QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FOR MS. ELWOOD
SENATOR WARNER

1.

Ethics Commitment

Do you intend to comply with all the stipulations in the Executive Order, "Ethics
Commitments by Executive Branch Employees," dated January 28,2017?
Yes.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FOR MS. ELWOOD
SENATOR WYDEN

1. Executive Order 12333: collection and minimization

a. The CIA's website currently posts Central Intelligence Agency Activities:

Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333
("Attorney General Guidelines"), and Policy and Procedures for CIA Signals
Intelligence Activities. Will you ensure that the CIA continues to post these
procedures as well as any modifications or superseding policies and procedures?

I agree withDirector Pompeo's recent statement thatthe CIA "must continue to be as
open as possible withthe American people so that oursociety canreach informed
judgments on striking theproper balance between individual privacy andnational
security." The CIA's decision to release publicly the updated Attorney General
Guidelines was a model of the CIA being transparent without compromising intelligence
sources and methods. If confirmed, I will fully support Director Pompeo's continued
efforts to be as open as possible.

b. In your written responses to pre-hearing questions, you wrote that there were
"stringent and detailed restrictions on information collected in bulk, as well as
unevaluated information, which is generally presumed to contain incidentally

acquired information concerning U.S. persons." As you noted during your
testimony, the Attorney General Guidelines permit the CIA to conduct queries of
this data "for the purpose of an authorized activity" (Section 6.2.3 of the Attorney
General Guidelines). Do you believe there are, or should be, more stringent
restrictions on CIA queries of U.S. person information collected under Executive
Order 12333?

The revised Attorney General Guidelines provide a detailed set of requirements on the
acquisition, access, retention, querying, use, and dissemination by the CIAof information
conceming U.S. persons. The applicable standards vary based in part on the nature and
sensitivity of the information at issue. At the hearing, I was referring in the quoted

phrase specifically to the retention and use of publicly available information conceming
U.S. persons—^which is properly regarded as less sensitive than non-public information.
Differentmles and procedures would apply, for example, to information subjeetto the
exceptional handling requirements in Section 6.2 of the Guidelines; that information, by
comparison, must be segregated from information that is not subjectto those
requirements; may be accessed onlyby certain CIA employees who have completed
training in the handling of unevaluated information; maybe queried only in accordance
with the requirements in Section 6.2.3; must have an auditable record of activity,
including access, queries made, andjustifications for queries designed to retrieve
information regarding U.S. persons; and generally must be destroyed no later than five
years afterthe information hasbeenmade available to CIApersonnel for operational or

analytic use. CIA Intelligence Activities: Procedures Approved bythe Attorney General
Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 § 6.2 (Attorney General Guidelines).

I understand that, during the prior Administration, the CIA and the Departmentof Justice,
in consultation with the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence, worked together

over many months to revise the Attorney General Guidelines in a waythat balances the
need to acquire andprocess essential intelligence information andthe needto protect the
privacy and other interests of U.S. persons. At present, I have no reason to believe the
Attorney General Guidelines strike an inappropriate balance or that additional restrictions
should be imposed. If confirmed, I lookforward to learning more about this issue and
hearing the Committee's views.

c. Section 4.4.1 of the Attorney General Guidelines describes "special collection
techniques" for use outside the United States, specifically electronic surveillance and

physical searches. Section 4.4.2 states that: "Any special collection technique
directed at a U.S. person outside the United States (including a U.S. person's
property or premises outside the United States) must be forwarded through the
General Counsel for concurrence and approved by the D/CIA or designee, the
Attorney General (as required by Section 2.5 of Executive Order 12333), and where
applicable, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court." Are there any
circumstances in which the CIA could employ a special collection technique directed
at a U.S. person and not require a warrant from the FISA Court?
A special collection technique is defined as a type of collection "that, underthe Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, would require a warrant if ehiployed inside the
United States for a law enforcement purpose." Attorney General Guidelines § 4.4.
Under Section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, "[n]o element of the

intelligence community may intentionally target, for the purpose of acquiring foreign
intelligence information, a United Statesperson reasonablybelievedto be located outside
the United States under circumstances in which the targeted United States person has a

reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required if the acquisition were
conducted inside the United States for law enforcement purposes, unless a judge of the

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courthas entered an order with respectto suchtargeted
United Statesperson or the AttorneyGeneral has authorizedan emergency acquisition
pursuantto subsection (c) or (d), respectively, or any other provision of this chapter." 50
U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2). Section 704(d) provides that, in an emergency situation, the
Attorney General may temporarily authorize the emergency acquisition of foreign
intelligence information without a court order, provided that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court is notified at the time of the acquisition and a formal application is
submitted to the court as soon as practicable thereafter. 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(d)(l).
Although I have not had an opportunity to examinethe issue closely, I am not currently
aware of a circumstance where a technique would meet the stated definition of "special
collectiontechnique" and would not trigger the general requirements of Section 704,
apart from this express exception.

d. The Policy and Procedures for CIA Signals Intelligence Activities state: "Agency
components shall consultwith the Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer (PCLO) and
the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (EXDIR) or their

designees on novel or unique SIGINT collection activities, and any significant
changes to existing SIGINT collection activities, to ensure that there are appropriate
safeguards to protect personal information." Do you commit to informing the full
Committee with regard to any novel or unique SIGINT collection activities and the
potential implications for U.S. person privacy interests?

The Director of the CIA has the affirmative duty under Section 502 of theNational
Security Act of 1947 to "keep the congressional intelligence committees fiilly and
currentlyinformed" of the Agency's intelligence activities, includingany significant
anticipated intelligence activity and any significant intelligence failure; he must do so
"consistentwith due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relatingto sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally
sensitive matters." 50 U.S.C. § 3092(a)(1). Director Pompeo has committed that he will
comply not onlywiththe letter of the law, but also with its spirit, whichis to ensure that
the Legislative Branch has the intelligence information it needs to perform its important
constitutional function. If confirmed, 1 look forward to helping him meet that
commitment, including with respect to SIGINT collection activities.

e. The Policy and Procedures for CIA Signals Intelligence Activities state that: "The
Agency shall, on an annual basis, review the Agency's use of SIGINT collected in
bulk and advise the DNI and APNSA on recommended additions to or removals

from the list of permissible uses of SIGINT collected in bulk." Do you commit to
informing the full Committee with regard to any additions to or removals from the
list of permissible uses of SIGINT collected in bulk?
Please see my response to Question 1.d.

f. The Policy and Procedures for CIA Signals Intelligence Activities state that: "The
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) shall approve any exception to
any provision of this regulation that is not required by the Constitution or a statute.
Executive Order, proclamation, or Presidential directive, and notify, and if

practicable consult in advance, the ODNI and the National Security Division (NSD)
of the Department of Justice. Will you commit to notifying the full Committee of
any exceptions to the provisions of the Policy and Procedures?
Please see my response to Question l.d.

g. Section 11.1 of the Attorney General Guidelines establishes emergency exceptions to
the procedures. Do you commit to notifying the full Committee when the CIA
invokes this provision?

Please see my response to Question 1.d.

h. Section 11.2 of the Attorney General Guidelines states that: "The General Counsel
shall consult with the Assistant Attorney General for National Security and the
Office of the DNI (ODNI) General Counsel regarding significant legal
interpretations of these Procedures." Do you commit to notifying the full
Committee of any such significant legal interpretations?
The General Counsel of the CIA is statutorily obligated to notify the Committee in
writing of any "significant legal interpretation" of the Constitution or federal law
affecting intelligence activities conducted by the CIA, to the extent consistentwith due
regard for the protectionfrom unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating
to sensitive intelligence sources and methods and other exceptionally sensitive matters.
2. Executive Order 12333: undisclosed participation

a. Section 9.3.2(f) of the Attorney General Guidelines states that: "With D/CIA
approval, and General Counsel concurrence, on a case-by-case basis, a person
acting on behalf of the CIA may join or participate in an organization in the United
States without disclosing affiliation in circumstances not falling into categories (a)
through (c)." Would these authorities permit a person acting on behalf of the CIA
to participate or join in a U.S. organization or venue that is not open to the public
for purposes other than cover maintenance or enhancement? If so, for what
purposes could this participation be conducted?

Although I have had no personalexperience interpreting or applyingthese provisions, I
understand that the CIA has publicly released a document discussing the application of
these standards. See Central Intelligence Agency, Detailed Description ofthe Attorney
General Procedures, at 7-8 (Jan. 18, 2017). If confirmed, I look forward to learning
more about how the standards have been applied in practice.

b. Section 9.3.2(g) of the Attorney General Guidelines states that: "With D/CIA
approval and General Counsel concurrence, on a case-by-case basis, a person acting
on behalf of the CIA may join or participate in an organization [in the United
States] without disclosing affiliation for purposes of influencing the activity of the
organization or its members, but only if the organization concerned is: (1) composed
primarily of individuals who are not United States persons; and (2) is reasonably
believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power." What is the nature of
"influence" permitted under this provision?
Please see my response to Question 2.a.

c. Do you commit to notifying the full Committee whenever the CIA invokes the
provisions of Section 9.3.2 ("Undisclosed participation requiring particular
approvals")?

I understand that the CIA already provides the Committee with information regarding the
instances and nature of various undisclosed participation activities within the United

States as partof its annual submission on activities conducted under Executive Order
12333.

3. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

Do you commit to making public the number of CIA queries of metadata derived
from Section 702 of EISA?

I understand that Section 603(b)(2)(B) of the USA FREEDOM Act requires the Director

of National Intelligence (DNI) annually to make publicly available the number of queries
forthe preceding 12-month period "concerning a known United States person of
unminimized non-contents information relating to electronic communications or wire
communications obtained through acquisitions authorized" under Section 702 of
FISA. As of the end of April 2016, the DNI concluded that "the good-faith estimate

required under Section 603(b)(2)(B) of theUSA FREEDOM Actcannot be determined
accurately because some, but not all, of the relevant elements of the [Intelligence
Community] are ableto provide suchan estimate." TheDNIreasonably anticipated that
the Intelligence Community should be able to provide an accurate estimate by the end of
calendar year2018. If confirmed, I will do all that I can as General Counsel of the CIA
to supportthe DNI in meetingthe statutory requirement.
4. Warrantless wiretapping ("Terrorist Surveillance Program")

You wrote in your responses to Committee questions that, when you served at the
Department of Justice, the Department reviewed and in many instances drafted
public statements about the program. You wrote: "I recall being involved in
reviewing at least some of those statements and discussing them with individuals
inside and outside the Department. As Deputy Chief of Staff, I was involved, in
particular, whenever the Attorney General made public statements about TSP."
The Department of Justice Office of Inspector General concluded that, in his public
testimony. Attorney General Gonzales "did not intend to mislead Congress, but...
his testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those who
were not knowledgeable about the program."

a. What was your understanding at the time of the extent to which the Attorney
General's testimony was confusing, inaccurate or had the effect of misleading?
The Senate JudiciaryCommittee twice held public hearings questioning Attorney General
Gonzales—^first on February 6, 2006, and again on July 24, 2007—aboutthat aspect of
the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) that is commonly referred to as the Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP). Roughly ten years later, I have no distinctrecollection of
my understanding at the timeabout the clarity of the Attorney General's testimony. As
discussed with the Committee, I first learned of the TSP in December 2005, and Twas not

part of the events related to the program priorto its becoming public. Further, I was no
longer working at Department of Justice (DOJ) when the Attorney General testified on
July 24,2007; I hadlefttheDepartment in June 2007, to care for my mother following

the deathof my father, and I do not recallpaying closeattention to the Attorney
General's testimony that day. But I notethe following points based on facts that are
known today.

According to the Reporton the President's Surveillance Program by the five Inspectors
General, the Attorney General'stestimony was examined in light of revelations in May
2007, "that DoJ and the White Househad a majordisagreement relatedto PSP, which

brought several senior DoJ and FBI officials to the brink of resignation in March 2004"
See Vol. I, at 68. The DOJ InspectorGeneralfocused on two points from the testimony:

(i) "thatthe dispute at issue between theDoJ and the White House didnot relate to the
'Terrorist SurveillanceProgram' that the President had confirmed, but rather pertained to
other intelligence activities"; and (ii) "that DoJ attorneys did not have 'reservations' or
'concerns' about the programthe 'President has confirmed.'" Id.

As I've saidpreviously, I do not recall beingread into the TSP or the PSP, nor having
anyknowledge of any aspect of the program priorto December 2005. I alsohad no
knowledge of the disagreement described above whenthat disagreement occurred; as best
I recall, I learnedof that disagreement when that information became public—^months
after the AttorneyGeneraltestified in February2006. Therefore, at the time of his
February 2006 testimony, I could not have appreciated that his testimony might generate
"confusi[on]" {id.) in light of that disagreement, which became known to me months
later. In addition, I was no longer working at the Department in July 2007, when the
Attorney General appears to havemade at leastthe first of the two points referenced
above.

b. What efforts did you make, if any, to ensure that the Attorney General's testimony
was clear and accurate?

Again, I was not working at the Departmentof Justice in July 2007, when the Attorney
General testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and would not have been
involved in preparing for that testimony.

I do not have a specific recollection of preparing the Attorney General for his appearance
before the Committee in February 2006. In the normal course, I would have reviewed his

prepared remarks and would have ensured those remarks were reviewed by the officials
within the Department who were most knowledgeable about the subjectmatter. In
addition, I would have assisted the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of

Legislative Affairs withany meetings with the Attorney General in advance of the
hearing to prepare. Withrespect to the testimony in February 2006, it is likely that the
Attorney General wouldhave met separately, and outside my presence, with individuals
who had access to classified information on the TSP and who were knowledgeable about
the TSP and PSP, such as the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC).

c. Yon have written, with regard to the Department of Justice's January 19,2006,
White Paper: "I recall thinking at the time that its analysis was thorough and

carefully reasoned and that certain points were compelling. I also thought that the
analysis of the FISA provisions presented a difficult question and that reasonable
minds could reach different conclusions about it." Did you believe at the time that

the September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force, alone or in
combination with Article II authorities, provided a sufficient legal basis for the
program?

As noted in response to Prehearing Question 16,1 reviewed the White Paper of January
19, 2006, but I did not do my own independent legal analysis. The White Paper—^which
I would later learn was a distillation of a classified opinion by Jack Goldsmith, a previous

Assistant Attomey General for OLC—explained thatthe NSA activities disclosed bythe
President were legal and rested both on the President's inherent Article II authorities and
on the authority granted by the Congress in the 2001 AUMF. Based only on my review
of the White Paper anddiscussions at the time,I believed that conclusion seemed
reasonable.

I have not analyzed the hypothetical question of whether, in the absence of the
President's Article II powers, the AUMF alone would have provided a sufficient legal
basis for the described NSA activities, consistent with the then-existing statutory
framework in FISA.

d. You have written that you "have not analyzed the hypothetical question of whether,
in the absence of the AUMF, the President's Article n powers alone would have

provided a sufficientlegal basis for the described NSAactivities, consistentwith the
then-existing statutory framework in FISA." During your testimony, you were
asked whether "the president has inherent authority under the commander-in-chief

provision of Article II to order warrantless surveillance of Americans citizens - of
American persons." You responded: "Under existing law, absolutely not." Is it
your viewthat Section 102of the FISA Amendments Act ("Statement of Exclusive
Means By Which Electronic Surveillance and Interception of Certain
Communications May Be Conducted") absolutely, and in all circumstances,

precludes the assertion of Article II authority as a basis for electronic surveillance
or the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications?
I have not done the legal analysis that would be required to answerthat question.
e. In a December 2005 exchange with an outside legal expert, you forwarded a draft

paper entitled "Legal Authority for the Recently Disclosed NSA Activities." It
included the following: "Any legislative change, other than the AUMF, that the
President might have sought specifically to create such an early warning system
would have been public and would have tipped off our enemies concerning our
intelligence limitations and capabilities." When is it permissible to conduct
surveillance activities based on novel and secret interpretations of existing law,

rather than seek explicit new authorities from the Congress?

Theanswer to that question would turn on a large number of factors including the scope
andterms of applicable legal authorities, existing precedent and interpretations of law,
and many other circumstances.
5. Interrogation techniques

Current law prohibits any interrogation techniques not authorized by the Army
Field Manual (AFM) as well as any modifications to the AFM that "involve the use
or threat of force." Do you agree that the CIA's former "enhanced interrogation
techniques" would violate the AFM and any modifications thereof?
I have not studied the CIA's former "enhanced interrogation techniques." But I agree

that current lawprohibits all interrogation techniques involving the use or threat of force.
6. The Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

Having reviewed the declassified Executive Summary of the Committee's Study of
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the CIA's June 2013 Response to

the Study, and the CIA's August 1, 2014, "Note to Readers" containing errata, what
is your view of the extent to which the CIA, and the Office of General Counsel in
particular, provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice about the
program?

It is vital for the CIA to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date informationto the
Department of Justice when seeking legal advice. On the particular circumstances
relating to information provided to the Department in connection with the CIA's
program, I cannot offeran informed view beyond the information contained in the
unclassifiedExecutive Summary and related materials referenced in the question,
because I have no information beyond those materials.
7.

The crimes referral

According to the CIA Inspector General, in February 2014, the then-Acting General
Counsel filed a crimes referral with the Department of Justice against Senate

Intelligence Committee staff members. According to the IG, the referral was based
solely on inaccurate information provided by two Office of General Counsel
attorneys. The IG concluded that, "there was no factual basis for the allegations
made in the CIA crimes report." During your testimony, you stated that the CIA
Accountability Board "exonerated the lawyers involved." The Accountability Board
stated that, "The Cyber Blue Team provided the factual basis for the referral,
wholly apart from any contribution by [REDACTED]."
a. Do you have any reason to disagree with the Inspector General's conclusion that: (1)
there was no factual basis for the allegations in the crimes referral, and (2) OGC
attorneys played a role in drafting the crimes referral and filing it with the
Department of Justice?

Because I do not know all the underlying facts, and have not reviewed the relevant
materials, I am not in a positionto offeran independent judgment aboutthe issue.
However, as I notedat the hearing, I understand that the CIA convened an Accountability
Board to reviewthe issues identifiedby the Inspector General. I understand that the
Board,which was chairedby former SenatorEvan Bayh, concluded that the Inspector
General had erred and that disciplinary action was not warranted on the facts presented.

SeeFinal Report of the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Network Agency
Accountability Board, at 33-35 (Dec. 2014).

b. If the response to the question above is no, please describe what, if any,
accountability should there be for the drafting and filing of a false crimes report
against congressional staff.

In the event that an attorneyunder my supervision is accused of misconduct, I will insist
thatthe allegations be fully and appropriately investigated. If the allegations prove to be
true, I will hold those responsible accountable.

c. As a general matter, please describe your understanding of the relative roles of the
Office of the Inspector General and CIA Accountability Boards with regard to
findings of fact.

I am not familiar with any regulations or understandings regardingthe relative roles of
the Office of Inspector General and CIAAccountability Boards with regard to findings of
fact. I assume that an Accountability Board focuses specifically on employee
accountability and discipline. If confirmed, I look forward to looking intothis issue
further.

d. How would you respond should a request or proposal for a crimes referral against
members of Congress or congressional staff come to you?

I wouldtake any suchproposal extremely seriously and give it my close, personal
attention with a full appreciation for the separation-of-powers principles at issue.
e. The February 2014 crimes referral referenced Section 1.6(b) of Executive Order
12333, as amended, and Sections VI.B, VII.A.4, and Vin.A of the 1995 Crimes
Reporting Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Justice and
the Intelligence Community pertaining to the reporting of information concerning
federal crimes. Do you interpret either these, or any other statutes, executive orders
or agreements as binding the CIA to refer accusations against members of Congress
or congressional staff to the Department of Justice?
I have not reviewed the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of

Justice and the Intelligence Community pertaining to the reporting of information
concerning federal crimes. If confirmed, I will ensurethat the Office of General Counsel
fully complies with that Memorandum of Understanding as well as any other statutes.

executive orders, or agreements pertainingto the reporting of information concerning
federal crimes. As I noted in the previous response, I would take any proposal to report
information regarding a member of Congress or congressional staff extremely seriously
andgive it my close, personal attention with a full appreciation for the separation-ofpowers principles at issue.
8.

Covert action

a. On September 6,2006, President Bush gave a speech publicly acknowledging the
CIA's ongoing Detention and Interrogation Program. Are there any legal
impediments to the public acknowledgment of an ongoing and continuing covert
action program, in whole, in part or with regard to one or more discreet operations?

These are importantquestions, and I look forward to studyingthem closely iff am
confirmed. As a general matter, it is up to the President to define the scope of a covert
action activity and to determine whether the U.S. Government's role in the activity
shouldbe publicly acknowledged. The legal questionwhether a particular operation is
authorized by a Finding or Memorandum of Notificationwould be determined by the text
of the relevant document and other traditional interpretive considerations. My

understanding is that the congressional intelligence committees are also routinely briefed
on the execution of any covert action programs and would have the opportunity to
consider the proper scope of thoseprograms. I am hesitant to express a more detailed
legal judgmenton these complex issues until I have access to all the necessary facts, have
learned more about the CIA's practices, and have had an opportunity to consider the legal
authorities in context.

During your testimony, you compared the interpretation of CIA authorities
pursuant to a presidential Finding or Memorandum of Notification (MON) to the
interpretation of a statute, insofar as the Finding or MON need not "describe every
possible activity to fail within the scope of the statute."
b. How does this analogy account for the lack of public transparency, the opportunity
for legal challenge and appeal, the development of jurisprudence, or congressional
action?

Please see my response to Question 8.a.
c. To what extent is the analysis of whether a particular operation that is not explicitly
referenced in a Finding or MON is nonetheless authorized influenced by whether
the full congressional intelligence committees have been informed of the operation?
Please see my response to Question S.a.

d. To what extent is the analysis of whether a particular operation that is not explicitly
referenced in a Finding or MON is nonetheless authorized influenced by whether
the President has been informed of the operation?

Please see my response to Question 8.a.

e. To what extent is the analysis of whether a particular operation that is not explicitly
referenced in a Finding or MON is nonetheless authorized influenced by whether
the National Security Council Principals Committee has been informed of the
operation?

Please see my response to Question 8.a.

f. The Executive Summary of the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program notes that the September 17,2001, Memorandum of
Notification made no mention of coercive interrogation techniques. The CIA's

public response to the Study does not dispute this statement. Do you believe that the
MON authorized the use of the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques"?

I am not familiar with the history of, and the facts underlying, the interpretation of the

September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification. It would not be appropriate for me to
express a view on this issue without knowing more about it andwithout a thorough
understanding of the applicable facts and law.
9.

Lethal authorities

During his confirmation process, now-DNI Coats was asked the following question:
"On December 2, 2015, now-President-elect Donald Trump stated the following:
'The other thing with the terrorists is you have to take out their families, when you

get these terrorists, you have to take out their families. They care about their lives,
don't kid yourself. When they say they don't care about their lives,you have to take
out their families.' Do you agree that this would be a violation of international
law?" In response. Director Coats stated: "The Law of Armed Conflict prohibits
intentional attacks against civilians, unless they are directly participating in
hostilities." Do you agree?

Yes, I agree that the law of armed conflict prohibits intentional attacks against civilians,
unless they are directly participating in hostilities.
10. Section 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act

Section 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act includes, among the duties of the
Director of the CIA: "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National
Intelligence may direct." The Director's duties related to the CIA's collection and
analytical missions are described in Sections 104A(d)(l) —104A(d)(3). All covert
action is governed by Section 503 of the Act. Please describe any "functions and
duties" that could be authorized under Section 104A(d)(4).

I am not familiar with the scope and historical uses of that provision of the National
Security Act. I look forward to learning more about it if I am confirmed.
11. Executive Order 13526

Executive Order 13526 (December 29,2009) provides that: "In no case shall
information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be
declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative

error; (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; (3) restrain
competition; or (4) prevent or delay the release of information that does not require
protection in the interest of national security." ExecutiveOrder 13292 (March 25,
2003) and Executive Order 12958 (April 17,1995) prohibited classification based on
the same factors. Do you agree with the prohibitions in these Executive Orders?
The prohibitions are binding on the CIA. They also seem sensibleto me.
12. Classified program

In your responses to Committee questions, you wrote: "At the Justice Department, I
worked on a program that I have since learned is affiliated with the CIA. Because
that affiliation remains classified, I cannot describe my involvement with that

program here." Please provide a classified description of your work on the
program.

The CIA has agreed to submit a classified response to the Committee on my behalf.