UNCLASSIFIED RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HEARING FEBRUARY 13, 2018

Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Rubio
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 2, 2018

Question: The National Security Strategy of the United States emphasizes, “The United States
also remains committed to supporting and advancing religious freedom.”
What kind of violations and threats to religious freedom do you assess are threats to our
national security? Which countries are the greatest offenders?
Answer:
Most foreign government violations of religious freedom—from the persecution of small
communities of Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses in many countries to North Korean
prohibitions against all faiths—can be categorized as human rights concerns that might create
conditions for future harm to U.S. national security interests. More direct threats to U.S.
interests primarily arise when religious repression fuels either the growth of anti-Western violent
extremism or instability in a country, such as majority-Buddhist Burma’s crackdown on its
population of 2 million Muslim Rohingyas, which the United Nations and others have described
as ethnic cleansing. Violations by governments against Muslims, for example, can bolster Islamunder-attack narratives that jihadist groups use to attract recruits and advance their agendas
against the West and its partners. Government violations of religious freedom also can fuel
societal intolerance against the targeted faiths, which in turn can lead to societal tensions,
protests, political turmoil, or other forms of instability in a wide variety of places around the
globe, including China and Western Europe.


Among the governments that violate religious freedoms—Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are designated by
the Department of State as Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) for engaging in or
tolerating “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” violations. In 2017, the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended designating Russia and Syria as
CPCs and placed Egypt, Indonesia, and Malaysia on the second-highest tier of concern.



Of the non-CPC countries, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, and Syria ranked highest on
the Pew Research Center’s most recent index of government violators compiled in December
2015. Sunni terrorist groups are internationally notorious for being among the more
egregious violators of religious freedom globally.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Rubio
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 2, 2018

Question: The National Security Strategy of the United States emphasizes, “The United States
also remains committed to supporting and advancing religious freedom.”
What trends do you see regarding religious freedom violations, especially from
governments justifying violations in the name of security or countering extremism?
Answer:
The depth and breadth of religious freedom violations around the world varies from country to
country but is historically elevated, according to diplomatic, UN, and other open-source
reporting. The level of violations in the early and mid-1990s that spurred passage of the 1998
International Religious Freedom Act has since worsened, according to the USCIRF and other
open-source reporting. Government restrictions on religious practice increased in all major
regions of the world between 2007 and 2015, according to the Pew Research Center, while social
hostilities and violations by nonstate actors also steadily increased in most regions. Department
of State and USCIRF reporting highlights the growth in recent years of government violations of
religious freedom tied to laws intended to counter terrorism or extremism.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Wyden
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: Recent news reports indicate that the same Russian hackers who infiltrated the
Democratic National Committee in 2016 and the German Bundestag in 2014 repeatedly targeted
senior US government officials, defense contractors, and scientists through their personal email
accounts. (AP, “‘Fancy Bear’ hackers took aim at US defense contractors,” February 7, 2018.)
Do you believe there is a legitimate government interest in protecting the personal accounts
and devices of government officials?
Answer:
The personal accounts and devices of government officials can contain information that is useful
for our adversaries to target, either directly or indirectly, these officials and the organizations
with which they are affiliated.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Wyden
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: Recent news reports indicate that the same Russian hackers who infiltrated the
Democratic National Committee in 2016 and the German Bundestag in 2014 repeatedly targeted
senior U.S. government officials, defense contractors, and scientists through their personal email
accounts. (AP, “‘Fancy Bear’ hackers took aim at U.S. defense contractors,” February 7, 2018.)
What resources do you need in order to ensure that these personal accounts and devices
are not a vulnerable target for foreign intelligence services?
Answer:
We have the resources we need to continue our respective education and awareness programs,
which are the most important weapons in the cyber-battlefield when it comes to personal devices
and accounts. We also need to continue to harden our government systems, both classified and
unclassified, to prevent the potential compromise of a Government-issued personal device or
account from becoming a major cyber-intrusion or cyber-success against our government
networks or programs; I have made this a priority for the IC. If these programs require
additional resources, I will inform this committee.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Cotton
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: March 29, 2018

Question: In 2017, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency referred to WikiLeaks as a
“non-state hostile intelligence service” that often aids U.S. adversaries like Russia and China. At
my request, Chairman Burr and Vice-Chairman Warner included language to that effect in the
FY17 Intelligence Authorization Act.
Do you agree with Director Pompeo and this Committee that WikiLeaks is a non-state
hostile intelligence service that often aids U.S. adversaries like Russia?
Answer:
Yes, WikiLeaks should be viewed as a non-state hostile foreign intelligence entity whose
actions, both individually and in collaboration with others, have caused harm to U.S. national
security and interests.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Heinrich
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: How long can personnel from the Executive Office of the President (EOP) hold
an interim clearance before the clearance process is terminated and access suspended?
Answer:
Under Executive Order 12968 (EO 12968), where official functions must be performed prior to
the completion of the investigation and adjudication process, temporary eligibility for access to
classified information may be granted. EO 12968 imposes no time limit on temporary access.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Heinrich
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: What accountability is there to the DNI, as the government’s security executive
agent, for the granting of interim security clearances generally, and the interim SCI
clearances, specifically?
Answer:
While the DNI has policy and oversight responsibilities for Government personnel security
programs and access to SCI, under authorities set forth in statute and Executive Order,
Agency Heads are responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective program to
ensure that temporary access to classified information by personnel is clearly consistent with
the interest of national security. Agency Heads are responsible for following the DNI’s
policy guidance when granting such clearances.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Heinrich
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: Has the DNI reviewed all the cases of interim access to SCI, both in the EOP
and across the government?
Answer:
The DNI does not routinely review cases of interim access to SCI in the government. The
DNI does not recommend temporary accesses be granted or denied in specific cases unless an
Agency Head specifically requests guidance.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Heinrich
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: Are personnel with interim access to SCI under a Continuous Evaluation
protocol, and if so, who manages that?
Answer:
Personnel with interim access may be under Continuous Evaluation. Identification of the
population covered by Continuous Evaluation is the responsibility of the Agency Head.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Heinrich
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 23, 2018

Question: Are there executive branch and EOP personnel who have held interim access to
SCI for longer than one year, and if so, how many such personnel and in what agencies do
they work?
Answer:
In terms of EOP interim SCI access, the best source of information would be EOP, and I
would defer to them to address questions regarding EOP personnel with interim access to
SCI.

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Hearing Date:
February 13, 2018
Committee:
SSCI
Member:
Sen. Harris
Witnesses:
Director Coats
Info Current as of: April 16, 2018

Question: You have the authority to issue Intelligence Community Directives that establish
policy across the IC. Your predecessor used that authority to establish specific duties to
warn victims?
Will you commit to using that same authority to establish a specific duty to warn states
about election related cybersecurity threats? If not, why not?
Answer:
We appreciate the importance of this issue, and the IC remains committed to warning our
intelligence consumers about the wide range of serious threats facing the United States that are
prioritized and disseminated commensurate with oversight by select committees for
intelligence. We do not intend to issue a policy specifically establishing a duty to warn states
about election-related cybersecurity threats. The referenced policy, ICD 191, Duty to Warn, was
issued in 2015 directing IC elements to warn U.S. and non-U.S. persons of impending threats of
intentional killing, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. The Duty to Warn Directive was
established to account for intelligence that, when encountered, would be acted upon in a timesensitive manner directly by IC elements. We do have policies in place that were established to
ensure the IC is providing intelligence information, at an appropriate clearance level, to support
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Executive Branch agencies, as
appropriate, in their ability to provide useful information to state, local, and tribal governments
in a timely manner. The first of these policies, ICD 209, Tearline Production and
Dissemination, was issued at the request of DHS to expand the utility of intelligence to a broad
range of customers. The second Directive, ICD 208, Write for Maximum Utility, was issued to
ensure intelligence products were written and disseminated in a manner that provides the greatest
use for our customers. The IC will continue to support our customers by providing useful and
timely intelligence information as appropriate.

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