Prehearing QuestioAs for David James Glawe upon his nomination to be
The Under Secretary for Ditelligence and Analysis
Department of Homeland Security
Senator Wyden

1.) OnFebruary 20,2017,1 sent a letterto the Department ofHomeland Security
(DHS) with questions rdated to border searches of personal electronic devices of US
persons. The Department responded on May 9,2017. In my letter, I asked what
legal authority permittedCustoms and Border Protection (GBP) to ask for or
demand,as a condition of entry, that US persons disclose their social media or amaii
account passwords. DHS's May 9,2017, letter stated that:

A person claimingto be a US citizen or lawful permanent resident must

establish that factto theinspecting officer's satisfaction (8C.F.R. § 235.1(b)
& (f)(I)(i)). In addition, an applicant for admission has the burden of

establishing admissibility under the immigration laws (See 8 C.F.R. §
23S.1(Q). If an applicant for admission is unable to establish admissibility, he
or she maybe denied admission. CBF has the authority to inspectand
examine allindividuals and merchandise entering or departingthe United
States, includingall types of personal property such as electronic devices.

(See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1357; 19U.S.C. § 1461,1499; see also 19C.F.R. § 162.6,
statingthat ^[a]ll persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving in the
Customsterritoiy of the United Stat^ from places outside thereof are liable
to inspection and search by a Customs officer").

a. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) authorizes a search without warrant of the ''personal
effects in the possession of any person seekingadmissionto the United

States" if the officer "mayhavereasonable cause to suspect that grounds
exist for dmiial ofadmission to the UnitedStates under this Chapter which
would be disclosed by such search." Is it DHS' interpretation of its
authorities that it may only demand disclosure of a social media or email

account password if titere is reasonable cause to suspect that access to such
account will provide grounds to deny admission? If so, how would DHS
establish and document such reasonable cause?

In my prior capacity atCBP, I was notengaged inborder search authority.policy
formulation orexecution. I defer to theofficials and attorneys at CBP and DHS
for additional insight and information onthistopic.
b. 19 U.S.C. § 1461 and 19 U.S.C. § 1499 relate to imported goods. How would
the contents of an email or social media account, with data stored on a U.S.

server bya U.S. technology company, beconsidered an imported good?

I defer tothe officials and attorneys at CBP and DHS for additional insight and
mfoimation on the interpretation of19 U.S.C. related toelectronic media storage.

2.) What statutory authorities allow CBP to requrat or demand that a TJ.S. person
provide his or her personal electronic device FIN or password?

In my prior capacity at CBP,I was not engagedin bordersearch authoritypolicy
formulation or ^ecution. I deferto the officials and attorneys at CB? and the DHS for
additionalinsigiht and information on this topic.
3.) DHS's May 9,2017 letter stati^ that "CBP may request the traveler's assistance in
presentinghis or her effects - Ifeciuding electronic devices - in a condition that
allows inspection of the item and its contents" (emphasis added). To the extent that
the inspection of tiie ''contents" of a personal electronic device requires the consent
of the IJ.S. person traveler, is CBP required to first inform the traveler that he or
she has the right to refuse to disclose a social media or email account password or
device PIN or p^sword?

In my priorcapacity at CBP, I wasnot engaged in bordersearchauthority policy
formulation or execution. I deferto the officials and attorneys at CBP and DHS for
additional insightand information on this topic.
4.) Accessing a! socialmedia account likety involves accessingdata not contained on the
device, or physically within a functional area of the border. What statutory

authorities allow CSP to search clouddata if a U.S. persondora not provide CBP
with consent to search their data?

In my prior capacityat CBP, I was not engaged in border search authority or execution

issues. I defer to the officials andattorneys at CBP andDHS for additional insijght and
information on this topic.
5.) My February 20,2017, letter requested data on the number of times in each
calendar year 2012-2016 that CBP personnel asked for or demanded, as a condition
of entry, that a IJ.S. person disclose a smartphone or computer pas^ord, or
otherwise provide access to a locked smartphone or computer. DHS's May 9,2017,

letter stated that CBP did not have data'responsive to fiiis request. How many times
in each calendar year 2012-2016 did CBP personnel obtain such passwords or
Otherwiseobtain such acc^s to a locked smartphone or computer?
I do not have access to data responsive to tiiis request. I defer to the officials at CBP for

additional insight and information onthis topic.
6.) My February 20,2017, letter requested data on the number of times in each
calendar year.2012-2016 that CBP. personnel asked for or demanded, as a condition

of entry, that a U.S. person disclosea social media email account password, or
otherwise provide CBP personnel access to data stored in an online account DHS's

May 9,2017, letter sfeted that CBP does not have data responsive to this request

How mamy tim«i in each.calendar year 2012-2016 did CSP personnelobtain such
passwords or otherwise obtain such aec^s to stored accounts?

I do nothave access to dataresponsive to this request I deferto die officials at CBP for
additional insightand information on this topic.
7.) CBP personnel met with my staff on March 8,2017, to discuss the issne of border
s^ches. During that meeting, my staff was informed that, in addition to

conducting electronic device searches as part of their owninvestigations, CBP
personnel will, on occasion, conduct an electronic device search.atthe request of
another government agency. How many times have such search^ fakgn place

during each ofthelastfive years? Please provide statistics for each requesting
agency, for each year.

I donothave access to data responsive to this request. I defer to the officials at CBPfor
additional insight and information on this topic.
8.) In a January 2017 interview widi NBC News, you stated that CBP has ^^confidential

human sources werun which falls under meas the national program manner."
a. Pleasedracribethe mission of fliese confidential source operations and the
authorities under which CBP conducts them.

CBP 1^ a broad and complex statutory mission to secure the United States
border, prevent dieentry of terrorists andweapons of terrorism, and facilitate
lawfol trade andtravel. 6 U.S.C. § 211. CBP's Confidential Human Source
(CHS) program seeks to utilize information from human'sources to fiilfill this

statutory mission. The use of a CHS bydesignated, trained CBP officers/agents
can contribute significantly to the agency's abilityto interdict individuals or .

• merchandise/contraband attempting to umawfiilly enter orexit the United States,
infurtherance ofthe security ofthe Nation, and the safety ofthe public and GBP
personnel.

CBP operates its CHS program consistent with its statutory authorities including^
but notlimited to, those setforth inTitles 6,8,19, and 31 ofthe U.S. Code, as.

well as implementing regulations, ffconfirm^ Iwill work to assist you in

getting themost up-to-date infonnation about CBP CHS operations from CBP.

b. Do these confidential human sources operate inside the United States? Ifso,
please d^cribe thecoordination withFBI and the extent to w:hieh theyare
subject to Attorney Generalor other relevant guidelines.
In all CBP CHSoperations, CBP coordinates and de-conflicts with the FBI and

other agencies as appropriate. CBP's Confidential Human Source Policy Manual
sets forfli CBP's policies and procedures regarding CHSs. This Policy Manual,
issued in2015, was modeled inpart upon CHS guidelines promulgated bythe

Department of Justi<% andotherfederal law enforcement agencies. If confirmed,
I
work to assist you in getting the most up-to-date information about CBP
CHS operations fix)m CBP.

Asthe Chiefintel%ence Officer ofDHS (ClNT), what would beyour rolein
coordinating between CBP human source operations, or any other DHS
human source operations, and the Intelligence Conimunity?

As theDHS CINT, I expect my role coordinating DHS Component Confidential
Human Source operations would be similar to the CINT role coordinating other
. DHS Componentintelligence capabilities: to exercise leadership and authority

over the formulation and implementation ofpolicy and programs througlhout the
Department, and to provide strategic oversight of and siq)port to the intelligence-. .
related missions and goals ofthe DHS Intelligence Enterprise. With respect to

DHS Component Confidential Human Sourceprograms,I wouldalso focus on
coordinating DHS'activities withthe rest of the IC agencies, andworic to ensure
that DHSactivities are not duplicativeof similar programs in place across the IC.
It is my understanding that the DHS CINT has no role coordinating or tasking
directlyDHS ComponentCHS operations. Given the &ct that DHS collectively
comprises the largest federal law enforcementpresence in the United States, I feel
that is a missed opportunity. Human enabled intelligence collection is a critical
element oftiie intelligencecollection cycle, and the information it yields is
essential in identifying and unraveling criminal networks. I believe it is
incumbentupon I&A, as the Dq)artinent's representative to the IC, to facilitate
opportunities for the DHS Intelligence Enterprise to collaboratewi& IC partners .
on Confidential Human Source operations to enhance coordination, reduce
potential dujplication, and add value to the overall homeland security mission. If
confirmed, 1 look forward to reviewing this topic fiirther and working with
Congressand other stakeholders to find ways to furdier enhance the CINT's

ability to fully exercise the authoriti^ associated with thepositioiL