(U) QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
(U) SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(U) OPEN HEARING ON DECLASSIFICATION
(U) 09 SEPTEMBER 2020

(U) Questions from Acting Chairman Rubio and Vice Chairman Warner
(U) VOLUME OF DECLASSIFIED MATERIALS
1. (U) What percentage of the Intelligence Community's records eligible for Automatic
Declassification pursuant to Executive Order 13526 do you estimate is being
declassified?

(U) The am ount of intelligence info1mation eligible for declassification that is actually
declassified varies widely across the Intelligence Community (IC). IC elements that are part
of larger departments and agencies (DI As) often defer to their parent organizations to handle
declassification. Som e IC elements are too young to have infonnation eligible for
declassification. Agencies with more established programs ar e declassifying between 10%
and 70% of the m aterial. Many agencies find it difficult to keep up with the am ount of
infonnation eligible for declassification .
2. (U) What is the primary reason those eligible for automatic declassification are not
being automatically declassified?

(U) Many IC records contain classified national security info1m ation (CNSI) recognized by
subject matter experts, the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), and
E.O. 13526, Classified National Security Information, as requiring protection beyond 25 , 50,
and even 7 5 years. Due to the high likelihood of such infonnation being present, DI As must
do a thorough review of all classified records that have pennanent historical value to prevent
inadve1ient release of infon nation still requiring protection per an ISCAP-approved
declassification guide. Given the volume of data requiring review, this can take a significant
am ount oftime. Additionally, increasing numbers ofrecords include info1mation drawn
from multiple DI As, which must be reviewed by each relevant DI A.
(U) COST
3. (U) How much does the IC currently spend per year on its declassification programs?
Please provide information by agency, if the agencies capture it.
~
) As noted earlier, som e IC elem ents are younger than 25 years old, so they do not
ha~
ssification programs in place, and either do not spend anything on those programs
or have agreements with other agencies to han dle legacy info1mation . Other IC elements are
palis of larger depaiim ents, so their pai·ent organizations review their information for
declassification, and the pai·ent organizations cover costs out of their budgets.

Cl assi f ied By :
Derived From:
Dec l assi f y On :

(U) IC agencies reported th e following declassification costs:
•

) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):

•

- ~se Intelligence Agency (DIA):

•

(U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):

•
•
•

- nal Reconnaissance Office (NRO):
National Geos atial-Intelligence Agency (NGA):

•
(U) PROGRESS ON REFORM
4. (U) What progress has the IC made in standardizing declassification guidance in IC
element classification guides?

(U) DI As that have declassification guides wrote them based on E.O. 13526 and N ational
Archives & Records Administration (NARA)IInfo1mation Security Oversight Office (ISOO)
guidance. The guides were then approved by ISCAP, which worked to make the guides
more consistent with each other. Once approved, DI As incmporate the guidance into
declassification instrnctions in th eir security classification guides. Those DI As with
suborganizations share the guidance downward. While more work can be done on
integration, the steps taken so far are impo1i ant in establishing a more consistent foundation
from which to work.
5. (U) What progress has the IC made in automating declassification?
~
) "Automating declassification" is a phrase with many inte1pretations. In its most
basic sense, the IC uses secure email and networking capabilities to communicate within and
between IC elements to complete appropriate consultations on classified materials. Another
capability is digitizing a pa~ lectronic review and marking by human analysts,
created tools to aid with searches in documents
as FBI cmTently does. The and streamline and standardize review and release practices. Those tools have increased
review consistency, speed, accuracy, and accelerated mission suppo1i by reducing or
eliminating multiple manual processes. anticipates that fmiher development of these
capabilities will enable greater public access to its records and expedite response to
mandato1y declassification requests.

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(U) In a wider sense, the phrase can also refer to the use of artificial intelligence to complete
initial reviews of info1mation to detennine whether it can be declassified. Various effo11s are
explo1ing these possibilities. One example is DIA's research into the University of
Maiyland's ARLIS initiatives, which offer technical promise for achieving meaningful
progress. However, no automated declassification actions have been initiated under this
project. Additionally, there remain concerns about standai·ds for such technology, which
would need to come from NARA/ISOO-the entity that oversees classification throughout
the executive branch-and about funding for such projects.
(U) O VERCLASSIFICATI0N AND C 0 MPARTMENTATION RE: SPACE A SSETS
6. (U) How is the ODNI addressing the problems of overclassification and
compartmentation that are impeding collaboration between the Department of Defense
and the Intelligence Community regarding space activities, as suggested in the op-ed on
July 13, 2020, in Defense News by Robert Work and Dennis Blair?

(U) More generally, under E.O. 13526, the ultimate source of classification and
compaiimentation detenninations ai·e original classification authorities (OCAs), typically
some of the most senior officials in each organization. These individuals ai·e trained each
yeai· on their responsibilities as OCAs. Lists of designated officials and the status of their
training are subinitted to NARAIISOO every year as paii of each agency's required repo11ing
on its classification management program. Accordingly, if overly restrictive decisions ai·e
being made by these officials, it is up to them and NARAIISOO, as the overseer of
classification management across the executive branch, to explore solutions for making better
decisions.

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(U) DECLASSIFICATION AT 25 YEARS
7. (U) What percentage of the IC records are exempted from declassification at the 25
year interval?

(U) The percentage of IC records exempted from declassification at 25 years varies greatly
depending on the paiiicular IC element's mission. Some IC elements have approval to
exempt neai·ly all of their records from declassification at 25 years. Other IC elements work
to declassify all their records at the 25-yeai· mark. The range of percentages is 5% to 100%.
(U) TECHNOLOGIES TO HELP DECLASSIFICATION
8. (U) What technologies has the IC experimented with to automate and improve
declassification?
~
) Those agencies that can afford to explore automation technolo ies are
ex enmentin with vai·ious ca abilities. One solution is an

automated search aids that facilitate and expedite the public's access to pe1manent records
accessioned to NARA. A third capability is softwai·e that can perfo1m keyword searches
related to specific te1ms or topics in individual records dming mandato1y declassification
reviews. This can substantially reduce the time spent reading and reviewing records for
redactions, improve quality control reviews, and expedite responses to mandator
declassification re uests. Lastl some research has been done on

9. (U) What are the IC plans for deploying such technologies?

(U) The FBI hopes to incorporate machine leaining technologies in its declassification
process within the next 2 to 4 yeai·s. IC agencies ai·e exploring vai·ious technologies related
to records and search capabilities as noted above, but do not have timelines for deploying the
technologies at this time. Smaller IC elements within larger D/As do not have the resom ces
to do the same but would likely take advantage of technologies deployed by their pai·ent
organizations.
10. (U) What agencies are piloting such technologies or have already deployed them? What
are some of their lessons learned?

u
tly

p
g
p
reviews in compliance with NARA requirements and keyword seai·ches related to its equities
in mandato1y declassification reviews. These effo1is are new enough that there are not yet
any lessons leain ed.
I

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(U) DISCRETIONARY D ECLASSIFICATION REVIEWS
11. (U) What criteria do you use to decide what materials to initiate such declassification

reviews for?

(U) Common criteria for discretionaiy declassification reviews include high public interest
(often measured through th e number of Freedom of Infon nation Act requests received on a
topic), records disposition schedules, historical significan ce, the potential yield ofreleasable
documents, and input from agency historians, sometimes in relation to significant events in
an agency's histo1y.
12. (U) Are all discretionary declassification reviews approved by the IC Transparency

Council?

(U) The IC Transparency Council does not approve discretionary declassification reviews.
Discretionai·y declassification reviews ai·e typically approved by agencies in furtherance of
authorized agency activities.
13. (U) How do you ensure that declassification reviews are not initiated for political
reasons, similar to the prohibitions in Executive Order 13526 for using classification to
conceal violations of law, hide embarrassing material, etc.?

(U) Automatic declassification reviews are initiated solely on the basis of the age of the
record. Mandatory declassification reviews ai·e initiated based on requests received from the
public, as outlined in law and regulation; historical value or interest; or requests from the
White House or Congress. In many agencies, the review of infon nation to be declassified is
peifon ned by both junior and senior officers, as well as subject matter expe11s, to ensure
proper handling and protection of sensitive and classified national security infon nation, as
appropriate. Lastly, the OCAs who make the declassification decisions ai·e trained annually
on their responsibilities, including the prohibitions and liinitations in E.O. 13526 § 1.7 .
14. (U) How do you take into consideration discretionary declassifications that might have
a political effect that occur close to an election?

(U) Agencies follow guidance laid out in E.O. 13526, 32 C.F.R. pa1ts 2001 and 2003, an d
(for DoD entities) DoD Manual 5200.01. In line with the text of these regulations, the
factors considered when making declassification decisions include historical interest, public
interest, and Government transpai·ency; politics is not pai1 of the process. Additionally, most

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reviews are complex and take considerable and variable time to complete, making it difficult
for a requester to time releases to any particular date or event.
(U) IMPACT OF DECLASSIFICATION ON SOURCES AND METHODS
15. (U) Can an IC element prevent an agency from declassifying information if it believes
the declassification will have a deleterious impact on sources and methods?
(U) The authority for declassification is set forth in Part 3 of E.O. 13526. With limited
exceptions, declassification decisions are made by the agency official who authorized the
original classification, their successor, or a supervisory official. Consistent with Section
3.1(c) of E.O. 13526, the DNI may, with respect to the Intelligence Community, declassify
information or intelligence relating to intelligence sources, methods, or activities. However,
to do so, the DNI must first consult with the heads of the originating IC element. In addition,
the Attorney General, may declassify, downgrade, or direct declassification of intelligence as
set forth in the President’s Memorandum on Agency Cooperation with Attorney General’s
Review of Intelligence Activities Relating to the 2016 Presidential Campaigns, issued May
23, 2019.
(U) Questions from Senator Wyden
(U) ARGENTINA DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT
1. (U) How much of the documentation declassified and released by the Argentina
Declassification Project would still be classified or withheld from the public but for the
presidential tasking?
(U) Absent the presidential tasking, some documentation released through the Argentina
Declassification Project (ADP) would have been declassified and released. However, much
of the information (hundreds of documents totaling thousands of pages) would have
remained classified because the information did not meet the criteria for discretionary release
and the personnel involved in reviewing the materials would have worked on other
declassification actions, as priorities dictated.
2. (U) What other important historical records more than 25 years old remain classified
due to the lack of a presidential tasking? Please identify topics related to U.S. foreign
and defense policy, covert action, domestic operations with political and legal
implications and other important historical subjects. What capabilities does the U.S.
Government have to achieve a similar level of declassification of those topics absent the
resources made available for the Argentina Declassification Project?
(U) Information related to multiple topics of historical interest remain classified, including
some records related to
major military operations between the end of the
Vietnam War and 1995 (the current 25-year automatic declassification date).
Declassification personnel in IC elements and, when applicable, their parent organizations
are working hard to review and declassify information in these areas and others, including at
the Department of State where historians continue to review historical U.S. foreign relations
topics for inclusion into the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series.
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However, there is a limited pool of people with appropriate expe1iise. Surging resources to
an action such as the ADP meant that resources were pulled from other declassification
priorities. As a result, focusing resources on one, high-priority effo1i such as the ADP
resulted in delays to reviewing and releasing infonnation on other topics of interest.
3. (U) The Argentina Declassification Project was extremely labor intensive. What were
the lessons learned from the Project in terms of the potential application of new
technology and systems to make similar projects in the future more efficient and cost
effective? To what extent would the application of new technology and systems have
resulted in the declassification of Argentina documents as a matter of course, absent the
presidential tasking?
~
) The main technical matter that would have relieved some of the labor burden
involved in the ADP is a stronger cross-agency coordination capability that enabled agencies
to collaborate on doclllllents within a single space. The use of Inteldocs was noted as helpful,
but ultimatel cumbersome as declassification is not the task it was desi ned for. Also, both

FBI also recommended the inco1poration of machine learning
entification of key tenns and content.

4. (U) What lessons learned did the DNI take from the Argentina Declassification Project
in terms of coordinating among departments and agencies inside and outside the
Intelligence Community? How was the DNl's coordination role necessary to achieve
the Project's goals across the U.S. Government? What obstacles were there to
coordination among departments and agencies and how were they overcome?
~
) Coordination of nearly 400 expe1is from 16 executive branch D/ As that
ultimately declassified and released over 7,000 records totaling almost 50,000 pages resulting
in the largest government-to-government declassification and release of records in U.S .
histo1y was indeed challenging. However, the results set a new standard for the use of
declassification as a tool for foreign affairs and international diplomacy, providing a uniquely
valuable contribution to the causes of hlllllan rights and justice. One of the challenges with
this complex and vollllllinous collection was the assurance that each DI A accurately
identified and subsequently coordinated equities with the applicable agency. The use of
Inteldocs, which ODNI oversaw, for the digital coordination of records by the majority of
paiiicipating D/As was instnunental in the project's successful completion , though as noted
earlier, it also presented its own set of difficulties and therefore delays. With the National
Security Council 's (NSC's) effective oversight, D/As were given a specific set of guidelines
to follow to identify responsive records and to review them with a view towai·ds
transparency. The ADP' s efficiency resulted from a combination of fnm White House
support (over two administrations), effective NSC leadership, sustained agency cooperation,
a compelling diplomatic and hlllllan rights rationale for the effo1i, and popular suppo1i from
nongovernmental organizations in Argentina and the United States.

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(U) DECLASSIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES
5. (U) Please describe the ODNl's experience in information technology and integration
policy through the IC IT Enterprise (IC ITE) and its application to declassification.

(U) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 121 Section D(l) directs IC elements to first
use an IC ente1p rise approach before adopting IC element-centric services. The ODNI and
the IC now have a strong histo1y of identifying Services of Common Concern (SoCC) for
ente1prise IT services that integrate well into the IC Infonnation Environment. ICD 121
Section F(4) confinns that individual IC elements retain their original classification and
declassification authorities and the related processes. IC elements are responsible for
detennining requirements and services for declassification. To date, no IC elements have
offered or re uested that a SoCC for declassification tools or services be established.

(U) DECLASSIFICATION BY ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
6. (U) Can another agency prevent declassification of information after the Original
Classification Authority has authorized its declassification?

(U) N o, but questions may arise regarding which OCA has jurisdiction over the infonnation,
or multiple OCAs may be involved.
7. (U) If yes, under what circumstances and how would that issue be resolved?

(U) As noted above, it is possible for multiple OCAs to be involved or for the relevant OCA
to be unclear. This often happens because info1mation from multiple agencies is used in a
single record. In these cases, coordination within multiple agencies is perfonned to ensure
that all agencies with equities in the infonnation are consulted.
(U) COSTS OF CLASSIFICATION
8. (U) Does the ODNI have a means to determine these costs? If so, please describe the
scope and methodology. What is the current cost?

(U) N o. As the organization with oversight of declassification activities across the IC,
NARA/ISOO receives repo1is on th ese costs each year. The ODNI does not receive these
reports and does not have a way of dete1mining these costs within the IC other than directly
asking each IC element. Accordingly, we will defer to NARA/ISOO to provide those costs.
9. (U) Does the ODNI have an estimate of the additional costs of classification and
declassification resulting from the obsolete and ineffective declassification system
described in reports of the ISOO and PIDB?

(U) We do not have a specific estimate but note that the cost is likely equivalent to the costs
of continuing to store and protect classified infonnation until it can be reviewed. One IC
agency estimated its costs in this area at a little over $300,000 each year.

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(U) DOCUMENTS WITH CLASSIFICATION FROM MULTIPLE AGENCIES
10. (U) What policies and technologies have been put in place to allow documents that
concern the equities of multiple departments and agencies to be subject to a
declassification process using electronic communications and document sharing?
(U) No specific policy governs the review of information for declassification among multiple
agencies. Regardless, interagency coordination on records and information containing the
equities of multiple D/As is typically accomplished over secure email or Intelink tools such
as Inteldocs. However, some smaller IC elements, such as those under larger D/As, have
limited access to these tools, which may result in the use of paper copies rather than
electronic copies.
(U) INTEGRITY OF CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS
11. (U) What incentives and disincentives have been put in place to ensure that the
prohibitions and limitations on classification in Section 1.7 of Executive Order 13526
are adhered to? What policies have been enacted to ensure that there is accountability
for failure to adhere to those prohibitions and limitations?
(U) Original and derivative classifiers throughout the IC take required training on their
classification responsibilities every one to two years, depending on agency policy. Most
agencies include information on sanctions for violations of E.O. 13526 in their training for
both original and derivative classifiers. Depending on how the agency has set up its training,
some personnel will find themselves locked out of their systems and unable to complete their
work if they do not complete the training on time. Training statistics, along with other
classification matters, are included in each agency’s self-inspection program. Reports on
self-inspection findings and actions to resolve those findings are submitted to NARA/ISOO
every year and form the basis for NARA/ISOO’s Annual Report to the President.

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