Questions for the Record for
David C. Gomm
Nominee to be Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI)
QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN FEINSTEIN AND VICE-CHAIRMAN
BOND:

Since August of this year you have been working on a short-term assignment at the
ODNI to evaluate how the "mission manager" concept is working in practice.

ANSWER: I did not expect to find as much cross-agency teaming other
than formal mission management as I found. Increasingly, Office of
Director National Intelligence (ODNI)-led integrated collection strategies
are being targeted on important and difficult subjects. Likewise, for certain
countries, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has organized more
robust cross-agency analytic collaboration than the norm for National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs). In the course of my short-term assignment, I
have identified opportunities to combine integrated collection efforts with
integrated analytic efforts and have discovered considerable receptivity to
this within ODNI and the Intelligence Community (IC).
This informal cross-agency teaming is not altogether surprising. In my
experience in both public and private sectors, professionals working in
separate structures can be highly motivated to collaborate across the
boundaries of those structures in the interest of tackling important problems.
In the case of the IC, the DNI has made clear in the latest National
Intelligence Strategy (NIS) and in recent public remarks that mission
management and other forms of cross-agency collaboration are keys to
integrating U.S. intelligence and to being more responsive and agile. Such
encouragement, coupled with practical ODNI efforts to clear away obstacles
to teaming, is resonating well with our intelligence professionals.

I have also learned that practices and procedures vary from one mission
manager to the next, e.g., the relationship to the relevant NIO, the skill-set of
the mission manager, and criteria for measuring effectiveness. This is not
necessarily a problem; indeed, I have concluded that some flexibility is
important.
•

Have you identified any improvements

that might be made?

ANSWER: I have identified a number of practical measures that could be
taken to facilitate mission management and other forms of horizontal
teaming. These include the removal of obstacles to collaboration that are
characteristic of vertical structures, e.g., differences in work routines,
intelligence accesses, and work location. (Removing such barriers in
connection with cross-agency teaming would have the added benefit of
fostering collaboration and integration generally.) In addition, I have
identified means of providing more consistent yet flexible oversight to
provide general guidance, assistance, and quality assurance without
imposing excessive control, which can inhibit performance and innovation.
Such governance would be linked to existing IC management mechanisms,
in particular the Executive Committees and the Deputy Executive
Committee, as well as to the NIC.
Given that this assignment was done while awaiting my confirmation
hearing as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI), I
have not proposed any such improvements to IC agency leaders, whose
support and involvement will be important. Therefore, I ask that the
Committee regard these only as my ideas, which I would pursue if I am
confirmed.
•

Under what circumstances
managers?

might you recommend creating new mission

ANSWER: As part of my short-term study, I have identified four basic
criteria that should be considered when determining whether and when
mission management should be established:
a. Importance to national security, near- and long-term
b. Difficulty of performing satisfactory intelligence collection and
analysis in the absence of formal cross-agency collaboration

c. Requirement to mobilize human and technical resources of multiple
agencIes
d. Demands of intelligence consumers, e.g., policymakers and military
commanders.
These same criteria could be used to determine whether and how long any
mission manager position should remain. Among my conclusions is that
mission management organized to deal with temporary problems should not
become permanent, and that ODNI and IC leadership must be sure that the
application of the mission management concept is adapted in response to
shifting security conditions and intelligence needs.
•

When you have finished your review of the Mission Management
function, will you provide your findings to the Committee?
ANSWER: Iwould be glad to do so. If confirmed, I will seek an early
opportunity to provide my thoughts to the Committee.

Since the National Intelligence Estimate of 2002 overstated Iraq's WMD
capabilities, the Intelligence Community, with the support of this committee, has
worked to reform the process of writing these NIEs. The Committee is currently
evaluating the outcomes of these reforms, including the new focus in the drafting
process on sourcing, dissent, confidence levels and assumptions. We also want to
make sure NIEs are timely in terms of relevance and that they are completed in a
timely fashion once they are in the pipeline.
•

What do you believe is the purpose of the National Intelligence
Estimates?
ANSWER: National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the most
authoritative written means by which the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) conveys to the President and other leaders the judgments of the entire
IC regarding national security issues. NIEs make assessments about the
future, well beyond interpretation of current developments and often about
trends that are not yet at the top of policy makers ' agendas. They explain
and, if appropriate, sharpen conflicting views within the Community on
critical issues and layout the reasons for the differences. The Chairman of
the NIC, who is responsible for production of the NIE's ensures that rigor in
3

vetting sources, attention to changes in key analytic and estimative
judgments, and encouragement of alternative and contrarian views are built
into the NIE process.

• How do they differ from other NIC and Intelligence Community
products?
ANSWER: They differ from other products in the degree of attention
formally given by the entire IC leadership. All NIEs are reviewed and
approved by the DNI-chaired National Intelligence Board. In addition to the
DNI and PDDNI, the board is composed of the principals of the 16
intelligence elements. Besides reviewing NIE findings, this body discusses
the strengths, weaknesses, and credibility of the sources used in developing
critical judgments. NIEs are also measured against the new IC analytic
quality standards promulgated by the DNI.

• If confirmed, how will you work with the NIC to ensure that NIEs are
written in a timely manner?
ANSWER: In preparation for my confirmation hearing, I have had
substantial discussions with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the NIC
regarding our respective expectations about the relationship of the PDDNI
and the work of the NIC. As background, I have worked with the NIC and
many NIOs over the years while at the NSC and the State Department, have
had close ties with numerous NIC leaders, have acquired a high regard for
this institution, and had a hand in commissioning NIEs. Current NIC leaders
and I agree that I should, if confrrmed, support the preparation of NIEs in
several ways, e.g., in lining up agency support when needed, in shaping
questions to be answered, in addressing critical analytic issues (where I have
the knowledge to do so), in assuring quality, in meeting schedules, and in
disseminating results. This does not mean that I would routinely involve
myself in coordinating and producing NIEs, which are the responsibility of
the NIC leadership and the NIOs. I will work to strengthen the NIC
products, not micro-manage the NIC. I should also stress that Director Blair
is also active in the NIE process. The DNI and PDDNI are ultimately
responsible for the timeliness, quality and integrity of NIEs.

• How can the DNI leadership ensure that the NIE judgments reflect good
analytic tradecraft, particularly the range of view-points within the
Intelligence Community and current discussions analysts are having
about a given topic?
ANSWER: As I indicated in response to the pre-hearing questionnaire, I
have been impressed by the analytic quality standards and tradecraft best
practices recently developed and issued by the ODNI. Based on my
experience in quality assurance of research and analysis, I know that such
standards result in high quality only if they are widely understood and
embraced by the analytic community and accompanied by processes to
assure independent critical review. It will take actual experience, if I am
confirmed as PDDNI, before I can assess how well the new standards are
applied in practice.
The use of sound analytic tradecraft in NIEs, including the incorporation of a
range of views, should be based on this general quality assurance system.
Indeed, NIEs should set the "gold standard" of quality assurance, given their
usual importance and impact. Having read scores of NIEs over the years,
and in preparation for my confirmation hearing, my impression is that
alternative points of view are commonly but not always given adequate
attention. It is crucial that they figure importantly in every NIE. Even if the
consensus judgment in the IC supports certain conclusions, policy makers,
intelligence executives, and other readers need to know that matters
addressed by NIEs are normally complex and surrounded by uncertainty. I
have found that this is better understood in the NIC and elsewhere in the IC
than it once was, but I am prepared to encourage and if necessary insist on
inclusion of improbable, dissenting, or other "outlying" analyses. In keeping
with formal DNI quality assurance standards, an NIE must give due
attention to ranges of uncertainty and to alternative views.

• Do you believe that National Intelligence Estimates should be
declassified?
ANSWER: The policy of the DNI is that NIEs should not, as a rule, be
declassified and should not be prepared in the expectation that they will be.
The basic reason for this policy is that the intent to declassify could affect
the wayan NIE is written, which could reduce its value to national decision
makers. I have not studied the question of when exceptions to this policy
5

might be made. But I will do so if confirmed and would be glad to discuss
this matter with the Committee. In any case, any declassification must
protect sources and methods and must not jeopardize U.S. diplomatic
activities or military operations.

Any troop increase in Afghanistan will necessarily require additional intelligence
support. Since 9111, we have seen DoD requests for forces pull traditionally
strategic assets - such as those of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) - from
foreign intelligence programs to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While
no one argues the necessity to provide our soldiers with the best possible
intelligence support, it comes at a cost - opportunity cost as well as real manpower
and funding costs that impact other efforts.

• What is the DNI's role in these resource decisions for Afghanistan and
Iraq?
ANSWER: The DNI has a central role in finding the right balance between
meeting the needs of forces and of policymakers. The National Intelligence
Priorities Framework distinguishes between these priorities and is informed
by input from both policymakers and combatant commanders. This provides
a discipline, a tool, and a venue for assessing trade-offs and deciding how
best to meet competing priorities. The framework is managed by the ODNI.
In my view, the integration of the IC, in such forms as information sharing,
cross-agency analytic collaboration, and integrated collection strategies, is
crucial to meeting competing demands, including those that the question
highlights. With integration, collection assets are more optimally used,
results are not compartmented but shared, human and technical resources
can be shifted flexibly and strategically, and opportunity costs can be
reduced. The more progress the DNI makes in integrating the IC, the better
U.S. intelligence will be at balancing and meeting the needs of military
commanders and policy makers. I have not been party to the specific
resource decisions mentioned in the question, but my general impression is
that the IC and its clients are already seeing the benefits of this, though
considerable upside potential remains. If confirmed, I will work with the
Director, DoD leaders, and other IC elements to realize the benefits of
integration in meeting competing demands. I will also assist the Director in

organizing and making required trade offs in ways that consider all the needs
and costs at stake.

• What can be done to ensure that broader strategic collection is not
sacrificed to support tactical collection in Afghanistan and Iraq?
ANSWER: Again, I am not under the impression that strategic collection is
being seriously sacrificed to support tactical collection in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Nevertheless, in light of significant current needs for the strategic
intelligence, it is crucial to ensure that these are not neglected, as this
question suggests.
In regard to collection in particular, a definitive answer to the question
would require more details about assets and methods that cannot be
discussed in an unclassified document. Broadly stated, some means are
primarily of tactical value, some are primarily of strategic value, and some
are of dual value. Moreover, opportunities may exist to adjust priorities
among strategic needs, some of which might be of lower priority than
tactical requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. This means that the most
important tactical needs (e.g., those where U.S. forces are operating) can be
met without sacrificing the most important strategic needs. Finally, a share
of collection for Afghanistan and Iraq has strategic as well as tactical
benefit.
While these factors do not mean that there is no need to make tradeoffs, they
limit to some extent that field in which tactical and strategic requirements
compete. In the final analysis, there is no substitute for disciplined and frank
interagency discussion among intelligence and policy officials, supported by
the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, to resolve such competition
in a way that ensures that the most important strategic needs are met
regardless of tactical needs.

The Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 required all IC elements to
receive an audit of their financial statements by March 1, 2005. This deadline was
extended several times, but today the IC remains unable to acquire the software
systems or perfect the processes needed to produce auditable financial statements.
The Committee remains concerned that the intelligence agencies continue to
7

operate without the internal controls necessary to ensure the effective use of their
resources.
I was heartened by the emphasis you placed on both the need for auditable
financial statements and personal accountability. The previous ONI pledged to
make senior managers accountable for achieving real progress in achieving "clean
opinions" on the IC's financial statements. But to date, the Committee has seen no
evidence of such accountability.

• What value do you see in the ability of the intelligence agencies to
produce auditable financial statements?
ANSWER: Broadly stated, the value of auditable financial statements
lies in the independent scrutiny they permit of those entrusted to manage
public resources. For the IC, financial statements are tangible indicators
of whether every agency's finances are ably managed, its use of
resources economical, and its operations efficient. Auditable financial
statements, based on accepted and objective standards, permit
disinterested review and evaluation of these indicators. Thus, such
statements are among the most important instruments to ensure and
verify that taxpayer dollars are being spent purposefully, effectively, and
accountably.
The ON!, supported by the rest of the IC leadership team, has set as a
strategic goal the achievement of "financial management transparency,
accountability, and auditability, compliant with applicable laws and
OMB guidelines." This reflects both an appreciation of its importance
and recognition that the IC has a considerable distance to go. When
intelligence agencies have the ability to produce auditable financial
statements, the ONI, the Executive Branch as a whole, Congress, and the
American people should be able to have a clear view of how all the
resources provided the IC are managed.

• If you agree it is a worthy goal to produce auditable financial
statements, what steps will you take to ensure each agency takes the
actions necessary to become auditable as soon as practicable?
ANSWER: If confirmed, I will assist the ONI and support the CFO in
several ways. I would, if confirmed, ensure that every agency does what
8

is necessary to achieve the goal, for example, by maintaining focus on
financial management as a priority for the IC leadership team (e.g., in the
Deputies Executive Committee); by insisting on regular progress reports;
by advocating financial management and controls that leverage public
and private sector best practices; by expecting the CIO to assist the CFO
by streamlining information systems to deliver timely, detailed and
reliable financial results; and by including progress in achieving the goal
in our assessment of leadership performance.

•

Are you personally willing to make good on past promises in this
area?
ANSWER: I am willing to commit to do whatever I can to achieve this
strategic objective and to keep the Committee informed of progress.

• And if so, what approach would you take in incentivizing senior
managers for financial results?
ANSWER: If confirmed, I will expect that programs, budgets and other
financial targets are formal commitments, just as they are in any strong
enterprise. I will work with the DNI, the CFO, and the program
managers to make the fulfillment of these commitments an explicit and
significant aspect of performance review, including for the leaders of IC
elements. Meeting these financial commitments requires making
adequate resources available and I will do my part to live up to this side
of the compact.

The Committee has been concerned about the IC's acquisition management
practices for some time. Several recent acquisition failures have involved massive
cost and schedule overruns. The ODNI recently estimates that for Fiscal Year
2009 over 72 percent of the NIP was executed through the contracting workforce,
indicating the acquisition function is critical to successful missions and operations.
Despite this importance, the primary finding of a recent Committee staff review of

the Community's acquisition capability found that agency senior managers
continually failed to dedicate adequate attention and resources to the function.
In your written responses you described a budget as a contract by which a unit can
count on an agreed amount of resources and the corporation can count on agreed
results. That is the way the IC should be run, too, but it has been largely lacking.

• What concrete management and accountability practices are you
prepared to take to end the Ie's chronic overruns on big, expensive
programs?
ANSWER: Without detailed knowledge of specific programs, my
starting point if confirmed would be the IC acquisition policy
promulgated by the DNI, which is specifically aimed at controlling and
eliminating over-runs. In particular, I would reinforce the following
tenets of that policy: do not start acquisitions you cannot afford; fully
fund what you expect to acquire; use proven technology or else fully
fund efforts to prove new technology; provide transparent execution; and
rely on tough, independent reviews and oversight. I would also ensure
that acquisition program managers and their senior management
understand that they will be measured against their cost, schedule and
performance commitments. While I do not believe that centralized topdown management of acquisition is necessary or desirable, I would be
prepared to advise the DNI to withdraw delegation of decision authority
from IC element heads if necessary to achieve better performance.
Taken together, and applied vigorously and consistently, these practices
should address the issues that have beset large IC acquisition efforts. I
am satisfied that the new Deputy DNI for Acquisition and Technology is
seized with this challenge and capable of orchestrating the effort to meet
it. As a result, I expect a significant and sustainable improvement in the
IC's ability to deliver major acquisitions on schedule, for the identified
cost, and with the expected performance.

• Please provide your thoughts on the use of tenure agreements and
succession planning to ensure program managers of major programs
develop a sense of ownership and accountability.
ANSWER: I am impressed by what I have learned about the direction
of IC acquisition policy in this regard. To improve continuity, personal
10

commitment, and accountability, the DNI has taken an initiative that
supports appropriate personnel tenure and active work force
management for major IC acquisitions. The DNI is considering policy
guidance requiring signed tenure agreements between program
managers and their respective decision authorities, which would set
forth the expectations and commitments of both parties in respect to
funding, schedule, and requirements.
In addition, the ODNI is monitoring the tenure of program managers
for major systems and adding this information to the next Annual
Report to Congress on Major Acquisitions. Also, for major programs
in DoD's IC elements, the USD(I) is currently reviewing a proposed
statement to ensure compliance with policy requiring tenure
agreements.
These measures point in the right direction, which is to base acquisition
performance on clear and reciprocal commitments, on accountability of
key managers and their leaders, and on revising personnel and
performance policies to promote better management and results. If I
find that there are other steps that could reinforce these, I would be
glad to discuss them with the Committee, if I am confirmed.

QUESTION FROM VICE-CHAIRMAN BOND:

Your written answers were candid about the huge geopolitical events that U.S.
intelligence has failed to predict - e.g., "the fall of the Shah, the collapse of
Communism, the rise of jihad ism, the rapid global spread of the Internet, and the
relentless economic growth of China. " More recently you note that the IC's recent
"Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World", "considered neither the possibility
nor the effects of a global financial crisis and sharp economic contraction, which
in fact occurred as the report was being issued. "

• In light of these low probability, but extremely high impact events
that U.S. intelligence consistently fails to project, do you believe that
policy-makers should ever expect the IC to anticipate transformative
events?

ANSWER: The problem as I see it is that the needs of policymakers
can, understandably, skew intelligence efforts to focus on informing
immediate national security matters. From my own experience (e.g., at
the end of the Cold War), I know that transformative developments often
begin precisely when, or because, current conditions are in turmoil, when
policymakers can be preoccupied. Thus, the risk is not so much that
policymakers cannot count on the IC to anticipate major change but that
the demands of policymakers will tend to pull the IC in the opposite
direction. It follows that IC leaders have to take responsibility and
initiative to anticipate major discontinuities even in the absence of strong
current demands to do so. This may include investigating lowprobability but high-consequence developments that are neither part of
the "assumption set" of current policy nor obvious from current
conditions.
The exchange I have had with the Committee on this problem prompts
me to think that it will be important, if confirmed, to explore explicitly
with colleagues on the policy side the need for analysis of seemingly
unlikely but high-impact developments. The existing National
Intelligence Priorities Framework, which is based on policy-intelligence
dialogue, would lend itself to establishing priorities for such analysis.
In sum, policymakers should expect the IC to anticipate transformative
events; IC leaders must be ready to take the initiative; and improving
U.S. intelligence in this regard may require more explicit discussions
between the intelligence and policy communities, which would of course
include this Committee.
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MIKULSKI:
Mr. Gompert, it is absolutely critical to have a Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence (PIDDNI) who is honest, candid, and objective. As you
stated in your confirmation hearing, when the Director of National Intelligence is
absent or unavailable, you will be the principal intelligence advisor to the

President. This may require you to tell the President something he doesn't want to
hear.
We can't have a person in your position who only says ''yes'' to the President. The
DNI and PDDNI must speak with truth and candor to the President because this
will help create more informed policies and will help prevent our government from
making reckless mistakes. I, like many other Americans, have great respect for
your lengthy national security experience - and it is admirable that you are willing
to return to government service.
• Given your lengthy intelligence and national security career, how can
we count on you to speak truth to power?
ANSWER: The ability and determination to speak truth to power is
fundamental to the responsibilities I will shoulder if confirmed. Failure
to do so would be a disservice to the American people, to the President
himself, and to my own duty and values. Having never hesitated to be
"honest, candid, and objective," I made a point in my first conversation
with Director Blair that I could only accept the nomination to be PDDNI
if this is what was expected of me. He said that these values were among
the reasons he wanted to recommend me, and that the President expected
no less.
In both government and the private sector, I have observed how the
reluctance of advisors and analysts to bear bad news can result in bad
decisions with bad results. In intelligence, this is intolerable. The key to
the discipline your question suggests, in my experience, is to make up
one's mind in advance that such considerations as job security, career
prospects, and the desire to please superiors must and will have no
bearing on one's objectivity. If I am confirmed, I have every expectation
that those who look to me for intelligence information and judgment will
count on strict objectivity, which is what they will receive.
•

What specific examples can you point to where you told a leader
something that he or she didn't want to hear?
ANSWER: While I do not want to imply that any leader would have
preferred me to be other than objective, I can give examples of delivering
information or advice that challenged established assumptions and
preferences.

In the early 1980s, I warned that U.S. NA TO allies would be unable to
support the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe without an earnest
parallel arms control effort. This was not received well in all quarters
(until huge demonstrations in Europe validated my views). As a result of
speaking truth to power in this case, I found it necessary to interrupt my
government career.
Prior to and during the violent break up of Yugoslavia, I warned that
there could be large-scale human suffering - what turned out to be
"ethnic cleansing" and mass killing - unless the U.S. organized a NATO
initiative. I did not hesitate to apprise others in government that
atrocities in Bosnia were likely to become so severe that our reputation
and leadership would suffer.
As Senior Advisor for National Security and Defense in the Iraq
Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003-04, I advised more than one
senior visitor from Washington that a full-blown Sunni insurgency was in
the making, fueled by jihadist messages and support. The accepted
wisdom at the time was that Sunni resistance came primarily from former
elements of Saddam Hussein's security apparatus and therefore would
die out. I also made clear that the insurgency was growing in size and
sophistication faster than Iraqi security forces were, which would lead
either to defeat or to a need to increase U.S. forces. These assessments
varied sharply with the more upbeat view at that juncture and called into
question the continuation of policies based on that view.
In business, on many occasions I insisted on making - or demanding realistic assessments that implied financial targets would be missed. The
sooner decision makers hear what they need to hear, rather than what
they would like to hear, the more likely it is that they will be able to
adjust and avert or mitigate damage.

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR HATeH:

In your prepared responses to the Committee questionnaire, you say that one of our
most critical national security priorities should be to "find and cripple" AI-Qa'ida.

• What do you mean by "cripple"? "Crippling" does not necessarily
equal eliminating their lethal intent.
ANSWER: The leaders and loyal followers of AI-Qa'ida and other
jihadist groups embrace distortions of history, religion, and international
politics that stoke strong hatred of the West, of regimes throughout the
Arab and Muslim worlds, and especially of the United States. While it is
important to pursue policies that encourage popular antipathy toward and
thus isolate the likes of AI-Qa'ida, hardened terrorists and eager recruits
are essentially immune to such efforts. Consequently, we cannot count on
affecting the intent of hard-core jihadists and instead must eliminate the
threat they pose to the U.S. and its interests and friends, whether by
preventive action or defense.
My use of the term "cripple" in responding to the Committee's
questionnaire was short-hand for disrupting, hampering, degrading the
material condition, damaging the organization, discrediting, and capturing
or killing those who lead or kill on behalf of AI-Qa'ida - measures that are
required against those whose intent we cannot expect to influence.
While it is not my place as a nominee for a leadership position in the IC to
prescribe counterterrorist strategy, this is my analysis of what it takes to
counter Al-Qa'ida .

• And why do you focus only on AI-Qa'ida? Do you not believe that
the global violent takfiri movement could create other AI-Qa'ida
imitators, what terrorist expert Marc Sageman calls "Leaderless
Jihad"?
ANSWER: We cannot exclude that violent salafist extremists, including
takfiri, will organize and conduct terrorism with global ambitions and
reach. Still, the principal danger to the U.S. and its interests remains AIQa'ida, even as its form changes. There have been splinter groups and
spontaneous cells with jihadist agendas, though these have so far been
limited in scale, structure, and means, and sometimes appear more
concerned with local issues than global ones. Often such groups are
inspired by, reach out to, or otherwise are touched by AI-Qa'ida's
tentacles. Even as AI-Qa'ida elements in Pakistan's frontier regions have
been damaged by U.S. and allied action, regional affiliates - AI-Qa'ida in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AI-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), Al-Qa'ida in the
15

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and AI-Qa'ida East Africa- have
demonstrated an ability and will to attack U.S. interests and friends, if not
necessarily the U.S. homeland. While Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other
top AI-Qa'ida leaders may not be directing or enabling operations among
these far-flung groups, they still appear to provide at least some
inspiration. In any case, the strength of AI-Qa'ida's extended network
does not depend on a strong AI-Qa'ida center. In sum, while we should
remain vigilant for salafist or takfiri movements and threats independent
of AI-Qa'ida, we are finding that AI-Qa'ida is showing an ability to
survive, adapt, mutate, and motivate.
Having said this, I agree that our intelligence collection and analysis, as
well as counterterrorism operations and defense, should not be so
preoccupied with AI-Qa'ida's network to the exclusion of other potent
transnational movements with extremist agendas and strategic reach.
While not jihadist as such, Hezbollah operates in several countries and
regions and is virulently anti-U.S. We should certainly not assume that
only AI-Qa'ida would be a threat to the U.S.

I believe that, for the foreseeable future, our nation will be facing the threat of
armed groups, which is how I refer to violent sub-state actors that include terrorist
organizations, insurgencies and criminal organizations. Many of these groups have
much in common with the others, and to approach the phenomenon as armed
groups should allow us to begin to adapt lessons we are learning in countering
some in order to apply against the others. The southern perimeter of the United
States will be subject to all kinds of pressure from armed groups operating against
us and the governments of Mexico, Central and South America.

• Where, in your priority of threats, do you place the threat of armed
groups?
ANSWER: Classifying terrorist organizations, insurgencies, criminal
organizations, and other violent actors as "armed groups" is useful for
conceptualizing a general, growing pattern of non-state dangers, as well
as for fashioning effective ways to counter them. This is not inconsistent
with maintaining important distinctions, e.g., between terrorists with
global ambitions, insurgents with local grievances, and criminal
organizations with economic motivations.
16

Armed groups south of the U.S., highlighted in the question, appear to be
driven by economic and local political considerations than by religious or
ideological extremism, though there is no guarantee against the latter
(and some signs of potential). Nevertheless, these armed groups are not
only non-state but transnational and even multinational. Some gangs that
specialize in drugs, extortion, and other crimes extend from Central or
even South America through Mexico to the U.S. - some with ties to U.S.
gangs. At present, the Mexican government is taking strong action, with
U.S. support. Consequently, while violence is on the rise, the IC's
current assessment is not pessimistic. However, Mexico is a significantly
higher priority than it was a few years ago, and I would favor great
vigilance in case the armed-group threat worsens. If it does worsen, the
threat of armed groups to the south of the U.S. would assume very high
priority.
If confrrmed, I would assess how well the IC is performing and preparing
for the threat of armed groups, apart from Islamist terrorists, and I would
be glad to discuss with the Committee both current IC efforts and any
additional efforts that might be indicated.

• And how do you assess their real and potential threats to our
national security?
ANSWER: While I have answered this to some extent in the preceding
response, I would say there is a serious and potentially severe threat to
U.S. security in several forms:
a. Drug trafficking
b. Drug-related violence against Americans along the border, along
drug-trade routes, and visiting Latin America
c. Interference with economic commerce and U.S. investments
d. Cyber attacks.
In general, it is important to appreciate that such groups can be
sophisticated, complex, dynamic, elusive, distributed, resourceful, and
uninhibited when it comes to advancing and protecting their interests,
which are inimical to ours.

In your prepared responses to Committee questions, you state, "IC leaders must
lead the battle against accepted ways of thinking."

• Can you give me any examples of where and when this occurred?
ANSWER: My sense is that the IC is making real progress in
encouraging and presenting unconventional analyses, which I would
build upon if confmned. The CIA's "Red Cells" regularly publish papers
that question assumptions and highlight alternative outcomes on most
key national security issues, including the Middle East, terrorism,
proliferation, the recent economic downturn, and religious extremism.
Several recent NIC publications also have challenged accepted thinking.
The NIC's Long-Range Analysis Unit examined the implications of high
energy prices for U.S. interests a year before prices peaked, and its
Global Trends work identified shifts in power from developed to
developing states as well as possible resource scarcities that challenged
common assumptions. I have also found alternative views well presented
in many of the classified studies I read in preparation for confirmation.
In sum, the direction is right, and the next PDDNI should join the DNI
and other IC leaders in lending their hand and ideas to strengthening the
trend.

• Can you please indicate how you would routinize analytic procedures
to include, for example, Alternative Competitive Hypothesis Testing?
ANSWER: Alternative competitive hypothesis testing is one method of
satisfying the IRTP A requirement to conduct alternative analysis. Many
IC products already involve structured exercises that challenge
underlying assumptions and develop alternative interpretations of events,
trends, and underlying forces. Production of several NIC products on
Iran and Egypt included, for example, exercises with outside experts that
tested competing scenarios for those countries. The DNI-chaired
National Intelligence Board, on which the PDDNI sits along with the
heads of the 16 intelligence agencies, would seem to be the best vehicle
to promote and institutionalize further the practice of the questioning key
assumptions and examining alternative scenarios. Most NIEs already
feature alternative scenarios and critiques by outside experts and, as such,
can serve as models for the rest of the IC to follow.

I was also pleased to learn that the DNI's latest "Standards of Analytic
Tradecraft" calls for the incorPOration of "Alternative Analysis" where
appropriate. This is important because it helps assure that adequate
treatment of unconventional views will be part of the IC's new qualityassurance process.

• Have you read the 2004 Report this Committee published on the
intelligence failures related to the Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction? If you have read the report, what lessons do you draw
from its conclusions? H you have not read the report, would you
please do so before you next testify to this Committee?
ANSWER: I have read the report from cover to cover. The lessons I
draw are essentially those spotlighted by the report: poor HUMINT,
inadequate skepticism about questionable sources, "group-think,"
insufficient attention to alternative explanations and dissenting voices,
poor quality assurance, failure to piece together an integrated view, haste.
I was struck by the finding that IC performance concerning WMD was
broadly unsatisfactory whereas IC performance on the question of
alleged links between Saddam Hussein and AI-Qa'ida was generally
satisfactory. This contrast suggests that the inadequacies of the Iraq
WMD effort were not indicative of an IC incapable of correct judgments.
Among the measures taken to address the lessons captured in the
Committee's 2004 Report, based on the IRTPA and Executive Order
12333, I would note the sharpening of analytic quality standards, the
strengthening of quality assurance processes, the upgrading of the Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, the instituting of greater
sharing and collaboration for both collection and analysis, investment in
better HUMINT, and clear evaluation of the reliability of sources.

• Finally, the IC is engaged in this Nation's conDicts in essential ways,
and it is learning how to do business in the new 21st century threat
environment. But, unlike the military, which cultivates a ''lessons
learned" culture, the IC has done this in a very paltry way. How do
you intend to redress this, and what measurements of success are you
will to commit to?
ANSWER: From what I know, the IC's effort in learning lessons is
uneven. Among the mechanisms used by the IC are investigations by
19

inspectors general, oversight committees, quality assurance officers,
historians, and of course, management. The ODNl has created a lessonslearned program and is endeavoring to coordinate this function with the
agencies. I understand that some of the products have been recognized as
quite good and valuable. Examples of useful lessons-learned in parts of
the IC underscore the potential value of institutionalizing this IC-wide.
Based on limited exposure, my impression is that more could be done to
regularize and create throughout the IC a culture of lessons learned, of
the sort practiced so diligently by the U.S. military. I have seen
successful lessons-learned work done for the military by the Joint Forces
Command and by Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(e.g., RAND and IDA). I have observed that military organizations and
leaders are not merely willing to learn from experience - including
failure - but determined to so in order to improve plans, capabilities, and
doctrine. I would like to hold off identifying specific measures that I
might take, if confirmed. But I agree that the question is important and
would be glad to take up the question with the Committee when I have
formed a clearer idea of what should be done.

You wrote an interesting monograph for RAND entitled Heads We Win: The
Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency. It focused on the global jihadist threat, in
specific, and counterinsurgency, or COIN ("coin") theory in general.

• What are the major gaps in analysis that the Ie faces in trying to
support our military in Afghanistan?
ANSWER: As a nominee for confirmation, I have not been involved in
or privy to sensitive intelligence specific to Afghanistan. My general
observation is that our forces have substantially better, faster, and more
complete intelligence information and analysis available to them in a
more rapid manner than they did only a few years ago. I attribute this in
large part to a strengthening of IC-DaD cooperation, which has
intensified under Secretary Gates and Director Blair. Nonetheless, I have
the impression that our forces would benefit from having a more
sophisticated understanding of various tribes and tribal leaders, especially
in the "Pashtun belt." If confirmed, I would be glad to report back to the
Committee on any gaps and efforts to fill them.
20

In identifying the major national security threats, you have indicated that one of
them is "understanding the implications of change." You specifically identify
certain aspects of change, including "environmental security."
Some still believe that intelligence is essentially about stealing secrets - gaining
access to protected foreign information that has an impact on our security. And
intelligence analysis is largely about analyzing information our enemies and
competitors would deny us.
Regarding "environmental security," this very serious subject is in the purview of
scientists and policy makers, but some believe the IC, which appears not to have a
lot of excess capacity, should be focusing on its core missions, which, by
definition, it will always meet incompletely.

• Please explain as SPecifically as possible your understanding of the
Ie's unique contribution to understanding the issue of
"environmental security."
ANSWER: It is important, in my view, for the IC not to try to do too
much in regard to gathering intelligence regarding environmental
security, given the abundance of open source information and scientific
data. Rather, the IC's mission with respect to environmental security
should be to analyze this open environmental information vis-a-vis U.S.
national security and produce intelligence products that provide
policymakers and military commanders a clearer picture of
environmental security threats and their potential to impact on U.S.
persons and interests. IC analysis should concentrate on what the U.S.
Government can do to avoid, mitigate, or prepare for dangers to
environmental security. Examples of useful intelligence analysis which
otherwise might not be available include: economic, political,
humanitarian, security implications that affect U.S. interests and
responsibilities; consequential behavior of other governments; and useful
input to inform negotiations and diplomacy.