Responses to Committee’s Questions for the Record
Robert P. Storch
July 21, 2017
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR KING

1.

If confirmed, what policy or process changes would you recommend to
ensure the Office of the Inspector General is sufficiently independent
from NSA leadership?
If confirmed, I would make every effort to ensure that the NSA OIG operates with
appropriate independence from NSA leadership, consistent with the Inspector General
Act and, of course, the decision of Congress to make the IG at the NSA a Presidentially
appointed Senate confirmed position. I would anticipate meeting early on with the staff
of the OIG, and I would explore in detail the existing relationship with agency leadership
and work with the leadership and counsel at the OIG to determine whether there are any
policy or process changes that would help to ensure the independence of the office’s
work. In that regard, if confirmed, I would ensure that the OIG has policy or process in
place to ensure that OIG personnel immediately notify me if there is any effort by anyone
in agency leadership to interfere with the office’s work. OIGs need to have good lines of
communication with their agencies, including engaging in appropriate dialogue with
agency leadership regarding our work. However, absent an invocation under Section 8G
of the Inspector General Act, the independence of the OIG requires that the decisions
regarding what work to do, and what findings and recommendations result from that
work must rest solely with the OIG.
If confirmed, I also would ensure that the OIG has adequate policies and
procedures in place to make sure that it has timely independent access to relevant
information and that any issues regarding such access are brought promptly to my
attention. An OIG cannot credibly conduct independent oversight if the entity over
which it has oversight responsibility determines what information it will provide to the
IG to do its work, whether that decision is made at the leadership or lower levels. This
important principle was emphasized in the recent passage of the IG Empowerment Act.
During my time on the leadership team at the DOJ OIG, we have been very engaged on
this issue, and one thing I have seen played out on a number of occasions is the
importance of elevating any access disputes promptly to the IG so that they can be
addressed immediately and the office’s work not unduly hampered or delayed.

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2.

If confirmed, would you support allowing appropriately cleared
Government Accountability Office (GAO) personnel access to NSA for
conducting audits and reviews at the request of this Committee?
If confirmed, I would work to ensure coordination with the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) by the OIG and I would support cooperation with GAO by
the agency to the greatest extent possible. As indicated in my responses to the
Committee’s Additional Pre-Hearing Questions, I recognize the importance of GAO’s
work, and strongly support a strong cooperative relationship between OIGs and GAO, as
we have enjoyed at DOJ OIG. I also believe that such cooperation is consistent with
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 114, which provides in Sections D.1 and D.2,
respectively, that “[i]t is IC policy to cooperate with the Comptroller General, though the
GAO, to the fullest extent possible,” and that “[t]o the extent consistent with national
security and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, IC elements shall provide
GAO access to information that relates to matters that are the subject of announced GAO
reviews.” With regard to physical access by appropriately cleared GAO personnel to
NSA facilities, OIGs do not, of course, have any authority over access to agency
facilities, which is a management function of the agency itself. Having said that, I am not
aware of any issues with obtaining access for appropriately cleared GAO personnel to
meet with the NSA OIG. I am not in a position to know if there are any issues with
regard to NSA facilities more broadly but, if confirmed, I would support the greatest
possible cooperation with GAO by the agency.

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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR WYDEN
Intelligence Community Contractors
3.

According to the report accompanying S. 795, a bill To Enhance
Whistleblower Protection for Contractor and Grantee Employees,
“Section 1553 of The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA) established whistleblower protections for all recipients of
stimulus funds, including all state and local government employees and
all contractors, including within the intelligence community (IC).”
(a)

Are you aware of any concerns associated with the ARRA’s
extension of whistleblower protections to Intelligence Community
contractors?

I am not aware of any concerns having been raised about the extension of whistleblower
protections by Section 1553 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
to Intelligence Community (IC) contractors. I should note that ARRA was passed several years
before I joined the DOJ OIG, and I do not recall any discussions about ARRA’s extension of
whistleblower protections to IC contractors during my time here or as Chair of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Whistleblower Ombudsperson Working
Group. Having said that, if confirmed, I will continue to make whistleblower protections a
priority, and I would welcome the opportunity to explore this issue further with the Committee to
ensure that we are doing everything possible to protect people who perform the difficult act of
coming forward with such information, wherever they may work.
In that regard, at DOJ OIG, I have worked to support the protection of contractor
whistleblowers pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (NDAA), as
expanded by S. 795. I believe that S. 795 was a significant piece of legislation in extending the
prohibition against reprisal for making protected disclosures to subgrantees and personal service
contractors, and making permanent the prior pilot program that provided procedures for
independent review by OIGs of reprisal complaints made by employees of contractors and
others. I have worked diligently to help effectuate these protections, including preparing and
working to disseminate informational materials to make sure individuals covered by the statute
are fully informed as to their rights and protections. Our brochure is publicly available,
including to all DOJ employees and contractors, on the OIG’s website at:
https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/docs/NDAA-brochure.pdf.
Whether someone works as an employee of an agency or a contractor, they still perform a
valuable service when they come forward with information, and they should not suffer reprisal
for doing so. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee to
further this fundamental principle at the NSA.

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(b)

Do you agree with the December 6, 2011, testimony of the Chair of
the Legislation Committee of the Council of Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) in which she supported the
extension of specific whistleblower protections in the ARRA?

I was not at the DOJ OIG or in the OIG community in 2011, but in response to this
question I have read the statement excerpted in the report accompanying S. 795 from the former
chair of the CIGIE Legislation Committee, and I have no issue with her testimony. I note that
her statement also referenced the concern that expanding ARRA whistleblower protections to all
government contracts, grants, and payments might have a significant impact on OIG resources,
and I can say that in my own experience at DOJ OIG and in serving as Chair of the CIGIE
Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group, this concern has been commonly expressed as well,
as these are frequently resource-intensive matters. Therefore, I believe it is important that
Congress consider providing additional resources to OIGs that would be necessary to ensure
compliance with any new or expanded protections in this area. As I believe our efforts at DOJ
OIG reflect, I am committed to the importance of whistleblower rights and protections and will,
if confirmed, similarly make them a priority at the NSA and would welcome the opportunity to
work with the Committee on these issues.

Confidentiality
4.

What are your views on the obligation of Offices of Inspectors General
not to reveal the identities of confidential whistleblowers? Are current
laws and regulations sufficient to protect the identities of
whistleblowers?

I believe that Section 7(b) of the Inspector General Act provides an extremely important
protection for individuals who come forward to OIGs with complaints or information. It is
critical that whistleblowers feel comfortable coming forward when they see something they
reasonably believe to be wrong, which enables the OIG or other appropriate recipients to look
into the situation and take any necessary corrective action. Given the difficulty of coming
forward with information within an organization or office or involving colleagues, it is
particularly important that OIGs scrupulously honor the confidentiality of whistleblowers, and I
would welcome the opportunity, if confirmed, to engage with the Committee on the issue further.

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Accountability
5.

What is the appropriate form of accountability for individuals found to
have reprised against whistleblowers?

Whistleblower reprisal is a prohibited personnel practice, and it is illegal. Individuals
who violate the law by engaging in or threatening reprisal against whistleblowers should face
swift and appropriate disciplinary action.

Ombudsman
6.

You serve as the chair of the CIGIE Whistleblower Ombudsman
Working Group. What are your views on whether the ombudsman role
can be strengthened or protected?

I believe that the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman positions established under the
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) and codified in Section 3(d) of the
Inspector General Act have performed an important role in helping to ensure that agency
personnel are informed regarding the prohibitions against retaliation for making protected
disclosures, and that persons who have made or are contemplating making protected disclosures
are aware of their rights and remedies against retaliation. As someone who has been working as
the DOJ OIG Whistleblower Ombudsperson before the positions were even required by the
WPEA, we have engaged in an extensive effort to get out a wide range of information in this
area, much of which is available on our robust Whistleblower Protection site at:
https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/whistleblower-protection.htm.
I do believe that there is room for further development of this important role, and have
welcomed the opportunity to engage with staff of the bipartisan Senate Whistleblower Protection
Caucus, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform on this issue. I testified before the HOGR Subcommittee on Government
Operations about this earlier this year -- my testimony at the hearing entitled, “Five Years Later:
A Review of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act,” is publicly available on the OIG’s
website at: https://oig.justice.gov/testimony/t170201a.pdf. Among the areas where I could see
potential for expansion of this function, consistent with on our own program at DOJ OIG, would
be promoting the timely and appropriate handling by OIGs of protected disclosures and
allegations of reprisal, and facilitating appropriate communications between the OIG and other
entities, including the Office of Special Counsel, CIGIE, and the Congress. If confirmed, I
would welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee on these issues.

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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN
7. Will you commit to reviewing the security procedures in place at NSA
and the ability of people to walk in and out with classified material?
Specifically, I want to stop the theft of classified material from the NSA
and am concerned about the three major thefts by contractors who have
simply walked out of the building with classified documents.
Will you include in this review a determination of whether or not
adding a physical search would be effective and appropriate in stopping
these thefts?
If confirmed, I will work with the staff of the OIG to ensure that the security procedures
in place at the NSA are reviewed appropriately, including the effectiveness and appropriateness
of physical searches in stopping any thefts of classified documents.

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