Keeping the Intelligence Committee Fully and Currently Informed
QUESTION 1: Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that the
obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of all intelligence activities applies to the Director of National
Intelligence and to the heads of all departments, agencies, and other entities of
the U.S. Government involved in intelligence activities. What is your
understanding of the standard for meaningful compliance with this obligation by
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies and other entities of the U.S. Government involved in
intelligence activities to keep the congressional intelligence committees, including
all their Members, fully and currently informed of intelligence activities? Under
what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate to brief the Chairman and
Vice Chairman and not the full committee membership?

ANSWER: Section 502 of the National Security Act requires the Director of
National Intelligence to keep the two intelligence committees "fully and currently
informed" of all U.S. intelligence activities, including any "significant anticipated
intelligence activity" and "significant intelligence failure." I understand the
standard for meaningful compliance with this obligation to mean that
congressional notifications must be timely, accurate, and complete to be
effective. Director Coats has committed that he will comply not only with the
letter of the law, but also its spirit. Like Director Coats, I believe that when the
Intelligence Community works together to inform Congress, and proper oversight
can be conducted, both the Intelligence Community and the American people will
benefit.

Asthe chief legal officer for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the
General Counsel assists the Director in carrying out his legal obligations, and, if
confirmed, I will expect all Intelligence Community elements to follow both laws
and policies that are in place within the Intelligence Community concerning
congressional notification. I will further expect the General Counsels of the
Intelligence Community elements to fulfill their congressional notification
obligation regarding significant legal interpretations affecting the intelligence
activities of their elements. If confirmed, I expect to assist the Director in
ensuring that the Intelligence Community works cooperatively with Congress and
the Intelligence committees and provides the intelligence committees with timely
notices under Section 502 subject only to limitations necessary to protect specific

operational details about sources, tradecraft, and other exceptionally sensitive
information.

Section 502 also provides that congressional notification must be made "[t]o the
extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure
of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or
other exceptionally sensitive matters." Section 503 states that a presidential
finding or notification about a covert action "may be reported to the chairmen
and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence committees, the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the
congressional leadership as may be included by the President," "[i]fthe President
determines that it is essential to limit access" to the finding or notification in
order "to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United
States."

Although I believe that these terms do not limitthe obligation to keep the
intelligencecommittees fully informed, Itake these provisionsto mean that the
Director of National Intelligence has a degree of latitude in deciding how he will
bring extremely sensitive matters to the committees' attention. As Director Coats
told this committee during his confirmation hearing, limiting access for noncovert actions would be rare and often a matter of timing, and, in his experience,

the committee leadership has worked in concert with the Executive Branch to
determine when to expand access to the information in question. Ifconfirmed, I
expect to assist the Director in pursuingthis process when it is required.
Priorities of the Director of National Intelligence

QUESTION 2: Have you discussed with the Director of National Intelligence his
specific expectations of you, ifconfirmed as General Counsel,and his

expectations of the Office of the General Counsel as a whole? Ifso, please
describe those expectations.

ANSWER: I have met with Director Coats and he expressed his expectations for

me, if I am confirmed as General Counsel, and for the Office of General Counsel as
a whole. Director Coats expressed the value he places on having a strong legal
team and stated that he expects me, and the office as a whole, to provide him

with sound legal advice and policy counsel on the full range of issues that both he
and the ODNI face. Beyond that, though, he stressed to me the absolute
importance of integrity, and that he expects integrity to be the guiding principle In
my work and the work of the Office of General Counsel.
The Office of the General Counsel
QUESTION 3: The Office of the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence has a myriad of roles and responsibilities. What are your
expectations for the Office?

ANSWER: Fundamentally, the Office of General Counsel must ensure that the
ODNI conducts its activities in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the

United States. To do that, I expect the lawyers in the office to identify legal issues
proactively and to provide timely, sound advice on the law related to those issues.
I also expect the office to provide helpfui policy counsel on ODNI's activities and
to be able to distinguish that counsel from legal advice.

More broadly, I expect lawyers in the office to be experts in their particular areas
of responsibility and to engage cooperatively with their counterparts in the
Intelligence Community and interagency and, where appropriate, to lead efforts
to resolve cross-cutting legal issues that may arise. I see this as an important part
of ODNI's community management role. Finally, just as the DNI expects absolute
integrity from me, if confirmed, I will expect the same of every attorney in the
Office of General Counsel.

a. Do you have any preliminary observations on its responsibilities,
performance, and effectiveness?
ANSWER: My observations on the Office of General Counsel to date have been

limited to several unclassified briefings by lawyers in the office and several
discussions with the office's current management and others who have worked
for, or interacted with, the office. My impression is that the office is staffed by
capable lawyers tasked with addressing a broad range of legal and policy
questions. It appears that in many cases lawyers in the office lead or coordinate

the resolution of legal issues affecting the entire Intelligence Community and not
just the ODNI.

b. If confirmed, will you seek to make changes in the numbers or
quallfications of the attorneys in the office, or the operations of the
office?

ANSWER: At this point, I cannot say whether I will seek to make such changes if
confirmed. Iwill, however, seek to gain a more in-depth understanding of the
office's operations, organization, and people to determine whether any changes
are necessary. If confirmed, I look forward to leading the office and ensuring that
it provides valuable legal services to the ODNI.
QUESTION 4: Describe your understanding of the responsibilities of the Director
of National Intelligence and the General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (GC/ODNI) in reviewing, and providing legal advice on, the
work of the Central Intelligence Agency, including covert action undertaken by the
Central Intelligence Agency.

ANSWER: The Director of National Intelligence is the head of the Intelligence
Community and is responsible for the provision of intelligence to the executive
and legislative branches of government. As the head of the Intelligence
Community, the Director has significant authority to oversee the work of all

Intelligence Community elements, includingthe Central Intelligence Agency. This
includes responsibilities over budget requests and appropriations for the National
Intelligence Program, oversight of intelligence priorities and taskings, governance
of national intelligence activities, and a specific mandate to ensure that all
Intelligence Community elements conducts activities in compliance with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, including covert action.

The Central Intelligence Agency is a critical component of the Intelligence
Community. The Director of National Intelligence's role in overseeing the
activities of the agency requires that the ODNI General Counsel work closely with
the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency to ensure that its national

intelligence activities are carried out in a legal and ethical manner. I believe that
direct and open collaboration between the two General Counsel's offices is
critical to support the Director of National Intelligence's role as the head of the
Intelligence Community and overseer of the Central Intelligence Agency.

QUESTION 5: Explain your understanding of the role of the GC/ODNI in resolving
conflicting legal Interpretations within the Intelligence Community.

ANSWER: Section 102A(f)(4) of the National SecurityAct provides that the
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure compliance with the Constitution
and laws of the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency and by other
elements of the Intelligence Community "through the host executive
departments" of those elements. It Is my understianding that the ODNI General
Counsel plays a significant role In helping the Director carry out this requirement.
Although the ODNI General Counsel lacks the authority to make the final decision
over the legal position that governs a particular element of the Intelligence
Community, It Is my understanding that the General Counsel often plays a lead
role In Identifying cross-cutting legal Issues or conflicting legal positions among
the Intelligence Community elements and working to resolve those Issues. It Is
also my understanding that the General Counsel often presents the consensus
views of the Intelligence Community legal community to the broader Federal
Government. If confirmed, I will work actively and cooperatively with my
counterparts across the Intelligence Community to Identify and resolve conflicting
legal Interpretations within the Intelligence Community and to advocate for those
positions with other federal government departments and agencies.
Guidelines under Executive Order 12333

QUESTION 6: One of the fundamental documents governing the activities of the
Intelligence Community Is Executive Order 12333. Under Executive Order 12333,
as amended In July 2008, there are requirements for Attorney General-approved
guidelines. For each of the following requirements, describe the principal matters
to be addressed by each of the required Attorney General-approved guidelines or
procedures, the main Issues you believe need to be resolved In addressing these
guidelines or procedures, and your understanding of the schedule and priorities
for completing them (or Indicate whether the existing named guidelines or
procedures are deemed sufficient).

a. Guidelines under section 1.3(a)(2) for how Information or Intelligence Is
provided to, or accessed by, and used or shared by the Intelligence
Community, except for Information excluded by law, by the President,

or by the Attorney General acting under presidential order in
accordance with section 1.5(a).
ANSWER: It is my understanding that section 1.3(a)(2) addresses the Intelligence
Community's access to, or use of, information collected by Federal Government
departments and agencies outside the Intelligence Community and that these

guidelines should implement the provision of section 1.5(a) directing the heads of
executive branch departments and agencies to "provide the Director access to all
information and intelligence relevant to the national security or that otherwise is
required for the performance of the Director's duties, to include administrative
and other appropriate management information, except such information
excluded by law, by the President, or by the Attorney General acting under this
order at the direction of the President[.]"

Section 1.5(a) of the executive order is intended to ensure that the Director, and
by extension the Intelligence Community, has access to relevant information
possessed by the Federal Government. The sharing of such information,
however, presents a number of legal and policy issues that, in many cases, are
specific to a particular type of information based on the laws and policies that
govern it. It is my understanding that the Intelligence Community has addressed
these issues on a case-by-case basis relying on a combination of guiding
documents, including, most notably, the Attorney General-approved guidelines
that govern particular elements' collection, retention, and dissemination of
information concerning U.S. persons. If confirmed, I intend to review this
approach and whether additional Attorney General-approved guidelines are
necessary.

b. Procedures under section 1.3(b)(18) for implementing and monitoring
responsiveness to the advisory tasking authority of the Director of
National Intelligence for the collection and analysis directed to
departments and other U.S. entities that are not elements of the
Intelligence Community.

ANSWER: The Director of National Intelligence, under section 1.3(b)(18), may
provide advisory tasking, in essence asking a federal government agency that is
not part of the Intelligence Community to collect information that is relevant to
the national intelligence mission. Section 1.5(d) provides that the heads of

executive branch departments and agencies shall provide such support to the
Director as he may request, to the maximum extent permitted by law and to the
extent consistent with that department's or agency's mission. This would include
responding to any advisory tasking by the Director. It is my understanding that
the ODNI has not prioritized the issuance of Attorney General-approved

guidelines for implementing and monitoring responsiveness to advisory taskings
because relevant information may be effectively obtained through existing
interagency processes, if confirmed, i will review whether these guidelines are
necessary and, if so, prioritize them accordingly.
c. Procedures under section 1.6(g) governing production and

dissemination of information or intelligence resulting from criminal drug
intelligence activities abroad if the elements of the IC involved have

intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic criminal drug
production and trafficking.

ANSWER: Section 1.6(g)directs the heads of Intelligence Community elements to
participate in the development of guidelines approved by the Attorney General to
govern the production and dissemination of inteiligence resulting from criminal
drug intelligence activities abroad, it is my understanding that these activities are
governed by Inteiligence Community elements' Attorney General-approved
guidelines for the collection, retention, and dissemination of information
concerning U.S. persons required by section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 and

discussed in more detail in my response to question 7.e, below.

d. Regulations under section 1.7(g)(1)for coliection, analysis, production,
and intelligence by intelligence elements of the FBI of foreign
inteiligence and counterinteliigence to support national and
departmental missions.

ANSWER: It is my understanding that the Federal Bureau of investigation issued

the procedures called for bysection 1.7(g)(1) with the approval of the Attorney
General, in coordination with the Director of National intelligence, on September
29, 2008.

e. Procedures under section 2.3 on the collection, retention, and

dissemination of United States person information and on the
dissemination of information derived from signals intelligence to enable

an Intelligence Community element to determine where the information
is relevant to its responsibilities.

ANSWER: Intelligence Community elements' Attorney General-approved U.S.

person procedures establish the parameters underwhich elements' may lawfully
collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons in a manner

that protects privacy and civil liberties. It is my understanding that, since the
2008 amendment to Executive Order 12333, a number of elements have engaged

in a processto update their procedures, which in some cases were decades old,
and other, newer Intelligence Community elements have similarlyengaged in a
process to issue new procedures. This process has resulted in the Intelligence
Community elements of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Department
of Energy issuing new or updated procedures within the last two years. The
National Counterterrorism Center also issued procedures in 2012. It is my

understanding that the ODNI Office of General Counsel has been substantially
involved in developing these procedures and has primarily sought to ensure that
their requirements are consistent with each other to the greatest extent possible,
accounting for elements' unique missions and authorities. Other elements
continue to work on new or updated procedures and, if confirmed, Iwill continue

to make engagement In this process a priorityfor the ODNI Office of General
Counsel.

With regard to the signals intelligence procedures called for by section 2.3, the
former Director of National Intelligence issued these procedures on January 3,

2017, with the approval of former Attorney General Lynch. Before the 2008
amendment to the executive order, section 2.3 had provided that the National

Security Agency could not disseminate raw signals intelligence to other
Intelligence Communityelements. The 2008 amendment enabled the National
Security Agency to disseminate raw signals intelligence to other Intelligence
Community elements, but only subject to procedures issued by the Director of
National Intelligence and approved by the Attorney General. These procedures
Identify the circumstances under which such disseminations may occur and

require that recipient Intelligence Community elements apply protections to the
raw signals Intelligence that are comparable to those applied by the National
Security Agency to the same Information. It Is my understanding that these
procedures were the product of several years of Interagency coordination led by
the ODNI Office of General Counsel. If confirmed, I Intend to ensure that the

office remains closely Involved In their Implementation and use.
f. Procedures under section 2.4 on the use of Intelligence collection
techniques to ensure that the Intelligence Community uses the least
Intrusive techniques feasible within the U.S. or directed at U.S. persons
abroad.

ANSWER; Section 2.4 of Executive Order 12333 limits the use of certain collection

techniques, such as physical surveillance, and establishes the governing principle
that Intelligence Community elements shall use the least Intrusive collection
techniques feasible when conducting collection activities within the United States
or when collection activities are directed at U.S. persons abroad. This provision
recognizes that certain collection techniques are Inherently more Intrusive than
others and thus require specific rules governing their use. Most elements have
addressed the requirements of this section within their Attorney Generalapproved procedures under section 2.3, which, among other things, provide
guidance on the collection of Information concerning U.S. persons. It Is my
understanding that, like the process for developing procedures required by
section 2.3, the ODNI Office of General Counsel has been closely Involved In the
development of procedures under section 2.4 since the 2008 amendment and. If
confirmed, I will ensure that the office remains closely Involved In the
development of any future procedures under this section.

g. Procedures under section 2.9 on undisclosed participation In any
organization In the United States by anyone acting on behalf of an IC
element.

ANSWER: Section 2.9 of Executive Order 12333 Is Intended to regulate
undisclosed participation In any organization In the United States by anyone
acting on behalf of an Intelligence Community element and Is one of the key
privacy and civil liberties protections found In the executive order. Like the

procedures required by section 2.4, most Intelligence Community elements have

incorporated the section 2.9 procedures into their Attorney General-approved
procedures established under section 2.3. My understanding isthat, like the
procedures discussed in subsections e. and f. of my response to this question, the
ODNI Office of General Counsel has been closely involved in developing these

procedures and, ifconfirmed, Iwill ensure that the office continues to prioritize
these issues.

Implementation of the FI5A Amendments Act of2012
QUESTION 7: Under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as

added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act), the Attorney
General and the DNI may authorize jointly, for a period of up to one year from the
effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
information. The FISA Amendments Act was signed into law in July 2008 and

reauthorized for five years in December 2012. The FISA Amendments Act also

provide for semiannual or annual assessments and reviews as described in section
702{i) of FISA.

a. Describe your understanding of the matters that the Attorney General
and DNI, with the assistance of the GC/ODNI, should evaluate in order to
determine, on the basis of your experience with the FiSA Amendments

Act (and annuallythereafter), whether there should be revisions in the
substance or implementation of (1) targeting procedures, (2)
minimization procedures, and (3) guidelines required by the FISA
Amendments Act, in order to ensure both their effectiveness and their
compliance with any applicable constitutional or statutory
requirements.

ANSWER: Under Section 702, the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence make annual certifications that authorize Intelligence Community

elements to target non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to located outside the
United States to acquire specific categories of foreign intelligence information. As
part of that annual certification, by statute, the Attorney General and the Director
of National Intelligence must make a number of attestations, including:

• That the targeting procedures "are reasonably designed to... ensure
that an acquisition authorized under... [Section 702]... Is limited to
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United
States" and "prevent the Intentional acquisition of any communication
as to which the sender and all Intended recipients are known at the time

of the acquisition to be located In the United States." See 50 U.S.C.
1881a(g)(2){A).

• That the minimization procedures "are reasonably designed In light of
the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance to minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpubllcly
available Information concerning unconsenting United States persons
consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign Intelligence Information" and also "require that
nonpubllcly available information, which Is not foreign Intelligence
Information ... shall not be disseminated In a manner that Identifies any
United States person, without that person's consent, unless such
person's Identity Is necessary to understand foreign Intelligence
Information or assess Its Importance." See 50 U.S.C. 1881a(g)(2)(A)(ll)
(citing to 50 U.S.C. 1801(h)).

• That both sets of procedures are consistent with the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment. See 50 U.S.C. 1881a(g)(2)(A).
In making these attestations. It Is my understanding that the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence rely on the Information they have
learned over the course of the year In their roles as overseers of the program.
The Department of Justice and the ODNI, Including attorneys within the ODNI

Office of General Counsel, are engaged In comprehensive and rigorous oversight
of the elements' Implementation of the Section 702 program, which Involves
regular oversight reviews of targeting decisions, querying activities, and
minimization practices of each element that participates In the program. The

Department of Justice and the ODNI also play a central role In Identifying,
reporting, and ensuring remediation of any Instances of non-compliance. I
understand that this extensive oversight Informs both the Attorney General's and
the Director of National Intelligence's attestations In the Section 702 certifications
and their recommendations on whether the relevant certifications. Including

underlying targeting and minimization procedures, should be revised to ensure
the effective implementation of this authority in a manner that comports with all
constitutional and statutory requirements.
b. Describe how the semiannual or annual assessments and reviews

required by the FISA Amendments Act should be integrated, both in
substance and timing, into the process by which the Attorney General
and DNI consider whether there should be revisions for the next annual
authorization or authorizations under the FISA Amendments Act,

including in applicable targeting and minimization procedures and
guidelines.

ANSWER: Section 702(1) requires the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to assess compliance with the targeting and minimization
procedures and identify any compliance trends. The Attorney General and the
Director of National Intelligence must submit these assessments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and the relevant congressional committees at least
once every six months. I understand that the statutory requirement to identify
and assess the Intelligence Community's implementation of the targeting and
minimization procedures, identify compliance trends, and make
recommendations on the program, also informs the Attorney General's and the
Director of National Intelligence's attestations in the Section 702 certifications to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and their conclusion regarding
whether revisions are necessary to ensure the effective implementation of this
authority to ensure compliance with the Constitution and the statute. If
confirmed, I look forward to learning more about how the ODNI and Department
of Justice conduct their oversight of this program and assess these compliance
trends.

c. In addition to the matters described in the FISA Amendments Act for

semiannual or annual assessment or review, are there additional

matters that should be evaluated periodically by the Attorney General
or the DNI to improve and ensure the lawful and effective
administration of the FISA Amendments Act?

ANSWER: Although I have not yet had the opportunity to work on issues arising
under Section 702, if confirmed I look forward to engaging with both ODNI and

Department of Justice staff to assess whether there are additional topics or issues
that we should consider in conducting oversight. If confirmed, I will be
committed to working to ensure that the Intelligence Committee fully and
faithfully complies with the Constitution and U.S. law, including through its
implementation of the Section 702 program.
QUESTION 8: In 2015, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum entitled
"Restriction Regarding the Use of FISA Section 702 Information in Criminal
Proceedings Against United States Persons." The current Administration has
confirmed that the memorandum remains in effect.

a. Do you believe there should be any restrictions on the use of
information from Section 702 other than as evidence in criminal

proceedings, i.e. as part of criminal investigations or as part of
administrative or civil investigations or proceedings?
ANSWER: I was not involved in the drafting of the 2015 policy and, therefore, I am
not personally aware of what factors the government may have considered when
deciding its scope and applicability. As such, Iam not currently in a position to
meaningfully assess whether the scope of the 2015 policy should be changed. If
confirmed, Ifully expect to be briefed further on Section 702, including on the
development and implementation of this policy.

b. The limitations in the 2015 policy include an exception for "transnational
crime." Do you support this exception and, if so, what do you believe
should be considered a "transnational crime"?

ANSWER: Although I was not involved in the drafting of the 2015 policy
referenced above, I understand that, to date, the only criminal cases in which
information obtained or derived from Section 702 has been used against an
aggrieved person have been prosecutions for terrorism-related offenses. I

understand that no such determination has yet been made regarding
"transnational crime." In the event the government seeks to use such
information in a prosecution for a transnational criminal offense, a determination
will be made at that time regarding the types of specific offenses that fall within
the listed category. Ifconfirmed, Iwould expect to be part of these discussions.

QUESTION 9: In his responses to Questions for the Record, John Demers, the
nominee to be Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division at the
U.S. Department of Justice, wrote that whether a U.S. person has been reverse
targeted under Section 702 was a "fact specific inquirythat would involve
consideration of a variety of factors." As an example, Mr. Demers stated that "if a
Section 702 tasking resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence
Community regarding a U.S. person, but little reporting about the Section 702
target, that might be an indication that reverse targeting may have occurred."
a. Doyou agree that substantial reporting regarding a U.S. person and little
reporting about the foreign target could be an indication that reverse
targeting may have occurred?
ANSWER: Section 702 prohibits reverse targeting. It is my understanding that the
determination of whether a particular, known U.S. person has been reverse

targeted is fact-specific and necessitates evaluation of a variety of factors. In its
2014 report regarding the government's use and implementation of Section 702,
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted that if a Section 702 tasking
resulted in substantial reporting by the Intelligence Community regarding a U.S.

person, but little reporting about the Section 702 target, that might be an
indication that reverse targeting may have occurred. I agree that one possible
indication of reverse targeting of a U.S. person could be the existence of
substantial reporting about that U.S. person, but little to no reporting about the
foreign target.
b. Are there other factors, such as the number or frequency of queries

involving U.S. persons, that could be an indication of reverse targeting?
ANSWER: As indicated above, it is my understanding that a reverse targeting

determination is a fact-specific inquiry that would involve consideration of a
variety of factors. As the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board noted in its
2014 report, cited above, it found no instances of intentional misuse of Section
702 authority. That notwithstanding, if confirmed, if I become aware of instances
of reverse targeting through ODNI's Section 702 oversight function, Iwill work
with the Department of Justice to determine the cause and implement solutions
to ensure the problem does not recur.

Encryption

QUESTION 10: Under Section 702 of FISA, the government can direct an
electronic communications service provider to provide "assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition." Under Section 702(h)(S), Ifa provider does not
comply with a directive, the government may seek an order from the FISA Court
to compel compliance. The government has stated that It has."not to date sought
an order pursuant to Section 702(h)(5) seeking to compel an electronic
communication service provider to alter the encryption afforded by a service or
product It offers."
a. Do you believe that the government should Inform the FISA Court when
it Issues a directive to a provider to alter the encryption afforded by a
service or product, regardless of whether the government files a motion
to compel compliance?
ANSWER: Section 702(h) permits the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to "direct... an electronic communication service provider
to... immediately provide the Government with all Information, facilities, or
assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition In a manner that will protect
the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the
services that such electronic communication service provider Is providing to the
target of the acquisition." 50 U.S.C. 1881a(h)(l). Under Section 702(h)(5), the
Attorney General may file a petition for an order to compel the provider If the
provider falls to comply with a directive. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(h)(5)(A). I am not
familiar with whether Section 702(h) could be used to compel an electronic
service provider in the situation you describe, but I Imagine It would depend In
large part upon the facts of the case, and would defer to the Department of
Justice. It is my understanding that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
would receive a Title VII directive only if a service provider challenged the
lawfulness of the directive or If the Attorney General moved to compel a provider.

b. Will you commit to notifying Congress of any such directive?
ANSWER: If confirmed, I commit to working with Director Coats, the Department
of Justice, and all Intelligence Community elements, to ensure that the ODNI
complies with the obligations both In the National Security Act and the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act to keep the intelligence committees informed of
intelligence activities.
Other Surveillance Matters

QUESTION 11: Section 4 of PPD-28 calls on each Intelligence Community element
to update existing or issue policies and procedures to implement principles for
safeguarding all personal information collected through SIGINT. Those policies
and procedures are currently posted publicly. Will you ensure that the
Intelligence Community continues to post these policies and procedures as well as
any modifications, superseding policies and procedures, or significant
interpretations?
ANSWER: If confirmed, I will ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to

publicly post its PPD-28 implementation procedures, along with any superseding
procedures, consistent with the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and
methods. I will likewise endeavor to ensure that any significant interpretations of
these procedures are made public, consistent with the need to protect sensitive
intelligence sources and methods.
QUESTION 12: Are there any circumstances in which an element of the
Intelligence Community may not conduct a warrantless search for a U.S. person of
communications that have been collected pursuant to Section 12333? If so,
please describe.
ANSWER: Executive Order 12333 sets forth the goals, directions, duties, and
responsibilities for United States intelligence efforts, including describing the
structure and authorities of the Intelligence Community, and sets certain rules for
the conduct of intelligence activities. Section 2 of the order addresses the
collection of information concerning U.S. persons, including a delineation of
particular collection techniques, and also requires that Intelligence Community
elements collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States
persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the
Intelligence Community element concerned (or by the head of a department
containing such element) and approved by the Attorney General after
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence. Because I have not yet
had the opportunity to see how these Attorney General-approved procedures

would apply In practice, particularly with regard to the collection of
communications, I am not in a position to comment on Intelligence Community
elements' particular practices regarding queries of already-collected data for
information concerning U.S. persons.
Detention and Intermgation
QUESTION 13: Have you read the declassified, redacted Executive Summary of
the Study?
ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION 14: If confirmed, will you commit to reading portions of the full,
classified Study relevant to the legal analysis of the program and the OONI?
ANSWER: My understanding is that, at the present time, the ODNI does not
possess a copy of the full, classified Study or any portion of it. If confirmed, I do
commit to reading any portions of the full, classified Study made available to me.
Transparency

QUESTION IS: Executive Order 13526 (December 29, 2009) provides that: "In no
case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail
to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or
administrative error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or

agency; (3) restrain competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of
information that does not require protection in the interest of national security."
Executive Order 13292 (March 25, 2003) and Executive Order 12958 (April 17,
1995) prohibited classification based on the same factors. Do you agree with the
prohibitions in these Executive Orders?

ANSWER: Yes, I agree with the prohibitions and limitations set forth in section 1.7
of Executive Order 13526.

QUESTION 16: Should the reports of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board be made
public?

ANSWER: I believe that the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board's reports
should be made public consistent with the Board's enabling statute that provides

that its reports should be "made available to the publicto the greatest extent that
is consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law."
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is an independent agency within
the executive branch and it performs important advice and oversight functions. I
understand that the Board worked very closely with the Intelligence Community
to ensure that its report on Section 702 could be released in a wholly unclassified

manner. The report performed a public service by providing an extensively
detailed and readily understandable description of the Section 702 program, if
confirmed, I intend to support this close working relationship.

QUESTION 17: If, for any reason, you make a public statement that is inaccurate,

do you commit to making a public statement correcting the record?
ANSWER: If confirmed, I intend to ensure that any public statements that I make
are entirely accurate. However, if for some reason I inadvertently make a public
statement that is inaccurate, I will - consistent with the requirement to protect
classified information and sensitive intelligence sources and methods - publicly
correct that statement. If I am not able to make a public correction because of a

requirement to protect such information, I will informthe Committee of the
inaccuracy in a classified setting.
Cfi/e/s of Mission
QUESTION 18: If a U.S. Ambassador directs the Intelligence Community to cease a

particular program or operation in the country where the ambassador is serving,
is the Intelligence Community obligated to do so, absent or pending intervention
from the president?
ANSWER: 22 U.S.C. 3927 states that: "Under the direction of the President, the

chief of mission to a foreign country... shall have full responsibility for the
direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch

employees In that country —" In practice, I believe that It Is Important for the
Intelligence Community to work collaboratlvely with the State Department to
proactlvely anticipate and resolve disagreements and. If confirmed, I will work
with the Legal Adviser to the State Department to do that.
Media Policies

QUESTION 19: On July 12,2013, the Department of Justice released a Report on
Review of News Media Policies. Which aspects of that Review do you agree with,
and which would you advise be modified?
ANSWER: I have reviewed the report and the regulation promulgated thereto at
28 CFR 50.10. My understanding Is that It primarily Involves Internal Department
of Justice policies and practices governing how law enforcement conducts
criminal and civil Investigations Involving members of the news media. Sections
(c)(4)(vl) and (c)(5)(v) of the regulation require certain certifications from the
Director of National Intelligence In Investigations or prosecutions of unauthorized
disclosures. I am not aware of whether the Director has ever Issued such

certifications or, more generally, how the policy has been applied In practice and,
therefore. It would be premature for me to assess whether those sections should
be modified. If confirmed, I will review the report and policy In light of any
Information not available to me now.

Evaluation of the Office of the Director of Notional Intelligence
QUESTION 20: Members of the Committee have expressed concern that the ODNI
does not have all of the legal authorities necessary to fulfill congressional
expectations for the office. Do you have any preliminary observations on
strengths or weaknesses of the authorities of the Office with respect to a
successful mission of the ODNI? If so, please describe.
ANSWER: In my Interactions with ODNI staff, I have observed that the ODNI has a

wide-ranging set of responsibilities that frequently Involve the equities of other
federal government departments and agencies. I have not yet formed an opinion,
however, on the relative strengths or weaknesses of ODNI's current authorities as

they apply to Its mission. Ifconfirmed, I Intend to consider this question closely
throughout my tenure as ODNI General Counsel and I will work with the

Committee to address any areas where the ODNi would require additional
authorities.

Pending Legislation
QUESTION 21: The Senate and House of Representatives have considered

legislation over the course of several Congresses on subjects such as providing
conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain
persons connected with the news media, the state secrets privilege, and
whistleblower protections. In your view, what evidence and issues should be
considered by the Administration and by Congress in the consideration of
whether legislation on these subjects should be enacted? Please discuss each
subject separately.

ANSWER: The subjects described in the question: the compelled disclosure of
information by certain persons connected with the news media; the state secrets
privilege; and whistleblower protections are overlapping to an extent in that they
involve the sometimes competing, but important, interests of public transparency
and the protection of information for national security purposes. In my view, the
Administration and Congress should therefore consider evidence and issues tied
to these two interests in considering legislation addressing these subjects.
With regard to the news media, legislation requiring or limiting compelled
disclosure in certain cases could raise constitutional issues both from the

standpoint of the president's obligation to protect national security and the
constitutionally protected freedom of the press. Legislation regarding the state
secrets privilege would similarly require an assessment of the president's
constitutional obligations and authorities and appropriate resolution of civil
litigation matters. Consideration of these issues would also benefit from careful
review of the implementation of laws and policies already in place. For example,
it is my understanding that, with regard to whistleblower protections, the
provisions of Intelligence Community Directive 120, Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection, have already been incorporated into law.

Executive Branch Oversight ofinteiiigence Activities

QUESTION 22: Are there improvements, In terms of resources, methodology, and
objectives that you believe should be considered concerning Executive Branch
oversight of the Intelligence activities of the United States Government?
ANSWER: All three branches of government conduct oversight over Intelligence
activities. In the Executive Branch, this oversight Is conducted from entitles inside
Intelligence Community elements, such as offices of general counsel, agency civil
liberties and privacy officials, and Inspectors general. In addition. Independent
entitles like the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and Intelligence
Oversight Board play a critical role In overseeing the Intelligence Community's
activities. The Department of Justice also conducts oversight of activities under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

I cannot say at this point whether Improvements in the structure or function of
Executive Branch oversight activities are needed. However, If confirmed I will

carefully consider whether they are and work to make any such Improvements
accordingly. Iview oversight to be a significant responsibility of the ODNI General
Counsel given his or her role as the chief legal officer of the ODNI and the Director
of National Intelligence's statutory obligation under section 102A(f)(4) of the
National Security Act to "ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the
United States."

Reiationship with Other Offdais in the inteiiigence Community
QUESTION 23: What should be the relationship of the General Counsel of the

Office of the Director of National Intelligence with respect to the following
officers of the Intelligence Community:
a. General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
ANSWER: As I stated In my response to question 4, above, the Director of

National Intelligence exercises oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency and, as
the chief legal officer of the ODNI, the ODNI General Counsel plays a significant
role In helping the Directorcarry out this function. It Is my understanding that,
with regard to the relationship between the ODNI General Counsel and the

General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, this has meant that, in
practice, both general counsels work together closely on significant matters of
legal interpretation or legal issues that otherwise have implications for the

broader Intelligence Community. Ifconfirmed, I will seek to maintain what I
understand has been an open and collaborative working relationship between
past general counsels for the two agencies.

b. Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Department of Justice
ANSWER: Although the National Security Division of the Department of Justice is
not part of the Intelligence Community, it is my understanding that the ODNI
General Counsel and the Assistant Attorney General for National Security have
had a close working relationship, mirrored by close working relationships among
members of their respective offices. This close relationship is necessary because
of the number of areas where the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney
General share responsibilities. For instance, many of the procedures and
guidelines required by Executive Order 12333 must be approved by the Attorney
General in consultation with the Director. Activities under the Section 702 of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act must be jointly authorized and overseen by
the Attorney General and the Director. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain this
close, collaborative relationship.
c. Inspector General, Office of the DNI
ANSWER: The ODNI General Counsel must have a close relationship with the
Inspector General because, along with the ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer,
they form the core group of officials responsible for overseeing ODNI's activities.
The Inspector General has his or her own legal counsel to help carry out the IG's
statutory obligations under section 103H of the National Security Act and, if
confirmed, I will seek to maintain what I understand to be a close working
relationship with both the IG and IG's legal counsel.
d. Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, Office of the DNI
ANSWER: The ODNI's Civil Liberties Protection Officer, who heads the ODNI Civil

Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency Office and whose duties are outlined in
Section 103D of the National Security Act reports directly to the Director of

National intelligence by statute. In addition, he serves as the Chief Transparency
Officer for the ODNI, and in that capacity, coordinates the implementation across
the Intelligence Community of the Principles of Intelligence Transparency. It is my
understanding the Civil Liberties Protection Officer and ODNI General Counsel,
and their respective offices, have had a very close working relationship and, if
confirmed, I will seek to maintain that relationship.
Professional Experience

QUESTION 24: For each of the of the following, describe specifically how your
experiences will enable you to serve effectively as the General Counsel for the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Include within each response a
description of issues relating to the position that you can identify based on those
experiences.

a. Partner, Holland & Knight, LLP:

ANSWER: Since joining Holland & Knight as a partner in March 2010, my practice
has focused on assisting clients to comply with U.S. laws designed to protect our
nation's critical infrastructure against acts of terrorism, including customs
enforcement and border security matters. In doing so, I have worked closely and
cooperatively with U.S. government attorneys and other officials, including those
from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and State Department. I also advise clients on issues relating to government
procurement and compliance with federal acquisition requirements.
b. Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
ANSWER: From October 2003 to August 2005,1 served as the first Deputy General
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. During my tenure, I
worked on a wide variety of matters, including counterterrorism, cybersecurlty,

data privacy> information sharing, incident response, government procurement,
transportation security, classification issues, and infrastructure protection.
During the course of my service at the department, I worked closely with my
colleagues across both DHS component agencies and headquarters components
offices.

While at the Department of Homeland Security, I regularly worked on a number
of cross-cutting interagency matters and issues, and represented the agency at
senior-level meetings held at the White House or other federal agencies. This
experience provided me a strong understanding of the interagency process, which
I believe will be valuable, if confirmed, as ODNI General Counsel, given the

agency's significant coordinating role.

Finally, as the Deputy General Counsel and the agency's second-ranking legal
officer, I had significant management responsibility for the nearly 1,500 DHS
attorneys. In that supervisory role Igained deep day-to-day management and
administrative experience attendant to helping oversee an office of that size.
While I understand that the ODNI Office of General Counsel has significantly

fewer attorneys, the management skills Iobtained during my tenure at DHS will
be helpful to my service at ODNI.

c. Deputy Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
ANSWER: From January 2002 to October 2003,1 was Deputy Associate Attorney

General, where I reported to the Associate Attorney General - the department's
third-ranking official. The Office of the Associate Attorney General oversaw
matters arising throughout the various civil litigating divisions of the Justice
Department. During my tenure, Iworked on certain national security related
matters, including civil litigation regarding terrorist financing, government
sanctions, and immigration enforcement. Iworked closely with attorneys from
multiple DOJ components. Treasury, State, and the intelligence Community. Ialso
coordinated with staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the

United States (the "9/11 Commission") to provide access to requested
information and other assistance as needed.

In addition to working on certain national security matters, I also oversaw cases
involving government contracting, corporate fraud, environmental issues, and
international treaties. During my tenure, I also served as a senior member of a
DOJ strategic management task force responsible for reorganizing and

streamlining agency resources consistent with post-9/11 priorities.
QUESTION 25: What, if any, conflicts might arise from your private practice if you
are confirmed as General Counsel, and how would you address these conflicts.

ANSWER: In the course of the nomination process, I have consulted with ODNI's

Designated Ethics Official, who in turn, consulted with the Office of Government
Ethics to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflict of interest
will be resolved consistent with the conflicts of interest statutes, standards of

conduct, and the terms of the Ethics Agreement that I have executed and which
has been provided to the Committee. Consistentwith the Ethics Agreement and
the ethics pledge set forth in Executive Order 13770, if confirmed, Iwill not
personally and substantially participate in any particular matter in which I know I
have a financial interest, in which I know a former client of mine is a party or

represents a party, or in which I know that Holland & Knight LLP is or represents a
party.

QUESTION 26: Please provide copies of the publications in your responses to the
Committee's Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees.
ANSWER: I have provided herewith copies of the three documents that I
identified under the heading of "Publications" in response to Question 13 of the
Committee's Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees.