Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
“Current Terrorist Threat to the United States”
February 12, 2015
Nicholas J. Rasmussen
Director
National Counterterrorism Center

Thank you Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, and members of the Committee. I
appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss the worldwide terrorist threat and our
efforts to counter it.
My statement reflects the collective work and insights of the National Counterterrorism
Center’s dedicated men and women. Although I am new to my position as their Director, I feel
privileged and honored to lead them. I want to express my appreciation to the Committee for its
unflagging support of these hardworking officers.
Hearings like this are an opportunity to continue this constructive dialogue with the
public and its elected representatives on the terrorist threat we face as a nation today.
Strategic Assessment: The Global Terrorist Landscape in 2015
Today’s terrorist threat environment is dynamic and dangerous, as are the wide array of
terrorist actors driving it. They are located across a wide swath of Africa, Asia and the Middle
East with the ability to reach into the West, and even the United States.
Events during the past several years—and especially the past nine months—have
demonstrated a new level of specialization and fragmentation within the larger terrorism
landscape. New groups have emerged in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011. Most are
located in the Middle East and North Africa and are primarily focused on achieving local gains.
We have witnessed the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) with its ambitious
vision, quick territorial expansion, extreme violence and brutality, and innovative use of social
media. All this is happening, even as we assess the leadership cadre of core al-Qa‘ida – the
group that planned and executed the 9/11 attacks – is at its weakest point since before 2001.
We might be moving into a new era in which centralized leadership of a terrorist
organization matters less, group identity is more fluid, and violent extremist narratives focus on a
wider range of alleged grievances and enemies.
The quantitative and qualitative scale of threat we are facing in the U.S. and the West is
different from the threat in the countries and regions where many of these terrorist groups are
located. In the U.S. and West, we have reduced the threat of catastrophic attack similar to what
we experienced on September 11, 2001 due to consistent counterterrorism (CT) pressure that we,
and our partners, have been able to bring to bear against some of the most dangerous and violent

terrorist groups. Continuing key elements of that pressure will be essential to preventing the
return of the higher-scale threats.
Recent actions by al-Qa‘ida adherents overseas underscore our continued concern
regarding the potential of high-impact attacks, including the ability of terrorist groups and
individual violent extremists to target Western aviation. As you know, last summer the United
States and United Kingdom implemented enhanced security measures at airports with direct
flights to the United States, which included new rules aimed at screening personal electronic
devices. Undeterred by regular improvements and enhancements to security measures, terrorist
groups continue to see commercial aviation as a desirable symbolic target, and these aspirations
are not limited to al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula.
Despite the persistent concerns over aviation security, we also still face a range of
moderate and small scale threats from a small, but persistent number of transnationally-oriented
groups, including al-Qa‘ida and some of its affiliates and allies. These groups remain intent on
striking the United States and are content to patiently develop their access and operational plans
over multiple years. I will go into greater detail on the threats we see from specific terrorist
actors later in my statement.
We face a much greater recurring threat from lone offenders and possibly loose networks
of individuals. Of the eleven attacks in the West since last May, ten were conducted by
individual violent extremists. Two occurred in the U.S.—one in September, and another in
October. The majority of these lone offender attacks more closely resemble the size, scale, and
sophistication of random acts of violence than they do the destructiveness of the organized and
well-developed plots that we witnessed in the years after September 11, 2001. These attacks
have happened more frequently, yet thankfully resulted in relatively few casualties. We expect
that individuals and small networks will try to maintain and build upon this momentum and
capitalize on the media coverage that these attacks generate.
In contrast, our allies and partners in Africa, Asia and the Middle East face a much
different threat outlook than we are facing in the West.
We assess countries in these areas—as well as many other nations worldwide—face a
higher level of threat, which is manifesting in a different form than the West has experienced
recently. In all of these regions, terrorists are trying to displace local governance or make
territorial gains. They are conducting violent attacks on a much more frequent basis and at a
larger scale than in the West. In the past year alone, we assess that there have been hundreds, of
attacks in these regions, resulting in thousands of deaths. Terrorists active in these regions are
contributing to population displacements that affect millions. Some are also responsible for
stoking sectarian tensions and contributing to the proliferation of Sunni-Shia violence,
particularly within Muslim-majority countries.
Many of the most ambitious terrorist groups are located in countries continuing to work
through the effects of the Arab uprisings, including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Others
are active in countries undergoing insurgencies, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria,
Somalia, and most of the countries previously mentioned.
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Despite distinct threat environments, the broader international community shares concern
about the greater than 20,000 foreign fighters from more than 90 countries who have traveled to
Syria since the conflict began. The rate of travelers into Syria exceeds the rate of travelers who
went into Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last ten years.
While the majority of foreign fighters have emanated from the Middle East and North
Africa, more than 3,400 westerners have traveled to join the fight against the Assad regime.
Within that pool of westerners, more than 150 U.S. persons from a variety of backgrounds and
locations in the United States have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria. A handful of these
U.S. persons have died in Syria.
The foreign fighter threat is multi-faceted and will likely affect the U.S. and West for
years in ways that are distinct from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. We all share the concern
that fighters will attempt to return to their home countries or regions, and look to participate in or
support terrorism and the radicalization to violence. We have witnessed this phenomenon in the
lone offender attack against the Jewish Museum of Belgium, which killed four. We have also
seen it manifested in an ISIL-claimed attack against the Corinthia Hotel in Libya, which killed
nine, including an American. However, our partners abroad will face the added burden of those
who opt to remain in Iraq and Syria and become citizens of ISIL’s self-declared caliphate, or
seek out other battlefields or violent extremist experiences using the personal connections and
networks they gained during their time in conflict.
I will continue my remarks by delving into further detail on the terrorist threats to the
homeland and then outline the threat to U.S. interests overseas. I will then focus the remainder
of my remarks on outlining some of NCTC’s efforts to address this complicated threat picture.
Threat to the Homeland
The up-tick in moderate-to-small scale attacks in the West since last summer by
individual extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely and immediate threat to the
Homeland will come from Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) or individuals with loose
affiliation to terrorist groups overseas. ISIL’s rise during the past year and its adept exploitation
of the media attention generated by the group’s actions has created unprecedented opportunities
for the group to reach potential recruits or influence those inspired by the group’s message.
Lone actors or insular groups who act autonomously pose the most serious HVE threat, and we
assess HVEs will likely continue gravitating to simpler plots that do not require advanced skills,
outside training, or communication with others.
We are closely monitoring for signs of homegrown violent extremists in the United States
plotting attacks here. The success of small arms attacks in France, Canada and the hatchet attack
against police officers in New York City underscores the threat from emboldened HVEs and,
how the rapid succession of these attacks may motivate some to attempt to replicate these tactics
with little-to-no warning. We are concerned by the growing trend by extremists in the West
toward carrying out simple opportunity-driven attacks, as those further diminish our insight into
terrorist operational planning and readiness.
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These attacks coupled with those in France, Australia, and similar to the 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings highlight the danger posed by lone actors and insular groups not directly
tied or loosely tied to terrorist organizations, as well as the difficulty of identifying these types of
plots before they take place because they often exhibit few behaviors that law enforcement and
intelligence officers traditionally used to detect a readiness to commit violence. The perceived
success of previous lone offender attacks combined with al-Qa‘ida’s, AQAP’s, and ISIL’s
incendiary propaganda promoting individual acts of terrorism has raised the profile of this tactic.
HVEs make use of a diverse online environment that is dynamic, evolving, and selfsustaining. This online environment is likely to play a critical role in the foreseeable future in
radicalizing and mobilizing HVEs towards violence. Despite the removal of important terrorist
leaders during the last several years, the online environment continues to reinforce a violent
extremist identity, supplies grievances, and provides HVEs the means to connect with terrorist
groups overseas.
This boundless virtual environment, combined with terrorists’ sophisticated use of social
media, makes it increasingly difficult to protect our youth from sometimes horrifically brutal
propaganda. ISIL’s online media presence has become sophisticated at disseminating timely,
high-quality media content across multiple platforms. The group’s English-language propaganda
is drawing westerners to Syria. These violent extremists are making contact with terrorist groups
and gaining battlefield experience, which could pose a threat to the Homeland if they are able to
return undetected.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
ISIL is a terrorist organization that has exploited the conflict in Syria and sectarian
tensions in Iraq to entrench itself in both countries. The group’s strength and expansionist
agenda poses an ongoing threat to our regional allies and to U.S. facilities and personnel in both
the Middle East and the West. In November, ISIL publicly announced its expansion into Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and last month the group publicly confirmed the
announcement of an affiliate in South Asia. The allegiance of violent extremists in these
countries provides ISIL greater operational reach and helps legitimize its self-appointed position
as the leader of all Muslims. The growth of ISIL’s support in Libya most likely provides the
group with an additional safe haven where it can collaborate with other North African terrorists
aligned with ISIL and to possibly plot attacks.
Then-Iraq-based ISIL exploited the conflict and chaos in Syria to expand its operations
across the border. The group, with al-Qa‘ida’s approval, established the al-Nusrah Front as a
cover for its Syria-based activities, but in April 2013, publicly declared its presence in Syria
under the ISIL name. ISIL accelerated its efforts to overthrow the Iraqi government, seizing
control of Fallujah last January. The group marched from its safe haven in Syria and across the
border into northern Iraq, killing thousands of Iraqi Muslims on its way to seizing Mosul this
June.
Along the way, ISIL has aggressively recruited new adherents. Some joined ISIL to
escape Assad’s brutal treatment and oppression of his own people. Others joined out of
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frustration, feeling marginalized by their own governments. But many joined out of intimidation
and fear, forced to choose either obedience to ISIL or a violent, oftentimes public death.
Our latest assessment on ISIL’s strength places the group’s manpower between 20,000
and 31,500 members. Sunni groups that ISIL is fighting with in Iraq also augment the group’s
strength in that battlefield. ISIL’s control over the Iraq-Syria border enables the group to easily
move members between Iraq and Syria, which can rapidly change the number of fighters in
either country. ISIL is also drawing some recruits from the more than 20,000 foreign fighters
who have traveled to Syria.
ISIL’s momentum on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria has slowed in recent months in the
face of coalition airstrikes and ground offensives by Iraqi Security Forces, Peshmerga, and Shia
militia forces. Coalition airstrikes have also killed several important ISIL military commanders.
Nonetheless, ISIL maintains a deep bench of leaders and continues to launch local offensives to
capture terrain while shoring up defenses in its strongholds. The large swaths of eastern Syria
and western Iraq that ISIL controls provides the group established sanctuaries from which they
plan, train, and plot terrorist acts with little interference. Its battlefield successes also have given
ISIL an extensive war chest derived from black-market oil sales, smuggling, robberies, extortion,
and ransom payments for hostages.
ISIL has used its territorial gains, access to foreign fighters, and sophisticated media
operations to challenge al-Qa‘ida for primacy within the global terrorist movement. While the
leadership of al-Qa‘ida’s recognized affiliates have reaffirmed their allegiance to Ayman alZawahiri and criticized ISIL’s declaration of a caliphate, ISIL’s ascendance has caused rifts
within some al-Qa‘ida-aligned groups, which we continue to monitor.
ISIL’s safe haven in Syria and Iraq and the group’s access to resources pose a direct
threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in the region. This includes our embassy in Baghdad and
our consulate in Erbil, as well as the U.S. military advisors deployed in Iraq. ISIL also continues
to hold foreign hostages, after its brutal execution of Americans James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and
Peter Kassig.
ISIL’s threat extends beyond the region, to the West. There have been at least 18 ISILlinked attacks against western interests in the past year, resulting in 24 deaths and 11 injuries. In
January, ISIL’s affiliates in Libya probably carried out a vehicle-borne improved explosive
device (VBIED) and small-arms attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli. Last September, ISIL’s
spokesman and external operations chief called on ISIL sympathizers worldwide to attack
Westerners and their property, a call to action that the group has repeated in its English-language
propaganda. The attacks in Ottawa and Quebec this past October, for which ISIL publicly
claimed responsibility, and most recently the attacks against a police officer and kosher grocery
in Paris by a French violent extremist who claimed the attacks for ISIL, clearly demonstrate the
threat posed by ISIL-inspired extremists and returning foreign fighters.
We remain mindful of the possibility that an ISIL-sympathizer could conduct a limited,
self-directed attack here at home with no warning. We also remain concerned that ISIL may
place a greater priority on more organized attacks on the West, as opposed to propaganda driven
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lone offender attacks. The group’s ambitions have grown in parallel with its capabilities; it sees
itself in competition with core al-Qa‘ida and could develop its own anti-Western plotting
capability and draw from some of the thousands of foreign fighters in theater.
Al-Qa‘ida Core and Pakistan/Afghanistan-based Groups
Turning now to core al-Qa‘ida and Afghanistan/Pakistan-based groups, we anticipate
that, despite core al-Qa‘ida’s diminished leadership cadre, remaining members will continue to
pose a threat to western interests in South Asia and would attempt to strike the Homeland should
an opportunity arise. Pakistan and Afghanistan-based al-Qa‘ida adherents still aspire to conduct
attacks against the West, even if the group’s diminished leadership could not replicate the impact
and casualties of a 9/11-style attack.
Despite ISIL’s challenge, al-Zawahiri remains the recognized leader of the global
terrorist movement among al-Qa‘ida affiliates and allies, and the groups continue to defer to his
guidance on critical issues. Since the start of the Arab unrest in North Africa and the Middle
East, Zawahiri and other members of the group’s leadership have directed their focus there,
encouraging cadre and associates to support and take advantage of the unrest.
We have long forecast a degradation of the security environment in Afghanistan and,
with the end of our combat mission there, we are entering a period where we begin to measure
the impact of this decline. Al-Qa‘ida’s primary presence in Afghanistan currently consists of
small numbers in the country’s remote northeast, and our chief concern is that a power vacuum
could emerge which in turn might offer the group space to reconstitute there and pose a
continued threat to the Homeland.
South Asia-Based Militants. Pakistani and Afghan militant groups—including Tehrik-e
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its splinter elements, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT), and the Haqqani
Network—continue to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests and our allies in the region, where
these groups probably will remain focused. We continue to watch for indicators that any of these
groups, networks, or individuals are actively pursuing or have decided to incorporate operations
outside of South Asia as a strategy to achieve their objectives.
TTP remains a significant threat in Pakistan despite the ongoing Pakistan military
operations in North Waziristan and Khyber, and leadership changes last year that probably
contributed to the most internal fracturing since the group’s formation. In August, TTP
commander Abdul Wali left the group to form Jama’at ul-Ahrar (JuA), and, in October, the TTP
spokesman and five regional amirs announced their decision to leave the group and pledge
allegiance to ISIL. JuA subsequently claimed responsibility for the November attack at the
Wagah Border Crossing that killed at least 50 people, and TTP conducted the 16 December
attack on a school for military officers’ children in Peshawar that killed approximately 150
people, mostly children. TTP warned the attack was just a “trailer,” suggesting additional
attacks might be planned and underscoring the threat the group still poses within Pakistan,
especially against soft targets.

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LT remains focused on its regional goals in South Asia. The group opposes improving
relations between India and Pakistan, and its leaders consistently speak out against India and the
United States, accusing both countries of trying to destabilize Pakistan. LT has attacked western
interests in South Asia in pursuit of its regional objectives, as demonstrated by the targeting of
hotels frequented by westerners during the Mumbai attacks in 2008. LT leaders almost certainly
recognize that an attack on the U.S. would result in intense international backlash against
Pakistan and endanger the group’s safe haven there. However, LT also provides training to
Pakistani and Western militants, some of whom could plot terrorist attacks in the West without
direction from LT leadership. In December, LT’s operations chief Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi,
incarcerated in Pakistan since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, was granted bail, a move immediately
opposed by the government of Pakistan. LT remains a threat to U.S. interests in South Asia
regardless of Lakhvi’s status.
In Afghanistan, we have turned the corner from a combat mission to one where we train,
advise, and assist our Afghan partners to combat threats to their stability. Chief among these
threats is the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which, despite suffering some setbacks from
Pakistani military incursions into Waziristan, remain capable of carrying out high-profile attacks
against remaining U.S., NATO, Afghan government, and other allied nation targets. As evidence
of this threat, and in contrast to the usual relative lull in violence during the winter months, the
Taliban, Haqqanis, and their militant allies carried out multiple of attacks in Kabul and other
major population centers at the end of 2014.
Al-Qa‘ida Affiliates and Allies
AQAP. Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains committed to conducting
attacks in the West and desires to target western interests in Yemen while operating in areas of
Yemen with minimal government presence. January’s attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine
office in Paris was AQAP’s first successful lethal operation in the West. Although the degree of
command and control of the operation is still under investigation, both the attackers and AQAP
attributed the attack to the group. AQAP’s three attempted attacks against the United States to
date—the airliner plot of December 2009, an attempted attack against U.S.-bound cargo planes
in October 2010, and an airliner plot in May 2012—demonstrate the group’s continued pursuit of
high-profile attacks against the United States. In a propaganda video released in December, a
senior leader threatened American citizens all over the world, highlighting AQAP’s persistent
interest in targeting the U.S.
AQAP also presents a high threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, especially during a time of political instability and growing sectarian violence. As you
know, the United States has suspended embassy operations in Yemen and temporarily relocated
staff out of Sana’a. We continue to track closely the status of AQAP plotting against our
facilities and personnel in Yemen that would suggest a repeat of a 2013 credible threat which
prompted the Department of State to close U.S. embassies in the Middle East and North Africa.
We are concerned AQAP could take advantage of the political chaos in the capital to carry out
attacks against on our personnel or other Western targets in Sanaa. The group may also plan
additional attacks against Huthis to further destabilize the situation in Sanaa. AQAP has also
intensified its attacks against the Huthis, as evidenced by their October large-scale VBIED attack
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in Sanaa which resulted in more than 50 deaths, all while continuing to target the Yemeni
government. In addition, last July AQAP launched its first successful attack in Saudi Arabia
since 2009, underscoring the group’s continued focus on operations in the Kingdom. Separately,
the failed rescue attempt of American journalist Luke Somers is likely to embolden the group
with continued attempts to kidnap westerners in Yemen, in particular Americans.
Finally, AQAP continues its efforts to radicalize and mobilize to violence individuals
outside Yemen through the publication of its English-language magazine Inspire. In December,
the group released the 13th edition with instructions for crafting a concealable non-metallic
explosive device, similar to the explosive AQAP used when it attempted to blow up an airliner
bound for Detroit in December 2009, and called for individuals to attack Western airliners.
Previous editions have encouraged “lone offender” attacks in the West, naming specific targets
in the United States, United Kingdom, and France and provided instructions on how to construct
a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.
Al-Shabaab. We continue to monitor al-Shabaab and its foreign fighter cadre as it
continues to threaten U.S. interests in East Africa. We assess it is a potential threat to the
Homeland, as some al-Shabaab leaders in the past publicly called for transnational attacks, but its
interest appears to still be primarily focused on operations in East Africa. The group has
attracted dozens of U.S. persons—mostly ethnic Somalis—who have traveled to Somalia since
2006.
Al-Shabaab is mainly focused on undermining the Somali Federal Government and
combating African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional military forces operating
in Somalia, as demonstrated by its Christmas Day attack on security forces at the Mogadishu
International Airport. Al-Shabaab’s mid-September 2013 attack on the Westgate mall in Kenya
demonstrated that the group continues to plot against regional and Western targets across East
Africa as part of its campaign to remove foreign forces aiding the Somali Government.
AQIM and regional allies. Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
its allies remain focused on local and regional attack plotting, including targeting Western
interests. The groups have shown minimal interest in targeting the U.S. Homeland.
In Mali, the French-led military intervention has pushed AQIM and its allies from the
cities that they once controlled, but the groups maintain safe haven in the less populated areas of
northern Mali from which they are able to plan and launch attacks against French and allied
forces in the region. Elsewhere, AQIM is taking advantage of permissive operating
environments across much of North Africa to broaden its reach. We are concerned that AQIM
may be collaborating with local violent extremists, including Ansar al-Sharia groups in Libya
and Tunisia.
In 2013, two highly capable AQIM offshoots, Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Mulathamun
battalion and Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa, merged to form the new violent extremist
group—al-Murabitun—which will almost certainly seek to conduct additional high profile
attacks against Western interests across the region. Belmokhtar—the group’s external operations
commander—played a leading role in attacks against Western interests in Northwest Africa in
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2013, with the January 2013attack on an oil facility in In-Amenas, Algeria and double suicide
bombings in Niger in May of that year. Last year, Belmokhtar reportedly spent time in Libya to
escape counterterrorism pressure in Mali, and probably to collaborate with Ansar al-Sharia
(AAS) groups and other violent extremist elements in the country to advance his operational
goals.
Al Nusrah Front. Although it has struggled to counter ISIL’s gains in Syria, al-Nusrah
Front is one of the most capable groups within the Syrian opposition and has mounted suicide,
explosive, and firearms attacks against regime and security targets across the country; it has also
sought to provide limited public services and governance to the local population in areas under
its control. Several Westerners have joined al-Nusrah Front, a few of whom have perished in
suicide operations, including at least one American, raising concerns capable individuals with
extremist contacts and battlefield experience could return to their home countries to commit
violence. In April 2013, Al-Nusrah Front’s leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, pledged
allegiance to al-Qa‘ida leader al-Zawahiri, publicly affirming the group’s ties to core al-Qa‘ida.
Al-Zawahiri named the group al-Qaida’s recognized affiliate in the region later in 2013, ordering
ISIL to return to Iraq. Following airstrikes in late-September, al-Jawlani also publicly called for
retaliatory measures against those responsible.
Khorasan Group. The Khorasan Group refers to a network of al-Nusrah Front and alQa‘ida core extremists who share a history of training operatives, facilitating fighters and money,
and planning attacks against U.S. and Western targets. The group—composed of fighters with
experience in conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and North
Africa—is taking advantage of the Syrian conflict to advance attacks against Western interests.
The group is actively recruiting Westerners to serve as external operatives to blend into their
home countries.
As of September, intelligence indicated that operatives from the group were nearing the
execution phase for an attack in Europe or the Homeland, which prompted U.S. military
airstrikes to protect our interests. The IC is continuing to monitor the group for reactions to these
strikes to inform our assessments of their effectiveness.
Al-Qa‘ida in the Indian Subcontinent. In September, al-Qa‘ida announced the
establishment of its newest affiliate, al-Qa‘ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). We assess the
creation of AQIS is not a reaction to al-Qa‘ida’s split with ISIL, though the timing of the
announcement may be used to bolster al-Qa‘ida’s standing in the global terrorist
movement. AQIS, which is led by Sheikh Asim Umer, has stated objectives that include
violence against the U.S., establishing Islamic law in South Asia, ending occupation of Muslim
lands, and defending Afghanistan under Mullah Omar’s leadership. AQIS claimed responsibility
for the thwarted hijacking in Karachi of a Pakistani Navy ship in September, asserting that the
plot’s objective was to hijack two Pakistani ships to attack U.S. and Indian naval vessels and
reiterated that the U.S. was its primary target.
Boko Haram. Boko Haram waged unprecedented violence in northeast Nigeria last year
and is expanding its reach into other parts of Nigeria and neighboring states to implement its
violent interpretation of sharia law and suppress the Nigerian Government and regional CT
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pressure. Since late 2012, Boko Haram and its splinter faction Ansaru have claimed
responsibility for five kidnappings of Westerners, raising their international profile and
highlighting the threat they pose to Western and regional interests. Boko Haram has kidnapped
scores of additional Nigerians in northeast Nigeria since the kidnapping of 276 school girls from
Chibok, Nigeria in April 2014. The group this year has captured all of the Nigerian military
outposts in northeast Borno State, giving it control of a 380 mile continuous stretch of
international borders, which Chad is currently trying to retake from it, and for the past two weeks
has conducted multiple attacks on the Borno State Capital of Maiduguri, the group’s birthplace
which it intends to make the capital of its Islamic state. The group’s violent attacks have led to
over one million internally displaced persons and hundreds of thousands of refugees in
neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
Threat from Iran and Shia Groups
In 2014, Iran, largely through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGCQF) Commander Qassem Soleimani, and Hizballah managed an increasingly expansive and effective
military campaign against ISIL in Iraq, primarily through its support and use of sectarian political
and military proxies to support the Iran-aligned, Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. At the
same time, Iran and Hizballah remain committed to defending the Assad regime, including sending
billions of dollars in military and economic aid, training pro-regime and Shia militants, and
deploying their own personnel into the country. Iran and Hizballah view the Assad regime as a key
partner in an “axis of resistance” against Israel and the West and are prepared to take major risks to
preserve the regime as well as their critical transshipment routes.

Beyond their role in Syria and Iraq, Iran and Lebanese Hizballah remain committed to
conducting terrorist activities worldwide and we are concerned their activities could either
endanger or target U.S. and other Western interests. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of
terrorism, and works through the IRGC-QF and Ministry of Intelligence and Security to support
groups that target U.S. and Israeli interests globally. Hizballah has engaged in an aggressive
terrorist campaign in recent years and continues attack planning abroad. In April 2014, two
Hizballah operatives were arrested in Thailand and one admitted that they were there to carry out
a bomb attack against Israeli tourists, underscoring the threat to civilian centers.
NCTC’s Counterterrorism Efforts
As I discussed earlier, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the broader
international community have increasingly expressed concerns about the greater than 20,000
foreign fighters who could potentially return to their home countries to participate in or support
terrorist attacks.
NCTC is undertaking a broad Center-wide effort to track foreign fighters traveling to
Syria, working closely with our Intelligence Community partners. We work to resolve the
identities of potential fighters to uncover possible derogatory information in NCTC holdings.
Additionally, the U.S. Government continues to work closely with foreign partners to combat
threats emanating from Syria.

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As part of this effort, NCTC aggregates information on known or suspected terrorists
traveling to Syria in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). This effort has
created a valuable forum for identifying, tracking, and sharing information with law
enforcement, counterterrorism, screening, and watchlisting communities on known or suspected
terrorists.
Our metrics-based tracking and assessment of these terrorist identities has directly helped
to resolve inconclusive identities, enhance TIDE records, and upgrade watchlist statuses on
several hundred known or suspected terrorists.
TIDE is much more than a screening database – it is an analytic database. It feeds the
unclassified screening database so that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of State and other agencies have timely and accurate information about known and
suspected terrorists. As disparate pieces of information about known or suspected terrorists
(KSTs) are received, trained analysts create new records, most often as the result of a nomination
by a partner agency. The records are updated—or “enhanced”—regularly as new, related
information is included and dated or as unnecessary information is removed. In all cases, there
are several layers of review before a nomination is accepted into the system. In the case of U.S.
persons, there are at least four layers of review, including a legal review, to ensure the
derogatory information is sufficient and meets appropriate standards.
To better manage and update the identities of individuals who have travelled overseas to
engage in violence in Syria and Iraq, we have created a special threat case in TIDE. This is a
special feature in the TIDE system which allows us to focus efforts on smaller groups of
individuals. A threat case links all known actors, and their personal information, involved in a
particular threat stream or case and makes that information available to the intelligence,
screening, and law enforcement communities.
NCTC’s management of this unique consolidation of terrorist identities has created a
valuable forum for identifying and sharing information about Syrian foreign fighters—including
ISIL—with community partners. It has better integrated the community’s efforts to identify,
enhance, and expedite the nomination of Syrian foreign fighter records to the Terrorist Screening
Database for placement in U.S. Government screening systems.
NCTC’s Pursuit Group, whose mission is to identify non-obvious terrorism connections
and develop leads for other agencies to investigate, is working to fully identify foreign fighters
entering Syria who have potential access or connections to the Homeland, so they can be
watchlisted. This analysis leverages NCTC’s unique access to a wider range of IC and law
enforcement information than any other agency, both within NCTC's counterterrorism data
holdings as well as natively through embedded officers from ten other agencies.
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
The growing number of individuals going abroad as foreign terrorist fighters to Iraq and
Syria only emphasizes the importance of prevention. Any hope of enduring security against

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terrorism or defeating organizations like ISIL rests in our ability to diminish the appeal of
terrorism and dissuade individuals from joining them in the first place.
To this end, we continue to refine and expand the preventive side of counterterrorism.
We have seen a steady proliferation of more proactive and engaged community awareness efforts
across the United States, with the goal of giving communities the information and the tools they
need to see radicalization in their midst and do something about it before it manifests itself in
violence. NCTC, in direct collaboration with DHS, has led the creation of CVE tools to build
community resilience across the country.
Working and closely coordinating with the Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, and with
the FBI, NCTC is engaged in this work all across the country, and I will point to just one
example.
You will recall the case last year in which three teenage girls allegedly attempted to
travel from Denver to Syria by way of Frankfurt, Germany, where their travel was disrupted. In
the aftermath of that incident, we, in concert with DOJ, DHS, and FBI, sent our officers on
multiple occasions to meet with the greater Denver community and to raise awareness among
community and law enforcement audiences about the terrorist recruitment threat. The briefing,
developed in partnership with DHS, is now tailored to address the specific issue of foreign
fighter recruitment in Syria and Iraq; and we have received a strong demand signal for more such
outreach.
This is not a law enforcement-oriented effort that might be perceived as intimidating.
Rather, it is an effort to share information about how members of our communities are being
targeted and recruited to join terrorists overseas. Seen in that light, we have had a remarkably
positive reaction from the communities with whom we have engaged.
We continue to expand our CVE tools. With our DHS colleagues, we have created and
regularly deliver the Community Resilience Exercise, a table top exercise that brings together
local law enforcement with community leadership to run through a hypothetical case study based
scenario featuring a possible violent extremist or foreign fighter.
Conclusion
Confronting these threats and working with resolve to prevent another terrorist attack
remains counterterrorism community’s overriding mission. This year NCTC enters its second
decade in service to the nation, and while the Center has matured tremendously over that period,
we are focused on positioning ourselves to be better prepared to address the terrorist threat in
decade to come.
Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Feinstein, and members of the Committee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you this morning. I want to assure you that our attention is
concentrated on the security crises in Iraq and Syria—and rightly so. But we continue to detect,
disrupt, and defeat threats from across the threat spectrum.

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Thank you all very much, and I look forward to answering your questions.

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