Statement
By
Daniel E. Payne
Director, Defense Security Service
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
7 March 18
Mr. Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to speak with you today on our efforts to transfer the DoD background investigations
mission from the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) to the Defense Security
Service (DSS). We know that we must conduct this transfer in a manner that has the least impact
on NBIB’s ability to reduce their current investigative inventory, the bulk of which belongs to
the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD has a vested interest and is the primary beneficiary
of NBIB’s ability to reduce their current investigative inventory.
DSS plans to conduct the transition in a phased manner over a three year period. DSS
will assume responsibility for the least labor intensive investigations first, while we build our
investigative capacity and infrastructure. During the second phase, DSS would seek to transition
resources from NBIB to DSS. By the end of the third year, DSS will be able to assume the most
labor intensive investigations. Our goal is to gradually reduce the number of investigations we
send to NBIB, allowing them to apply the excess capacity that is created toward the reduction of
the existing inventory. This phased approach, combined with other efforts currently underway
by NBIB to increase their investigative capacity, should have a positive impact on the reduction
of inventory.
I think, however, it is important for us to discuss something that is fundamental to the
challenges we all face with the security clearance process. The way we currently do business has

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to change; we simply cannot continue to maintain the status quo. The current security clearance
process was developed decades ago and, while there have been a number of significant changes
over the years, the foundation remains intact. We have to modernize and transform the process..
We now have insider threat programs, continuous evaluation, continuous vetting, electronic
adjudication, risk rating tools and a number of other things we never had used before. We need
to better utilize these tools to help identify the high risk populations.
We must use our investigative resources in a targeted manner rather than a one size fits
all manner. But we have to go even further than that. We must look for a 21st century way to
get the information we need to meet our adjudicative standards and we need to determine, as a
government, how much risk we are willing to accept. Director of National Intelligence Coates
recently stated in testimony before this Committee that the security clearance process was
“broken.” He also quoted Vice-Chairman Warner as having said that the security clearance
process did not need evolution, it needed revolution. I think we all agree.
To that end I wish to highlight and applaud an effort that has been initiated by Director
William Evanina of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center which will commence
over the next few weeks. Director Evanina’s office has collaborated with both internal and
external experts of the personnel security field to take a “blank slate approach” to the security
clearance process. The goal is to start from scratch, with no ideas off the table, to develop a
completely new security clearance process. I think this type of review is long overdue and I
commend him for initiating it.
Thank you again for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing and look forward to
answering any of your questions.

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