Questions for the Record
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Nomination Hearing - Open Session
May 5, 2020
Questions for the Record for Representative John L. Ratcliffe
[From Senator Wyden]
1. Three times during your confirmation hearing, you testified that Russia had not been
successful in "changing votes or the outcome of [the 2016 election]." While the January
2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) included a DHS assessment related to
vote tallying, the Intelligence Community has made no assessment as to whether
Russia's influence campaign did or did not succeed in achieving or contributing to the
election of Donald Trump. The ICA stated:
"We did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities
had on the outcome of the 2016 election. The US. Intelligence
Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions,
capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US.
political processes or US. public opinion."
•

Have you seen any intelligence analyses supporting your statement that
Russia did not succeed in changing the outcome of the 2016 election? If so,
please provide it to the Committee. If not, on what do you base your
judgment?
Answer: Page iii of the “Key Judgements” section of the declassified 2017
Intelligence Community Assessment ICA 2017-01D noted that “DHS assesses that
the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in
vote tallying.” I also understand that the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence’s report, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the
2016 U.S. Election Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure,
stated that, “In its review, the Committee has seen no indications that votes were
changed, vote-tallying systems were manipulated, or that any voter registration
data was altered or deleted.” The report concluded with SSCI open hearing
testimony from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) witnesses on June 21, 2017, where witnesses expressed
agreement “that they had no evidence that votes themselves were changed in any
way in the 2016 election.”

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2. Have you had any discussions with Attorney General Barr, U.S. Attorney John
Durham, or anyone other administration official concerning Mr. Durham's
examination of the U.S. Government's Russia investigation? If yes, please
describe those discussions.
Answer: No.

3. During your confirmation hearing, you testified that "no one can spy or surveil outside
the law." However, in your responses to written questions, you wrote that "FISA
constitutes the exclusive statutory means" by which electronic surveillance may be
conducted.
•

Please clarify whether your reference to "the law" was intended to limit
surveillance to the FISA statutory framework, or you believe that electronic
surveillance outside that statutory framework and based on an assertion of
non-statutory authorities can be consistent with "the law."
Answer: I believe this question relates to my response to Question 10 of the
prehearing questionnaire. That question asked, “Do you believe that the
intelligence surveillance and collection activities covered by FISA can be
conducted outside the FISA framework?” My answer stated and remains, “As set
forth in Section 112 of FISA, with limited exceptions, FISA constitutes the
exclusive statutory means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in FISA,
and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electric communications for foreign
intelligence purposes may be conducted.”

4. Do you support any legislative reforms to FISA? If so, please describe them.
Answer: As a Congressman and a member of the House Judiciary and Intelligence
Committees, I have supported past efforts to reauthorize FISA authorities that are
critical to our national security and the Intelligence Community (IC) while also
ensuring civil liberties are protected and proper protocols and accountability are
established throughout FISA and its statutes. FISA is a vital tool for the IC to collect
information on valid intelligence targets. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress, the Attorney General, and the IC to continue to promote legislation that
ensures FISA’s operational effectiveness while strengthening U.S. person privacy
protections.

5. Top election cybersecurity experts, as detailed in a 2018 National Academy of Sciences
report, are in universal agreement that transmitting marked ballots over the internet is
dangerous and should not be done. However, in your responses to written questions,
you wrote "resilience built on audits, redundancies and expertise minimizes the impact
any threat can have even if using the internet to deliver some portion of ballots."

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•

Please provide a fulsome and detailed explanation for how internet voting
can be rendered secure from sophisticated hacking and why you disagree
with the recommendations in the 2018 National Academy of Sciences
report.
Answer: I do not disagree with the recommendations of the 2018 National Academy
of Sciences report. The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA), along with the FBI, serve as the Federal leads on election infrastructure
security. My complete response to Question 49 of the pre-hearing questionnaire
states, “The goal of our system is to be resilient. In today’s age, no system is truly
invulnerable to an aggressive and capable threat. However, resilience built on audits,
redundancies and expertise minimizes the impact any threat can have even if using
the internet to deliver some portion of ballots. The IC will continue to support DHS
and FBI in their work to support the states in their leadership role on securing
elections.” This was in reference to the states who currently permit overseas and
military voters to transmit their marked ballots directly to local election officials over
the internet, mostly via email. My answer alludes to the fact that no system is ever
completely secure, and that only by building auditability, redundancies and expertise
into all systems do we minimize any threat, regardless of the manner in which that
threat occurs. CISA continues to assist in advising states and localities on how to
incorporate best practices that can keep their systems secure. If confirmed, I look
forward to ensuring DHS and the FBI continue to receive all the IC support they need
to accomplish their critical election security missions.

•

Please identify the cybersecurity experts with whom you have consulted on
this topic, and specifically those who have informed you that the risks of
internet voting can be sufficiently minimized through "audits, redundancies
and expertise."
Answer: As stated above, no system is ever completely secure, and if confirmed, I
look forward to supporting DHS and the FBI in their work to support the states in
their leadership role on securing election systems.

6. There are currently no mandatory, federal cybersecurity standards for voting systems,
including the servers and technology used by local election officials in 23 states that
receive marked ballots over the internet from Americans in the military and those living
overseas.
•

How confident are you that these servers and the technology currently used
by local election offices to receive marked ballots over the internet are
sufficiently secure to protect against hacking by foreign governments?

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Answer: As it relates to election security, the role of the IC is to identify potential
foreign-related threats and potential mitigating factors. I trust that our DHS and FBI
partners, specifically CISA, in combination with other federal partners, will continue
to develop and promulgate best practices, protocols, and tools that help inform state
and local election authorities on how to enhance the security and resilience of our
nation’s election systems. This includes the ability to test systems, audit, and review
results accordingly to maintain and strengthen states’ election security needs.

7. Federal cybersecurity experts did not conduct forensic examinations in 2016 and 2018 of
any of the servers used by local election offices to receive ballots over the internet.
•

How confident are you that foreign governments have not tampered with
internet-returned electronic ballots in prior federal elections?
Answer: I am not aware of any information indicating an adversary has tampered
with ballots in prior federal elections. At this time and without further information,
I am unable to assess a particular level of confidence in response to your question.

[From Senator Heinrich]

8. Mr. Ratcliffe, you testified in the open nomination hearing that you concur with the
unanimous assessment of the 17 agencies of the Intelligence Community that Russia
engaged in an effort to interfere in the 2016 elections and that Moscow will keep
working to sow discord. But you hedged about the IC's assessment that Russia's aim was
to bolster Donald Trump's campaign, and in other forums, you have suggested that it
was Hillary Clinton's campaign that colluded with Moscow.
On that point, you stated at the hearing that you had not seen the "underlying
intelligence to tell me why there is a difference of opinion" between the assessments
of the IC and this Committee and the House Intelligence Committee. You committed
to Vice Chairman Warner that you would come back to the Committee if you reach a
different conclusion than the IC once you review the underlying intelligence. My
request is a slight variation on the Vice Chairman's request:
•

Please provide a commitment that if confirmed, you will review the
underlying intelligence within the first six months of your tenure as DNI
and that you will brief the Committee on the conclusions you reach about
the accuracy or inaccuracy of the IC's assessment and the basis for your
conclusions.
Answer: If confirmed, I will study this issue and provide my feedback to the
Committee within six months of my tenure as Director of National Intelligence.

9. During a House Judiciary Committee markup of the USA FREEDOM Act in 2015, the
Committee considered an amendment to end the "backdoor searches" of Americans'
communications under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act without a warrant.

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In your comments on the amendment, you stated: "In full disclosure to everyone, I am a
former terrorism prosecutor that has used warrantless searches, and frankly have
benefitted from them in a number of international and domestic terrorism cases."
•

Please explain how you "used warrantless searches and have benefitted
from them," and to which cases you were referring. (If necessary, you
may provide a separate classified answer.)
Answer: My comments related to the importance of Section 702 authorities
generally, and were a reference to the same matters previously disclosed to
the Committee in the Annex to Question 9c.

•

Do you believe that it is reasonable for the government to conduct
warrantless searches of Americans' communications?
Answer: The U.S. government should conduct warrantless searches only in
accordance with the Constitution and the authorities and laws passed by
Congress.

10. When you were first nominated last year for the position of Director of National
Intelligence, critics on both sides of the aisle registered concerns about your lack of
qualifications and about false claims you made about your record as a prosecutor.
Explaining your reasons for withdrawing your nomination five days after it was first
submitted, you stated: "I do not wish for a national security and intelligence debate
surrounding my confirmation, however untrue, to become a purely political and partisan
issue."
•

Do you believe critics were being "political and partisan" in
highlighting your lack of qualifications for this position and your
misrepresentations regarding your record as a prosecutor?
Answer: Yes, I do believe some critics were being “political and partisan” in
attempting to mischaracterize or inappropriately construe my records and
qualifications. My experience and background stands on its own, and it is
covered extensively in my responses to the Committee’s prehearing
questionnaire and to questions I received in the Committee’s nomination
hearing.

•

Please acknowledge that you misrepresented/exaggerated/lied about your
past experience and explain why the Members of this Committee should
have confidence that if confirmed, you will not misrepresent facts to this
Committee.
Answer: I have not misrepresented, exaggerated, or lied about my past experience
to anyone. Members of this Committee should have confidence because I have
provided this Committee with both documentation and testimony under oath
establishing that media reports alleging a lack of national security and intelligence

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experience were inaccurate and untrue. Out of all the prosecutions brought under
my name, authority, and signature as U.S. Attorney from 2007-2008, I am aware of
only a single case where details of my role were inaccurately stated in press and/or
campaign materials, and which were immediately clarified when brought to my
attention.

[From Senator King]
11. In your written statement, you mentioned having a "good rapport" with the
President.

• How did you establish your rapport with the President? Was this rapport
forged during political conversations or at fundraisers?
Answer: My reference to good rapport relates to discussing policy matters,
including national security and intelligence issues, with the President when he
first began considering me as a possible nominee for DNI. Since that time, and
until present, we have continued to develop a good relationship during personal
interactions at official events.
12. What commitments did you make to the President or his team when he originally
nominated you last summer? What commitments did you make prior to being renominated in March?
Answer: In both instances, I committed to the President that, if nominated, I would lead
with integrity, and at all times, act in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the
United States.
13. Did you and the President ever discuss the Durham Investigation?
Answer: I cannot comment on the particulars of my conversations with the President,
other than to say that our discussions have been on policy matters. Please also see my
response to Question 2 of the Open Hearing Questions for the Record.
14. Will you state, unambiguously and for the public record, that you concur with the
Intelligence Community' assessment that Russia engaged in an unprecedented effort
to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with the specific aim of bolstering
then-candidate Donald Trump's campaign?
Answer: I concur with the IC assessment that Russia engaged in unprecedented efforts to
interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election to sow discord and undermine faith in our
democracy. As I stated in the open hearing, the House and Senate intelligence committees
reached different conclusions on whether a specific aim by Russia was to bolster thencandidate Donald Trump’s campaign. I respect both committees, was not involved with
the findings of either committee, and have not seen the underlying intelligence to render
an informed opinion on that specific issue. As indicated above, if confirmed, I will study
this issue and will provide my feedback to the Committee as expeditiously as possible.

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15. On April 3, 2020, the President fired IC Inspector General Michael Atkinson.

• Did you concur with the decision to fire the ICIG?
Answer: As I stated in the open hearing, I do not have enough information to offer an
opinion.
16. During a December 11, 2019, hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, you
claimed without any evidence that the Ukraine whistleblower "got caught" and
"made false statements." The next day you tweeted that "the whistleblower didn't
tell the truth both verbally and in writing."

• Do you believe it is appropriate for elected officials to defame
whistleblowers who have complied with the law?
Answer: No, I do not believe it is appropriate for anyone to defame, as
used in the law, whistleblowers who have fully complied with the law.
17. As a member of HPSCI, do you make it a point to participate in every
classified meeting?
Answer: I make it a point to participate in as many HPSCI activities, both classified
and unclassified, as I possibly can. As one of only a few of the 435 House members,
and until recently the only HPSCI member, to serve concurrently on four committees,
I do my best to balance the obligations for all my committee assignments.

[From Senator Sasse]
18. Please provide an assessment of what DNI's AI strategy (Augmenting
Intelligence Using Machines or AIM) has accomplished thus far, including
highlighting accomplishments by agency.

• What do you plan to do to enable more efficient progress on
implementing AI technologies at the agencies?
Answer: I have received initial briefs on the IC’s AIM Initiative. As I
understand it, the ODNI has been leading this initiative, and is in the early
stages of seeing it implemented across the IC. Its goal is to align IC
efforts and oversee IC investments in adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI).
The AIM Initiative has made substantial progress organizing formerly
disparate AI activities, reducing overlap and duplication, and setting in
place a coordinated, long-term portfolio management approach and
investment strategy. I further understand the IC is already implementing
elements of the AIM initiative across the Community. If confirmed, I
look forward to supporting efforts to help speed the development and
application of AI technologies in critical IC mission areas like identity

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intelligence, strategic indications and warning, countering foreign malign
influence, confirming authenticity of information and enhancing security.

• What do you plan to do to enable more efficient hiring and training of AI
professionals - to include software engineers, data engineers and scientists,
mathematicians, and machine learning experts?
Answer: Like the rest of the Federal Government, the IC competes for the same
workforce that is in high demand across the economy. The IC simply cannot
compete with private sector compensation packages, and the IC’s need for cleared
professionals further complicates the matter. In my briefs, I learned that the AIM
Initiative does have a workforce component, and its objective is to build and
sustain an AI-ready workforce to shape and integrate AI solutions into IC
operations, analysis, and support across the board. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure the IC is working to build a deep bench of AI and machine learning
expertise through targeted and innovative recruiting; training of existing staff;
improved and accelerated clearance and onboarding practices as part of security
clearance reform and utilizing partnerships with universities, industry, other
agencies, and liaison services to augment the current workforce. I will also focus
on examining what structural changes are necessary to successfully recruit and
retain the best and the brightest talent.
[From Senator Feinstein]
19. During your confirmation hearing, when asked about your views on contractors, you
responded that "I agree [that] contractor use . . . should be limited and [that] government
employees should be doing government functions. I know there's always a look in terms of
ratios and the percentages. I'm not a one-size-fits-all person. If confirmed as DNI, I'll look at
where things stand right now."


Please provide a more detailed answer, including the steps you plan to take to review
the IC's use of contractors, and how you will ensure that contractor use does not
encroach on inherently government functions.
Answer: Contractors play a critically important role in the success of the IC’s mission.
In many cases, contractors offer specialized skills and abilities that the civilian
workforce, in some cases, may not possess with the required level of proficiency. In
other cases, contractors can be leveraged for specialized skills to execute short-term
requirements. But contractors cannot and should not be utilized for inherently
governmental functions. I understand that both law and policy provide clear guidance
to the IC on the appropriate use of contract personnel.
If confirmed, I will work with IC leadership to ensure compliance with both law and
policy on the utilization of contractors across the Community. I will also ensure that
IC elements are fully utilizing the authorities provided under the Multi-Sector
Workforce Initiative to ensure the appropriate mix of contractor, civilian and military
personnel to meet mission priorities.

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