UNCLASSIFIED

Senate Committee on Intelligence
Additional Prehearing Questions
for
David James Glawe

Upon his selection to be

The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
Department ofHomeland Security

Roleand Responsibilities of flie Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
QUESTION 1.The mission of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of
Intelligence & Analysis C^&A) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
which mandatedI&A's responsibility for critical infrastructure analysis. The mission was
further defined hythe Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Actof2004(IRTPA)
and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of2007. What is your
understanding of the histoiy and purpose, as established by Congress, of the office of the
Under Secretary for I&A in DHS?

As I under^d it, the DHS Office ofIntelligence and Analysis (T&A) was designed to address
key intelligence failures identified after Septembw 11,2001, bycreating anoffice responsible
forthe integration, analysis, and sharing ofall-source information andintelligence for and in
support ofthemissions ofthenewly established DHS, and all other federal, state, local, private
sector and other partners with homeland security-related responsibilities related to theprevention
of and responseto terrorist attacks againstthe United States^

The HomelandSecurity Act of2002 (HSA) established theOffice ofInformation Analysis, the
predecessor to I&A within theDepartment's Directorate for Information Analysis and
Inftastructure Protection, to improve the coordination, sharing, andanalysis of this information

and intelligence; toprovide DHS a seat atthe table ofthe US Intelligence Community (IC) and a
voice indetermining the nation's intelligence collection priorities; to facilitate, leverage, and
exploit the intelligence-related information already being collected by DHS tluough its
constituent elements and operational components; and facilitate greateraccess to and cross-

mission coordination of information collected byfederal, state, and local intelligence, law
^orcement, and other agencies.

Insubsequent years, Congress enacted changes to theHSA thatafforded I&A greater
intelligence access, including toraw information, and analytical c^abilities: (1) tomeet a
broader range ofthreats tothe United States; (2)toprovide intelligence analysis to allofthe
other directorates intheDepartment, to state andlocal government, andto law enforcement; and
(3) for the purpose ofpreventing terrorist attacks, enhancing border security, protecting critical

inftastructure, enhancing emergency preparedness and response, and better inVnrming the
Department'sresearch and development activities.

The Implementing Recommendations ofthe 9/11 Commission Act of2007 (9/11 Act) also
included key changes to I&A's mission aimed atimproving information sharing among federal.

UNCLASSIFIED

state, local, and tribal authorities. In the 9/11 Act, Congress sought to improve the organization
and mission structure.forDHS-wide intelligence by codifying the role and expanded authorities

ofthe Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis asthe Chiefhitelligence Officer (CINT^ of
the Deputment, and th^ ofthe DHS Intelligence Components, as constituent elements ofthe
DHS hitelligence Ente^rise (IE) led by the CINT. Congress granted the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysisnew responsibilities as CINT in order to drive a common intelligence
missionat the Department As the head of the DHS IE, the DHS CINT exercises leadership and
authority over the formulation and implementation of intelligencepolicy and programs
throughout the Department, and providesstrategic oversi^t ofand support to the intelligencerelated missions and goals of the DHS IE.
QUESTION 2, In addition to statutes, I&A's strata was further refined by
Dej^rtmental and IC strategies and guidance, including Vision 2025, fiie Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review, and the Department's Bottom-Up Review. What do you
understand I&A's current mission to be?
•'

1

I&A's mission statement is "to equip die Homeland Security ^terprise widi die mtelligence and
information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient" I believe this mission
statement accurately reflectsthe evolutionof I&A's role and responsibilities, to include various
forms ofDHS and IC stiategic guidance.
QUESTION 3. In your opinion, does I&A have a focused and well-defined mission
consistent with the purpose Congress originally intended?

I share the Committee's past concernsthat I&A has historically struggled to establish a clear
missionand consistrat priorities. However, as indicatedin my response to QuestionTwo, I
believe I&A has a defined mission. If confirmed, I intend to continue in that direction and focus

on helpingI&A better implementits broad statutory authorities, better identify its customers, and
better serve those customers' needs.

QUESTION 4. What should I&A's mission be in the future?

If confirmed, I intend to focus my efforts on ensuring I&Aprovides timely, usefiil, and
operationally-relevant inteUigence to itscustomers, specifically DHS Components witiiin DHS,

state and lo(^ law enforcemjent partners, and tiie private sector. Inaddition, I&A should devote
more attention to its role ofintegratingthe Components' unique intelligence and operational
capabilities with the IC, state and local law enforcement,and private sector partners.

QUESTION 5. I&A has been criticized in the past for producing intelligeiice products that
are duplicative of finished intelligence from other IC entities. In addition, in 2014, I&A was
found by some mrasures to be producing about one finished intelligence product per
analyst - a level that is far below average throughout the IC.
A How should I&A's role be distinct finm the anafytic role played by other
members of the IC, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigatipn (FBI) or the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)?

UNCLASSIFIED

I&A's legislated mandateto share infonnation with the Homeland Partners sets it

apart from theother domestic Intelligence entities. Unlike FBI, which is charged
with thedomestic law enforcement mission forterrorism andcounterintelligence, and
NCTC which is limited toForeign-based or inspired Terrorism issues, I&Aprovides
intelligence information for alldomestic threats to meet theneeds of DHS operational
components, state, local, tribal, andterritorial andprivate sector partners, andthe IC.
I&Ashould strive to provide its partners and customers withtimely, useful, and '
op^tibnally-relevant intelligence and information at the lowest classification level
possible.

B. What does I&A add that is missing from other IC production?

I believe I&A adds value to IC production in two ways. Thefirstis by utilizing.
DHS' vastdata holdings, as wellas intelligence andinformation from DHS

Components and state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners, in
finished intelligence. I&A also ad^ value by developing products tailored to
- meet the needs of its uniquecustomer sets, and releasing them at the lowest
possible classification level. If confirmed, 1 would work to ensure I&A's

analytic efforts add value to IC production, rather than duplicating it.
C. Howwillyou measure and definethe success of I&A analytic production? Is
I&A currently meeting those standards?

Inmyview, successful analytic production results in sustained increases in thequality
and quantity ofintelligence,collection, reporting, andintelligence analysis thatgives
homeland security stakeholders— state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector

partners; the Department; and the IC—^insights they need to m^e evidence-based
policy, operational, md resource decisions about theirhighest priority intelligence
requirements and questions. I&A'sanalytic production must reflect Department
priorities, address homeland-focused threat streams, andbe operationally-relevant to
itsintended audience. If confirmed, I planto review whether I&A's analytic
production meets these standards. I connnitto keepingthe Comnuttee informed of
my findings including anynecessaryimprovements.

D. Which is more important: the quantity or the qualhyfimpact of the reporting?
Why?

Both quantity andquality of rawreporting arecritically important It ismy
understanding thatI&A sets achievable targets for analytic production thatdrive
production for some I&A customer sets. In achieving foose targets, quality is of
paramount concern. If confirmed, I will continue to seek opportunities to improve

both the quantity and quality ofI&A's production and services across the entirety of
the intelligence cycle toensure I&A isdelivering timely, useful, and operationallyrelevant intelligence and analysis across all fourmajor Departmental threatstreams.

UNCLASSIFIED

QUESTION 6. Does I&A's work reduce the risk of a terrorist attack? If sO, please explain
how.

I need to conduct an assessment to better understand

metrics. I&A has used to evaluate if

ite work has reduced the risk of a terrorist attack. I&A was.established in large part to
facilitate greater intelligence and information sharing with state, local, tribal, territorial, and

private sectorpartners. I&A hasprovided those entities information to help identify threats
and vulnerabilities but the feedbackfrom the curr^t and former local law ^orcement and
IC executives has been mixed.

I do believe the unique intelligence and information l&A can produce could be of great
value. Especially regarding travel, border, maritime and aviation security to help protect the
homeland and r^uce the risk of a terrorist attack. I&A's work to better understand border
security threats such as transnational criminal organizations and networks that smuggle
aliens and contraband into the homeland, as well as weaknesses in foreign immigration,
travel, and border security policies, helps push US borders out and inform actions taken to
reduce vulnerabilities that could be e^loited by dangerous people across the spectrum-r—
froni criminalgto terrorists—effectively mitigating those threats before they reach our soil.

. l&A also works across the Department to provide threat information and analysis to support
DHS risk mitigation programs including FEMA's State Homeland Security Chant Program
and Urban Area Security Initiative; various integrated Threat Risk Assessment processes for
counterterrorism Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear programs, and other riskbased analysis programs. In addition, I&A's analysis ofterrorist trends, radicalization
efforts, and direct interface with our state and local and private sector partners is uniqtie in
thelC.

QUESTION 7. The Inspectors General of the IC, DHS, and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) released a joint report in March 2017 entitied, "Review of Domestic Sharing of
Counterterrorism Information," in r^ponse to a 2014 SSd-led request The report found
that both DHS and FBI personnel eiqiressed "concerns about overlaps in flieir CT Missions
and activities." What unique role should I&A be performing, if any, with regard to
countering violent extremism in the United States?

Violent extremism,whether inspired by foreign terrorist groups or rooted in a range of domestic-

based radical ideologies, poses a persistent and unpredictable threatto our homeland. Countering
violent extremism has become a key focus of DHS's work to secure the homeland. The
Department created the OfBcefor CommunityPartnership (OCP) dedicated to the mission of
countering violent extrmism by partnering with those at-risk conmiunities to spur societal.
change.

As a former locallaw enforcment ofQcer, I have seen the value of working with and directly
engagingat-riskcormnunities. A key conditionfor success in this approach is that govermnent
entities must be accepted by the conununity as legitimate interlocutors. As a result, it is

importantto carefiilly evaluatethe role of Intelligence and law enforcementpersonnel. It is my
understanding that l&A provides some analytical support to the work of OCP and broader USG

UNCLASSIFIED

efforts to counter violent extremism. Ifconfirmed, I plan to review thelevel of support I&A
provides to these efforts, andwouldbe happyto report backdie results of that review.

QUESTION 8. This sameMar^ 2017report found that the ''DHS IntelligenceEnterprise
is not as effective and valuable to the IC as it could be. For example, there is still a lack of
unity among I&A and other DHS component intelligence programs, which also affects
inteffigence reporting."
A. As the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) of DHS, will you need more aufiiorities to
help unify DHS intelligence efforts?

hi myview, Con^ss andthe Secretary have, through statute andstanding delegations,
alreadyprovidedthe CINTwidi the baseline authoritiesnecessary to drive a common
intelligence mission acrossDHS. For example, the CINT is empowered to formulate and
implement intelligence policy and programs throughout the Department and to exercise
strategic oversight of andsupport to the intelligence-related missions and goalsof the

DHS hitelligence Components and their individual component intelligence programs that
comprisethe DHS IntelligenceEnterprise.
Having said that, I can imagine a situation where the need for additional or enhanced

authorities wouldbecome.t^parent For example, shouldthe DHS portion ofNational
Intelligence Program funding andthe Department's overall footprint widiinthe IC further
evolve and mature, the functional authorities of the Under Secretaryin DHS-wide
intelligence-related planning, programming, and budgeting mayproveinadequate. If
confirmed, and if necessary, I commit to workingwithmy leadership and Congress, as
appropriate, to address any changes or additions diat may be needed.

B. Are there other l^al authorities that I&A does not poss^ but that you believeit
should poss^ to further its mission?

At this time, I believe I&Apossesses the right mix of statutoryand delegated authorities
to perform the functions Congress intended. However, if confirmed, and if necessary, I
commit to working withmy le^ership and Congress, as appropriate, to address any
changes or additions lhat may be needed.

QUESTION 9. Are there legal authorities that I&A possrases that it does not need of
should not have?

c

.

TheUnder Secretary for Intelligence andAnalysis' authorities appearappropriate. If confirmed, I
would assess diese authorities foradjustment, and, as necessary andappropriate, work widi my
le^ershlp and Congressto correctany problems.

QUESTION10. What unique role should I&A play in supporting the efforts of DHS
entities to combattrade-based monq^ laundering, illegalbulk cash transfers, exploitation of
mon^ service businesses,and other illicit money flows fliat support the drug trade and
other security challenges?

UNCLASSIFffiD

I&A's role shouldbe to synchronize the operational intelligence work ofthe Componentsto
ensure collection and analysis on these topics supports the needs ofDHS operators in an
integrated and efBcient manner.

QUESTION 11. One ofthe responsibilities you have with theGI^ role istoexercise
leadership and authorityover intelligence policy throughout the department. This means
you have.a role in other DHS operational components such as Customs and Border
Protection (CEP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security

Administration ^SA), Coast Guard, and Secret Service, all ofwhich have intelligence
functions.

A. Does the Under Secretary for I&A have the authority to int^rate intelligence
activities and analysis effectively from these various components?
\

As stated in' my response to QuestionNine, f believethe Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis' authorities appear appropriate given the breadth ofthe DHS Intelligence
Mission. If confirmed, I would assess these authorities for adjustment, and, as necessary

andappropriate, workwithmy leademhip and Congress to correctanyproblems.
B. From a budget standpoint, tiie intelligence functions of these components are
outside of I&A's budget control Should the Under Secretary for I&A have

authority over their budgets?
Based on my experience as the formet Chief Intelligence Officer of a DHS Component
and my prior ce^acityas the Acting Under Secretaryfor Intelligence and Analysis, I
believeAere is value in empoweringthe Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
with additionalbudget-relatedauthorities for certain DIK Component intelligence
fimctions. Such authorities could enhance the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer's ability to
coordinate and execute the DHS-wide intelligence mission and ensure an integrated DHS

Intelligence Enterprise business model. It could also beused asa tool to prevent
duplication of effort andhelp identify andeliminate waste. However, anysuch change in
authorities must be studied carefully and executed properly to be successful. If
confirmed, I plan to review the statutory and delegated authorities for the Under.
Secretaryoffiitelligence and Analysis for adjustment, and, as necessary and appropriate,

work with my leadership and Congress to address any changes or additions that may be
needed.

C. What isyour assessment of efforts to date to'improve integrationbetween I&Aand
the other components?

There has beenmuchprogress but there is still workto do. I believe the ultimategoal in
improving integration between I&A and die DHS Components is to betterintegrate the
intelligenceactivities across DHS. If confirmed, I plan to focus both on better leveraging
.the Under Secretary's strategic oversight authorities oyer departmental intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED
•

activities and improving the DHSMelligehce Enterprise's abilityto organize itself to
provide the rightkind of intelligence support whetherit is strategic, operational^ or
tactical support.
In my prior capacityas Chieffotelligrace Officer for a DHS Component and my tenure
as the ActingUnder Secretary for Intelligenceand Analysis, I identified two important
tools that I believe can be leveragedto achieve this goal. The first is the Homeland
Securityhitelligence Cormcil (HSIC). During my time at DHS, I have watched the HSIC
matureto the point that it has been able to begin addressing some basic DHS intelligence
integration challenges. For example, tiie HSIC is currently working within the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise to address staffing shortfalls at key intersectionsofthe
Departments intelligence and operational missions: the Southern Borders and Approaches
Campaign JTFs, the NationalTargetingCaiter, the Human Smuggling Cell and &e
Human Smugglingand Trafficking Center. If confirmed, I plan to focus the HSIC's
attention on coordinatingoperationally-relevantintelligence support at these critical
mission centera, ensuring our customers get the intelligence support they need, where
they need it

In addition to the HSIC, I believe the Intelligence Mission Manager/Functional Manager
constructcan also be a valuabletool for coordinating DHS-wide intelligence efforts.

DHS hasstarted to implement this concept by usingIntelligence Mission Mangers to help
coordinateintelligence efforts within their topical domains across multiple intelligence
fimctions. For example, they developed the FY17 Strategic Analytic Guidwce which in
turn was the basis for the FY 2017 DHS Intelligence Enterprise's Program of Analysis.
The Intelligence MissionM^agers were also the major contributorsto the development
ofthe DHS QHSRThreatEstimate. They are at various stages of completing
departmental strategies that focus coordination efforts in their domains. However, as I
understand the current concept, tiie Mission Manager role at DHS is only a collateral
responsibility. Ifconfirmed, I plan to review the currrat Intelligence Mission Managers
conceptas it exists at DHS and find ways to improve it
QUESTION 12. If confirmed, how will you evaluate whether your tenure as Under
Secretary for I&A has been a success?

Inmyview, mytenure at I^ will besuccessful if we areableto position I&A to ^vide or
facilitate customeraccessto timely, actionable, and operationally-relevant intelligencethat
allowsthose customers to re-adjustresourcesand achieve, operational outcomes related to key
homeland securityobjectives. I will also assess whether I&A is providing the kind oftimelystrategic intelligenceproducts that allow its customers to adjust to the asymmetric, fluid and
emerging threats &cing the homeland.
QUESTION 13. Have you discussed with the Secretary of Homeland Security his specific
expectations ofyou, if confirmed as Under Secretary for I&A, and his expectations of I&A
as a whole? If y^, please describe those expectations.

UNCLASSIFIED

Secretary Kelly commimicatedclearly to me his expectatioiis for I&A.. He expects I&A to
provide timely, useful and operationally-relevant intelligence to the DHS enterprise, the IC, state
and local law enforcement partners and the private sector. He also directed me to, if confirmed,

act through the role ofthe CINT to develop a DHS Intelligence Enterprise approach to DHS'
representation within US Embassy countryteams.
QUESTION 14. Have you discussed with die Director of National Intelligence his
expectations of the relationship between I&A and the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence and other elements of the IC? Ifyes, please describe those expectations.

Inpreparation for the confirmationprocess, I met with DNI Coats. He ejqpressed his interest in
the continuedintegrationofthe DHS Intelligence Enterprise vdth the IC and the aggressive

pui^it of efforts to increase the sharing of DHS data with tiie-IC. We also discussed in general
terms the niced to take a closer look at Ihe threat posed by Transnational Organized Crime and
how to better equip operatorson die front lines with the intelligence and information Aey need to
cor^ont the threat before it reaches the border. We also discussed the need for I&A to continue
strengthening relationships widi state and local law enforcement and to expand outreach to
private sector partners, especially on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure.
Priorities and Performance

QUESTION 15. What do you believe are the most critical analytic priorities for I&A
today?

Themost critical analytic priority forI&Ais to identify areas where DHS is bestpositioned to
add value to the ovendl body of analysis. I believe that is centered on leveraging the unique
data collectedheld by the Department I&A should levmage that data to produce timely,
usefiil, and operatioiially-relevantproducts focused on trade, travel, border and aviation
security, and the functional threats associated with those thretf vectors.

I&A's intelligence analysis priorities will continue to evolVe based on new intelligence and
customer requirements ofthe Secretary, DHS operational components, and state, local,

tribal, territorial, and privatesectorcustomers in the field. As those priorities evolve, I&A
must remain focused on continuing to leverage unique DHS data fused with IC reporting to

performanalysis those mission areas most closely associated with protecting the
Homeland.

QUESTION 16. I&A has many customers competing foranal^c capacify. Who areI&A's
top five customers?
I&A has one ofthe broadest customer bases in tiie IC, ranging from the Secret^, to DHS and
USG policymakersand operators, thousands of state local and private sector officials, and

foreign partners - each of ytiiom have different information classification requirements and
limitations: I believe I&A's customer base frdls into the following five categories: policy m^ers,
federal entities, state and local govermnmits, tribal and territorial leadership, and critical
infrastructure asset owners and operators. All ofthem are important, and I&A must continue

UNCLASSIFffiD

meeting theirneedsbyproducing a broad range of products at differentclas.sific:qfion levels. If

confirmed, and consistent with thedirection provided to me bythe Secretary, I intend to focus
I&A's analytic ct^acity onareas where we are positioned to add value orthatare underserved by
otherparts of the IC, rather than duplicating workdone eisewhere.
Workforce

.

QUESTION 17. Moralewithintiie ofGce of the Under Secretary for I&A has been
consistently low.

A. If confirmed, what is your plan to address this issue?

Based onmyexperience, morale isoften linked closely to an employee's ability to
clearly understand the mission, to identify how their role supports the missinn, andto be

given the resources and discr^ion todo their job. It is my understanding that there, are a
number of morale improvement initiatives already in pl^ at I&A, as well as arfHitinnaT

factors for consideration that I believe will improve morale and employee engagement.
If confirmed, my.first action onthis fiontwillbe to ensure theagency's mission is
communicated clearly andconsistently to flie workforce. I will holdI&A managers,
especially at middle management level, accountable for establishing daily briefs ontheir
activities, messaging campaigns that help communicate dievalue ofthework they
produce, andestablish a battle rhythm with ali their employees diat clearly articulates the

mission and operational requirements ofI&A's customers. Inaddition, I&A managers

will be expect to provide daily feedback and transparency on the mission and

intelligence products they produce. To foster better understanding of customer needs and
help employees develop a closer, deeper coimection to ourcritical homeland security
mission, I also intend tocreate opportunities fortheworkforce to engage more regularly
and directly with their customers through field deployments and rotational asaignTnentc j
also intend to continue efforts already inprogress at I&A to equip employees with the
tools and resources they need to do their jobs, including improving;rr service support to

employees, enabling analysts toaccess data and data sets more quickly, and standardizing
andcodifying processes that impact employees on a dailybasis..
B. Why will this strategy work where otiiers have failed?

I amconfident thatemployee morale will improve as employees betterunderstand their

mission, develop a deeper connection to that mission, and receive thesupport they need
to accomplish that mission.

QUESTION IS. Do you have a human capital strategy to recruit and retain the "best and
brightest" to I&A?

Inorder to position I&A for success, it is imperative I&A's Human Capital OflSce retain skilled

and experienced HRprofessionals ^iliar with the unique mix ofhiring autibiorities at I&A's

UNCLASSIFIED

disposal as a result of itsposition within DHS andwithin theIC. With those professionals in
place, I&A will bebest positioned to successfully execute itsoverall human capital strategy.
While I am not an HR professional, I telieve there are certain common elements in successful

human capital strategies at federal agraicies. First, it is important to define the organization's
mission ina way thatappeals to those looking to begin or continue a carea government service.
I believeI&A's statedmission meets that threshold. So to be successful, I&A must also be able
to communicate and marketthat mission in a clear and effectiveway.

Torecruit applicants at the entry level, I&A mustwork to increase itspresence at entry-level
hiring opportunities. And to recruit experienced applicants looking to fiirfeer develop their
career, I&Ashould findways to increase visibility of openopportunities and streamline fee
implication andhiringprocess for qualified applicantsalreadyin fee IC, DHS, other federalor

state agencies, and fee private sector. The I&A workferce should also represent fee diversity of
thecommunities we serve, soI&A must develop newandcreative ways to target demographics
that are under-representedin fee workforce.

Concerning retention, I&A must ensure itsemployees receive fee eiqierience, training, and •
advancement opportunities theyneedto develop intoHomeland Intelligence Professionals. To
me,feis means improving fee on-boarding programto help newemployees acclimate to fee
culture of I&A andDHS. It alsomeans developing distinct career pathswife associated
roadmaps featidentify eachdevelopment stage, trainingopportunities and rotational
assignments along fee way. It also means ftiUy leveraging all available workforce awards and
recognition programs whichemphasize not onlyJong-termcontributions to fee mission, but on-

fee-motrecognition of time-sensitive arid situatioimlly-specific employee contributions.

Itis myunderstanding featI&A'sHuman Czqiital Office isworking to develop a strategic
recruitment plan thatprecisely targets the sources oftalent tomeet our current and emerging
mission sets. Ifconfirmed, I look forward to reviewing featplanandensuring it helps I&A build
a workforce capable of execudngI&A's missionand fiilfiUing fee prioritiescommunicated to us
by DHS and IC leadership.

QUESTION 19. Arefee|ie any reforms you plan to taketoimprove theskiil setand
experience profile of the I&A workforce?

I ana proud to have been nominated to lead theI&Aworkforce, which I believe is made up of
dedicated, hard-working andskilled Homeland Intelligence Professionals responsible for both
executing-and supporting fee intelligence cycle at I&A.

confirmed,I intend to build on this

solid foundation andIning a greater operational focus to fee mission I&Aperforms.

Tothatend, I&A mustprovide its employees wifefee requisite professional development
opportunities to advance thismissioiL If confirmed, I planto leverage additional training
opportunities asa wayto build andsustmn a skiUed andprofessional workforce capable of
responding to both current md emeigent threat vectors andby mqpanding andenhancing
professional development Elements of a successful training program mristinclude a mivofinresidence, on-line andweb-enabled, and hybrid courses, seminars, and workshops sourced from
10

UNCLASSIFIED

vvitflin the department, IC, andLaw Enforcement Community to advance studente' knowledge,
skills,and abilities which, in turn,ejqpand and enhanceI&A's intelligencecapacities.
QUESTION 20. A significant portion of I&A's budget has been used for contractor
support What are the appropriate roles for contractor staff within I&A and what, in your
view, is the appropriate contractor-to-employee ratio?

It is my imderstanding that I&A, in responseto the Conunittee's direction and to better support

execution ofitsmission, has significantly reduced itsreliance on contractor support for
intelligence and support fimctions over the last several years. At the same time, contractors

bring vduable e]q)erience, and ^ble UIA toaccess sl^s in specific technical or&st-evolving
areas like cyber and data analyticsfor mission areas that cannot be fully staffed by federal
employees dueto the marketratefor those skills, hi^ tumover, or higfitraining costs.
Contractors also provide flexibility to respond to surge requirements. If confinned, I will work
to ensure I&A maintains a contractor-to-employee ratio that allows it to achieve its mission
objectivesas defined by DHS leadership, the DNI, and the President
QUESTION 21. Do you believe that contractor staff should serve as intelligence analysts?
If yes, under what conditions?

In general, all-source intelligence analysis shoidd be p^otmed by federal employees, and
- it is my understanding that is g^erally the case at I&A. However, there are cases where
contract intelligence analysts can provide the flexibility needed to quickly bring to bear

specific skills, competencies, or subjectmatter e^qiertise tiiatmay hot already reside in the
. federal workforce. For example, I believe it would be appropriate to consider contract .
support to fiilfill unanticipated requirements for immediate analytic support to meet critical
mission objectives, particularly where that need could not be fulfilled through ordinary
workforce plajming processes and hiring efforts. Ihis kind offlexibility may.be

particularly usefulat I&A, whichcontinuesto grow and mature capabilities and expertise
of its analytic workfcnce in a dynamic mission environment

It is my impression that contractors are being phased oid ofcore analytic,functions, but that
a limited number will remam as tradecraft mentors to continue to support the development
of our more junior analysts and in watchlisting and watchstanding roles, and in situations
that require a short-term surgein persoimel. I think'this is the right approach, and if
confirmed, I will continue working to ensure I&A achieves the appropriate mix offederal
-employees and contractors in its analytic workforce.

. QUESTION 22. I&A now enjoysdirect hiring authority. How has this new authority
affected I&A's ability to recruit and retain personnel?

It is my understanding tiiatI&A'sdirecthire authprity has braefited the organization's abilityto
aggressively recruit and hireindividuals, and that I&A's fill ratehas increased from 80 percentto
over97percent overthe lasttiiiee years. Ifconfirmed, I willworkto ensuredirecthire authority
is strategically leveraged to target applicantswith highly technical and sou^-afier skills and
bring them on quickly to support critical I&A missions.
11

UNCIASSIFIED

QUESTION 23. How ^11 you manage the analysis' career paths to ensnre that they have

opportunities to serve in DBS or ebewhere in tte IC at the senior-most levels?
I believea DHS rotational assignment program can be a very effective way to develop Homeland
Intelligence Professionals and retainemployees within l&A and the DHS Intelligence Enteiprise.
If confirmed, I will work to ensureI&A analysts receive requir^ tradecrafi: trainingprovided by
DHS and the IC, and that they are exposed to the various elements ofthe DHS Intelligence
Enteiprise throu^ serving on temporary assignments, and workingcollaboratively. Exposure to
the intelligence lieeds, requirements, and contributions ofthe Department \iinll provide I&A

analysts with unique intelligence skills and competencies tiiat will make them competitive inthe •
Department and the IC.

QUESTION 24. If confirm^, do you plan to provide additional bpportunities for I&A .

analysts toworkdirectly withI&Acustomer groups to improve the level of collaboration
between I&A anatysts and the customers they serve?

I believe strotigly thatall analysts canbenefit fix)m being more closely aligned to their
customers—particularly the operators. Inmyprior capacity as the ACtiiig Under Secretaryfor

Intelligence and './WlySis, 1wo^d with the le^ership team tobegin identifying ways to
implementan analyst deployment program designed to place analysts alongside their
counterparts in operational Components ofDHS. If confirmed, increasing I&A analysts',
exposure to these and ofiiercustomersets will be a top priority of mine. I plan to aggressively
pursuejoint dufy and long term deployments within &e DHS operational Components. In
addition,1 also plan to develop an integratedDHS Eiiteiprise intelligerice capability widiin select
US Embassies, and deploy personnel within those select embassy country teams. I look forward
to.the opportunity to review I&A's resource allocations and explore additional opportunities to
get the analysts closer to their customers.
QUESTION 25. I&A has undergone almost yearly realignments since it was established.
Each time, our Committee has been told that it is imperative to the future success of the
organization, but it seems to further confuse eihpltqrees and cause uncertainfy with I&A's
mission. Are you satisfied with the current organization ofI&A, or do you intend to .
reorganize the office? If the latter, how would yon organize I&A if confirmed as Under.
Secretary for I&A?

I understand the Committee's concem with the nuinber ofrealignments fiiat have been initiated
at I&A. If confirmed, I plan to evaluate how well I&A is serving our customers' needs under die
current organizational structure, and leverage that analysis to drive resource allocation decisions
that.ensure I&A is maximizingtiie value ofDHS's unique intelligence and operational
capabilities. Based on my eiqierience as the Chief IntelligenceOfficer ofa DHS Componentand
my prior capacity as the Acting Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, it is clev that
I&A is not adequatelyintegrated with the DHS operational Components. As a result, I do
anticipate some structuraladjustments will be needed to siqipqrtand enhance the operational
Components' need for IC data, integration and resources. If confirmed, I ^ook forward to
workingwith the Committee to developand execute those adjustments.
11

UNCLASSIFffiD

Fasion Centers and Information Sharing

QUESTION 26. Theaforementioned March 2017 report identified gaps ^d duplication among the nearfy 300 domestic information-sharing entities, including Fusion Centers.
I&A provides representatives to approximate^ 60 Fusion Centers.
A. Is there duplication between these field elements that are either run by, or staffed
with, federal government resources?

I believethat the National NetworkofFusion Centersbrings context and value to
homelmd security and law enforcement that no other federal or local organization can

replicate. Fusion centers accomplish thisthrough dieirunique information, perspective,
and role. Theirindependence fromfederal mtities allowsfhsion centersto provide
partners witha unique perspective on threatsto their state or locality,while also
contributing to the national threatpicture. Theresult is a securityforce multiplierdiat
helps strengthen and protect the homeland fiom all manner oftlueats. If confirmed, I
plan to take a closer Iqok at the findings ofthe report in the context ofI&A's mission in

this space, withan eye tow^d eliminating anyduplication wifiiin I&A's missionspace.
B. Do yon believe the current level of Fusion Center staffing by I&A is sufficient? How
would you improve the current Fusion Center model?

It ismy understanding that additional personnel in currentpositions, and establishing a
newjob category could helpenhance andmature intelligence production and Support in
the field. If confirmed, I plan to review I&A's overall field footprint in the context of
funding and resource constraints. Ifthere areopportunities where additionalstafiing
makessense, I will workwith DHS leadership and Congress to explorefiiose
opportunities.

.

C. How can Congress measure the effectiveness of Fusion Centers? How do you hold

them accountable when eachoneis uniquely structured and opeirated by a
particular state?

It is my understanding that DHS conducts an annualfusion center assessment to provide
a comprehensive picture ofthe National Network's performance, help measure the
effectiveness of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant funding, and

guide partners to invest in mission areas with the greatest potential benefitto the entire
homeland. It is critical thatDHS usethis assessment process to capture performance
measures that demonstrate the impactofthe National Network and provide a standard
, against which to measure its progress, strengths and weaknesses, all focused on outcomes
of fusion center activities and their impact on protecting the homeland. An horiestand

objective review of howthe National Networkis meetingthese p^ormance measures
will help all stakeholders, including Congress, make informed decisions about how best
to allocate resources and adjust policies to make steady and visible progress. If

13

UNCLASSIFIED

confirmed, I will commit to working with Congress to continue improving DHS' fusion
center assessment process.

QUESTION 27. In recent years, the Intelligence Anthorumtion Act has set limits on the
number of personnel I&A has posted in the field as Information Officers and Reports
Office!^. Part of the reasoning behind fiiese limitations was to force a close examination of
I&A's field presence to ensure th^ had a clear mission, and to encourage de-confiiction
with FBI and otiier federal agencies. Should I&A's presence be limited, particularly in
light ofthe March 2017 report identifying sharing issu^ between federal entiti^ in the
field?

As stated in my response to Question 26B, it is my understanding that placing additional I&A
field persormel in currentpositions, and establishkg a new job category could help enhance and
matureintelligenceproduction and support in the field. If confirmed, I plan to review I&A's
overallfield footprint in the context of fimding and resource constraints. If there are
opportunities where additionalstafBng makes sense and adds value to DHS operationalmissions,
includingborder security, travel security, andrefugee and immigration screening and vetting, I
will work with DHS leadership and €k)ngress to explore those opportuniti^.
QUESTION 28. The DHS Data FVamework aims to foster the efficient sharing of homeland
security information across DHS and IC ehtiti^ while protecting United States persons'
privacy. The Committee has supported this effort to get DHS information to IC analysts.
A What is the status of this project?
The DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) runs the Data Framework
Program in close coordination with I&A, vdio is responsible for the technical work on the
classified network. It is my understanding that, based on DHS and IC customer
feedback, the Data Framewodc is currently focused on enhancing the quality of several
data sets critical to the scre^iing and vetting mission. .Once that data quality work is

complete, I&A will be able to deliverthese data sets to IC partners through a siiigle data
flow. I&A has already built the infrastructure necessary to deliver this data to IC

partners, and has alre^ybegun sending tiie Data Framework's cleaned ESTA data for a
classified program tiiat supports DHS screening and vetting.
B. Is I&A behind the projected schedule? Ifyes, why?

Having received only initialbriefings on this topic, my knowledge of the history of this
program is limited. It is my understanding that in its effortsto accelerate the ingestion
schedule ofthe top 20 priority people-screening and vetting data sets, the Data
Frmnework program underestimated the technical and policy implementation challenges
that would arise as a result offocusing resources on accelerating ingestion efforts.

Feedback from usersemph^ized a needto prioritize data quality over continued data
ing^on, and the program has adjusted its focus on cleaning up and standardizing data.
C. Doyou consider this proj^ a top priority?
•

14

UNCIASSIFIED

Yes.The Data Frameworkis positionedto continue closing long-standingnational
securitygaps by enablingI&A andother IC analysts to access accurate,curtent DHS data
sets. The projectprovides critical information sharing capabilitiesto the IC, Departaent
andthe homeland securityenterprise, while fulfilling the Department's responsibility of
ensuringtiie privacy, civil rights,and civil liberties of individuals are not diminished by •
efforts, activities, and programsaimed at securing the Homeland. If confirmed, maturing
this program will be one of my top priorities.
Management

QUESTION 29. What do yon believe are the most important management-related
challenges facing I&A today?

In my opinion, employee morale is tiiemostpressing management-related challengefacing I&A.
It is critical that I&A leadership move quickly to ad(h:ess this challenge, and if confirmed, I
intend to execute the strategy I described in my response to Question 17.
QUESTION 30. Previous reports have found I&A processes to be ill-defined, inconsistent,
and ad hoc. Does I&A tie budgets and financial planning to requirements tiirongh a

delved and stable long-term bndgetihg, planning, and programming process? Kso, do you
have confidence that the process eff^dively serves its purpose?

Over the course of my career, I have gained a deep appreciation for the effectiveness of
well-defined, consistent, and repeatable management processes. I am not aware ofany
^stemic deficiencies in I&A's budgeting, planning, and programming processes. If
confirmed, I will continue to look for ways to improve resource management at I&A and

ensureI&A budgets alignedto missiongoals de&ed by the Secretary,the DM, and the
President.

QUESTION 31. Do you believe DHS I&A should have outcome measure for antiterrorism
and intelligenco'related programs consistent with fiiose measures ^tablished by other
government agencies? Please explain.

It is my understanding that I&A has developed a robust performance measurement and analytic
capabilitythat can measure both ouqiuts and outcomes across the full spectrum ofthe
intelligence cycle. In someinstances, I&A is helping lead IC effortsin this mission space, and
the analytic capability has beensuccessful in increasing the quantity, quality and focus of
intelligence production across the board. If confirmed, I plan to use this capability to further
analyze I&Aproductionand outcomes to ensure it is meeting or exceeding its quantitativeand
qualitativegoals.

QUESTION 32. How do you intend to measure financial and human capital processes as a
part of I&A's performance measures?

15

UNCLASSIFIED

It is my understanding that I&A has invested in and developed a dedicated performance
measurement and evaluation capabilitydiat assesses the lull ^ectrum ofdie intelligence cycle
and the performance ofmissionsupportprocess. Throu^ regular reviews with I&A leadership,
the organizationconsistentlyreviews human capital, CIO and CFO processes. I participated in
some ofthese reviews, and I am encouraged that the metrics in jplace do help ensure I&A is
efSciendy executing its appropriated and authorized resources. If confinned, I look forward
to refining those metrics to ensure I&A's mission priorities align witii those ofthe Secretary,
the DNI, and the President.

I&A's Relationship with the Intelligence Community
QUESTION 33. I&A has responsibilities for disseminating information from within DHS
to tiie broader IC.

.

A. What role shoiild I&A play in disseminating information obtained from other
elements of DHS to the IC?

I think I&A can play a critical role in helping operators and decision makers protect
the homeland by disseminating and providing access to timely, relevant, and
comprehensive intelligence and information across the fiill range of Homeland
Security missions (e.g., preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and
managing our borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws,

safeguarding cyberspace, anid ensuring resilience to disasters). I&A can also play a
key role in integrating DHS and state and local data with data collected or produced
by the IC. DHS data has.the potential to contribute significant vdue in key
Departmental mission areas such as identity resolution, contacts, travel history, and
derogatory information such as criminal activity. DHS data can, and has, contributed
to the IC's knowledge about threat actors.

B. What kinds of Informationshould be so disseminated, and from what elements of
theDHS?

I&A supports the dissemination and analysis of a wide range ofDepartment
information to other agencies ofthe Federal Government, including the IC, with
responsibilities related to homeland security, and to state, tribal, territorial, local,.and
private sector entities. This includes law eiiforcement information, suspicious activity
reporting information, unique travel and immigration data, seizures data, and cyber
intrusion data.

C. What limitations should apply to such disseminations, if any?

DHS must protect the integrity of ongoing law enforcement investigations, and
ensure that information sharing practices are conducted in a manner consistent with
file US Constitutibn, federal and state law, privacy and civil rights, ciA^liberties '
laws, and international treaties and agreements when applicable.

16

UNCLASSIFIED

QUESTION 34. If an individual U.S. person or non-U.S. person voluntarily provides
information to a DHS entity, such as GBP, ICE, TSA, or the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, do yon believe that information should be made available for Title
50 entities conducting intelligence activities?
I believe such infoimation should be made available where it is relevant and necessary to the
purposes for which it is being shared, provided that information is collected and shared in
accordance with any applicable notice requirements and proper oversight and policy
protections that ensure the individual's privacy and civil rights and liberties are protected.

The Privacy Act, the ViolenceAgainst Women Act, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, and Executive Order 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities, are some of the
governing legal authorities used by DHS to determine the circumstances of sharing
information reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information. The Department's
Chief Privacy Officer, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Generm Counsel also
serve significant roles in determining the scope of terrorism information that can be further

disseminated within the IC and also with our state, local, tribal and territorial andprivate
sector partners. Collecting and sharing information is a serious responsibility shared by
many within the Department, and we must serve as responsible stewards of &e information
collected fiom the public.

QUEiSTION 35.K confirmed, what assistancedo you expectfrom an IC elementthat is
primarily focused on foreign thr^ts?

It is my sense that in general, I&A today has good partnerships across the IC. But it is
imperative that DHS and the IC enhance these partnerships to better integrate law enforcement
and intelligence capabilities to secure .^erica's borders. Specifically, leveraging National .
Security Agency (NSA) andNational Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) capabilities to
identify real-time, tactical threats emanating from foreigncountries that are tryingto evade US
border security agencies. It is clearthat the traditionallaw enforcement model is not capableof
securing the homeland without aid fipm the IC and partnershipwith foreign intelligenceand law
enforcement organizations.

QUESTION36. While the mission of I&A is statutorily unique, the particular program
activities carried out at the division and branch levels, are not. If confirmed, will you
commit to reviewing l&A programs to ensure they are not redundant or duplicative of any
other Federal, state, local, or private effort?

I am absolutelycommittedto reviewingDHS intelligmice programs to eliminate redundancies
and identify opportunities for sharedservices and resources with intelligence, law enforcement
and military partners.

QUESTION37. Do you believethat the roles of DHS and the FBI are clear with respect to
domestic information sharing?

TheFBI and DHS roles in domestic information sharingmust be more specifically defined to
preventredundancy, duplication and/orconfiiction of intelligence reports. It is clear to me that
17

UNCLASSIFIED

there is still room for improvemeiit, especiallyin the intemational and domestic terrorism

programs. If confirmed, I willwork with mycolleagues in the DHS Components andtiie rai to
develop a specific business plan vhichdefines ourrespective "lanes inthe road." In addition, I
will lookto eliminate or reduceprograms whereduplicationofefforts is obwous.
QUESTION 38. How do you envision the relationship between DHS and FBI in providing

intelligence support for 1^ enforcement penonnel?
As a former FBIAgent who worked national s^urity and cpuntertmorismcases,I have a good
understariding of how theBureau works to provide intelligence support to law e^orcement

persotmel. AsI indicated inmyresponse to Question 37, if confirmed, I look forward to'
working closely with theFBI to ensure ^at I&A's unique capabilities and data are usedto
meet our customers' intelligence needs in a way that is complementary and not duplicative
or in conflict widi the FBI's efforts.

I&A's Relationship with State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and Private Partners
QUESTION 39. What role should I&A play in disseminating information obtained from <
other IC elements to state, local, tribal, territorial, and private partners?

The HSA identifies I&A as the only IC element statutorily charged with delhreiing intelligence
to our state, local,tribal,territorialand private sector partners, and developingintelligencefiom

those partners fortheDepartment and the IC. Therefore, I&A should, and does, providethe
tools for state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to share information with
and receive information fi-om the IC by way of unclassified and classified connectivity, as
well as relevant, timely analysis.

Additionally, I fiilly support I&A'srecently assumed responsibility to meetthe requirement of
paragraph 5 ofthePresidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21), "Additional Federal
Responsibilities," forIC assessments regarding threats to critical infiastructure. I also support
I&A's effortsto lead and leveragethe IC to produce PPD-21 related intelUgence assessments

regarding foreign and foreign-in^ired threats to US critical infrastructure. Thiseffort will
supportthe flowof IC information to critical infiastructure partners.
QUESTION 40.^at is the proper role of I&A in framing requests for information from
state and local law enforcement officials, as well as retaining such information and
disseminating it to the IC?

It is my understanding that I&A ensures that its field personnel who interface vnth state and
local law enforcement customers are trained irilritelligence Oversight, CRCL and Privacy

guidelines. Theyprovide guidance to stateand local officials on the formulatiori ofrequests
so that requests for informationare appropriate for DHS to respond. Any I&:A responses
intended for state and local customersreceive additional oversight review and vetting before
disseminatinn. I&A does not share State and local requests or the results ofthose requests
with other partners. Responses may be sharedwith other partners if they have requestedthe.

18

UNCLASSIFIED

•

same information from DHS I&A, and the response is cleared by the requester and can
satisfy multiple customers.
QUEiSTION41. If confirmed, what measures wdnld you take to improve the effectiveness
of efforfs.to share information in both directions?

While I have not yet had the opportunify to an conduct a full assessment of these processes
and procedures, my sense is that that there is appetite for'aligning the fusion centers along a

moieunified business model for information sharing. .1 also believethat DHS Components
could benefit from'a more uniform alignment of intelligence functions, similar to how CBP

has aligned at fiie Soufiiwest borderby regions and corridors. If confirmed,I plan to conduct an extensive review ofthe process, its metrics, and its outeomes to determine its •
effectiveness and identify what gaps need to be addressed.
QUESTION 42. What types of information (e.g. threat information, infrastructure .
vulnerability, etc.) are appropriate for sharing?

I believe that I&A should share any type of information thatenables itspartners to take
timely, informed action to prevent, protect against, and effectively respond to threats in the

homeland. Atthe same time, information sharing does have limits, such as the protection of
investigations, sources andmethods, andfiie privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties ofUS
persons.

QUESTION 43. I&A has taken positive steps to provide intelligence reporting that has
greater relevance to its private sector customers. Do you believe this is important? If yes, if
you are confirmed, what additional steps will you implement to ensure that I&A private
sector customers are provided with timely and relevant intelligence reports?

I agree that I&A has taken positive steps to improve the intelligence provided to fiie private

sector. However, more must be done toincrease the quantity and qu^ity oftimely, usefid,
operationally-relevant intelligence and information provided to I&A's private sector
customers, pa^culmly inthe areas of cybersecurityand threats to critical infrastructure. If
confirmed,it would be one ofmy top priorities to build upon these improvements to ensure
the private sector has the intelligence it needs to effectively protect critical infrastructure
from threats.

QUESTION 44. Do you intend to work with I&A customers to determine training needs
and requests?
It is my understanding that I&A does work with state and local partners to identify training
that can and should be integrated into I&A intelligence training curricula. If confirmed, I
will workto strengthenthis partnership and measure performance against it by incorporating
it as an evaluated item in the annual fusion center assessment process.
QUESTION 45. If confirmed, how do you plan to incorporate the IC law enforcement and
Intelligence Enterprise partners* training plans into the I&A training plan?
ie

UNCLASSIFIED

If confirmed, I intmd.to leverage I&A's current relationships and processes vdth. state and
local partners, as well as the HSIC to ensure that I&A receives input firom, and meets the
training needs of its customers. I will also ensure that IC and state and local training
opportunities are available to DHS personnel When possible and appropriate.
QUESTION 46. If confirmed, what assistance would yon expect from state, local, tribal,
territorial, and private partners?

If confirmed, I intend to rem^ actively engaged with all of I&A's partners and stakeholders
to maintain an open dialogue and relationship that will support a two-way exchange of ideas
to meet our shared goals. With respect to state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector

partners, I will leverage I&A's State andLocal Intelligence Council (SLIC) as the primary
mechanism to solicitfeedback and guidancefrom these partners.
I&A's Relationship within DHS Intelligence Enterprise and DHS

QUESTION 47. If confirmed, what assistance would you expect from the rest of DHS, and
the other intelligence elements of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, including as to the
Under Secretary for I&A's role as head of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council
(HSIQ?

As I mentioned in my response to Question 1IC, I believethe HSIC is one ofthe primary
vehiclesfor achieving integration, harmonization, and synchronization of departmeiitai
intelligence. Althoughthe CINTdoes not retain operationalcontrol ofthe Department's
intelligenceassets, the HSIC can serve as the CINT's touchpoint to the DHS Xntelligence

l^teiprise and the mechanism by which the department's intelligence activities are de-confiicte^
coordinated, and integrated. I expectthat DHS Componentrepresentativesto the HSIC come to
the table not just to.representtheir component equities, but to work together focusing on
Departmental equities. While this is often difficult to do, especially when everyone at the table
has their ovm specific intelligence mission and a direct chain of command linkage to tire
Secretary, it is imperative.
. .
.
I also mentioned the role the Intelligence FimctionalManagerscan provide in terms of leadership
and direction on DHS-wide intelligence issues. In many cases, the current Intelligence
Functional Managers are I&A employees. They coordinateand faciiitate intelligence integration
activities directly with their component counterparts.

And finally, I&A continues to serveas DHS touchpoint into the IC. Among others things, I&A
performs- the Collections Managementfimction for the Department, coordinates

Counterintelligence functions as well as Information Sharing and Safeguarding functions,
coordinatesthe watchlisting effort for the Department, and manages the Compartmented Access
Program for the Department 1 expect that this would continue.
QUESTION 48. What do you believe are the key barriers to enhanced coordination and
integration? If confirmed, what steps would you take to overcome th^e barriers?
20

UNCLASSIFffiD

In my prior capacity as Chief IntelligenceOfficer at GBP, I represented CBP on die HSIC.
While it is apparent to me that efforts to improve integration between I&A and die
components havematuredin recentyears, the Homeland Security IntelligenceEnteiprise
has not yet reached its full potential. If confirmed, I would continue to leverage the HSIC to
ensure that I&A and all the DHS Components are integrating efforts to meet &e
Department's mission of protecting the Homeland.

It has been my experience,that coordination and integration at DHS is often hindered by an
inability to resolve competing priorities between component operational needs and
enteiprise priorities with limited resources. Differingauthorities among intelligence
compon&its as well as cultural differences between the various members ofthe DHS

Intelligence Enterprise alsopose challenges. If confirmed, I will work to identify new ways
to demonstrate the valueI&A provides to the DHS Intelligence J^terprise and the
Components' operaticmalmission generally, develop and communicate consistent

departmental intelligence priorities, identify and leadcollaboration to address gapsin
intelligence support to operations and ^s in intelligencecapabilities, and develop
consistentcareer development roadmaps for IntelligenceEnterprise staff..
QUESTION49. Do yod believethat each of.the compopents of DHS should retain its own
intelligence function, or would the Department he better suited by haviug I&A assume
their efforts?

I do not believe that I&A should assume tiie intelligence functions or efforts ofthe .
Components, nor is it structured or resource to do so. The role ofI&^ in the DHS

Intelligence Enteiprise should beto integrate andalignthe efforts ofthe Component

i Intelligence Programs to maximize theeffectiveness of DHS intelligence in ^pport ofthe
Homeland SecurityEnterprise.
EachDHS Operating Component has its own operational and tactical intelligence functions
that are tailoredto its own uniquemission. In addition, each DHS Componenthas '
developed the knowledge,' skills and abilities ofits intelligence workforce to meet its needs.
TheHomeland Intelligence Professionals we have developed over tiie years throughout the
Department are not interchangeable. It is this the diversity ofknowledgeand experience
across the Department that enables us to betterprotectthe homeland collectively. If
confirmed, I will workto lead andfurther develop the DHS intelligence mission, not control
or centralize it at I&A.

QUESTION 50.Some DHS components have their ownIndividual intelligence support
units tiiat provide operational supportto their field elements. HowdoesI&A uniquely
augment these efforts?

In my view, I&A canuniquely augment these efforts by producingtailored aU-source
analytic products thatfuse IC,DHS Component, and stateand local partnerinformation,
qiecifically for the operations of tiie DHS Intelligence Enterprise. Additionally, I&A can
21

UNCLASSIFIED

provide a centralized collection requirements management process and a centralized
intelligence request-for-infonnation process for the DHS Intelligence Enterprise incliK&ng
intelligence support unite to help eliminate the duplication ofstafBng similar efforts at DHS
Components. Finally^ I&A field personnel must routinely engage and collaborate with their
DHS component partners in the field to ensure a unified approach to intelligence and
information sharing.

QUESTION 51.-What proc^ is in place to ensure that I&A does not duplicate the efforts
of th^e intelligence support units?

In my view, I&A has struggled with its relationship and coordination wi& the DHS Components.
The fur&er maturation ofthe HSIC and die recent implementation ofthe Intelligence Mission
Managers concepthas helped identify areas of duplication in some cases, but as tiie former Chief
Intelligence Ofticer ofDHS's largest Component Intelligence Program, it is ^parent that the
Intelligence Mission Managers need to be fitrther empowered to accomplish their missions. The
MissionManagers concept at DHS lacks a defined business process and ability to direct

intelligence collections andoperations. I envision the Mission Manager position as a full-time,
seniormanagement position with the ability to coordinate and at times direct intelligence
operations and collection. In addition,using a similar to models elsewhere in the IC, the creation
of functional Senior Intelligence Officers (SIC) for key Homeland Securify threats such as
terrorism, trade/finance, transnational organized crime, foreign/counter-intelligence, weapons of
mass destruction, cyber and immigration/migration can help fiise intelligence functions and
analysiswith the DHS Componentsand the IC.
Homeland Security Intell^euce Program (HSIP)
QUESTION 52. When the HSIP formed.in 2012, the stated rationale was to fund

intelligenceactiviti^ that predominantly support Department-focusqd efforts. However, no
Homeland Securify lhtel%ence Enterprise components, except for a small portion ofI&A,
are funded in the HSIP.

A. Ho you consider it inconsistent to apply this methodology onfy to I&A resources,
without doing the same to other elements of the Homeland Securify Hitell^ence
Enterprise? ,

I believe the HSIP is the appropriateway to identify and managing intelligence resources
focusedprimarily againstDepartmental mission objectives. I also think there is value in
examiningwhether it is appropriate to place non-National IntelligenceProgrmn (NIP)

intelligence activities of theDepartment as a vvhole intothe HSIP. It is my understanding
that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for conducting an
annual review ofComponent intelligence budgets and making recommendations to the
Secretary, and the HSIP could.be used to better facilitate this proems. However, I am
also aware ofthe functional ditSculties oftins approach. Although the Department now
has a CommonAppropriations Structiire, remaining differencesin DHS Components'
accounting and reporting systems make it difBcultto account for and managethese
resources in a unified way. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this issue further.
22

UNCLASSIFffiD

B. What standards doyou believe should be used to determme if something should be
included in the HSIP?

I am not inaposition to speculate onthis topic atthistune. Ifconfirmed, I plan to raise
this issue atthe HSIC and widi DHS leadership to determine collectively what standards
might beappropriate when considering what I&A and DHS Component intelligence
activities mi^t be appropriate for inclusion inthe HSIP.
DomesticIntelligence Responsibilities

QUESTION 53. Please describe any and all intelligence roles I&A and other DHS

intelligence components perform,other than analysis.

It ismy understanding that I&A personnel engage inthe full range ofactivities necessary to

execute the intelligence cycle. Examples include the Field Operations Division whose personnel
perform overt collection; watchlisting; information sharing; incident response; routine outreach,

engagement, and liaison services; and tiaining support topartners inthe field. I&A's Foreign
Liaison OflBce also serves a key liaison and information sharing role with theDepartment's
foreign intelligence and security service partners. I&A also executes a robust private sector
engagement program, serving Crucial liaison and information sharing roles with critical

infrastructure owners, operators, and decision makers. I&A maintains a Security Management
Branch aswell to perform multi-disciplinary security support to. I&A andstate andlocal

partners. Add finally, I&A leads a comprehensive, integrated and imified counterintelligence
program that spans across DHS.

As the former head ofa DHS Component Intelligence Program; I am very familiar with the
variety ofintelligence flmctions executed byDHS Components. Such activities include the

collection and exploitation evidence collected during law enforcement operations; Confidential
Human Source Operations (toinclude policy oversight, approval, anddirection of confidential
human source operations); toeprocessing, racploitation, analysis, anddissemination of

intelligence collected from Component air assets; intelligence collection management and
reporting; operational Field Testing^ed Cell Testing (to include toe use ofundercover agpintc
and ofGcers atDHS operational Components to covertly test and surveil border security
operations, identify toe vulnerabilities, and develop/deploy counter-measures); and TT>RiHp.r
Threat and Counterintelligence, toinclude intelligence analysis and investigations aswell as
proactive and reactive activities that identify vulnerabilities totoeDHS enterprise systems and
personnel.

QUESTION 54. What policies shouldgovern I&A's use, retention, and dissemfnatfoii of
U.S. person information? How shouldthese policies differ, if at all, from other IC
elements?

Executive Order 12333 requires thatelements of toe IC collect, retain, and

information regarding US persons only inaiccordance wito procedures established bytoe
head oftoe element ordepartment and approved by the Attorney General. These procedures
23

UNCLASSIFIED

incorporate principles set forth in the EO, and expand upon them ^ required for the
mission-specific requirements of each IC element This January, I&A's Intelligence
Oversight Guidelines were signed by the Secretary and Attorney General, and they are now
in effect The guidelines take into consid^ation DHS's national and departimental missions,
I&A*s specific legal authorities (and constraints), and both the frequency and manner in
which I&A routinely encounters US Persons infotmation. •
QUESTION 55. What limitations exist with regard to die collection, retention, and analysis
of information related to First Amendment-protected freedoms of speech, association, and
religion?

It is my understanding tiiat I&A's intelligence oversight guidelines prohibit collection of

information regar^g US persons solely for thepurpose, ofmonitoring activities protected
by the US Constitution, the National Security Act, and HSA, among other statutes, such as
the First Amendment protected freedoms ofreligion, speech, press, and peaceful assembly.
The guidelines permit US Person information collection only where there is a reasonable
belief ofa nexus between the subject and one or more of I&A's defined collection categories
(such as terrorism information, counterinteUigence, threats to safety, etc.), and where the
information is necessary for the conduct ofan autiiorized I&A mission.

I&A's functions, and its handling ofUS Person infbnnation, are subject to numerous legal
and policy restrictions, including the US Constitution and other statutes, executive orders
and directives, and internal departmental guidelines, including I&A's Intelligence Oversight
Guidelines. If confirmed, I would consider it a core part of my responsibilities to work
closely with the DHS Office ofthe General Counsel, the I&A Intelligence Oversight Office,

the DHS Chief Privacy Officer and the DHS Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties to
ensure that I&A is operating in fiill compliance with the law and consistent with DHS

policies toprotect privacy rights, civil ri^ts, and civil liberties.
Analytic Quality

QUESTION 56. How would you assess I&A's analytical tradecraft, analyst training,
editing, quality control measures, approval procedures, and independence from political
considerations?

It is my understanding that I&A has made considerable strides to improve the analytic
tradecraft of finished intelligence products. If confirmed, I will work to continue efforts to
promote I&A's analytic tradecraft, ensuring analysts have access to analytic mentoring and
training designed to focus on ICD 203 standards.
QUES'TION 57. How does I&A ensure that all I&A anatytic reports meet well-defined IC
analytic tradecraft standards prior to production of intelligence that is disseminated to tiie
IC?

It is niy understanding that all finished analj^c products at I&A are independently reviewed
and scored against ICD 203 tradecraft standards, and that results are consistently and
24

UNCLASSIFIED

regularly reviewed by leadership and feedback is routinely provided to analysts. If
confirmed, I wiUwotk to ensure lesdraship remains focused on tradecraft standards as we
workto increasethe productionand dissemination oftimely, useful, and operationallyrelevant intelligence to our partners.
QUESTION 58. Should I&A be an Intelligence a^^tor or a value-added provider of
analysis? If confirmed, how will you ensure fliat I&A reflects your vision?
It is my undemtanding that I&A has a statutory mandate to both share terrorism-related
information wd to produce original analysis. I believe fiiat this broad mission calls for a .

healthy b^ance of both. While'I&Aisresponsiblefor sharingintelligenceproducedby
others when itis relevant to state, local, andprivate sector homeland security partners, I&A
can also add significant value by fusing that intelligence together with other sources of
information to include unique Departmental data to provide a holistic picture ofthe
threate to the Homeland.

Congressional Oversight

QUESTION 59. Under what circumstances, If any. Is it appropriate to briefthe Chairman
and Vira Chairman and hot the full Committee membership?

In general, it is my understanding such an arrangement would be appropriate only when
necessaryand essential in light of ejctraordinary cwumstances affecting the vital national
security interests ofthe United States, as determined by the President pursuant to Section
S03(C)(2)ofthe National Security Act of 1947. I am not aware of any instance whm« I&A
has sought such an arrangement
QUESTION 60. If confirmed, do you pledge to provide all of I&A's unclassified and
classified Intelligence piuducts to this Committee?

I pled^ to work in good faith with die Committee to ensure access to all information,
classified or unclassified, that is necessary for full and proper oversight of I&A activities.

QUESTION61. If confirmed, how willyou change fiie I&A budget justification to,ens,ureit
Is effective for I&A managers and can be effectively evaluated 1^ Congress?
It is my understanding that I&A's budget justification must adhere to the structure and
format utilized by DHS and the Director ofNational Intelligence. I&A provides both
versions ofthe justification to the Intelligence Committees vdien they are released. If
confirmed, I will work the Committee to find ways to improve these submissions, subject to
DNI, Department, and 0MB approval.

QUESTION 62. Do division-levelpianagers have visibility into the I&A budget? Do you

intend toprovide visibility tothese managers, ifconfirm^?

25

UNCLASSIFIED

It is my understanding that sinceFY2013, the I&A CFO has consistently provided detailed
execution data to the Deputy Under Secretaries on a monthly basis which includes data
responsive to. execution of annual spending down to die Branch level. I&A CFO also

provides quarterlyspendingplans, and is monitoring and reporting spending execution at the
Divisionlevel. The Under Secretary also leads monthly Resource Management Board
meetings whichreview execution of funds and provide a forum for wide-ranging

discussions on resource management issues. Ifconfirmed, I will lookfor additinna] waysto
increase the transparency of I&As budget and execution information in order to facilitate

full and open discussion abouthow I&A spends its authorized and appropriated resources.
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

QUESTION 63. Pleasedescribe the actions you wiU take, if confirmed, to prevent, detect,
and report unauthomed disclosures of classified information.

Presidential direction, DNIguidance, andrequirements'refiected intheHSA each emphasize the
. need to protect intelligence and information that I&Aproduces and receives. It is my
understanding tibat theUnder Secretary for Intelligence andAnalysis serves as the Department's
Senior MorniationSharing and Safeguarding Executive as well as the Department's Counterintelligence.Executive. Ifconfirmed, I will u^ theauthorities, in cooperation and
coordination withtheDHS ChiefSecurity Officer, ChiefHuman Capital Officer, Inspector
General, and otherDHS and external officials, to ensure that the Department's
coimterintelligence and infohnation sharing processes and procedures are sound, andpersonnel
areproperly trainedinuprotecting this information. In the event of intelligence or other classified
information beingimproperly handled or shared with individuals withoutproperneed-to-know, I
will ensureall incidents are.&oroughly investigated and adjudicated.

26