improved for efficiency and performance. I also look forward to engaging the Committee
on this issue.
QUESTION 4: ​Based on your professional experience:
A. ​Do you believe in the utility of the PDB to ensure the President has the ​ ​most current
information on pressing national security challenges facing​ ​the nation?
Yes.
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B. ​Do you believe the current organizational structure of U.S. intelligence agencies is optimal to
support the needs of the President, our warfighters, and other policy makers? If not, what
changes would you recommend to the current structure?
If confirmed, I look forward to seeing in action and studying carefully the current IC
organizational structure. In the event I identify issues with the current structure, I will consider
whether changes can be made to fulfill more effectively the needs of the President and others who
rely on the IC’s work, and I will consult with the Congress to understand your views as well.
QUESTION 5: ​The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was
an effort intended to improve the management and coordination of the IC to meet current and
future national security challenges.
A. ​Does the DNI have sufficient legal authorities, budgetary and otherwise, to effectively
execute the DNI’s IC management role? If not, what are your recommended enhancements or
changes to IRTPA’s authorities?
The IRTPA provides significant authority to the DNI to execute on the DNI’s IC management role.
If I am confirmed, I will have an opportunity to better understand how those authorities are
exercised in practice and whether they have been effective. I look forward to e​ ngaging the
Committee on this issue.\.​
B. ​Do you believe that granting the DNI more control over the intelligence agencies’ personnel,
training programs, and business systems would accelerate the integration of the IC? What
would be the downside to such a step?
If I am confirmed, I look forward to exploring the current relationship between the DNI, on the
one hand, and other intelligence agencies’ personnel, training programs, and business systems,
on the other hand, in order to determine whether alterations to that relationship would help to
advance the Intelligence Community’s fulfillment of its essential mission.
C. ​What do you consider the highest priority leadership and management challenges facing the
IC at this time? If confirmed, what will you do to address these challenges?
One of the greatest challenges to be faced by the next DNI -- internally and externally,
including with the workforce, this Committee, and the public -- is building the trust and
confidence necessary to effectively protect the American people. To be effective, it is essential
that the Intelligence Community workforce and the American people understand and believe
that the IC’s role is to provide honest, apolitical analysis and advice, regardless of whether it is
convenient or expedient. If confirmed, I intend to reaffirm that vital role for the IC by
communicating it consistently and demonstrating it personally. The IC workforce will hear me
emphasize, from my first day on the job, that politics must end where intelligence work begins
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and that, moreover, the IC’s responsibility is to offer honest, high-quality analysis without
concern for whether the message is likely to be well received. I will lead by example, providing
-- in public where appropriate, as well as in private -- intelligence work that reflects
professional expertise and candid conclusions, and overall a steadfast commitment to truth.
If confirmed, I would also seek to support and elevate the workforce and the mission, setting a
strategic vision for the work of the IC that looks beyond the immediate horizon to ensure we
are well postured to address developing threats while also taking advantage of new
opportunities as they arise, promoting national resilience, innovation, competitiveness, and
shared prosperity.

Qualifications
The 2004 IRTPA requires that, “Any individual nominated for appointment as Director
of National Intelligence shall have extensive national security expertise.” 50 U.S.C. §
3023(a)(1).
QUESTION 6: ​Please describe the specific experiences you have had in your professional
career that will enable you to serve effectively as the head of the IC. What lessons have you
drawn from the experiences of former DNIs?
I have worked for close to two decades on a wide array of national security, intelligence, and
foreign policy matters; and, through those experiences, I developed extensive national security
expertise. I have served in all three branches of the U.S. government; what’s more, I have worked
as a lawyer, a policymaker, and in the Intelligence Community, and have worked in several
different executive branch entities. That diverse set of experiences have given me a rich
understanding of how to leverage different parts of the U.S. government to serve U.S. national
security interests and the various legal and policy frameworks through which the United States
promotes its national security and intelligence interests. I have, in particular, both worked within
the Intelligence Community and been a customer of the Intelligence Community, and thus have a
sense not only of how the community operates but also of the expectations of the national security
community outside of the Intelligence Community and how best to serve their national intelligence
needs. Moreover, I have worked with budgets in and out of government, have management
experience, and have worked with international partners to achieve results for the United States.
I look forward to drawing on those experiences, as well as on consultation with former DNIs, to
fulfill the responsibilities of the DNI, if confirmed.
QUESTION 7: ​Please explain, and provide corresponding evidence, how your background
fulfills the requirement that a DNI nominee have “extensive national security expertise.”
Please see answer to Question 6.
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QUESTION 8: ​The DNI is one of the most important national security jobs in the U.S.
government, overseeing 17 agencies with disparate capabilities, authorities, and workforces
across six federal departments and two independent agencies, deployed around the globe,
accountable to multiple committees of Congress.
A. ​What experience do you have running a federated enterprise?
While the DNI is a relatively unique position in government, I gained important experience as
Deputy National Security Advisor. In that role, I coordinated the work of a variety of different
departments and agencies across a range of unique and wide-ranging issues.
B. ​What experience do you have leading and managing intelligence activities?
As Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I helped to lead and manage that agency’s
critical intelligence activities around the world.

Shape, Size, and Function of the ODNI
The DNI has three core responsibilities: serving as the President’s principal intelligence
adviser, leading the IC, and overseeing and directing implementation of the NIP. IRTPA
prescribes a number of other responsibilities, including management of the NIP budget, IC
acquisition, setting analytic integrity and standards, oversight of foreign relations, tasking,
information sharing, protection of sources and methods, maintenance of uniform procedures for
classified information, and coordination of relations with foreign governments. It also specifies a
number of offices, including the National Intelligence Council; Office of General Counsel; IC
Chief Information Officer; IC Chief Financial Officer; Civil Liberties, Privacy, and
Transparency Office; National Counterintelligence Executive; National Counterterrorism Center;
National Counterproliferation Center; and a Principal Deputy DNI and up to four Deputy DNIs.
QUESTION 9: ​Do you commit to executing these responsibilities and maintaining the
complete operation of all these functions and offices as prescribed in law?
Yes.
QUESTION 10: ​Do you believe that the ODNI’s current mission is appropriately scoped? If
not, please describe the reasons for your response. Do you believe that aspects of its mission
should be carried out by other parts of the IC? If so, which missions should be transitioned to the
component agencies and why?

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If confirmed, I look forward to studying carefully the role played by ODNI and the roles played by
other elements of the Intelligence Community, as well as the relationship among them, to
determine the current strengths and weaknesses and where improvements are possible and to
avoid duplication of effort as between the ODNI and other IC elements. ​I also look forward to
engaging the Committee on this issue.
QUESTION 11: ​If confirmed, what goals do you have for the IC as its leader?
If confirmed, I will seek to support and elevate the workforce and the mission, including by
recruiting and retaining diverse talent, promoting innovation in every aspect of our work, and
fostering a culture that is ethical, nonpartisan, accountable, and aligned with the values we share
as a country--all with the intent of empowering us to take on the critical external challenges
ahead. The DNI must also, in my view, set a strategic vision for the work of the Intelligence
Community that looks beyond the immediate horizon to ensure we are prepared and well postured
to address developing threats and take advantage of new opportunities.
QUESTION 12: ​Will you commit to appearing before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence for its annual Worldwide Threats hearing?
Yes.
QUESTION 13: ​Will you commit to appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee
for its annual Worldwide Threats hearing?
Yes.
QUESTION 14: ​Do you believe the ODNI should play a larger or smaller role as leader of the
IC? Why?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying carefully the role played by ODNI and the roles played by
other elements of the Intelligence Community, as well as the relationship among them, to
determine the current strengths and weaknesses and where improvements are possible.
QUESTION 15: ​There has been considerable debate in the past concerning the appropriate size
and function of the ODNI. The IRTPA specifically prescribed a number of offices and functions
to the ODNI to ensure they were performed and to promote clear accountability to the Congress.
In answering this question, please address the staff functions of the ODNI and the specific
components of the ODNI, where appropriate, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the
National Counterproliferation Center, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and
the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center.
A. ​What is your view of the ODNI’s size and function?
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I believe the ODNI’s size must be sufficient to accomplish the responsibilities assigned to it but no
bigger than what is necessary to fulfill its critical mission. If confirmed, I look forward to
reviewing the size and functions of the organization.
B. ​Do you believe that the ODNI has sufficient personnel resources or more personnel than
required (including ODNI cadre and IC detailee personnel) to effectively carry out its statutory
responsibilities?
If confirmed, I look forward to examining the staffing posture of the ODNI.
C. ​What in your view is the appropriate balance between the ODNI’s community-management
responsibilities and providing flexibility to the daily decision-making authorities of individual
IC agency directors?
If confirmed as the next DNI, I am committed to reviewing the organization from all angles,
including Community management, to determine how best to deliver on ODNI’s vital mission.
QUESTION 16: ​What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the following officers, and
for each of them, how would you ensure that each officer is performing the mission required by
law?
A. ​The General Counsel of the ODNI.
Consistent with 50 USC § 3028, the ODNI General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the ODNI
and shall perform such functions as the DNI prescribes. It is essential that those include ensuring
that intelligence activities comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
B. ​The Inspector General of the IC.
Consistent with 50 USC §​ 3​ 033, t​ he responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community is (1) to create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to
Congress, to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on
programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the DNI; (2) to provide
leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities designed to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of such programs and
activities and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and activities; (3) to
provide a means for keeping the DNI fully and currently informed about problems and
deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities within the responsibility and
authority of the DNI and the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and (4) to
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of significant

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problems and deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and
authority of the DNI and the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions.
C. ​The ODNI Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency Officer.
Consistent with 50 USC § 3029, the ODNI Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Transparency officer
shall​ (​ 1)​ ​ensure that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is appropriately incorporated in
the policies and procedures developed for and implemented by the ODNI and the elements of the
intelligence community within the National Intelligence Program; (2) oversee compliance by
ODNI with requirements under the Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and
implementing guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy; (3) review and assess complaints
and other information indicating possible abuses of civil liberties and privacy in the
administration of the programs and operations of the Office and the DNI and, as appropriate,
investigate any such complaint or information; (4) ensure that the use of technologies sustain, and
do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal
information; (5) ensure that personal information contained in a system of records subject to
section 552a of title 5 (popularly referred to as the “Privacy Act”), is handled in full compliance
with fair information practices as set out in that section; (6) conduct privacy impact assessments
when appropriate or as required by law; and (7) perform such other duties as may be prescribed
by the DNI or specified by law.
D. ​The individual assigned responsibilities for analytic integrity under Section 1019 of
IRTPA (50 U.S.C. § 3024).
Consistent with Section 1019 of IRTPA, the individual or entity assigned responsibility for
analytic integrity shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed reviews of finished intelligence
products or other analytic products by one or more elements of the Intelligence Community
covering a particular topic or subject matter; shall be responsible for identifying on an annual
basis functional or topical areas of analysis for specific review; and may draft lessons learned,
identify best practices, or make recommendations for improvement to the analytic tradecraft
employed in the production of the reviewed product or products.
E. ​The individual assigned responsibilities for safeguarding the objectivity of intelligence
analysis under Section 1020 of IRTPA (50 U.S.C. § 3024).
Consistent with Section 1020 of IRTPA, the individual assigned responsibilities for safeguarding
the objectivity of intelligence analysis shall counsel, conduct arbitration, offer recommendations,
and, as appropriate, initiate inquiries into real or perceived problems of analytic tradecraft or
politicization.
QUESTION 17: ​Do you believe 50 U.S.C. § 3024(h) and Intelligence Community Directive
(ICD) 203 (regarding analysis and analytic standards) need to be strengthened and its
implementation made more vigorous? In what ways?
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I believe that objectivity in intelligence analysis is critical to maintaining the integrity and
credibility of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I look forward to studying carefully how
the statutory provision and the Intelligence Community Directive are being implemented in
practice to determine whether alterations are advisable.

Management of the ODNI
QUESTION 18: ​How many Deputy DNIs do you believe are necessary?
If confirmed, I look forward to considering whether the current number of Deputy DNIs best
facilitates the execution of ODNI’s critical mission.
QUESTION 19: ​What do you believe is the appropriate grade structure for the ODNI?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail the current ODNI grade structure to determine
whether alterations are advisable.
QUESTION 20: ​What do you believe is the appropriate balance between government
employees and contractor employees in the ODNI?
There are legal and regulatory limitations on the use of contractors that the IC must continue to
abide by. With regard to the value of a workforce mix that includes both contractors and
government employees, both play a critical and complementary role in ensuring that the
Intelligence Community performs its mission. Questions to consider when deciding whether to
hire contractors include: whether the work is inherently governmental; whether an effort is
temporary or enduring; what presents the most cost-effective option; and whether the skill set is
unique or a surge requirement requiring a quick solution. If I become the next DNI, I will closely
examine the reliance on a contract workforce both at ODNI and throughout the IC with an eye to
ensuring that such contracts are in the best interest of the Community and prudent from a
resource perspective.
QUESTION 21: ​What do you believe is the appropriate balance between ODNI cadre
employees and those on detail or assigned from other government agencies?
If confirmed as the next DNI, I am committed to reviewing the organization from all angles,
including staffing. I am also committed to the Joint Duty Assignment program and believe it is a
critical tool to develop IC officers across the Community. Accordingly, I am equally committed to

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encouraging ODNI cadre officers to take details to IC elements and to recruiting JDA officers to
work at the ODNI.
QUESTION 22: ​Will you commit today that if confirmed you will, to the best of your abilities,
seek to recruit, attract, and retain a diverse workforce and uphold principles of fairness and
equity when hiring new staff?
If confirmed, I will, to the best of my abilities, ​seek to support and elevate the workforce and the
mission, including by recruiting and retaining diverse talent and upholding principles of fairness
and equality in hiring new staff.
QUESTION 23: ​Should the authorities for intelligence be vested through the Director of
National Intelligence?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying carefully the manner in which intelligence authorities
are currently allocated and what their exercise looks like in practice, so that I can consider
whether any changes should be recommended. I also look forward to engaging the Committee
on this issue.
QUESTION 24: ​Should the resources appropriated for the IC be separate from those
appropriated for defense?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying carefully how the appropriations process is
operating today so that I can consider whether any changes should be recommended.

Filling High-Level ODNI Positions
In the recent past, many top positions in the ODNI were vacant for sustained periods or
performed by Acting officials or officers “performing the duties of” the position. Such positions
include Principal Deputy DNI, Deputy DNI for National Security Partnerships, General Counsel,
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the Inspector General for the IC, and Program
Manager Information Sharing Environment.
QUESTION 25: ​What characteristics do you believe are required for
appointments to each of these positions?
While the particular statutory requirements and other characteristics differ among these
positions, common to them all is the need for integrity and commitment to providing policymakers
with the best possible intelligence analysis free from political influence.

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QUESTION 26: ​What is your plan for advising the President on nominating or appointing
personnel to fill these positions on a permanent (i.e., not temporary or “acting”) basis? What
criteria will you consider in providing this advice?
I believe in the importance of filling these critical positions, as expeditiously as feasible, on a
permanent rather than temporary basis. I also believe in the importance of filling these positions
with individuals who share my commitment to high-quality intelligence work free from political
influence.
QUESTION 27: ​Do you believe political appointee positions at the ODNI should be filled by
individuals who are apolitical, committed to congressional engagement obligations, and
committed to the IC’s role to deliver objective and independent analysis and intelligence? Are
you committed to staffing the ODNI positions with individuals who meet these criteria?
Yes, anyone who takes one of these critical positions should be prepared to put politics aside and
fulfill ODNI’s mission of providing the best possible intelligence work free of political influence.

Obligations to Congress - Keeping the Congressional Intelligence
Committees Fully and Currently Informed
QUESTION 28: ​What is your understanding of the obligations of the DNI under Title V of the
National Security Act of 1947?
A. ​What steps should the DNI take to ensure that all departments, agencies, and other entities of
the U.S. government involved in intelligence activities in general, and covert action in
particular, comply with the reporting requirements?
B. ​Under what circumstances do you believe notification may and should be limited to the
Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence
committees? In those circumstances, if any, what is the obligation of the DNI to subsequently
notify the full membership of the committees as expeditiously as possible?
C. ​The law establishes a separate category of notification for covert action. Given the
specificity of the law, do you believe the Executive Branch could ever limit notification on
matters other than covert action?
Under Title V of the National Security Act, the DNI has the responsibility to ensure that the
congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of intelligence
activities. Although Section 502 provides that congressional notification must be made “[t]o the
extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
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information relating to sensitive sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters,” I
believe that this phrase does not limit the obligation to keep the intelligence committees fully
informed but rather provides the DNI with a degree of latitude in deciding how she will bring
extremely sensitive matters to the committees’ attention. In certain rare circumstances, I believe
it could be appropriate to brief the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the intelligence committees
on particularly sensitive matters. Limited notification should be undertaken only in the most
exceptional circumstances, by analogy to the provision of Section 503 that permits limited
briefing on covert actions “to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interests of the
United States.” Even in those circumstances, however, I expect that, if confirmed as DNI, I would
discuss concerns about further briefings with the Chairman and Vice Chairman and have an
ongoing dialogue with them about how and when the full committee membership should be
briefed on the matter.
QUESTION 29: ​The IC can perform its mission properly only with close partnership
from and accountability to Congress.
A. ​What is the DNI’s role in ensuring Congress is kept fully and currently informed, as
required by law, including 50 U.S.C. § 3091 and ICD 112? How do you intend to fulfill those
duties?
As reflected in the law, the Director of National Intelligence has a responsibility to ensure that the
congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of U.S. intelligence
activities, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity, so as to allow the committees
to fulfill their oversight responsibilities. In fulfilling this role, I will need to build trust with the
Committee and establish open lines of communication between the ODNI and Committee
Members. I will also need to establish regular meetings with the Committee. I furthermore
believe in restoring open, unclassified Annual Threat Assessment Hearings. I am committed to
being transparent and communicative with this Committee.
B. ​Are there circumstances that would justify delaying notification of Congress of important
intelligence assessments, or not notifying Congress at all? Do you believe the National
Security Council (NSC) should play a role in these decisions? If so, what should that role be?
I am committed to ensuring that Congress is able to perform its essential oversight function
and, moreover, to benefit from the vital work of the Intelligence Community in considering
national security policy. In general, Congress should be notified of important intelligence
assessments. While the National Security Council has a role to play in coordinating
legislative engagement across national security departments and agencies, the NSC has no
role to play in determining the substance of the IC’s intelligence analysis, which should be
produced by the IC alone.
C. ​Under what circumstances do you believe notification of Congress can or should be
16

limited to the Gang of Eight? What should the role of the NSC be in determining what
information should be limited?
In certain rare circumstances, I believe it could be appropriate to brief the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the intelligence committees on particularly sensitive matters. Limited notification
should be undertaken only in the most exceptional circumstances, by analogy to the provision of
Section 503 that permits limited briefing on covert actions “to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting the vital interests of the United States.” Even in those circumstances, however, I expect
that, if confirmed as DNI, I would discuss concerns about further briefings with the Chairman and
Vice Chairman and have an ongoing dialogue with them about how and when the full committee
membership should be briefed on the matter. W
​ hile the National Security Council has a role to
play in coordinating legislative engagement across national security departments and agencies,
the NSC has no role to play in determining the substance of the IC’s intelligence analysis, which
should be produced by the IC alone.
D. ​If confirmed, do you commit to complying with statutory deadlines set forth in the
Committee’s legislation, specifically the Intelligence Authorization Act for each fiscal year?
Yes, to the maximum extent possible. I also commit to informing the Committee of the reasons
for any delays.
E. ​How would you work to prevent the abuse of classification authorities? Do you believe
critical information on election security threats, pandemics like coronavirus, or other topics of
critical importance to the American people ought to be classified? If so, why? In what
circumstances should the information be declassified?
The over-classification of information not only undermines critical democratic objectives, such as
increasing transparency to promote an informed citizenry, but also negatively impacts national
security objectives because it can increase the challenges associated with sharing information to
address threats and furthermore undermines the basic trust that the public has in the government.
If confirmed, I will look for ways to improve the classification system so as to, among other
things, minimize over-classification.
QUESTION 30: ​The Committee and its Members rely on their staff for assessments of the
policy, budgetary, and legal implications of intelligence activities. Will you commit to ensuring
that all staff, including Member designees, are read into IC programs and assessments consistent
with protecting sources and methods?
I believe strongly in the importance of facilitating this Committee’s vital oversight role and I
know how important staff is to achieving that purpose. If confirmed, I commit to working with the
Committee to ensure that the Committee and its Members are able to rely on their staff to
facilitate meaningful oversight.
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QUESTION 31: ​Would you consider a finished intelligence product to be “privileged” in
any way such that you would not release it to Congress? Please explain.
From my previous experience in the Intelligence Community and in other national security roles,
I know that Congress receives many finished intelligence products. If confirmed as DNI, I would
expect that to continue and look forward to ensuring that Congress benefits from the important
work of the Intelligence Community workforce, including through finished intelligence products.
QUESTION 32: ​Will you commit to provide the Committee intelligence reports, such as FBI and
DoD Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), National Security Agency (NSA) reports, and CIA
“TDs,” in support of the Committee’s intelligence oversight duties, upon request? Will you
commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees National Intelligence Council
products, e.g., Major Issue Studies or National Intelligence Estimates, in support of their oversight
duties?
I believe strongly in the importance of facilitating this Committee’s vital oversight role. If
confirmed, I will ensure that Congress is provided intelligence reports to the maximum extent
possible.
QUESTION 33: ​If confirmed, will you fully support the Committee’s Audits and Projects
Team, and allow team members to have access to the people and information throughout the IC
that is required for their functions, upon the Committee’s request?
I believe strongly in the importance of facilitating this Committee’s vital oversight role. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to ensure that its Audits and Projects
Team is able to inform the oversight work of the Committee.
QUESTION 34: ​If confirmed, will you fully support the Committee’s Technical Advisory
Group (TAG) studies and allow the TAG members to have access to the people and information
throughout the IC that is required for their studies upon the Committee’s request?
I believe strongly in the importance of facilitating this Committee’s vital oversight role. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to ensure that its Technical Advisory
Group is able to inform the oversight work of the Committee.
QUESTION 35: ​Will you keep the Committee fully and currently informed of the personnel,
resources, facilities and authorities from the National Intelligence and Military Intelligence
Program that are necessary to implement the recent DNI and Secretary of Defense memorandum
designating the Space Force as the 18th member of the IC?
Yes.
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Analytic Integrity and Objectivity
A principal reason the ODNI was created was to ensure objectivity and independence
in intelligence analysis so that cognitive and political bias does not interfere with the IC’s
overriding purpose of conducting and furnishing objective assessments.
QUESTION 36: ​How do you view the importance of intelligence agencies’ freedom to present
their assessments objectively to decisionmakers in both the executive and legislative branches,
regardless of what a particular policy might be, even if their assessments may be unwelcome or
inconvenient?
Analytic objectivity, which consists of intelligence officials writing and saying what they believe
to be the truth without consideration for policy or politics, is fundamental to U.S. national
security. To safeguard the integrity of our Intelligence Community and to promote better
decision-making, the DNI must insist that politics ends where intelligence work begins.
QUESTION 37: ​How do you propose enhancing the IC’s objectivity and
independence to maintain its insulation from political influence?
Our intelligence professionals are dedicated patriots who have devoted their careers to ensuring
the Intelligence Community can provide accurate, apolitical, and expert intelligence and analysis
to inform the President and other national security policymakers. My first mission, if I am
confirmed, will be to ensure the workforce feels they have a DNI who understands their role,
supports them in that role, and keeps politics out of their work. I will make clear to them that they
will be protected from any inappropriate influence, so that they can do their job of speaking truth
to power. And I will make clear that they will be protected from retaliation if they deliver a
message that is unwelcome to policymakers.
QUESTION 38: ​Would you ever request, encourage, or support an intelligence
professional’s adjusting his/her assessment to avoid criticism from the White House or
political appointees? Would you ever change or remove content in an intelligence assessment
for political reasons, or at the behest of political leadership?
No.
QUESTION 39: ​If intelligence agencies or analysts are discouraged from providing objective
analytic assessments, how would this harm national security?
American national security is advanced by the President and other policymakers having the best
possible objective intelligence analysis to inform their consideration of options. Good policy
19

decisions require fact-based, objective, and rigorous analysis. Discouraging intelligence analysts
from providing objective analytic assessments, would mean depriving policymakers of the
information they need to be as informed as possible in weighing the pros and cons of different
options and thus selecting wisely.
QUESTION 40: ​What recourse should intelligence analysts have if they believe their
objective assessments have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled? How would you
ensure that career IC professionals have protected channels to address their concerns that
objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled?
Analysts should be able to raise concerns regarding analytic objectivity without fear of reprisal at
every level. In every component under IC guidelines, someone should be designated as
responsible for responding to concerns raised about adherence to analytic standards in analytic
products. If confirmed, I will ensure this requirement is being implemented, ensure that career IC
professionals have protected channels to raise relevant concerns, and be a strong supporter of an
independent Inspector General, which is another channel through which such concerns can be
raised, who is allowed to do his or her work free from improper influence.
QUESTION 41: ​Do you believe the DNI has an obligation to address analysts’ concerns that
objective assessments may have been downplayed, diminished, or overruled, because a
policy maker may disagree with the analysis or conclusion being presented? Please provide
examples from your career of times when you have told the truth, even when that position
was uncomfortable or unpopular.
If confirmed as DNI, I will take seriously allegations that objective assessments have been
downplayed, diminished, or overruled, and address such allegations as appropriate. I have
consistently provided candid advice in my career that the President and others knew would
remain protected as appropriate, but I can assure this Committee that I have exhibited a steadfast
commitment to telling the truth at every turn, even if that message was uncomfortable or
unpopular.
QUESTION 42: ​Personnel decisions can affect analytic integrity and objectivity.
A. ​Would you consider an individual’s personal political preferences, to include “loyalty” to
the President, in making a decision to hire, fire, or promote an individual?
No. Decisions about hiring, promoting, or firing career IC staff should be based on their
professional qualifications; partisan and political factors should play no role.
B. ​Do you commit to consider professional qualifications in IC personnel decisions
exclusively, without consideration of partisan or political factors?

20

Yes, partisan and political factors should play no role in decisions about hiring, firing, or
promoting career IC staff.
C. ​If you were to receive credible evidence as DNI that an individual was undermining IC
objectivity and furthering a political agenda, would you immediately remove that individual?
Yes, to the extent consistent with the authorities of the DNI and all other applicable laws.
D. ​Will you or any of your staff impose a political litmus test for IC employees? Is a political
litmus test ever appropriate in determining who can or should work in the IC?
No and no.​
E. ​If confirmed, will you reassure your workforce that “loyalty tests” are not allowed within the
IC? If you receive credible allegations that ODNI employees or others in the executive branch are
seeking to fire or force out IC employees because of their perceived political views or loyalty to
the President, will you commit to informing the Congressional Intelligence Committees and
immediately stopping such efforts?
Yes, decisions about hiring, firing, or promoting career IC staff should be based on their
professional qualifications; partisan and political factors, such as a “loyalty test,” should play no
role.
QUESTION 43: ​How would you approach communicating IC analytic conclusions to the
public if the analysis and conclusions did not align with the President’s views and political
objectives?
The decision of what IC analysis to communicate to the public should be based solely on the
importance of public disclosure and the need to protect sensitive sources and methods. Politics
should play no role in that decision.

National Security Threats and Challenges Facing the IC
QUESTION 44: ​What in your view are the principal threats to national security with which
the IC must concern itself in the next five years? In the next twenty years?
A. ​What are the highest priority questions that the IC should address in its collection activities
and assessments?
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B. ​In your opinion, how has the IC performed in adjusting its policies, resource allocations,
planning, training, and programs to address these threats? How will you further adjust?
It is clear that U.S. national security faces a number of key threats in the coming years. Those
include more traditional state-actor threats posed by China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, as
well as evolving and critical transnational threats, including climate change, cyber attacks,
terrorism, pandemics, global organized crime and corruption, disinformation campaigns, and
more. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the current analysis of the great professionals of
the Intelligence Community to understand today’s most urgent priorities, to assess how the IC is
performing in relation to those priorities, and to determine where adjustments are warranted.

Election Security
QUESTION 45: ​Do you commit to maintain election security as a top priority for the IC?
Yes.
QUESTION 46: ​What would you do to ensure election security efforts are
appropriately resourced?
Election security requires a whole-of-government approach, and involves not just the
federal government but also state and local officials, the private sector, and civil society.
If confirmed, I would ensure that threat information associated with election security is
communicated to those who require it in order to defend against such threats, and I
would collaborate with partners and support the efforts of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to defend our elections.
QUESTION 47: ​How would you ensure our intelligence efforts on election security
remain apolitical, and avoid the perception or reality of political influence?
Foreign interference in the U.S. electoral process represents an assault on the American
people and their constitutional right to vote. This is not a partisan issue, but a national
security issue. I will ensure that intelligence analysis on this issue is focused on the
foreign threat to our democratic institutions, period.
QUESTION 48: ​Will you commit to keep the Election Threats Executive Office in place to
ensure continuity of efforts, and build on the successes of recent elections?
If confirmed, I will undertake a review of recent successes in safeguarding U.S. elections from
22

foreign interference, as well as how to implement outstanding statutory obligations like the
Foreign Malign Influence Center while building on the work of the Election Threats Executive
Office, to ensure the Intelligence Community is best positioned to identify and analyze foreign
threats to elections and provide policymakers with the information they need to formulate
responses.
QUESTION 49: ​Do you commit to provide the congressional intelligence committees with
complete and timely information regarding election threats, as required by statute?
Yes.
QUESTION 50: ​A number of states still use paperless voting machines, in which the only
record of a voter’s ballot choices is held in digital memory. How confident are you in the
security and integrity of paperless voting machines, particularly those that are connected to the
internet, whether directly or indirectly?
If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that policy makers are provided whatever foreign intelligence
information is relevant to that question.
QUESTION 51: ​Election cybersecurity experts universally recommend that states adopt
hand-marked paper ballots for most voters and routine, post-election risk limiting audits. Do you
agree? If not, please explain why.
If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that policy makers are provided whatever foreign intelligence
information is relevant to that question.
QUESTION 52: ​Twenty-four states currently permit overseas and military voters to transmit
their marked ballots directly to local election officials over the internet, mostly via email. These
ballots are electronically delivered to local election offices’ email servers, for which there are no
mandatory federal cybersecurity standards. In close races, where the margin of victory is less
than the number of overseas and military ballots, the outcome of the election can be determined
by ballots submitted over the internet. Do you agree that the use of the internet to deliver
marked ballots poses a serious threat to the integrity of American elections? If not, please
explain why.
If confirmed as DNI I will ensure that policy makers are provided whatever foreign intelligence
information is relevant to that question.
QUESTION 53: ​Previous administrations have been stymied in their efforts to handle
effectively foreign election interference owing to an array of reasons, to include the novel and
audacious character of the threat. How would you endeavor to ensure future instances of
foreign election interference are met with swift, decisive, and deterrent policy response?
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If confirmed as DNI I will ensure that policy makers have timely and complete intelligence
information to enable them to make decisions on this important issue.
QUESTION 54: ​Do you agree that there should be federally mandated minimum
cybersecurity standards for election systems?
If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that policy makers are provided whatever foreign intelligence
information is relevant to that question.
QUESTION 55: ​Do you believe that moving state and local election related agencies to
.gov domains will improve the government’s ability to detect and prevent cyber
intrusions?
If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that policy makers are provided whatever foreign
intelligence information is relevant to that question.

Russia
QUESTION 56: ​Do you believe Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election in
any way? If so, how?
Both the Intelligence Community and this Committee concluded that Russia interfered in the 2016
election, and I agree with those conclusions.
QUESTION 57: ​Do you believe Russia presents a continuing interference threat with respect
to the U.S. political system?
Yes.
QUESTION 58: ​Do you believe Russia poses a threat specifically to the integrity of U.S.
elections? If so, please describe the threat as you see it.
Yes. Foreign interference in the U.S. electoral process represents an assault on the American
people and their constitutional right to vote. ​ Numerous unclassified intelligence assessments, as
well as this Committee’s own investigation, have underscored the significant activities that Russia
in particular has taken, employing a range of tools in an attempt to sway voters’ preferences, sow
political discord, undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, and keep voters away
from the polls.
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QUESTION 59: ​Do you commit to immediately notifying policymakers and the public of
Russian attempts to meddle in U.S. democratic processes, to include our elections?
Yes. I will follow statutory requirements to notify Congress of significant foreign cyber intrusions
or active measures campaigns intended to influence an election. I will also publicly report on
attempts by any foreign actors to interfere in U.S. democratic processes, consistent with statutory
requirements and President-elect Biden’s commitment to transparency, with the goal of building
public resilience against interference operations.

China
QUESTION 60: ​How do you view the threat from China, and where would China fall in terms
of your priorities if confirmed as DNI?
China has been growing more authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad, and is
challenging our security, prosperity, and values in significant ways. If confirmed, I would ensure
that the collection and analysis of information relating to the full scope of China’s activities is a
top priority for the entire Intelligence Community.
QUESTION 61: ​How would you allocate staff and budget resources to support the effort to
counter Chinese influence, both globally and inside the United States?
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Intelligence Community has the resources necessary to
inform efforts to counter China’s influence, both globally and inside the United States. I look
forward to working with Congress on this challenge.
QUESTION 62: ​What would you do to prevent discrimination against Asian Americans, and
ensure that community is an ally in the fight against Chinese espionage?
If confirmed, I will make it a priority to prevent and counter discrimination against Asian
Americans in the Intelligence Community. I will engage Asian Americans in the IC
workforce and civil society to work toward transparency, gain mutual understanding and
trust, and engage in inclusive dialogue.

25

North Korea
QUESTION 63: ​North Korea continues to take provocative steps like missile testing, despite
U.S. efforts to convince them to stop. How do you interpret North Korea’s continued missile
testing in the context of the previous administration’s efforts to negotiate a nuclear agreement
with North Korea?
Understanding the capabilities and intentions of a country like North Korea is a critical
responsibility of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the latest
intelligence and analysis by IC professionals on North Korea’s continued missile testing.
Iran
QUESTION 64: ​With the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran has gradually
rolled back its observance of the limitations set forth in the JCPOA. Is Iran closer today to
having the materials it needs to develop a nuclear weapon than it would have been at this point
under the JCPOA? Does this make the world more, or less safe?
If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that the Intelligence Community provides the best
possible intelligence and analysis to the President and other policymakers as they assess options
for addressing the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program.

IC Missions and Capabilities
QUESTION 65: ​What is your assessment of the quality of current IC intelligence analysis? If
confirmed, would you pursue additional steps to improve intelligence analysis, and, if so, what
benchmarks will you use to judge the success of future IC analytic efforts?
If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that the Intelligence Community provides the best
possible intelligence and analysis to the President and other policymakers as they assess options
for addressing today’s complex array of national security threats, as well as to determining how
best to assess the success of those efforts.
QUESTION 66: ​What is your view of strategic analysis and its place within the IC? Please
include your views about what constitutes such analysis and what steps should be taken to ensure
adequate strategic coverage of important issues.
U.S. Government policymakers, on behalf of the American people, expect the Intelligence
Community to provide insight into both specific, often imminent threats and longer-term analysis
26

of foreign actors’ strategic intent. In turn, it is a responsibility of the IC to be able to deliver both
forms of analysis to policymakers so that they understand both near-term, as well as and
longer-term challenges and opportunities.
QUESTION 67: ​What are your views concerning the quality of intelligence collection
conducted by the IC and your assessment of the steps that have been taken to date by the
ODNI to improve that collection? If confirmed, would you pursue additional steps to
improve intelligence collection and, if so, what benchmarks will you use to judge the success
of future collection efforts by the ODNI?
My previous service in the Intelligence Community and in other national security roles left me
deeply impressed by the diligence, patriotism, and commitment of the Intelligence Community
workforce, which represents the IC’s most precious asset. If confirmed, I look forward to
assessing firsthand the state of U.S. intelligence collection and analysis and, based on that,
determining steps to improve U.S. intelligence collection efforts.
QUESTION 68: ​The IC has designated functional managers for Geospatial Intelligence,
Open Source Intelligence, Measurement and Signature Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, and
Human Intelligence. Do you think ODNI’s administration of the IC’s analytic enterprise
would benefit from a Functional Manager for Analysis?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying this question carefully and determining whether a
Functional Manager for Analysis would advance the Intelligence Community’s critical mission.
QUESTION 69: ​Are there additional analytic standards, to include analytic tradecraft
standards, not presently contemplated under ICD 203, that you feel should be added as
measures for governing the production and evaluation of the IC’s analytic products?
I believe that objectivity in intelligence analysis is critical to maintaining the integrity and
credibility of the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I look forward to studying this question
carefully, including asking any additional questions needed to understand fully the recent report
of the analytic ombudsman, and determining whether additional analytic standards would be
beneficial.
QUESTION 70: ​Beyond the current system of reviews, evaluations, and surveys, are there
further measures that you believe should be implemented by the Analytic Integrity and
Standards Group to gauge the quality and accuracy of IC analysis?
The Analytic Integrity and Standards Group has done vital work in assessing analytic quality but
accuracy is often the most difficult analytic standard to evaluate. Most of the data we have on
analytic accuracy comes from the IC Prediction Market, managed by ODNI and used by all IC
elements. As I understand it, it has evaluated the accuracy of half a million intelligence judgments
on hundreds of topics. If confirmed, I would like to see the IC Prediction Market and similar tools
27

used more widely, so that we can better understand analytic accuracy, what we get right, what we
get wrong, and where we can improve.

IC Information Technology Environment
QUESTION 71: ​The IC Information Technology Environment (IC-ITE) is a significant
accomplishment, intended to better integrate the IC and reduce long term costs by sharing
services. With IC-ITE operation, it may be time to consider a larger role for ODNI in other
“back office” support activities, such as financial management, human resources, asset
management, and procurement to force increased integration and efficiencies.
A. ​What are your thoughts on integrating these activities?
B. ​Does the DNI have the authority to manage these functions as a shared service for
the entire IC?
I believe it is important to find ways to better integrate the IC and reduce long term costs by
sharing services. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the IC-ITE carefully and determining
which functions could be securely and cost-effectively centralized under existing authorities.
QUESTION 72: ​Are there additional initiatives that need to take place in order to capitalize on
existing efforts? If so, please explain.
If confirmed, I look forward to assessing whether additional shared service or other initiatives
should be put in place to capitalize on existing IC efforts.

ODNI Personnel
QUESTION 73: ​The congressional intelligence committees’ ​Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021​, incorporated in the ​Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(Public Law 116-260), and the ​Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year ​2020, incorporated as Division E to the ​National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 ​(Public Law 116-92), both included provisions
supporting IC employment of those with science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) backgrounds and expertise. If confirmed, how would you undertake outreach,
recruitment, and retention of employment candidates with STEM experience?
It is critical for the IC to have a strong STEM workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to
studying the current efforts underway to undertake outreach and enable recruitment and
retention of STEM talent and to identify ways in which those efforts can be enhanced. I also look
forward to engaging the committee on this issue.
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QUESTION 74: ​What is your view of the principles that should guide the IC in its use of
contractors, rather than full-time government employees, to fulfill intelligence-related functions?
A. ​Are there functions particularly suited for the use of contractors?
B. ​Are there some functions that should never be conducted by contractors, or for which the use
of contractors should be discouraged or require additional approvals by the DNI?
C. ​What consideration should the IC give to the cost of contractors versus government
employees?
D. ​Does the IC need any legislation or administrative policies or practices to facilitate the
replacement of contractors by full-time government employees?
There are legal and regulatory limitations on the use of contractors that the IC must continue to
abide by. ​Contractors should not conduct inherently governmental functions. Examples of
inherently governmental functions are judgments related to monetary transactions, resources,
entitlements, exerting control over acquisitions, and developing IC policies.​ With regard to the
value of a workforce mix that includes both contractors and government employees, both play a
critical and complementary role in ensuring that the Intelligence Community performs its mission.
Questions to consider when deciding whether to hire contractors include: whether the work is
inherently governmental; whether an effort is temporary or enduring; what presents the most
cost-effective option; and whether the skill set is unique or a surge requirement requiring a quick
solution. If confirmed, I will take a close look at the reliance on a contract workforce both at
ODNI and throughout the IC with an eye to ensuring that such contracts are in the best interest of
the Community, appropriately limited, and prudent from a resource perspective.
QUESTION 75: ​What do you believe is the appropriate proportionality in the ODNI
between cadre employees and detailees from other government entities?
If confirmed as the next DNI, I am committed to reviewing the organization from all angles,
including staffing. I am also committed to the Joint Duty Assignment program and believe it is a
critical tool to develop IC officers.
QUESTION 76: ​What is your assessment of the personnel accountability system presently in
place both at the ODNI and within the other IC elements? What actions, if any, should be
considered to strengthen personnel accountability as well as ensure fair process in the IC,
including matters related to allegations of serious misconduct?
I believe strongly in personnel accountability. If confirmed as DNI, I am committed to reviewing
the organization and the Intelligence Community as a whole from all angles, including personnel
29

accountability, and thus to determining what actions might strengthen personnel accountability
and ensure fair process.

Information Access
QUESTION 77: ​What is your view of the IC’s current efforts to enable the IC to operate like a
true “information enterprise,” where information is accessible by all IC elements? If confirmed,
how would you pursue this goal?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail how information is accessed by Intelligence
Community elements and understanding current plans to operate more like an “information
enterprise,” then determining the best approach for facilitating the IC’s fulfillment of its critical
mission.
QUESTION 78: ​What in your view are the appropriate steps that should be taken to allow for
increased interagency access to sensitive intelligence information? If confirmed, how would you
pursue these efforts?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail how information is accessed by Intelligence
Community elements, then determining the best approach for facilitating the IC’s fulfillment of its
critical mission.
QUESTION 79: ​Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3032)
establishes the authorities of the Chief Information Officer of the IC (IC CIO), including
procurement approval authority over all information technology items related to the
enterprise architectures of all IC components.
A. ​What is your view of the authority of the IC CIO to create an integrated national
intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprise?
B. ​If confirmed, how do you intend to achieve true integration of national intelligence
and military intelligence information sharing enterprises?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail the authority and work of the Intelligence
Community Chief Information Officer, then determining the best approach with respect to
handling national intelligence and military intelligence information sharing enterprises.

Cybersecurity
QUESTION 80: ​The National Security Agency and United States Cyber Command are
currently led by a single uniformed military officer in a “dual-hat” arrangement, due to their
intertwined missions, which has allowed them to share many of the same resources and
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capabilities.
A. ​What is your opinion on this arrangement?
B. ​Do you believe that the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command
should be dual-hatted?
If confirmed as DNI, I will work with DoD to review the current status of the relationship between
U.S. Cyber Command and NSA, Cyber Command’s maturity, and, in particular, how a separation
might affect the functioning of both, operational risk, and overall effectiveness.
QUESTION 81: ​The ODNI has a central role to play in coordinating cybersecurity efforts,
particularly with the respective roles of the Director of the NSA and the head of U.S. Cyber
Command.
A. ​Are there any changes that you would recommend for the DNI’s and IC’s roles within the
nation’s cybersecurity infrastructure?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing in detail the DNI and IC’s roles within the national
cybersecurity infrastructure, then determining any changes that might be beneficial. I look
forward to consulting with the Committee after my review.
B. ​What is your view regarding the proposals to end the “dual-hat” relationship between the NSA
and U.S. Cyber Command?
See response to Question 80.
C. ​What should be the IC’s role in helping to protect U.S. commercial computer
networks? What cyber threat information (classified or unclassified) should be shared
with U.S. private sector critical infrastructure entities to enable them to protect their
networks from possible cyber-attack?
If confirmed as DNI, I will work hard to facilitate a robust data sharing and information
exchange relationship as between the Intelligence Community and the private sector. And, if
confirmed, I look forward to engaging with IC experts on what information is currently being
shared and identifying areas where improvements can be made to optimize the public-private
cybersecurity partnership.
D. ​What is your view of the role of the ODNI’s Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center
within the national cybersecurity efforts?

31

If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail the role currently played by ODNI’s Cyber
Threat Intelligence Integration Center to determine the best approach for that Center in fulfilling
ODNI’s critical mission.
QUESTION 82: ​Do you agree that encryption keys of the kind necessary to implement a
statutory mandate for government access to encrypted communications would be targets
of foreign cyber adversaries?
While not an expert on the technical aspects of encryption, yes, I think that session keys, like any
other key capable of providing potentially useful information to adversaries, would be targets for
criminal and foreign intelligence adversaries.
QUESTION 83: ​Do you agree that the existence of any such keys generally undermines U.S.
corporate and government cybersecurity as well as the security of Americans’ communications?
The encryption of data is essential. Strong encryption promotes cybersecurity, thwarts
criminals and preserves privacy. At the same time, encryption has also presented
challenges for law enforcement investigations, leading to law enforcement calls for lawful
access capabilities to be required of encryption technologies. I do not have the answer
for how to approach this incredibly challenging issue but if confirmed, I commit to you
that I will do everything I can to support a pragmatic and constructive discussion among
policy makers on these issues by ensuring they receive unvarnished answers to any
questions they put to the intelligence community..
QUESTION 84: ​Do you agree that the communications of IC and other U.S. government
personnel, including through their own devices and accounts, poses a target for foreign cyber
adversaries and should be protected?
Yes, I do believe they pose a target and that we should endeavor to protect them.
QUESTION 85: ​SolarWinds was an attack on the country’s cyber supply chain. What steps
should be taken to prevent a recurrence of this kind of attack?
While we are still learning about the extent of the SolarWinds breach and the
vulnerabilities that have been exposed, it is apparent that it is a grave risk to our national
security. To prevent a recurrence of this kind of attack, we need to close the gap between
where our capabilities are now and where they need to be in order to deter, detect,
disrupt, and respond to such intrusions far more effectively in the future. If confirmed as
DNI, I will review the expert conclusions from the SolarWinds incident and the current
intelligence about supply chain vulnerabilities and what steps may be taken to address
any vulnerabilities.
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QUESTION 86: ​Do you agree that the hacking of databases with large amounts of information
on Americans, either controlled by the government or the private sector, poses a national
security threat to the United States? If yes, how should the U.S. seek to strengthen the security of
those databases?
Yes. If confirmed, I will examine the current data infrastructure and seek to address any
vulnerabilities.
QUESTION 87: ​The NSA has identified internet ads as a vector through which malware can be
delivered, and has recommended that agencies block all ads. If confirmed, would you require all
IC agencies to adopt the recommendations of the NSA and block ads?
If confirmed, I look forward to fully understanding this potential vector for the delivery of
malware and assessing NSA’s recommendation.
QUESTION 88: ​Federal law requires civilian agencies to encrypt data stored on their
computers, but this requirement exempts the IC. If you are confirmed, will you agree to require
that the IC encrypt all data, unless there is a specific operational necessity for the data to not be
encrypted?
I believe strongly in ensuring the protection of data stored by the Intelligence Community. If
confirmed, I look forward to understanding fully the use of encryption in the Intelligence
Community and the proposal for a presumptive encryption requirement.
QUESTION 89: ​The recently announced, indiscriminate supply-chain breach of numerous
government and private sector computer networks by an advanced persistent threat cyber actor
represents a serious national security threat. Furthermore, the disclosure of the breach occurred
from a private sector cybersecurity company, rather than from the government, which raises
significant questions regarding the government’s ability to detect and respond to cybersecurity
threats.
A. ​What is the role of the IC in detecting and warning against nation-state efforts targeting
U.S. networks and infrastructure?
I believe that the IC plays an integral role in detecting and warning against nation-state
targeting of U.S. networks and infrastructure. If confirmed, I will examine how better
collaboration between the IC and the rest of the U.S. government, coupled with closer
partnerships with the private sector and our international allies, can enhance our ability to
deter, detect, and mitigate cyber attacks.
B. ​How will you prioritize IC resources to improve its ability to detect sophisticated
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foreign efforts to breach U.S. networks?
If confirmed, I will examine how the Intelligence Community is postured to address the
prevailing threat.​ ​I look forward to engaging the Committee on this issue as I learn more.​
C. ​Does the IC and the DNI have the authorities it needs to adequately monitor and protect
U.S. cyber infrastructure? If not, what additional authorities are needed?
If confirmed, I will examine the IC’s current authorities to ensure that our agencies and
components have the ability and the agility to support the Community’s cybersecurity
mission​.
D. ​The ODNI recently reorganized and consolidated some of its cyber centers under the Cyber
Executive. Do you agree that this change was necessary?
1. ​Do you think additional reorganization of cyber resources in the ODNI is
necessary? If so, how would you organize ODNI’s cyber responsibilities?
2. ​What additional cyber intelligence resources are required, either within
ODNI or in the broader IC?
If I am confirmed, cybersecurity will be a priority for me. I will study the recent changes to the
cyber elements of ODNI and determine whether any additional adjustments are needed. I look
forward to consulting with the Committee on this issue.
QUESTION 90: ​One of the shortcomings the Committee has observed in the aftermath of
the recent breach is a lack of mandatory threat information sharing between the private sector
and government. Any information sharing occurring pursuant to this breach has been
voluntary from the private sector’s perspective.
A. ​How do you intend to improve information sharing – in both directions – between the IC
and the private sector?
Information sharing between the IC and the private sector is increasingly important to ensure that
our data systems and networks are secure. If confirmed as DNI, I look forward to reviewing the
Intelligence Community’s data sharing and information exchange relationship with the private
sector, to engaging with IC experts and private sector leaders on what information is currently
being shared, and to examining the efficacy of the current framework for sharing threat
information.
B. ​What types of cybersecurity intelligence information should be transmitted from the private
sector to the government?
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If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that we have a robust data sharing and information exchange
relationship with the private sector, and look forward to studying current information sharing to
determine how it can be improved and what types of information can be shared to enhance
cybersecurity protections. The private sector has unique insight and expertise on malicious
activity occurring within its networks. Real-time integration of private sector and government
data could lead to more effective prevention and mitigation outcomes.
QUESTION 91: ​The private sector often has unique insights about network
infrastructure and software that are potential targets of interest for foreign adversaries.
A. ​Do you think that the IC should improve communications channels with the private sector in
order to receive inputs that can help with foreign intelligence collection?
Yes.
B. ​If so, how will you do so?
If confirmed as DNI, I will ensure that we have a robust data sharing and information exchange
relationship with the private sector, and look forward to studying current information sharing to
determine how it can be improved and what types of information can be shared to enhance
cybersecurity protections. The private sector has unique insight and expertise on malicious
activity occurring within its networks. Real-time integration of private sector and government
data could lead to more effective prevention and mitigation outcomes.

Science & Technology and Research & Development
QUESTION 92: ​How do you assess the state of science and technology (S&T) activities
within the IC? If confirmed, how would you improve S&T activities in the IC?
It is vital for the IC to be at the leading edge of science and technology. If confirmed, I will
review the state of such activities in the IC and seek to improve these efforts.
QUESTION 93: ​The Committee has a strong interest in IC research & development (R&D). If
confirmed, what would be your top priorities with respect to R&D in the IC? What should be the
appropriate size of the research and development budgets as a percentage of the total NIP?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the IC’s research and development programs and
gaining a better understanding of the resource allocation and reasoning.
QUESTION 94: ​What should be the future role and mission of the Intelligence Advanced
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Research Projects Activity (IARPA)?
IARPA focuses on long-range research, pursuing breakthrough technologies that are typically
more than five years from being fielded. It is essential that IARPA continue to focus on
leap-ahead intelligence advantage by drawing on the best minds in academia and industry.

Financial Intelligence
QUESTION 95: ​The IC’s ability to investigate and disrupt the illicit financial and commercial
networks that enable nefarious actors is central to addressing national and international security
threats. Please describe your strategy for improving the IC’s collection and analysis efforts
regarding financial intelligence, including the use of open source and proprietary commercial
information, and obtaining the cooperation of other countries.
I completely agree that the IC’s ability to understand illicit financial and commercial networks is
critical to our national security. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing ongoing Intelligence
Community efforts to understand illicit financial and commercial networks and to assessing how
the IC might improve those efforts.

Management, Infrastructure, and Classification of Information
QUESTION 96: ​Are there any changes you see as necessary to improve IC acquisition
management?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying carefully IC acquisition management to
understand current practices and assess where improvements might be possible.
QUESTION 97: ​What is the appropriate balance between classified and unclassified
capabilities in IC acquisition programs?
If confirmed, I look forward to carefully studying IC acquisition programs to understand
the current balance between classified and unclassified capabilities and assess whether
that balance is appropriate.
QUESTION 98: ​The IRTPA assigned certain budget authorities to the DNI to include
developing a consolidated NIP.
A. ​Do you see a need to modify financial management of the NIP?
B. ​What should be the relationship between the IC and the Defense Department and Services
36

in the management and execution of all NIP resources?
If confirmed, I look forward to carefully studying financial management of the National
Intelligence Program to assess whether modification is advisable and what the optimal
relationship is between the IC and the Defense Department and Services in the management
and execution of all NIP resources.
QUESTION 99: ​Please explain your understanding of Section 102A(i) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3024(g)(1)(G)), which directs the DNI to establish and implement
guidelines for the classification of information, and for other purposes.
A. ​If confirmed, how would you implement this section of the law?
B. ​What approach would you take to the systematic review and declassification of
information in a manner consistent with national security, including the annual disclosure
of aggregate intelligence appropriations?
I have a deep and genuine commitment to transparency. At the same time, I recognize the
importance of appropriately protecting the nation’s secrets. If confirmed, I look forward
to facilitating as much transparency as possible while protecting national security,
including through systematic review and declassification of information where
appropriate.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Defense
QUESTION 100: ​Please explain your understanding of the need to balance the requirements of
national and military intelligence consumers, specifically between establishing a unified national
intelligence effort that includes intelligence elements housed within DoD with the continuing
requirement that combat support agencies be able to respond to the needs of military
commanders.
A. ​What is your assessment of the national intelligence effort to satisfy the needs of military
commanders for human intelligence collection, and what steps would you take to address any
deficiencies?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the national intelligence efforts to satisfy the needs of
military commanders for human intelligence collection.
B. ​What is your assessment of the military intelligence gathering effort, and what role do you see
for the DNI in addressing programs funded by the Military Intelligence Program (MIP)?
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The DNI participates in the Secretary of Defense’s development of the annual MIP budget and
provides guidance for the development of the annual budget for each element of the Intelligence
Community that is not within the NIP. If confirmed, I will review the military intelligence
gathering effort and look forward to consulting with the committee.
C. ​What should be the relationship between the ODNI and the OUSD(I&S) in the management
and coordination between the NIP and the MIP resources?
The ODNI and OUSD(I&S) must work closely in managing and coordinating NIP and MIP
resources, particularly due to the blending and overlapping nature of many of the requirements
they support. This is a critical relationship. If confirmed, I would strive to establish and sustain a
close and collaborative relationship between these offices.
D. ​What is your understanding of the different roles that the DNI and the Secretary of
Defense should play with respect to intelligence elements within DoD?
The DNI and Secretary of Defense have important shared and statutory responsibilities regarding
intelligence elements within the DoD. As such, the DNI must work closely with the Secretary of
Defense to achieve unity of effort and the best effect in employing DoD intelligence elements
within the law in support of the National Security Strategy.
E. ​What is the relationship between the DNI and the heads of the individual intelligence agencies
residing within DoD?
The intelligence agencies residing within DoD are individual members of the Intelligence
Community managed by the DNI. As such, their input is sought and they are included in IC-wide
initiatives and activities. To ensure integration and synchronization of intelligence activities
across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, the USD(I&S) manages these agencies’ activities on
the DNI’s behalf by functioning as the DNI’s Director of Defense Intelligence.
F. ​Does the DNI now have visibility over the full range of intelligence activities conducted
by DoD?
If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and USD(I&S) to ensure the DNI has
appropriate visibility into these DoD activities.
G. ​Are there additional authorities that the DNI should have regarding the full range of
intelligence activities conducted by DoD?
If confirmed, I will review the DNI’s current authorities in this regard and how they work in
practice. I will seek additional authorities should I identify such a requirement and commit to
consulting with the committee as I develop my views on the proper authorities of the DNI.
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H. ​Is the USD(I&S) subject to the authority of the DNI? If so, to what extent?
The relationship between the DNI and USD(I&S) is critical in coordinating the work of the DoD
elements and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) funding; indeed the USD(I&S) is
cross-designated as the Director of Defense Intelligence, indicating the importance of that
relationship. If confirmed, I would reaffirm the USD(I&S) as my Deputy for Defense Intelligence
and seek to work closely with USD(I&S) to support my role of integrating and coordinating the
IC, relying on them to assist in achieving effective coordination and facilitating work on
important issues of shared interest across the community, including MIP/NIP cost shares, critical
DOD collection programs and platforms, and intelligence support to combat elements.
QUESTION 101: ​What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the USD(I&S)
regarding the different intelligence elements within the DoD?
My understanding of the responsibilities of the USD (I&S) is threefold. First, the USD (I&S)
represents the principal staff assistant and advisor to the DoD leadership on intelligence,
counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. Second,
the USD(I&S) exercises the Secretary of Defense’s authority, direction, and control over Combat
Support Agencies, Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities regarding defense intelligence,
counterintelligence, and security components. Finally, the USD (I&S) exercises planning, policy,
and strategic oversight over all DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and security policy, plans,
and programs.
QUESTION 102: ​If confirmed as DNI, what issues do you believe require the attention of
the DNI and the Secretary of Defense regarding the role of the Office of the USD(I&S)?
If confirmed, I will collaborate closely with the Secretary of Defense on issues surrounding
intelligence and security, particularly critical national security issues, and on funding for the IC’s
DOD elements and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). If confirmed, I would seek to better
integrate USD (I&S) into the DNI’s work of integrating and coordinating the IC, relying on them
to assist in achieving effective coordination and to facilitate work on issues of shared interest
across the community, including MIP/National Intelligence Program (NIP) cost shares, critical
DOD collection programs and platforms, and intelligence support to combat elements. I would
also ensure coordination and collaboration between other elements of the IC and DoD where
defense equities are concerned. This collaboration will be critical as I seek to integrate and
coordinate U.S. national intelligence.

ODNI Relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency
QUESTION 103: ​What is your view of the DNI’s responsibility to supervise, direct, or
39

control the activities of the CIA?
A. ​What do you see as the DNI’s role in the supervision, direction, or control of the
conduct of covert actions by the CIA?
By statute, the DCIA "shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency," which should enable a DNI to have a current and holistic
understanding of the CIA’s current activities. I envision that dialogue being rooted in clear
communication and regular information sharing to work through issues of common concern.
B. ​What level of notification about covert action activities should the DNI receive?
If I am confirmed as DNI, I look forward to reviewing the level of notification the DNI receives
about covert action activities and determining whether any adjustments are necessary.
C. ​What role should the DNI have with respect to the Director of the CIA’s responsibilities to
coordinate the relationships between IC elements and the intelligence and security services of
foreign governments or international organizations?
By statute, the DNI is responsible for overseeing the coordination of relationships between IC
elements and the intelligence and security services of foreign governments and international
organizations. In my experience, DNI’s role in doing so did not conflict with the Director of
the CIA’s role in managing liaison relationships with foreign services. If I am confirmed as
DNI, I would expect to work closely with the Director of the CIA on these matters.
D. ​What role should the DNI have with respect to the CIA’s management of its national human
intelligence responsibilities?
The DNI should establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the Intelligence Community,
including the CIA, to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence, including national human intelligence.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
QUESTION 104: ​What is your view of the role of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) within the IC?
The intelligence components of the FBI are part of the Intelligence Community, with specific
authorities defined in Executive Order 12333, particularly with respect to activities within the
United States. It is essential that the Intelligence Community respect and abide by legal and
40

policy constraints that place domestic matters in law enforcement’s purview.
QUESTION 105: ​What is your understanding of the relationship between the FBI and the DNI,
particularly regarding collection priorities and information sharing?
The FBI, as a component of the Department of Justice and a member of the IC, serves as a vital
link between intelligence and law enforcement communities. I​ f confirmed, I will review the
current relationship to understand if any adjustments are warranted.
QUESTION 106: ​What is your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the
FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI, with respect to U.S. counterterrorism efforts?
The DNI, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI have complementary roles and
responsibilities with respect to the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism efforts and effective
collaboration is critical to an effective counterterrorism approach. The Department of Justice,
led by the Attorney General, and the FBI investigate possible violations of criminal law,
including counterterrorism matters. The DNI is charged with integrating all counterterrorism
intelligence analysis of the federal government, to provide an IC-wide view of the terrorism
threat. In addition, the National Counterterrorism Center, an integral part of the ODNI, has a
statutory responsibility to, among other things, integrate all intelligence possessed or acquired
by the federal government and provide all source intelligence analysis on terrorism threats to its
customers.
QUESTION 107: ​What is your understanding of the different roles and responsibilities of the
FBI, the Attorney General, and the DNI, with respect to U.S. counterintelligence efforts?
The Department of Justice, led by the Attorney General, and the FBI investigate potential
violations of criminal law, including counterintelligence matters. As directed in statute, the
National Counterintelligence Executive (Director of the ODNI’s National Counterintelligence
and Security Center) serves as the head of the U.S. government counterintelligence activities,
including setting operational priorities, developing strategies and policies, and delivering to the
President the U.S. counterintelligence strategy.

ODNI Relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and
Other Departments of the United States Government
QUESTION 108: ​What is your view of how well the intelligence elements of the Departments
of Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy are integrated within the IC? Do you believe
that there are changes that should be made to the organization, mission, or resource level of any
of these agencies?

41

If confirmed, I look forward to exploring in detail the current relationship among the
intelligence elements of the Departments of Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy,
and then to identifying any changes that might facilitate more effective fulfillment of the
Intelligence Community’s mission.
QUESTION 109: ​Please describe your understanding of the different roles and
responsibilities of the DNI and the following officials, regarding the IC elements within their
departments:
A. ​The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Several authorities of the DNI are exercised subject to the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, the authority of the DNI with regard to the
transfer or reprogramming of National Intelligence Program funds is subject to the approval of
the Director of OMB. In addition, the ODNI, like other federal agencies, complies with
applicable OMB guidance and policies for implementation of various Federal laws.
B. ​The Secretary of Energy
C. ​The Secretary of Homeland Security
D. ​The Secretary of State
The intelligence elements of the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and State are
responsible for supporting both national and departmental missions, in addition to other
missions specifically assigned to them by Executive Order 12333. These elements play an
important role both within the IC and within their respective departments.
As the head of the IC, the DNI has responsibility for the overall effectiveness of the national
intelligence effort and has specific authorities to guide elements--most of which reside in other
government departments--in meeting this responsibility. For example, the DNI provides budget
guidance to these elements. The DNI is also entitled by law to be consulted on the appointment
of heads of the intelligence elements, including those in these departments.
As the heads of the departments that contain IC elements, the Secretaries of Energy, Homeland
Security, and State have responsibility for ensuring that these elements support the overall
effectiveness of their respective departmental missions.
E. ​The Secretary of the Treasury
The DNI, Treasury Secretary, and Treasury Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
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work together to ensure effective economic security and financial intelligence support. This
integration is critical given the direct intelligence support required within the Department of the
Treasury and across the U.S. Government on anti-money laundering, counterterrorism finance,
economic and trade sanctions, financial system integrity, investment security and international
economics. Collaboration between our organizations is necessary to ensure coordinated
acquisition, budgeting, burden sharing, information sharing, and prioritization for Treasury’s
Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the broader IC.

De​fense Intelligence Agency
QUESTION 110: ​The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is the “Defense HUMINT Manager”
under DoD directives, with the responsibility for managing human intelligence activities across
the DoD, including those activities undertaken by the military intelligence agencies. Do you
believe that DIA should, in both its Title 10 and Title 50 roles, have the authority and ability to
manage, direct, and oversee all DoD human intelligence and counterintelligence activities?
If confirmed, I will assess the activities and authorities of the Defense Intelligence Agency and, to
the extent necessary, discuss them with the Secretary of Defense.

Privacy and Civil Liberties
QUESTION 111: ​Section 102A(f)(4) of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)(4))
provides that the DNI “shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United
States by the [CIA] and shall ensure such compliance by other elements of the [IC] through the
host executive departments that manage the programs and activities that are part of the National
Intelligence Program.”
A. ​What are the most important subjects concerning compliance with the Constitution and laws
of the United States that the DNI should address in fulfilling this responsibility?
I believe that the DNI should work to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the
United States across all of the activities of the Intelligence Community.
B. ​What do you understand to be the obligation of the DNI to keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed about matters relating to compliance with the
Constitution and laws of the United States?
The DNI has the responsibility to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of intelligence activities, and is specifically required to report any illegal
intelligence activities.
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IC Whistleblowers
QUESTION 112: ​Do you support a strong Inspector General of the IC to provide independent
oversight for the IC?
Yes.
QUESTION 113: ​Do you support the statutory rights of IC whistleblowers and intend to
honor the anonymity of whistleblowers who come forward? Are there aspects of the IC
whistleblower statute with which you disagree?
Yes, I support the statutory rights of IC whistleblowers and, if confirmed, I intend to
rigorously protect whistleblowers from reprisal at every level and will honor their anonymity
in accordance with the law.
QUESTION 114: ​Do you believe the subject of a complaint, even if the subject is the President,
should be told about the complaint? If so, under what circumstances?
Whether the subject of a complaint should be notified of the complaint must be decided on a case
by case basis, while protecting the integrity of the IG mission and any investigations.
QUESTION 115: ​On October 22, 2019, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) sent a letter, signed by the inspectors general of sixty-eight government
departments and agencies, to the Assistant Attorney General, disagreeing with the Office of
Legal Counsel’s opinion permitting the DNI to withhold from Congress a whistleblower
complaint determined by the IC Inspector General to be an “urgent concern.” The CIGIE letter,
whose signatories included inspectors general from across the IC, noted that the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act does not grant the DNI discretion, but rather states
that the DNI “shall” transmit such complaints to Congress. It further warned that the opinion
“could seriously undermine the critical role” of whistleblowers, chill whistleblower disclosures,
and undermine the independence of inspectors general. Do you agree with the CIGIE and the
inspectors general, inside and outside the IC, that the DNI is required to transmit to Congress
whistleblower complaints determined by the Inspector General to be “urgent concerns”?
If confirmed, I commit to transmitting to Congress whistleblower complaints determined by
the Inspector General to be an urgent concern.
QUESTION 116: ​IC whistleblowers have the statutory right to provide their complaints
directly to Congress. The law states that whistleblowers must obtain from the DNI, through the
44

IC IG, “direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance
with appropriate security practices.” Do you agree that this provision does not permit the DNI
to deny that direct access to Congress altogether?
If confirmed, I commit that I will not deny the IC IG direct access to the Congress..
QUESTION 117: ​Do you agree that any monitoring of IC personnel for purposes of detecting
insider threats must protect the confidentiality of protected whistleblower communications? If
so, how should that protection be assured?
If confirmed, I intend to study the current whistleblower procedures to determine whether any
changes are appropriate.
QUESTION 118: ​Do you believe that IC whistleblowers who request access to an attorney with
appropriate security clearances should have that access?
I believe firmly in the role of lawful whistleblowers in raising legitimate concerns, and in the
importance of legal representation in such matters. If confirmed, I intend to study the current
whistleblower procedures to determine whether any changes are appropriate.
QUESTION 119: ​The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 prohibited revocation
of security clearances as a reprisal against whistleblowers. The same law required the DNI, in
coordination with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, to issue policies and
procedures for when a whistleblower needs to adjudicate an adverse security clearance decision.
Will you ensure that these policies and procedures are issued as required by the law?
Yes.

Inspectors General of IC Agencies
The independence and integrity of inspectors general is critical to ensuring the
accountability of the executive branch.
QUESTION 120: ​If confirmed, how would you ensure the IC’s IGs maintain their
independence?
A Senate-confirmed Intelligence Community Inspector General is critical to providing an
appropriate avenue for whistleblowing consistent with the need to protect classified information.
If I am confirmed, I intend to make it very clear to the IC workforce that I will respect the IC IG
45

as well as the IGs of other IC elements and protect them from political or other untoward
influence.

Captured IC Personnel
QUESTION 121: ​Do you commit to doing everything within your powers to ensure U.S.
persons captured in the line of duty are returned home?
Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that policymakers have all of the relevant intelligence to help
inform them in ensuring the return of captured Americans.

Interrogation
QUESTION 122: ​Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
prohibits the use of any interrogation technique or approach or treatment related to interrogation
not authorized by the Army Field Manual. Is this provision of law absolutely binding on the IC
and the President?
Yes.

Classification & Transparency
QUESTION 123: ​Executive Orders 13526 states, “In no case shall information be classified,
continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal
violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person,
organization, or agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of
information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.” Executive
Orders 12958 and 13292 prohibit classification for these same factors.
A. ​Do you commit to fulfilling both the letter and the spirit of these standing Executive Orders?
Yes.
B. ​What role do you believe IC Inspectors General should play in investigating possible
violations of these prohibitions?
Inspectors General can play an important role in investigating possible violations of these
prohibitions. Their precise role can depend on the nature of the alleged violation and how it is
reported or discovered.
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C. ​What accountability do you believe is appropriate for violations of these prohibitions?
I believe that if it is determined that someone has classified, or failed to declassify, information
for impermissible reasons, some form of discipline is appropriate, depending on the
circumstances.
QUESTION 124: ​In his August 16, 2019, letter to President Trump, the Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) described a “deluge” of classified information
that “will continue to grow unabated,” referring to the current framework as “unsustainable.”
He called for the “investment, adoption, and use of advanced technologies” as well as “new
policies and practices” to address the problem. He further wrote: “The Government has not
invested in the technologies needed to support electronic information management and
information security.” Similarly, the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB), in its June
2016 report, called for “the adoption of a government-wide technology investment strategy for
the management of classified information.”
A. ​Do you agree with the assessments and recommendations of the ISOO and PIDB with regard
to the failure of the current framework to manage the increasing amount of classified
information?
I agree that current policies, practices, and technologies cannot keep pace with the amount of
classified information generated each year. If confirmed, I look forward to examining these
challenges and identifying what changes may be warranted.
B. ​What should be the role of the DNI in developing, promoting, or mandating the use of
advanced technologies to address the problem? Should the DNI prioritize investments in
this technology? What new policies and practices are necessary to address the problem?
I believe the DNI should support the strategic investment of resources in developing and
implementing technologies that help reduce the challenges associated with the increasingly large
amounts of classified information generated each year. If I am confirmed as DNI, I would look
forward to giving close consideration to how classification practices may be innovated across the
Intelligence Community.
QUESTION 125: ​Executive Order 12333 procedures and guidelines, as they apply to IC
entities, are publicly available. Do you commit to continuing to post these procedures and to
make public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant
interpretations?
Yes, to the extent consistent with the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
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QUESTION 126: ​Implementing procedures under PPD-28 for IC entities are publicly
available. Do you commit to continue to post these policies and procedures and to make
public any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant
interpretations?
Yes, to the extent consistent with the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods.
QUESTION 127: ​If you or another ODNI official were to say something pertaining to
national security that was factually inaccurate in public, would you correct the public record?
I believe strongly in transparency and in ensuring that the American public has an accurate sense
of the work of the Intelligence Community. If a factually inaccurate statement were made, I would
work to correct any inaccuracy while also protecting information that is properly classified.

Security Executive Agent
The DNI is designated by law to serve as the U.S. government’s Security Executive
Agent.
QUESTION 128: ​What is your view of the effectiveness of the governance framework for
personnel and credentialing vetting reform established by the OMB led Performance
Accountability Council?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this governance framework and determining whether
any changes are advisable.
QUESTION 129: ​Do you believe the Trusted Workforce 2.0 personnel vetting reforms are
prudently scoped? Would you seek to modify them? How would you accelerate reforms?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Trusted WorkForce 2.0 personnel vetting reforms
and determining whether any changes are advisable.
QUESTION 130: ​How would you improve reciprocity in the recognition of clearances
across the government?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the current handling of reciprocity of clearances and
determining whether any changes are advisable.
QUESTION 131: ​What are your views on the interagency security clearance process? If
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confirmed, what changes, if any, would you seek to make to this process?
Security clearance reform will require my immediate attention if I am confirmed as the next
DNI. It is apparent that the current system is perceived as moving too slowly, which costs the IC
talent--talent that we need in order to provide the best possible intelligence to policymakers as
they confront a complex array of national security challenges. If I am confirmed, I will seek
rapidly to understand the extent and nature of the problems with the existing processes and the
status of ongoing reform initiatives, and I will ensure that the Committee is kept informed of our
efforts to improve the system.

National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)
QUESTION 132: ​The NIPF guides priorities for the IC. Do you believe there is adequate
interagency participation in the development of the President’s Intelligence Priorities? How
would you change or update the current procedures?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying in detail the current process for development of the
National Intelligence Priorities Framework, including the current forms of interagency
participation in that development process, to determine whether changes or updates are
advisable.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
Title VII of FISA expires on December 31, 2023. In a February 8, 2012, letter to Congress from
then-DNI Clapper and then-Attorney General Holder, they stated, “We look forward to working
with you to ensure the speedy enactment of legislation reauthorizing Title VII, without
amendment, to avoid any interruption in our use of these authorities to protect the American
people.” And in a September 7, 2017, letter to Congress from then-DNI Coats and
then-Attorney General Sessions, they stated, “We look forward to working with you to ensure
the speedy enactment of legislation reauthorizing Title VII, without amendment beyond
removing the sunset provision, to avoid any interruption in our use of these authorities to protect
the American people.”
QUESTION 133: ​Do you agree with these statements regarding FISA Title VII’s
reauthorization in 2023, including removing the sunset provision? Please explain the basis for
your response.
Title VII of FISA provides some of the most critical intelligence to protect our national security. I
understand that there are a variety of proposals to modify Section 702 and if confirmed as DNI I
would work with elements of the Intelligence Community, the Department of Justice and the
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Congress to determine whether any changes can be made that would improve the protection of
privacy and civil liberties without compromising national security.
QUESTION 134: ​The USA Freedom Act of 2015 reauthorized legal authorities – namely,
Business Records, Roving Wiretap, and Lone Wolf – that subsequently expired on March 15,
2020. Congress sought to reauthorize these important national security authorities in early 2020,
but the Senate was unable to obtain final passage. Do you support a clean reauthorization
(without further sunset) of these authorities? Please explain the basis for your response.
I support reauthorization of the expired provisions, which have bipartisan support and provide
tools to protect Americans while protecting their rights. If confirmed as DNI, I will make it a
priority to ensure that intelligence collection is carried out with due respect for Americans’
rights. . If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to provide additional information to allow
Congress to consider reauthorizing the expired provisions.
QUESTION 135: ​Title 50, Section 1812 provides for exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance and interception of certain communications may be conducted. Do you agree that
this provision of law is binding on the President?
I agree that the President must take care that the law be faithfully executed and Title 50,
Section 1812 is no exception.
QUESTION 136: ​What would you do if the IC was requested or directed to conduct
collection in conflict with the limitations of Section 1812? Would you notify the full
congressional intelligence committees?
I will not authorize any surveillance of any sort that is not consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and I will notify the Committees of any illegal intelligence activities.
QUESTION 137: ​Do you agree that the FISA Court ​amici p​ lay an important role in raising
significant matters of law with the Court? If yes, do you believe that granting the ​amici a​ ccess to
all FISA information, as provided for in the Section 215 reauthorization legislation passed by
both houses of Congress, helps the ​amici f​ ulfill its role of raising issues with the Court?
I believe that FISA Court a​ mici​ play an important role. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
they have access that allows them to play the role envisioned for them by statute.
QUESTION 138: ​The Department of Justice has published policy guidance on the use of
cell-site simulator technology, often referred to as stingrays. The guidance requires law
enforcement to obtain a probable cause warrant for the use of stingrays, other than in
emergencies. Do you believe that the IC should obtain a FISA probable cause warrant for the
domestic use of stingrays consistent with the conduct of electronic surveillance under FISA?
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If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue carefully. If confirmed I will ensure that all
intelligence activities are conducted in conformity with the Constitution and laws.
QUESTION 139: ​In December 2020, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General released its Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Strategy and Efforts to
Disrupt Illegal Dark Web Activities. The audit described Network Investigate Techniques
(NITs) which “require computer exploits that the FBI is increasingly developing for national
security purposes but not for criminal investigations.” If confirmed, will you agree to make
public annual statistics on the number of times the FISA Court has authorized the use of
computer exploits against Americans’ phones and computers?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue carefully to determine whether additional
transparency is possible, consistent with the need to protect national security.
QUESTION 140: ​In June 2018, in the case of ​Carpenter v. U.S.,​ the U.S. Supreme Court
found that the government’s collection of cell-site locational records was a Fourth
Amendment search. In November 2019, the government acknowledged that it was not
collecting cell-site or GPS information pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
which does not require a warrant. In 2019, both houses of Congress passed legislation
reauthorizing Section 215 that prohibited such collection, although the legislation was not
passed into law.
A. ​Do you agree that, should Section 215 be reauthorized, it should not be used to collect
cell-site and GPS information?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue and will ensure that all intelligence activities
are conducted in conformity with the Constitution and laws.
B. ​Do you agree that the constitutional principle enunciated in ​Carpenter a​ nd reflected in the
government’s decision with regard to collection under Section 215 applies generally to the IC’s
collection under other provisions of FISA and EO 12333?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue and will ensure that all intelligence activities
are conducted in conformity with the Constitution and laws.
C. ​If confirmed, will you commit to issuing controlling guidance on the application of
Carpenter ​to the IC and making that guidance public?
If confirmed, I commit to reviewing with IC lawyers whether such guidance would be useful and
furthermore to seek opportunities to be increasingly transparent regarding the frameworks
within which we collect information while protecting sources and methods.
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QUESTION 141: ​During his confirmation process, Director Ratcliffe was asked whether the IC
can purchase information related to U.S. persons if the compelled production of that information
would be covered by FISA. His response read, in part, that “not all intelligence activities are
governed by FISA, and it is my understanding that in appropriate circumstances elements of the
IC may lawfully purchase information from the private sector in furtherance of their authorized
missions.”
A. ​Do you believe that the privacy interests of Americans should depend on whether their
information is purchased or compelled?
I believe strongly in protecting the privacy interests of Americans. If confirmed, I look forward to
understanding fully current methods of obtaining information and intelligence to understand this
issue better and determine whether changes are advisable.
B. ​If you are confirmed, will you ensure that the IC is transparent about the type of information
on Americans that it purchases and the legal basis for that collection?
If confirmed, I will seek to articulate and make public the circumstances under which the IC
purchases commercially available information and the legal basis for doing so, consistent with
the protection of sensitive sources and methods.
QUESTION 142: ​Section 103 of the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 prohibited
the collection, under Section 702 of FISA, of communications that contain a reference to, but are
not to or from a target (“abouts” collection) while laying out processes for the resumption of such
collection in emergency situations and following congressional notification. Do you agree that
any resumption of “abouts” collection should be announced to the public?
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Congress is informed of any resumption of “abouts”
collection, and to the degree possible consistent with the protection of sensitive sources and
methods, would make such information public.
QUESTION 143: ​Do you believe that the government can collect purely domestic
communications under Section 702 of FISA?
Under Section 702, the government may not target any person known at the time of acquisition to
be in the United States, any person reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the
purpose is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States, or
any United States person, and may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the
sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the
United States.
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QUESTION 144: ​Under Section 702 of FISA, the government can direct an electronic
communications service provider to provide “assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition.”
Under Section 702(h)(5), if the provider does not comply with a directive, the government may
seek an order from the FISA Court to compel compliance. Prior to the reauthorization of Section
702 in 2018, the government stated that it had “not to date sought an order pursuant to Section
702(h)(5) seeking to compel an electronic communications service provider to alter the
encryption afforded by a service or product it offers.”
A. ​Do you believe that the government should inform the FISA Court should it issue a directive
to a provider to alter the encryption afforded by a service or a product, regardless of whether the
government files a motion to compel compliance?
B. ​Will you commit to notifying Congress of any such directive?
C. ​Do you believe the public should be informed should the facts underlying the
government’s public statement related to Section 702(h)(5) change?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying these issues carefully and consulting with Intelligence
Community lawyers. I believe in the greatest possible transparency consistent with the need to
protect sensitive sources and methods, and if confirmed I will ensure that the law and the Rules of
the FISA Court with respect to notifications are followed.
QUESTION 145: ​During his confirmation process, Assistant Attorney General for National
Security John Demers was asked about the prohibition on reverse targeting in Section 702 of
FISA. He responded:
“As I understand it, determining whether a particular known U.S. person has been reverse
targeted through the targeting of a Section 702 target necessitates a fact specific inquiry
that would involve consideration of a variety of factors. For example, as the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its 2014 report, if a Section 702 tasking resulted in
substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S. person, but little
reporting about a Section 702 target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may
have occurred.”
If you are confirmed, how would you seek to implement this “fact specific inquiry” through the
Section 702 nominations and querying processes of IC entities?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue carefully and consulting with Intelligence
Community lawyers and the Attorney General to ensure that all collection activities are
conducted in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

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QUESTION 146: ​Do you believe the IC can collect Americans’ web browsing or internet
search history without a probable cause warrant? If yes, under what authorities, in what
circumstances and with what limitations?
I am committed to ensuring that all intelligence activities are conducted in accordance with the
Constitution and the law, and that when it is necessary to seek a probable cause warrant, we
comply.

Saudi Arabia
QUESTION 147: ​The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020,
which was passed into law, required that the DNI submit to Congress an unclassified report on
the death of Jamal Khashoggi. The law required that the report include the identification of those
who carried out, participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the
death of Khashoggi. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, found that that the DNI’s
failure to product such unclassified report was “contrary to the unambiguous and lawful
command of Congress,” called for full accountability for the murder, and expressed the Sense of
the Congress that the IC’s determinations can be included in an unclassified report “without
putting sources and methods at risk.” If confirmed, do you commit to submitting to Congress the
unclassified report on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi required by law?
Yes.
QUESTION 148: ​A declassified August 2019 FBI Intelligence Bulletin concluded that
“Saudi Officials Almost Certainly Assist Saudi Citizens Flee the United States to Avoid
Legal Issues, Undermining the US Judicial Process.”
A. ​If confirmed, will you make Saudi efforts to undermine the U.S. judicial process a collection
and analytic priority?
If confirmed, I look forward to understanding the resources currently being invested in
understanding this issue and determining whether additional resources are appropriate.
B. ​The FBI further assessed that “KSA officials are unlikely to alter their practice of assisting
the flight of Saudi citizens in legal trouble from the United States in the near term unless the
USG directly addresses this issue with the KSA.” If confirmed, do you agree to raise this
concern directly with your Saudi counterparts?
If confirmed, I look forward to providing the best possible intelligence to support policymakers
as they determine how best to approach this issue.
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Foreign Influence Campaigns
QUESTION 149: ​In the recommendations accompanying Volume 3 of its Report on Russian
Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, the Committee stated:
“In the event that [a foreign influence] campaign is detected, the public should be informed as
soon as possible, with a clear and succinct statement of the threat, even if the information is
incomplete.” If confirmed, will you ensure that a mechanism is established for the timely
declassification and public release of information related to foreign influence campaigns, and
that this mechanism is established well in advance of the next election?
I very much support this recommendation and agree that addressing foreign influence
campaigns effectively is critical. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that we can release
such information as soon as possible, while also doing so responsibly and more generally,
exploring carefully how the Intelligence Community can best assist the broader U.S.
Government efforts to address foreign influence campaigns.
QUESTION 150: ​If confirmed, will you review the Committee’s Report on Russian Active
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, in particular Volume 5, for
additional declassification?
Yes, if confirmed, I will order a review of the Committee’s report to determine whether additional
declassification is possible consistent with the need to protect national security.
QUESTION 151: ​If confirmed, will you review intelligence related to foreign interference
in the 2020 U.S. election, including with regard to Russian agents referenced in the
Treasury Department’s September 10, 2020, sanctions announcement, for additional
declassification and public release?
Yes, if confirmed I will order a review of these materials to determine whether additional
declassification is possible consistent with the need to protect national security.

Executive Order 12333
QUESTION 152: ​According to a chart posted by the ODNI, only the Department of Treasury
Office of Intelligence and Analysis does not have finalized Attorney General approved EO
12333 procedures. Will you prioritize the completion and public dissemination of those
procedures?
Yes.
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QUESTION 153: ​NSA Director Nakasone has stated that, absent consent of the U.S. person
or certain emergency situations, U.S. person queries of communications collected under
Executive Order 12333 “normally must be approved by the Attorney General on a
case-by-case basis after a finding of probable cause.”
A. ​To what extent should this requirement apply to other IC entities?
B. ​What is the role of the IC in developing and documenting the case for probable cause in
this context?
C. ​Please describe any exceptions to this requirement.
If confirmed, I will review carefully how this requirement is implemented to consider its
appropriate application.

Outsourcing Intelligence
QUESTION 154: ​Please describe what you believe to be the appropriate limitations on the IC’s
receipt of, use, retention and dissemination of communications as well as communications or
geolocation records on U.S. persons collected by a foreign partner or entity. How should those
limitations address instances in which the foreign partner specifically targeted U.S. persons who
are not the subject of a warrant in the United States or instances in which the foreign partner has
collected bulk communications or bulk communications or geolocational records known to
include those of U.S. persons?
If confirmed, I look forward to studying this issue carefully and consulting with Intelligence
Community lawyers and the Attorney General. I am committed to ensuring that all intelligence
activities are conducted in compliance with the Constitution and laws.​
QUESTION 155: ​Do you agree that no element of the IC can request that a foreign entity
conduct any activity that it is not authorized to undertake itself?
Executive Order 12333 requires all intelligence activities to be consistent with the Constitution
and laws and provides that no element of the Intelligence Community may participate in or
request any person (including a foreign entity) undertake activities it forbids.

Surveillance Against the U.S.
QUESTION 156: ​Over the past year, media reports have revealed how data brokers are
indiscriminately selling location data collected from Americans’ phones. Do you believe that
the sale of Americans’ location data, including data from U.S. government officials’ phones, to
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foreign governments could harm U.S. national security?
Yes.

Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
QUESTION 157: ​Do you believe that the mandate of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board (PCLOB) should be expanded beyond counterterrorism?
If confirmed, I will consult with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board about the
effectiveness of its current mandate and assess whether changes to it should be requested of
Congress.
QUESTION 158: ​If confirmed, will you ensure that the IC fully cooperates with the PCLOB,
both with regard to the Board’s formal reviews and its information exchanges with the IC?
Yes.
QUESTION 159: ​Will you commit to ensuring that the PCLOB is provided full access to any
information it requests?
I believe in the importance of the PCLOB’s work and, if confirmed, look forward to facilitating
the PCLOB’s access to information to ensure that it can play its critical oversight function.
QUESTION 160: ​Do you agree that the PCLOB’s reports should be made public?
Yes, to the extent consistent with the protection of sensitive sources and methods.
QUESTION 161: ​If confirmed, will you ensure that the IC fully cooperates with the PCLOB,
both with regard to the Board’s formal reviews and its informal exchanges with the IC? Will
you commit to ensuring that the PCLOB is provided full access to any information it requests?
I believe in the importance of the PCLOB’s work and, if confirmed, look forward to facilitating
the PCLOB’s access to information to ensure that it can play its critical oversight function.

Lethal Authorities
QUESTION 162: ​Please describe your view of the legal and policy implications of targeting or
otherwise knowingly killing a U.S. person in a U.S. Government lethal operation. What
additional public transparency do you believe would be warranted in that situation?
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I believe strongly in transparency, including about the U.S. Government’s use of force and
especially in relation to U.S. persons. If confirmed, I will be an advocate for the maximum
amount of transparency about national security matters consistent with the need to protect
national security.
QUESTION 163: ​On July 1, 2016, President Obama issued EO 13732, “United States Policy
and Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving
the Use of Force.” Section 3 of the EO directed the DNI to publicly release an annual report on
strikes undertaken by the U.S. Government against terrorist targets outside areas of active
hostilities. President Trump revoked Section 3 on March 6, 2019. Section 1723 of the Fiscal
Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act included a similar reporting requirement.
A. ​Will you advocate for a new or revised Executive Order that includes reporting on strikes
taken by and civilian casualties caused by all U.S. Government agencies?
Yes.
B. ​Will you ensure compliance with Section 1723, including the requirement that
the report be submitted in unclassified form?
Yes.
C. ​Would you support making Section 1723 permanent?
Yes.

Transparency
QUESTION 164: ​Will you support the declassification and public release of any interpretation
of law that provides a basis for intelligence activities but is inconsistent with the public’s
understanding of the law?
Yes, to the extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

Chief of Mission Authority
QUESTION 165: ​If a U.S. ambassador directs the IC to cease a particular program or
operation in the country where the ambassador is serving, is the IC obligated to do so,
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absent or pending intervention by the President?
If a U.S. ambassador directs the IC to cease certain activities within the country for which they
are the U.S. representative, in my view, the IC should either elevate the issue or cease such
activities. During my time serving as Deputy Director of the CIA, I built a strong working
relationship with the State Department, including my counterpart there as Deputy Secretary of
State. That experience taught me that conflicts between departments generally can be worked out
through consultation and negotiation, making it possible to avoid such scenarios.
QUESTION 166: ​ICD 402 states that “[i]n all cases the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Chief of Station shall serve as the DNI Representative [redacted].” If the situation described
above occurs, what would be your direction to the DNI Representative?
In the situation described, I would direct the DNI Representative to report to my senior staff the
conflict in the field between departments so that we could resolve it at a leadership level with
our State Department colleagues.

Detention and Interrogation
QUESTION 167: ​Do you believe that any of the CIA’s former enhanced techniques are
consistent with the Detainee Treatment Act, the U.S. statutory prohibition on torture, the
War Crimes Act, or U.S. obligations under the Convention against Torture or Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?
I believe that the CIA’s interrogation program’s enhanced interrogation techniques included
torture, which violates U.S. commitments and obligations.
QUESTION 168: ​Executive Order 13491 prohibits the CIA from operating any detention
facilities other than “facilities used only to hold people on a short-term transitory basis.” Do
you support this prohibition?
Yes.
QUESTION 169: ​Section 1045 ​of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
requires the Secretary of Defense, in ​consultation with the DNI, the Attorney General, and the
Director of the FBI, to complete a “thorough review” every three years of Army Field Manual
2–22.3 (Human Intelligence Collector Operations) (“AFM”).
A. ​Do you agree to advocate for a timely review of the AFM?
Yes.
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B. ​Do you agree that the CIA’s former enhanced interrogation techniques should be prohibited
under the AFM?
The AFM constitutes the totality of permissible interrogation techniques. Anything not permitted
by the AFM, including all forms of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, are
forbidden.
C. ​Section 1045 requires that the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) submit a report
on best practices for interrogation and states that the review of the AFM may include
recommendations for revisions based on HIG research. After reviewing the science, the HIG
concluded that, “[b]​ased on the comprehensive research and field validation studies detailed in
this report, it is concluded that the most effective practices for eliciting accurate information and
actionable intelligence are non coercive, rapport-based, information-gathering interviewing and
interrogation methods.” Do you agree that the review of the AFM should be consistent with these
scientific best practices?
Yes, and even if a technique involving cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment were determined
to be effective, I would not endorse its use.
QUESTION 170: ​If confirmed, will you review the options for making the full, unredacted
Study, or relevant portions thereof, available to appropriately cleared defense counsel at the
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay and report to Congress on that review?
If confirmed, I will review the Study to determine whether there are options for releasing it, in
whole or in part, to appropriately cleared military commissions defense counsel.
QUESTION 171: ​If confirmed, will you review the options for ensuring that medical personnel
at Guantanamo Bay have access to any information in the Study relevant to the health of
detainees?
If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Study to determine its suitability for possible
access by relevant medical personnel.
QUESTION 172: ​On August 6, 2014, CIA Director John Brennan convened an Agency
Accountability Board in response to the CIA Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) July 18, 2014,
Report of Investigation, “Agency Access to the SSCI-Shared Drive on RDINet.” The Board was
authorized to investigate the conduct of five individuals named in the OIG report, and provide
recommendations regarding their individual accountability and any system failures. On
September 8, 2014, Director Brennan recused himself from the portion of the Board’s work
related to any accountability for the five individuals and directed the Board to report its findings
and recommendations to you.
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A. ​What role, if any, did you play in convening, scoping, guiding, or overseeing the
Accountability Board prior to the Board’s completion of its report in December 2014?
None.
B. ​Please describe the discussions, communications and other consultations you undertook in
connection with your decision to accept the Accountability Board’s recommendation that
disciplinary action not be imposed.
I reviewed and accepted the Board’s report when it was completed, in coordination with ODNI.
QUESTION 173: ​Intelligence Community Offices of Inspectors General play a critical role in
identifying waste, fraud, abuse and violations of law. Their reports provide the bases for
necessary changes in policies and practices, as well as individual accountability.
A. ​As a general matter, what is the responsibility of an IC entity to accept the factual findings of
an Inspector General?
B. ​What should the process or standard be for disregarding or overriding the factual findings of an
Inspector General? Should factual differences arise, what is the proper channel for reconciling
those differences with the IGs?
I believe strongly in the independence of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General. If
confirmed, I ​look forward to discussing with you the appropriate treatment of an IC IG’s factual
findings.
QUESTION 174: ​On June 27, 2013, Director Brennan submitted to the Committee a letter
acknowledging that, with regard to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, the CIA
“[f]ell short when it came to holding individuals accountable for poor performance and
management failures.” The CIA then made the following recommendation:
“Broaden the scope of accountability reviews. Direct that the Executive Director ensure
that all memoranda establishing and laying out the scope of an accountability review
board, including directorate level boards, explicitly call on the board to assess and make
recommendations to address any systemic issues revealed by the case, and to expand the
scope of the review as warranted to include officers responsible for those systemic
problems.”
The 2014 Accountability Board did not expand its scope beyond the five individuals, nor did it
address accountability for officers responsible for systemic problems.
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A. ​As a general matter, if confirmed, how would you improve accountability within the IC?
B. ​Do you believe that accountability reviews, at the CIA and at other elements of the IC,
should be broadened to consider officers responsible for systemic problems?
C. ​If confirmed, will you review accountability review processes across the IC to ensure that
they address systemic problems and include officers responsible for those systemic problems as
well as management failures?
I believe strongly in accountability. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring ways to improve
accountability within the Intelligence Community, including broadening accountability reviews
and ensuring that accountability review processes address systemic problems.
QUESTION 175: ​On February 7, 2014, the Acting General Counsel of the CIA filed a crimes
report with the Department of Justice containing allegations against Committee staff. The OIG
investigation “determined that the factual basis for this referral was unfounded and the author of
the letter had been provided inaccurate information on which the letter was based.” The
Accountability Board did not dispute this finding.
A. ​Who should be responsible for ensuring that crimes reports filed with the Department of
Justice are factually accurate?
Those authorized to file such reports must be responsible for ensuring their accuracy.
B. ​If confirmed, will you seek to ensure that there are safeguards in place, at the CIA and
elsewhere in the IC, to ensure this doesn’t happen again?
Yes.
QUESTION 176: ​The OIG found that RDINet IT officers “were not forthcoming in their initial
interviews with OIG.” The Accountability Board determined that “[u]nder the circumstances,
where the alleged transgression is a lack of completeness not lying, more is needed to conclude
that the individuals were unreasonable in their initial responses.” As a general matter, do
individuals who are interviewed by Inspectors General and who become aware that their
statements may have been incomplete have an obligation to contact the relevant OIG and seek
to expand on their previous interview(s)?
I believe strongly in candor to Inspectors General, and believe that those interviewed by IGs
should ensure that their answers are accurate and complete to the best of their ability.

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